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ABSTRACT
The two tea countries: competition, labor, and economic thought 
in coastal China and eastern India, 1834-1942
Andrew B. Liu
This dissertation explores how the tea-growing districts of  China and colonial India were integrated 
into the global division of  labor over a formative century of  boom-bust expansion. I explore this 
history of  competition by highlighting two dimensions of  economic and intellectual change: the 
intensification of  agrarian labor and the synchronous emergence of  new paradigms of  economic 
thought. As tea exports from China and India soared and competition grew fiercer, planters, factory 
overseers, peasants, and government officials shifted their attention from the wealth-creating 
possibilities of  commerce to the value-creating potential of  labor and industrial production.
This study also historically situates two older, teleological assumptions in the field of  Asian 
economic history: the inevitability of  industrialization and of  proletarianization. Both assumptions 
emerged from social and economic transformations during the nineteenth century. In particular, 
periodic market crises compelled Chinese and colonial Indian officials to seriously question older 
“Smithian” theories premised upon the “sphere of  circulation.” Instead, both regional industries 
pursued interventionist measures focused on the “abode of  production.” In India, officials passed 
special laws for indentured labor recruitment. In China, reformers organized tea peasants and 
workers into agrarian cooperatives. Finally, colonial officials and Bengali reformers in India agreed 
that they needed to liberate the unfree “coolie” from the shackles of  unfree labor. And in China, 
reformers articulated a critique of  rentier “comprador” merchants and moneylenders who exploited 
peasant labor. Thus, although the “coolie” and “comprador” became twentieth-century symbols of  
Asian economic backwardness, they were each, as concepts, produced by profound social and 
economic changes that were dynamic, eventful, and global in nature.
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PART I. THEMES AND BACKGROUND
Chapter One
Introduction: Compradors and coolies
In the year 1834, tea was synonymous with China. Long before this moment, when the Government 
of  India formally announced experiments to cultivate their own tea in eastern India, the Qing 
empire (1644-1911) had already cemented its reputation as the sole supplier of  tea to the rest of  the 
globe. Only one century later, however, the world of  tea had been turned upside down. British 
planters in India had overpowered their Chinese rivals, and Indian tea was now considered the 
model industry all other countries sought to emulate (rivaled only, perhaps, by their colonial siblings 
in Ceylon). Meantime, the Chinese tea trade was in shambles. After narrowly losing their seat atop 
the world market during the last century, Chinese tea merchants spiraled into a crisis of  dwindling 
quality and shrinking production, problems exacerbated by political regime changes, economic 
depressions, and military aggression from Japan. As a final insult, British propagandists had also 
taken advantage of  a weakened China by successfully convincing consumers around the world that 
India, not China, was the true birthplace of  tea, by then the most commercially successful beverage 
in the world.1
This long and eventful century of  competition, one which frames the current dissertation, was 
accompanied by not only profound transformations of  social life in each region but also striking 
political reversals that are puzzling upon first glance. Consider the case of  late imperial China. 
1 Cf. Wu Juenong, “Cha shu yuanchandi kao” (1922), in Wu Juenong, Wu Juenong Xuanji [Selected 
Works of  Wu Juenong], ed. Zhongguo chaye xuehui (Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu chubanshe, 
1987)Wu Juenong Xuanji, 1-15.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
2
During the eighteenth and nineteenth-century heyday of  Chinese tea, the Qing empire 
enthusiastically threw its support behind the coastal merchants responsible for brokering deals 
between inland tea factories and Euro-American trading houses. Thus, when the tea trade began to 
falter in the 1890s, the Guangxu emperor (1875-1908) adhered to an established Qing principle by 
passing commercial-friendly policies and expressing his “sympathy for the merchants”(sushang, 
xushang).2 However, by the early decades of  the twentieth century, Chinese reformers now 
scapegoated commercial groups for the collapse of  the industry and the pauperization of  the 
masses, denouncing them as “compradors,” “devils” (mogui ǋƝ) and, in one vivid instance, “an 
ulcer that has hardened into an unnecessary appendage (juchengfugu ʓ3ǹƮ).”3 
By contrast, the Indian tea industry was less concerned with the activities of  merchants and 
financiers than with the problem of  “coolie labor.” In 1834, when the Government of  India first 
commissioned tea cultivation experiments, officials recognized that labor shortages threatened to 
hinder the industry’s growth. Cautious officials advised against deploying coercive recruitment 
tactics that could incite scrutiny from abolitionist movements. “The Government,” wrote one 
Parliamentary member in 1839, “should be careful of  establishing a precedent for the transfer of  
laborers for a consideration which eventually may assume a shape not easily distinguishable from the 
transaction so much cried out against in Mauritius and in the Slave Colonies.”4 By the end of  the 
century, however, the Indian industry had flourished precisely because the government had 
ultimately adopted policies of  labor indenture which bound workers to tea plantations with the 
threat of  incarceration or corporal punishment. Officials openly acknowledged that these laws were 
2 William T. Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-century China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 198. The actual quote regarding tea is in Chapter four.
3 Zhang Wei, “Guanyu Pingli Hezuoshe [On the Pingli cooperative],” in Pingli chaye yunxiao xinyong 
hezuo baogao, ed. Anhui shengli chaye gailiangchang (Qimen: Dawen Yinshuasuo, 1934), 23.
4 British Library, IOR/F/4/1882/79965, 293-295.
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consciously modeled on “the same organized system of  recruitment that was pursued by the 
planters of  Mauritius.”5 
Juxtaposed in this acute fashion, these two sets of  contradictory images raise obvious questions 
about the social and economic transformations impacting nineteenth-century Asia: why did political 
thinkers in China pivot from merchant sympathy to merchant demonization? and why did the 
colonial Indian government abandon principles of  free labor and instead adopt policies of  labor 
indenture? Such questions have not been directly addressed by the existing historiography of  the 
world tea trade. For instance, scholars of  Chinese tea have tended to fixate on the “golden age” of  
the trade, before its crash, emphasizing the excitement of  a flourishing commercial synergy between 
the Qing empire and early modern Europe. They have spent far less time studying the history of  tea 
at the turn of  the twentieth century, and when they do, they characterize the industry’s decline as a 
tragic but inevitable consequence of  unchanging traditional practices unprepared for a new world of  
industrialization. By contrast, studies of  Indian tea often begin after the decline of  the China trade, 
around the 1880s, and they take for granted the firm institutionalization of  the indentured labor 
system. They have focused far less on the rocky first decades of  the industry, characterizing those 
early years as mere “growing pains” and a prelude to the real history of  colonial rule and indenture. 
In both cases, the focus has remained one-sided, and attitudes towards merchants (China) and labor 
(India) have been characterized in undynamic terms.
Of  course, there are tools within existing national historiographies to explain these noteworthy 
changes. For instance, the conflicting attitudes towards the Chinese tea merchants clearly belong to a 
much longer trajectory of  ambivalent representations of  commerce within Chinese intellectual 
history.6 Similarly, the Government of  India’s volte-face from promoting principles of  free labor to 
5 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, Report of  the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906. (Calcutta: 
Office of  the Superintendent of  Government Printing, 1906), 135. Hereafter referred to as 1906 
Report.
6 Examples of  these studies include Richard Lufrano’s Honorable merchants : commerce and self-cultivation 
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adopting policies of  indenture could be greatly illuminated by recent studies of  how, in the late 
nineteenth century, the colonial administration emphasized the racial particularities and “customary” 
aspects of  Indian society, a shift which provided an alibi for the Government to abandon its liberal 
principles.7 But although such directions certainly have much to offer, any methodological decision 
to start from explanations grounded in national history would ignore the basic fact that the social 
and economic dynamics governing the global tea trade were not restricted to either region alone. 
Indeed, the forces that impacted patterns of  industry, labor, and commerce in both China and India 
stemmed as much from the mutually-constituting dynamics of  global competition as they did from 
particular regional habits. In fact, placing these two regional stories side-by-side can reveal new 
dimensions of  social change that have been previously obscured by the conventions of  national 
historiography. 
Thus, grounded in the conviction that the story of  Chinese and Indian tea must be studied in 
connection with one another, this dissertation shall argue that the puzzling changes surrounding the 
merchant in China and labor in India were actually two sides of  the same coin: the demotion of  
commerce and the promotion of  industrial labor within the global political economy of  tea. By this 
phrase, I mean that across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as tea exports from China 
and India soared and competition grew fiercer, planters, factory overseers, peasants, and government 
officials began to de-emphasize the wealth-creating possibilities of  commerce, narrowly defined as 
the exchange of  money and goods, and to instead prize the value-creating potential of  labor and 
production. This underlying social dynamic, best described as the dynamic of  “industrial capitalism,” 
in late imperial China (1997), Yen-P’ing Hao’s The comprador in nineteenth century China: bridge between East 
and West (1970), and Ping-Ti Ho’s “The Salt Merchants of  Yang-Chou: A Study of  Commercial 
Capitalism in Eighteenth-Century China” (1954) -- not to mention the plethora of  primary materials 
on the “comprador” (maiban) during the first decades of  the People’s Republic of  China (1949-).
7 Examples of  such studies include Nicholas Dirks’ Castes of  mind : colonialism and the making of  modern 
India (2001), Elizabeth Kolsky’s Colonial justice in British India (2010), Karuna Mantena’s Alibis of  
empire : Henry Maine and the ends of  liberal imperialism (2010), and Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and 
India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
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made its presence felt across the tea-growing districts of  China and India, even as it manifested 
itself  in different and regionally specific ways. 
In order to further clarify the contours of  this claim, I will first situate it in relation to extant 
approaches to studying economic history. If  this dissertation seeks to highlight the underlying social 
connections between these two regions, then we must also understand why past scholars have been 
so hesitant to identify commonalities between the histories of  Chinese and Indian tea. Such 
commonalities, I believe, have been overshadowed by a historiographical emphasis on 
modernization and development. Because of  the striking decline of  Chinese tea in the late 
nineteenth century and the attendant rise of  their Indian rivals, scholars have framed this period of  
history as one of  economic divergence: the rise of  Indian industry ushered in the fall of  the Chinese 
trade. This proposition was first advanced by British agencies at the time of  their ascendance, and it 
was also internalized by early twentieth-century Chinese reformers looking for answers. Indian tea, 
Qing observers wrote, represented the modern industrial methods of  machine-based production 
while Chinese tea remained stuck in the traditional, preindustrial age of  human-based production. 
Late Qing reformer Zhang Zhidong, for instance, claimed in 1900 that “because our labor processes 
are imperfect, they fall short of  the quality of  machine-made tea.”8 Another Qing writer wrote, 
“westerners work harder, they conduct research, and they use human ability to conquer nature.”9 
And in the 1920s, agricultural reformer Wu Juenong stated that Chinese tea peasants continued to 
use “the ancient practices of  thousands of  years before, they are so far away from modern scientific 
8 Zhang Zhidong, “zha Jiang-han guandao quanyu huashang gouji zhicha,” 1900, in Chen Binfan, 
Yu Yue, and Guan Bowen, eds., Zhongguo Cha Wenhua Jingdian [The Classic of  Chinese Tea Culture] 
(Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1999), 603.
9 “Cha shi” in Shao Zhitang, quoted in Chen Binfan, 621. It may seem confusing that this writer 
aligned the British-run plantations with “human ability” (renli), considering the ITA had placed itself  
on the side of  machinery, but the formal logic between the ITA message and the Qing officials was 
consistent: whereas Indian tea production had advanced beyond cultivation as mere nature, Chinese 
tea production remained tied to nature. Indian tea succeeded because it relied upon human-made 
machines, and Chinese tea failed because it relied upon human hands.
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methods that they do not overlap at all (yuan buhui jiechu).”10 It was these men’s observations which 
have provided the historical archive utilized by historians of  China. Both in Chinese and English-
language scholarship, researchers began from the premise that the decline of  Chinese tea was 
symptomatic of  the underdeveloped, precapitalist character of  indigenous Chinese agrarian society.11  
Concomitantly, historians of  Indian tea have also generally agreed with this characterization. 
Although these scholars were critical rather than celebratory of  colonial industrialization, they 
nonetheless emphasized the exceptionally modern features of  South Asian tea, which they attributed 
to the importation of  capital-intensive techniques from Europe.12
The claims of  this dissertation, however, will not rest upon an analysis of  technological or 
economic progress but rather a more basic question about the changing social structures and 
intellectual climate within which processes of  commercialization, competition, and industrialization 
took shape. When Wu Juenong asserted that Chinese and Indian tea production patterns did “not 
overlap at all,” he spoke mainly of  technological benchmarks: the invention of  devices for rolling, 
withering, sorting, and packing tea in British India. But whereas Wu Juenong asked a technical 
question -- one framed as a problem demanding a solution -- this dissertation seeks to historically 
ground the very problem of  productivity itself. How did this concept, the measurement of  the ratio 
between outputs (e.g., tea) per input (capital and labor), which has developed into the overriding 
10 Wu Juenong, “Zhongguo de Nongmin Wenti [The Agrarian Problem of  China],” Dongfang Zazhi 
19, no. 16 (1922), 11-12.
11 Cf. Chen Ciyu, Jindai Zhongguo Chaye de Fazhan Yu Shijie Shichang [The Development of  the Modern 
Chinese Tea Industry and the World Market] (Nangang: Academica Sinica, 1982); Robert Gardella, 
Harvesting Mountains: Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1757-1937 (Berkeley: University of  California 
Press, 1994); William T. Rowe, Hankow, Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1984).
12 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Private Investment in India, 1900-1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), 161-163; Amalendu Guha, “A Big Push Without a Take-off: A Case Study of  Assam 
1871–1901,” Indian Economic & Social History Review 5, no. 2 (1968), 202-204; Sabyasachi Bhattacharya 
and B. Chaudhuri, “Eastern India,” in The Cambridge Economic History of  India, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 270–331, 325.
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paradigm for understanding economic activity around the world, become crystallized in China and 
India? The answer, I contend, requires more than a study of  the technical conditions of  each region 
but also a historical analysis of  social relations and of  political economic thought.
The contrast between approaches I have outlined here roughly mirrors the methodological 
distinction that historian William Sewell has drawn between studies of  economic growth versus 
those of  “forms of  economic life.” In recent decades, Sewell argued, the “overriding, ... all-
consuming, issue for the new economic historians was the explanation of  economic growth, 
conceptualized quite specifically as a rise in national income per capita.”13 By contrast, earlier studies 
did not take “the economy” as their “epistemological object” but rather economic life more broadly: 
“the history of  human participation in the production, exchange, and consumption of  goods.”14 
While I of  course do not seek to romanticize some ideal of  pre-cliometric economic history,15 I take 
seriously Sewell’s suggestion that historians should continue to ask basic yet challenging questions 
about how commercial and wealth-seeking activities took on different forms over time, questions 
that are often obscured by a singular focus on measuring growth. As I shall expound below, such 
growth-centered studies falter insofar as they project twentieth-century benchmarks of  development 
back into earlier historical periods. Instead, this dissertation ultimately seeks to historically account 
for one “form of  economic life,” that of  industrial capitalism, and to explain how it was shaped out 
of  different prior patterns of  social interaction and economic thought in the agrarian tea districts of  
13 Economists arrived at this figure by adding up the total goods and, later, services produced by a 
country then dividing that sum by population figures. It is not a measure of  distribution or 
inequality but of  rates of  productivity in a given country. For a more detailed history of  these 
measurements, and their culmination in the statistic “gross domestic product,” see Diane Coyle, 
GDP: A Brief  but Affectionate History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) and Zachary 
Karabell, The Leading Indicators: a Short History of  the Numbers That Rule Our World (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2014).
14 William H. Sewell, “A Strange Career: The Historical Study of  Economic Life,” History and Theory 
49, no. 4 (2010), 146-149.




Over the following chapters, I aim to demonstrate both A) that late nineteenth-century tea 
production in China and India experienced a similar social dynamic of  increased competition that 
compelled merchants and managers to extract greater productivity from their workers, albeit under 
different circumstances, and also B) that by the turn of  the century, these social dynamics would be 
formally articulated in works of  political economic theory penned by observers writing in Chinese, 
English, and Bengali. Such works, in turn, elevated tea producers, namely peasants and manual 
workers, as the primary agents of  creating wealth. By the beginning of  the twentieth century, 
Chinese and Indian tea companies fought to survive in an increasingly hostile world market by 
continually improving their methods of  production: eliminating superfluous middlemen, 
economizing upon labor through new machinery, and combining cultivation and manufacture into 
larger economies of  scale. As reformers and industry insiders internalized this paradigm of  
continual improvement, with its attendant emphasis upon productivity, they also projected 
backwards in time the performance gap between Chinese and Indian tea. In this way, a relatively 
recent divergence between two regions, starting in the 1870s and eighties, could be retrospectively 
naturalized into a deep-seated civilizational difference: that Indian tea had been destined to succeed 
because colonial companies valued modern science; and that Chinese tea had been destined to fail 
because agrarian China had never escaped its limitations as a premodern society of  small peasantry. 
The history of  competition between China and India, therefore, can help us understand the history 
of  the idea of  divergence itself.
The primary focus of  this dissertation, Part I, shall be the nineteenth century period of  world 
competition, the beginnings of  which can be dated to the 1830s and forties. It was during these 
decades that the Qing Chinese tea trade, formerly reserved for the southern port Canton, was 
liberalized through a series of  unequal treaties with the British empire, the political consequence of  
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the first opium war. At roughly the same moment, and framed in the same militaristic idiom of  
“destroying” and “annihilating” the Qing imperial monopoly, British officials in eastern India began 
to experiment with cultivating their own tea tracts in the newly-annexed territory Assam. Before 
long, both tea countries began to significantly increase production for overseas markets, as tea sales 
grew to over twenty times previous levels. This massive expansion entailed recruiting new workers, 
supplying new capital, and establishing new routes for transporting money, goods, and labor.
By demonstrating how these two tea-growing regions underwent similar dynamics of  change, 
this work challenges historiographical assumptions which cast Chinese and colonial Indian 
commercial practices as, respectively, premodern and modern archetypes. As a contribution to 
Chinese history, I demonstrate that tea merchants were far more dynamic than previously imagined, 
actively intervening into the processes of  cultivation and manufacturing in the tea districts of  Anhui, 
Fujian, and Jiangxi. They sought to improve and rationalize production methods in response to 
rising foreign demand, which gradually grew in the late eighteenth century and then spiked from the 
mid-nineteenth century. Merchants from the coast and small inland shop owners — known as “tea 
warehouses” (chazhan Ġɰ) and “tea shops” (chahao ĠÎ) respectively — installed new disciplinary 
tactics aimed at economizing the labor of  casual workers plucking, roasting, rolling, and packaging 
teas. On the flip side, I show that Indian tea was not always “modern” and “industrial” but actually 
first required decades of  failure before businessmen learned how to focus their attention on 
rationalizing production. During the first years of  experimental cultivation in Assam, British and 
Bengali capitalists did not aim to replace the methods of  small-scale tea production they found in 
China but rather sought to emulate them. Only after the industry nearly collapsed under a 
speculative rush for tea lands during the 1860s did these businessmen decide to establish a model of  
plantation-style agro-industry powered by the efforts of  laborers recruited from other provinces. 
Both Indian and Chinese tea producers increased greater productivity by following similar tactics of  
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“labor-intensive growth,” a concept I will expand upon in further chapters.
These parallel histories of  changing production patterns thereby beg the question of  economic 
thought. If, indeed, Chinese and Indian tea production both underwent dynamic social processes 
over the course of  the nineteenth century, then why did the oppositional imagery of  a traditional 
Chinese versus a modern Indian tea sector become so ingrained in the minds of  twentieth-century 
observers? At issue is the widespread acceptance of  a political economic paradigm which takes for 
granted that techniques of  industrialization — the maximization of  output per labor and capital 
input — are the most natural and desirable method of  wealth accumulation. Prior to the late 
nineteenth-century consolidation of  this economic paradigm, however, both Qing Chinese and 
British colonial officials subscribed to theories that can best be described as “Smithian.” These men 
placed the greatest faith in merchants and the marketplace, rather than agriculture and manufacture, 
as the key agents of  enriching society. Adam Smith’s basic premise that market expansion would 
necessarily entail productivity gains through the division of  labor, I argue, aptly described both the 
political philosophy of  Qing elites and also that of  British officials experimenting with tea 
cultivation in eastern India. In Smithian theories, improvements to production were limited and 
subordinated to larger processes that began and ended with commercial circulation.16 Most 
succinctly, Smith wrote in the first book of  The Wealth of  Nations (1776): “As it is the power of  
exchanging that gives occasion to the division of  labour, so the extent of  this division must always 
be limited by the extent of  that power, or, in other words, by the extent of  the market.”17 The basic 
tenets of  this exchange-centered theory enjoyed great resonance across pockets of  the early modern 
world. At the outset of  the nineteenth century, writers in Qing China and British India believed that 
government was necessary only up to a certain point, after which markets and merchants could best 
16 Wrigley 2004 describes how Smith belonged to a generation of  thinkers trapped in the “organic 
economy” of  pre-industrial limits. Esp. the chapter “Two kinds of  capitalism, two kinds of  growth.”
17 Adam Smith, The Wealth of  Nations (1776) (New York: Bantam Classic, 2003), 27.
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solve problems of  distribution, poverty, and livelihood (thus, although I use the term “Smithian,” I 
do not use it to trace the genealogy of  a great man but rather use his ideas as a placeholder 
designating a constellation of  intellectual resemblances across early modern Asia and Europe).18
By the second half  of  the century, however, the Indian and Chinese tea industries experienced 
massive industry-wide crises which forced government officials to reconsider their Smithian 
assumptions and to pay greater attention to difficulties in tea production. A speculative “tea mania” 
overtook Assam in the 1860s, and in the aftermath, Government of  India officials recognized the 
political importance of  the “labor question.” Decades later, the ascent of  Indian tea hit Chinese tea 
producers hard, and as prices and sales plummeted in the 1890s, Qing officials looked to improve 
peasant production. In both regions, labor and production -- though long a concern to business 
participants for decades -- ultimately replaced market expansion as the most pressing political 
question. The Government of  India intervened with laws assisting labor recruitment to Assam, and 
the Qing and Republican Chinese administrations cycled through various proposals to ameliorate the 
dearth of  capital available to the peasantry. Whereas Smith had embedded productivity gains within 
cycles of  commercial expansion, late-nineteenth century theories of  industrial growth focused on 
specialized, and state-directed, measures for improving productivity itself. Concern over production, 
in other words, began to take on a life of  its own.19 
18 The recent surge of  scholarship on early modern economic thought suggests that pro-circulation 
ideas developed hand-in-hand with the increased commercialization of  life in the pre-eighteenth 
century world, regardless of  people’s familiarity with the Scottish thinker.
British officials in India were of  course highly educated in Smithian thought, but Qing officials did 
not read Smith until the turn of  the twentieth century. However, I believe this fact strengthens the 
validity of  the category “Smithian” insofar as it demonstrates the two regions were deeply 
embedded in the same social dynamics that gave rise to, and were described by, Smith.
19 This very abstract process has been obliquely remarked upon by other theorists in the past. For 
instance, Karl Marx wrote that in nineteenth-century texts, there was a “crude tearing-apart” of  
production from circulation. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of  the Critique of  Political Economy 
(1859), trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin, 1973), 87. Karl Polanyi also spoke of  how 
production relations were formerly “embedded” in everyday social life before later becoming 
“disembedded” from society as a whole. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon 
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For a concrete illustration of  this process in Chinese society at a general level, we need only note 
Wellington Chan’s observation that at the turn of  the last century, the concepts of  circulation and 
production, both formerly contained under the umbrella of  “shang” (ĵ) in Chinese, had been 
separated in both thought and practice:
Since the merchant was carrying out both commercial and industrial functions, discussions about 
him before the 1890s tended not to differentiate his social role and status on the basis of  which 
function he was performing. By the late 1890s, however, a growing distinction was made 
between shangye ĵ¼ as commercial enterprise and shiye p¼ as industrial enterprise. When the 
progressive monthly Dongfang zazhi [Eastern Miscellany] published its first issue in February 1904, 
there were separate sections devoted to shiye and shangwu….The development reflected the 
growth of  social distinctions between the two groups of  merchants . . . .”20
The historical narrative of  tea that I am proposing, then, also clearly hints at larger global 
histories of  economic thought and practice, the scope of  which would far exceed the contours of  
this dissertation. As such, I recognize that the tea trade cannot fully stand in for similar processes 
elsewhere in China and India, much less around the world21 (indeed, “[o]ne would need to be a god 
to write a truly adequate history of  capitalism.”).22 Rather than provide an exhaustive account, my 
goal is simply to illuminate historically, step by step, just how the operative categories of  labor and 
productivity assumed greater practical and intellectual importance over time in these two specialized 
Press, 1957), 72-73.
20 Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Chʻing China 
(Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1977), 33-34. Romanization modified 
into pinyin.
21 Within Chinese historiography, for instance, Madeleine Zelin’s recent study of  the salt industry in 
Zigong, Sichuan indicates that domestic salt merchants in the nineteenth century were much more 
attuned to methods of  capital-intensive industrialization than their peers in the tea districts. In those 
regions of  Anhui and Fujian, which grew for global markets, merchants appear to have committed 
less attention to accumulation and investment into improving production. Madeleine Zelin, The 
Merchants of  Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005).
22 William H. Sewell, “The Temporalities of  Capitalism,” Socio-Economic Review 6, no. 3 (2008), 535.
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regions of  Asia. In doing so, I believe this work can help unlock certain puzzles that riddle the 
historiography of  Chinese and Indian tea, questions that have deep resonance with the larger fields 
of  Chinese and Indian history, as well as the global history of  capitalism. Below, I shall explore two 
of  the most important questions in the following sections through a selective discussion of  national 
historiographies: economic development in Chinese history and labor in Indian history.
Chinese history and the problem of  development
Past studies of  the Chinese tea economy have generally framed themselves through the terms of  
development and modernization. Among scholars in China, Peng Zeyi described the tea trade as a 
form of  preindustry arrested at the stage of  “the sprouts of  capitalism” (ziben zhuyi mengya). His 
judgment continued a familiar pattern within twentieth-century PRC historiography, which described 
“capitalist tendencies without capitalist results.”23 Among U.S. scholars, William Rowe’s study of  the 
Hankou tea trade (1984) and Robert Gardella’s research on Fujian (1994) both explored the 
decentralized, small-scale nature of  production in greater conceptual detail. 
Gardella’s work, the most extended treatment of  the tea economy, was centrally organized 
around the theme of  “growth without development.” The term, first coined by Sinologists Ramon 
Myers and Philip Huang, suggested that the pre-1949 rural economy failed to exhibit traits of  
“modern economic development.”24 Gardella claimed that “there was no structural transformation 
of  the economy, for ... growth was extensive rather than intensive.”25 Here, Gardella was invoking a 
key distinction in modern economics between extensive growth and intensive growth, namely, 
“whether growth occurred as a result of  greater factor inputs or thanks to technological and 
23 Arif  Dirlik, “Chinese Historians and the Marxist Concept of  Capitalism: A Critical 





institutional advance.”26  Only the latter type of  growth, characterized by “technological advance,” 
has been viewed as constitutive of  modern development. For instance, in recent years, many 
scholars have reached a consensus that modern capitalism was only made possible by the widespread 
adoption of  non-human, “mineral-based” energy sources, viz., fossil fuels, because only they could 
raise productivity so dramatically.27 
It was the absence of  this type of  labor-replacing, capital-intensive technology in the Chinese tea 
trade which signaled the lack of  development in late imperial China. For Gardella, the 
“preindustrial” and “episodic commercialization” of  the early modern tea trade was premised upon 
greater factor inputs, such as more workers, more leaves, more tools, but with none of  the type of  
rolling, drying, and packaging machines invented specially for the Indian tea industry. Thus, Gardella 
concluded that the nineteenth-century outburst of  commercial activity in southern China had fully 
receded within decades, and the tea sector would need to wait until the twentieth century for policies 
of  nationalist industrialization.
Gardella’s arguments also rested upon an opposition between a “decentralized market-directed 
form of  economic organization,” versus an “organizational market-negotiated mode.” These terms, 
coined by economist Robert Solow, echoed an older theme within European economic history: the 
opposition between merchant and industrial capital. Because the tea trade was dominated by men 
who were traders by profession, Gardella argued, production was rendered inert and dependent 
upon the whims of  the marketplace. Merchants profited by buying low and selling high, not by 
improving the methods of  production themselves. By contrast, industrial capitalists would have 
26 Kaoru Sugihara, “The East Asian Path of  Economic Development: A Long-term Perspective,” in 
The Resurgence of  East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives, ed. Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita, 
and Mark Selden (New York: Routledge, 2003), 88-89.
27 E.A. Wrigley, Poverty, Progress, and Population (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
68-86. Many other economic historians have also cited Wrigley’s work, including Timothy Mitchell, 
Kenneth Pomeranz, R. Bin Wong. Although productivity gains had been recorded throughout earlier 
eras, improvements from coal were so drastic that they represented a qualitative break from the past, 
not merely a quantitative improvement; a difference of  type, not merely of  degree.
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invested greater resources into production, improved the tools and materials, and trained a proper 
labor force. Whereas the tea merchant’s capital remained outside production, industrial capital would 
have intervened into it. This inside/outside formulation left little room for historical complexity. 
“For much of  the twentieth century,” Madeleine Zelin noted, “the orthodox Marxist view that the 
rise of  commercial capital had an inhibiting, rather than a stimulating, effect on the rise of  industrial 
capital dominated Chinese scholarship.”28 
This analysis of  the shortcomings of  tea merchants in China will become more intelligible if  we 
briefly explore the economic theories behind the concept “growth without development.” Starting 
in the 1970s and eighties, Sinologists such as Mark Elvin and Philip Huang affirmed that Ming and 
Qing China in fact witnessed impressive degrees of  commercialization. These studies stood in 
contrast to earlier culturalist and civilizational theories which claimed a despotic state had always 
stifled a static and tradition-bound Chinese society. Unfortunately, according to these studies, such 
patterns of  commerce ran up against the limits of  pre-industrial growth. Huang argued that Chinese 
peasants and workers had begun to exhaust the vitality of  cultivable land, which led to diminishing 
returns on agricultural output, a phenomenon he labeled “involution.”29 Elvin shared the same 
Ricardian tone, further emphasizing the social costs of  cheap labor: owing to China’s dense 
population, merchants always believed it was expedient to hire more labor rather than invest meager 
28 Madeleine Zelin, “Critique of  Scholarship on Chinese Business in the People’s Republic of  China 
and Taiwan,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998), 97. Indeed, Solow’s distinction between 
“market-directed” and “market-negotiated” business echoes Marx’s declaration that  “[i]n the stages 
that preceded capitalist society, it was trade that prevailed over industry; in modern society it is the 
reverse.” Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of  Political Economy, Vol. 3 (1894), trans. Ben Fowkes (New 
York: Penguin Classics, 1981), 448. 
Gardella in a footnote acknowledged that Solow’s categories also corresponded to the Marxian 
categories invoked by Immanuel Wallerstein.
29 Philip C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), 1-18.
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surpluses into capital improvements.30 Elvin’s “high-level equilibrium trap” was so popular that it 
even found a receptive audience from the editor of  the Cambridge Economic History of  India, Tapan 
Raychaudhuri, who borrowed the model to explain stunted development in eighteenth-century 
India.31 Raychaudhuri continued to argue that China, therefore, offered “the closest parallel to the 
Indian economy,” for “both were traditional agrarian economies with dominant subsistence sectors 
co-existing and partly interacting with a complex and sophisticated world of  commerce.”32 The idea 
that these two large Asian commercial empires had enjoyed “growth without development” 
appeared as a compelling theory that could reconcile historical evidence of  early modern commerce 
with twentieth-century poverty and upheaval. The bottom line across these works remained a 
fixation on the absence of  labor-saving, capital-intensive technological advances, with blame fixed 
on the tea merchants, who behaved as merely traditional merchants.
In the last two decades, however, a second, revisionist position has emerged that consciously 
aimed to repudiate the pessimistic claims of  Elvin and particularly Huang. In this new interpretation 
of  early modern Chinese society provided by Kenneth Pomeranz and R. Bin Wong, the eastern 
region of  the Yangzi Delta, it is claimed, exhibited the classic dynamics of  growth spelled out by 
Adam Smith: market expansion that encourages specialization, division of  labor, and subsequently 
increased productivity.33 The nineteenth-century divergence between Britain and China, they argued, 
did not stem from any profound differences of  social structure but rather from the “contingency” 
of  technical and material differences, namely, the proximate location of  coal mines in England as 
30 Mark Elvin, The Pattern of  the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), 298-315.
31 Tapan Raychaudhuri, “Mughal India (Non-agricultural Production),” in The Cambridge Economic 
History of  India, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 295.
32 Tapan Raychaudhuri, “The Mid-eighteenth-century Background,” in The Cambridge Economic 
History of  India, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 35.
33 Roy Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of  European Experience (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), 16.
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well as the ecological slack afforded by New World colonies. If  early modern commerce in China 
faced built-in limits to growth, as Huang and Elvin suggested, then so too did the most densely 
populated core areas of  England, as did, indeed, most of  the world.34 As one sociologist observed, 
this new generation of  historians had “discovered Smith in Beijing.”35 Although this new Smithian 
paradigm has not been as popular in the South Asia field, several historians have begun to explore its 
applicability. Prasannan Parthasarathi, for instance, has recently followed Pomeranz and Wong’s lead 
and argued that eighteenth-century eastern and southern India were economically on par with the 
England and Yangzi Delta of  1800.36 
What are the lessons we can learn from this disagreement among economic historians? I am less 
interested here in adjudicating the empirical claims advanced by both sides, for many of  those details 
have already been extensively debated between the authors themselves.37 Rather, I believe the most 
productive lesson would be to spotlight the problem of  anachronism and historical specificity raised 
by several participants. Pomeranz in particular echoed a chorus of  early modern scholars who have 
recently warned that it would be anachronistic to measure modern “meaningful development” 
throughout all historic periods, for capital-intensive productivity gains only became widely accepted 
34 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of  the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 69-107.
35 Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of  the Twenty-First Century (London: Verso, 2007), 
26.
36 Prasannan Parthasarathi, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not : Global Economic Divergence, 
1600-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Cf. also the recent works of  Tirthankar 
Roy.
37 Philip C. Huang, “Development or Involution in Eighteenth-century Britain and China? A 
Review of  Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of  the 
Modern World.,” The Journal of  Asian Studies 61, no. 2 (May 2002); and Kenneth Pomeranz, “Beyond 
the East-west Binary: Resituating Development Paths in the Eighteenth-century World,” The Journal 
of  Asian Studies 61, no. 2 (May 2002).
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as the primary method of  wealth accumulation over the last couple centuries.38 For these scholars 
interested in the histories of  Asia and Europe before the eighteenth century, it is clear that 
productivity gains were only one method among many for increasing wealth, alongside war, 
commercial expansion, and rent extraction. Thus, the very premise of  “growth without 
development” advanced by Elvin and Huang, and which helped to shape Gardella’s study relied 
upon a very twentieth-century notion of  “development.”
Another way of  understanding this methodological impasse is to note how the two sides 
emphasized different units of  analysis in their reconstruction of  the late imperial economy. Elvin 
and Huang premised their explanations of  the high-level equilibrium trap and of  involution, 
respectively, upon a sharp contrast with the clear and “meaningful” path of  development in the 
twentieth century: chiefly, the adoption of  capital-intensive, labor-saving machinery. Rather than 
emphasize the role of  markets and commerce, Elvin and Huang’s definition of  capitalism revolved 
entirely around the question of  production arrangements. Huang’s unit of  analysis, in particular, was 
the Chinese peasant household, which he repeatedly described as “petty production.”39 His 
interpretation of  economic history was indebted to the work of  European historian Robert Brenner, 
who, in a rather literalist interpretation of  the first volume of  Marx’s Capital, claimed that commerce 
alone was insufficient to bring about capitalist development. Instead, only the political enclosure of  
common lands, which simultaneously produced a moneyed property class and a landless proletarian 
class, could facilitate factory-style industry along with the economic incentives to invest capital into 
labor-saving machinery.40 Huang called this a “bottom up” form of  industrialization: “from village 
38 Pomeranz 2002; Frank Perlin, “Proto-Industrialization and Pre-Colonial South Asia,” Past & 
Present, no. 98 (February 1983): 30–95; Jairus Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of  Production and 
Exploitation (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011).
39 Huang 1990, 2.
40 Cf. Robert Brenner and Christopher Isett, “England’s Divergence from China’s Yangzi Delta: 
Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of  Development,” The Journal of  Asian Studies 61, 
no. 2 (May 2002), 609-613.
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handicraft home industry to small-town handicraft manufacturing to big city machine 
manufacturing.” Absent this process, Chinese society could never industrialize until property 
relations were altered in their own particular way: the “top down” industrialization of  nineteenth 
century treaty-port imperialism followed by the Communist revolution.41 Along similar lines, 
returning to the tea trade, Gardella’s emphasis on the role of  merchant capital indirectly suggested 
that Chinese tea failed to develop because merchants had suppressed changes in the realm of  
production. Thus, for these scholars, expansive early modern trade was like a rapid stream of  water 
that left the underlying riverbed undisturbed. Until those foundations were overturned by 
extraeconomic forces — forced expulsion, imperialism, revolution — meaningful development was 
hopeless.
By contrast, Pomeranz and Wong, to the extent that they shared any expectations about 
capitalism, borrowed generously from the vision of  merchant capital detailed in Fernand Braudel’s 
three-volume history of  early modern Europe.42 Their starting point of  analysis was not the peasant 
household but rather the marketplace: circulation, rather than production. Certainly, they were 
concerned with specialization in production and labor-intensive growth, but these changes only 
derived from the expansion of  market activities, in direct contrast to Brenner and Huang’s 
subordination of  the market to property relations. Wong in particular cited Braudel’s work with 
approval, heartily endorsing his focus on trade and commercial activity.43  For Braudel, “capitalism” 
meant the constant activity of  inserting financial resources into the ceaseless process of  production, 
41 Huang 1990, 263-264. Cf. 143 and 313.
42 Pomeranz 2000, 166, italics in original.
43 Pomeranz is less willing to endorse Braudel’s definition of  capitalism. Nonetheless, insofar as 
Pomeranz wrestles with any definition of  capitalism, he wrestles with Braudel’s, and at any rate, 
Pomeranz’s definition of  “concentrated capital accumulation” dovetails well with Braudel’s. Pomeranz 
2000, 166. Emphasis in original.
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the crucial agent being the circulation and accumulation of  capital itself.44 Both Braudel and the 
Sinologists he influenced self-consciously limited their research to the early modern period of  1500 
to 1800 CE, the same moment when Adam Smith observed the dynamic relationship between 
commerce and specialization but also decades prior to the advent of  machine-based 
industrialization.45 In fact, Braudel made especially clear that although the merchant capitalists of  his 
study did dabble in improving production, such activity was always secondary to his primary 
occupation as a “man of  the market.” As such, the merchant “only took an interest in production 
when necessity or trading profits made it advisable. Capitalism did not invade the production sector 
until the industrial revolution.”46 
Thus, although the debate over development in Chinese economic history has produced fruitful 
points of  direct clash, its participants have also approached their research from distinctive historical 
perspectives. Elvin and Huang have used the standards of  twentieth-century industrialization and 
looked backwards. Pomeranz and Wong have tried to understand early modern Asian patterns of  
commercial capital accumulation in their own time. Whereas the former took the peasant family 
household as their unit of  analysis, the latter began from the starting point of  commercial 
circulation. 
The obvious question which emerges from this theoretical impasse, then, is how to 
44 Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), 47-48.
45 For instance, see Raymond Williams’ discussion of  “industry.” Raymond Williams, Keywords: a 
Vocabulary of  Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 165-168. 
N.B. Marx had complimented Smith for writing as “the quintessential political economist of  the 
period of  manufacture” because he stressed the benefits of  specialization and the division of  labor 
rather than machinery, which only began to play a larger role in British production decades after 
Smith’s death. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of  Political Economy, Vol. I (1867), trans. Ben Fowkes 
(New York: Penguin Classics, 1976).468, fn. 19.
46 Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of  Commerce, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, v. 2 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 372.
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conceptualize the passage from early modern patterns of  commercial capital accumulation to this 
twentieth-century emphasis upon investment into production: from an earlier moment when 
merchant capital was highly prized to a later one when merchants were disparaged as superfluous 
social parasites. We can begin by looking at the available models of  social transformation provided 
by the authors analyzed thus far.
If  Pomeranz and Wong correctly diagnosed an alarming anachronism in the work of  Elvin and 
Huang, then their own model of  market-centered accumulation is also vulnerable to criticisms that 
they flatten history in their own way. In their commitment to minimize the civilizational or cultural 
differences between east and west, Pomeranz and Wong strategically emphasized continuity across 
early modern Smithian dynamics and twentieth-century industrialization. For instance, Wong 
suggested that industrialization, whether British or Chinese, was an extension of  the same Smithian 
dynamics that already operated in eighteenth-century China and England: “the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century economic impact of  foreigners was felt by most Chinese in terms of  trade 
opportunities, the principles of  which did not differ from those available in previous centuries. New 
commercial opportunities expanded the spatial scale on which Smithian dynamics worked; they did 
not fundamentally alter those dynamics.”47 The logic of  Pomeranz’s arguments about coal and colonies, 
though less forthright, mirrored Wong’s stress on continuity. Such innovations did not alter the 
extant Smithian market dynamics in England but rather merely allowed them to expand and flourish. 
“These favorable resource shocks,” he wrote, “bought time for the emergence of  other innovations.”48 
By identifying Smithian dynamics as the foundation of  the modern world, Pomeranz and Wong 
minimized the distinctions between early modern dynamics of  commercial capital accumulation 
versus modern industrial capitalist production. As a result, “the transition to capitalism is seen to 
47 Wong, 21. Emphases added.
48 Pomeranz 2000, 211. Emphasis added.
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occur as a smooth unilineal process—which is essentially no transition at all.”49 Thus, even though 
Pomeranz and Wong convincingly demonstrated that a Smithian model provides the most helpful 
framework for understanding late imperial Chinese society, their approach runs into empirical 
limitations once we begin to look at the highly industrialized, state-driven forms of  growth in the 
twentieth century (to his credit, Pomeranz openly acknowledged this lacuna within his research in 
his 2002 debate with Huang).50
In particular, recent historical research has revealed pressing questions about the transformation 
of  economic life across eighteenth and twentieth-century China that cannot be smoothed over by an 
emphasis on commerce. For instance, we see sharp changes at the level of  political theory. In the 
1700s, the “social and economic values of  commerce achieved a broad consensual authority they 
had never before enjoyed.”51 Under the Yongzheng (1723-1735) and Qianlong emperors 
(1736-1796), commercial policy suggestions aimed to expand the arena of  trade, without 
fundamentally altering the character of  production itself: projects of  land reclamation, reforestation, 
resettlement, and irrigation. The mechanism was the impersonal law of  the market, namely, the 
rational and profit-seeking behavior of  Qing merchants.52 By contrast, the “goal of  the Kuomintang 
49 Robert Brenner, “The Origins of  Capitalist Development: A Critique of  Neo-Smithian 
Marxism,” New Left Review 104, no. July-August (1977), 39.
50 “Huang emphasizes the obvious point that there was “a terrible toll of  lives exacted in the mid-
nineteenth century” by wars, drought, and other calamities (528). I do not deny this, nor do I have 
any stake in doing so. On the contrary, a grim nineteenth century is rather helpful to my claims that 
we can reconcile a relatively good eighteenth century with the widespread poverty that undoubtedly 
existed in the early twentieth century….We come back, then, to some very basic and as yet 
unresolved questions of  modern Chinese history: Should we focus on failures of  the state in the 
nineteenth century?…Should we focus on imperialism and opium; on various kinds of  social and 
economic dynamism that, however positive they might have been in one sense, placed unbearable 
strain on a Qing fiscal system and administrative structure that did not change enough to keep up 
with them; or on a socioeconomic-ecological crisis rooted largely in population 
pressure?” (Pomeranz 2002, 573).
51 Rowe 2001, 198.
52 Rowe 2001, 215-249. Cf. also Helen Dunstan, State or Merchant?: Political Economy and Political 
Process in 1740s China (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).
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government (1928-1949) was economic development through expansion of  national production by 
application of  modern and scientific technology.”53 This “productivist” approach sought to install 
within the countryside the same patterns of  technological improvement and capital-intensive 
industrialization found in the coastal cities, and it was rooted in a faith in state planning and a 
distrust of  the landlord and merchant classes.54 These two snapshots of  the eighteenth and twentieth 
centuries therefore oblige historians to account for the political shift from valorizing merchants to 
demonizing them, from a political theory of  circulation to one of  “productivism.” 
By contrast, although Elvin and Huang’s approach foregrounded the problem of  transition, their 
emphasis upon technology led them to equate the transition to capitalism with the introduction of  
foreign machinery.55 Such explanations were premised on the idea that machines could simply be 
forced onto the peasant household and local merchants. They therefore ignored any analysis of  
ideological content: why did such practices become accepted among the Chinese peasants and 
merchants? It was not predetermined whether imported machines would be accepted in China.  Late 
Qing reformers, for instance, complained during the earliest years of  reform that when they did 
encourage using overseas tea-rolling machines, the machines simply collected dust, for producers 
distrusted these new devices.56  Thus, in order to understand why foreign machinery and industrial 
53 Margherita Zanasi, Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 2006), 70.
54 Zanasi, 68-78. Although the Chinese Communist Party was radically opposed to KMT policies at 
many levels, this emphasis upon production and a suspicion of  the marketplace was a rare point of  
agreement. William Kirby has argued in several articles that political animosity between the KMT 
and CCP have masked certain points of  overlap between the two parties’ economic policies.
55 “It was the historic contribution of  the modern West to ease and then break the high-level 
equilibrium trap in China. Opening the country to the world market in the middle of  the nineteenth 
century led before long to rapid commercial and industrial growth at the main points of  contact, 
especially Shanghai. Work done with and on foreign machinery trained the Chinese in modern 
technical skills, and laid the foundations of  modern Chinese enterprise.” Elvin, 314.
56 In fact, one of  Elvin’s central contentions was that adequate scientific knowledge had long been 




practices could eventually “stick” in China, we would need to also understand how the dynamics of  
competition had prepared merchants to welcome these new methods of  production. Put another 
way, if, as Huang suggested, the late imperial peasant household obeyed a Chayanovian logic of  
growing “for survival and not for capitalist accumulation,” then the transition from a subsistence 
mentality to one of  capitalist accumulation would need to be accounted for at the historical level of  
social dynamics and economic thought, in addition to a technical analysis of  production practices.57  
Another approach is therefore necessary, one which can retain the strengths of  these scholars’ 
contributions while also avoiding the pitfalls of  A) overemphasizing continuity and B) conceiving 
change mechanically. In my speculative attempts to navigate through these issues, I have found it 
useful to critically reexamine the claims made by one of  the theoretical inspirations behind 
Pomeranz and Wong’s work, the historian Fernand Braudel.
Social practice and economic thought
In the introduction to the second volume of  his three-part series Civilization and Capitalism, Braudel 
explained why he departed from the method of  nineteenth-century economists who looked at the 
“hidden abode of  production.” Instead, Braudel chose to focus on the “sphere of  circulation”:58
[F]or the historian, looking backward in time, it is hard to begin with production, a baffling 
territory, difficult to locate and as yet inadequately charted. Circulation, by contrast, has the 
advantage of  being easily observable….The clamour of  the market place has no difficulty in 
reaching our ears. I can without exaggeration claim to see the dealers, merchants and traders on 
the Rialto in the Venice of  1530, through the very window of  Aretino, who liked to look down 
at this daily scene.….
[W]ho would seriously think of  minimizing the role of  the market? Even in an elementary form, 
it is the favoured terrain of  supply and demand, of  that appeal to other people without which there 
would be no economy in the ordinary sense of  the word, only a form of  life ‘embedded’ as 
English economists say, in self-sufficiency or the non-economy. The market spells liberation, 
openness, access to another world. It means coming up for air. Men's activities, the surpluses 
they exchange, gradually pass through this narrow channel to the other world with as much 
difficulty at first as the camel of  the scriptures passing through the eye of  a needle. Then the 
57 Huang 1990, 313.
58 These phrases were Marx’s, and Braudel was “happy” to continue using them. Braudel 1982, 25.
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breaches grow wider and more frequent, as society finally becomes a ‘generalized market society’ 
….59
Although at first glance Braudel seems to be justifying a general definition of  capitalism as the 
activities of  circulation and the marketplace, a closer examination makes clear he also advanced an 
insight about historical methodology. Namely, Braudel suggested that what the scholar or pedestrian 
observer chooses to fix his/her attention on has already been narrowed in advance by the objective 
structures of  economic life in a given time and space. To Braudel, a historian of  the sixteenth to 
eighteenth century, it was the marketplace, rather than the “baffling territory” of  production that 
jumped out to him when sitting down to read the annals of  the past. The corollary was that those 
nineteenth-century writers who eventually gave production such an esteemed and central position in 
their economic theories -- namely, Marx and Proudhon -- lived in an age when production was no 
longer “difficult to locate” but rather very publicly politicized. Thus, the most popular categories 
and ideas at a given time also historically correspond to the dominant, and hence visible practices at a 
moment. In early modern times, when the main economic activities consisted of  traveling 
merchants, commercial treatises predominantly voiced Smithian ideas about the marketplace. Ideas 
about industry only gained precedence in later periods, when mechanization and scientific 
production began to overtake commercial activities. 
I believe this deceptively simple proposition about appearance and visibility — Braudel 
designated it a problem of  the “restriction of  our field of  observation” —  provides a suggestive 
and useful approach for theorizing social transformation in China and India while also resolving the 
two pitfalls I isolated above. On the one hand, Braudel’s insistence that economic concepts are not 
natural but contingent upon changes in human activity is a useful reminder to avoid telling smooth 
and unlinear narratives that emphasize continuity at the expense of  specificity (e.g., Pomeranz and 
Wong). On the other hand, he connects objective histories of  physical or technological changes with 
histories of  subjective interpretation. As such, his is a corrective to somewhat mechanical renderings 
59 Braudel 1982, 25-26. Emphases in the original.
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of  “transition” which anachronistically project twentieth-century paradigms of  growth backwards 
into earlier periods (e.g., Elvin and Huang). 
We can further develop Braudel’s insights by revisiting some of  Marx’s own self-conscious 
meditations on the development of  economic ideas, of  which Braudel was perhaps aware.60 
Certainly, Marx was primarily interested in nineteenth-century industrial production, but, as Jairus 
Banaji has recently argued, he also provided speculative reflections on how evolving methods of  
capital accumulation had over time simultaneously reshaped the available tools for political 
economic analysis, especially that of  merchant capital. Situated within the most developed industrial 
society of  his age, Marx wrote that from “the standpoint of  the capitalist mode of  production and 
within its limits,” commercial capital appeared a mere “branch,” “phase,” or subsidiary “department” 
of  the true economic activity of  production.61 That is, from the perspective of  a Manchester 
industrialist, the itinerant merchant seemingly produced no new value but rather simply transported 
finished goods to and fro. Thus, for someone like David Ricardo, who championed the primacy of  
labor and production, the idea that a merchant could play any useful role in an industrial society 
“perplexed” and “embarrassed” him.62 
Before the industrial age, by contrast, a European system of  thought known as “the mercantile 
system” gave greatest priority to circulation over production. These writers had assumed the most 
crucial activity was exchange, and the most coveted source of  wealth accumulation was a positive 
60 Braudel cites all three volumes of  Capital in his history writing, but he seems primarily interested 
in reading Marx as a guide for reconstructing early modern life. He does not comment on Marx’s 
meditations on method and logic, but given how compatible his own views on merchant capital are 
with Marx’s chapter on “historical materials on merchant capital,” I would not be surprised if  
Braudel fully accepted Marx’s theses on how different forms of  capital generate different 
standpoints and perspectives on the world.
61 Marx 1981, 442. In earlier drafts, he substituted for “capitalist mode of  production” phrases such 
as “productive capital” and “industrial capital.” Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, 
vol. 33 (New York: International Publishers, 1991).
62 Marx 1981, 441. The German phrase that Marx used, “in Verlegenheit,” means to “be at a loss to 
explain.” Different translators used “perplexed” and “embarrassed” in English.
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balance of  trade.63 Contra Ricardo, these earlier writers believed that circulation was the central value-
producing activity of  commercial society and that the merely subsidiary “branch” was production: a 
temporary pitstop along the merchant’s busy itinerary of  exchanging goods for money, extending 
credit to producers, and collecting manufactured goods months later.64 Braudel’s characterization of  
early modern production captures the subsidiary role production played relative to circulation: 
“Whenever one of  these businessmen owned a boat or shares in a boat, whenever he controlled a 
putting-out system, it was always as a corollary of  what he really was: a man of  the market, the Stock 
Exchange, of  the networks and long chains of  commerce. Above all a man in distribution, 
marketing - the sector in which real profits were made….”65
As the story goes, only with the late eighteenth-century emergence of  greater productivity gains 
that precipitated the mechanization of  production did writers like Smith (a visionary, after all) and 
Ricardo begin to suggest that production played a greater role in capital accumulation than 
previously imagined. For the first time, wealth could be conceived as the fruits of  labor, in the form 
of  industrial profit, rather than as rent from land or as a positive balance of  trade. What I find worth 
retaining from these passages is the basic logical contrast between an early modern commercial 
worldview and a modern industrial one and, in particular, the idea that the history of  economic 
thought has consisted of  individuals observing and interpreting the most visible practices of  their 
day. Here is where I believe we could locate a mechanism for historical change.  
This approach holds great analytical purchase for understanding the transformation of  political 
63 Marx relied upon James Steuart’s notes to reconstruct the history of  mercantilism. Cf. Marx and 
Engels 1991, 20-22.
64 The contrast between the older “mercantile system” versus the theorists of  productive capital, 
Ricardo and Smith, emerges much more clearly in Marx’s notes to this chapter from the 1861-1863 
manuscripts. Marx and Engels 1991, 64-67. For whatever reason, Marx had erased the direct 
comparison between the two schools in his 1865 notes, from which Engels based the final 
publication of  volume three.
65 Braudel 1982, 372.
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economy in China and India. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, many British, Chinese, and 
Indian writers involved in the tea trade initially held notions about commerce and production that 
were similar to the canonical ideas of  European economic thought. During the first half  of  the 
nineteenth century, in both Qing China and British India, officials placed their faith in the market to 
regulate production and distribution and to maximize wealth for all. This “Smithian” commercial 
paradigm was inextricably linked with the patterns of  merchant-dominated production observed in 
the tea districts of  Anhui and Fujian, the two engines driving the expansion of  the tea trade. 
Eventually, however, new practices emerged in response to the saturation of  the world market, and 
planters in both locales realized they needed to invest greater attention and money into economizing 
tea production. These changes within the tea trade occurred against a wider backdrop of  intensive 
competition around the world for new commodities traveling between industrial centers and 
agricultural hinterlands. Over the course of  the 1800s, world historians have shown, the world 
marketplace converged to such an extent that price differentials diminished, and competition driven 
by comparative advantages of  production (or tariff  policies) mattered more than access to untapped 
markets and “non-competing goods” (of  which Chinese tea was a classic example). The half-century 
following the 1820s, O’Rourke and Williamson contend, constituted the “big boom” of  
globalization and price convergence.66 This century also represented a banner moment in which not 
only goods but also production processes were exported across the world.67 The migration of  tea 
production from China to India was just one instance of  a larger pattern. 
This nineteenth-century moment of  intensifying competition holds the key for understanding 
how in many parts of  the world, merchants formerly interested in commercial expansion 
subsequently turned their attention to economizing on production. An age of  commerce, it appears, 
66 Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “When Did Globalisation Begin?,” European 
Review of  Economic History 6, no. 1 (2002), 23-28.




ceded its reign to an age of  industry, and political economic thought was transformed along the way.
This hypothesis explaining the history of  industry and ideas about development is also 
instructive for understanding the origins of  the field of  labor history, which shared many 
presuppositions. As such, the contours and attendant problems which animate the historiography of  
Chinese tea closely resemble those concerning Indian tea labor, to which I now turn.
Indian tea and the teleologies of  doubly-free labor
If  the history of  Chinese tea has conventionally been narrated as a story of  pre-industrial, 
mercantile activity, then Indian tea has been placed on the other side of  the spectrum, having 
received attention as a site of  industrial labor history. These historical studies, beginning with Rana 
Behal and Prabhu Mohapatra’s landmark 1993 article, detailed how the Indian tea industry recruited 
and mobilized a labor force through the deployment of  penal labor contracts: approximately one-
quarter million workers were brought into the Assam tea industry over the last three decades of  the 
century.68 This system of  indenture was facilitated by the Government of  India, which, starting in 
the 1860s, legally codified contracts that allowed planters to forcibly and physically punish workers 
whom they believed had failed to live up to the terms of  the contract. 
The newer studies have addressed the themes of  planter violence, racialized colonial law, 
industrial discipline, and the gendered character of  both recruitment and the workforce (over one-
half  of  tea labor were women). Such works represent an advance upon an earlier generation of  
Indian economic and labor histories, which were encumbered by rigid paradigms fixated on 
proletarianization. I will first briefly review the development of  the Indian labor history field by 
recounting the journey from, first, older teleological narratives of  urban proletarianization, to, 
68 Rana P. Behal, “Power Structure, Discipline, and Labour in Assam Tea Plantations Under 
Colonial Rule,” in Coolies, Capital, and Colonialism, ed. Rana P. Behal and Marcel van der Linden 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 143. Cf. Behal and Mohapatra 1993. Behal 2006. 




second, the initial years of  anti-Eurocentric critique during the eighties and nineties, and, finally, with 
recent calls for a more flexible approach worthy of  the name “global labor history.” 
 Much like teleological histories that presupposed the inevitability of  capital-intensive 
industrialization, labor histories presupposed the inevitable formation of  a workforce composed 
entirely of  “doubly free labor”: free, first, in the sense that, unlike slavery or indentured labor, these 
workers could choose wherever they wished to work; but also free in the sense that, unlike peasant 
households, they were separated (“freed”) from property and the means of  subsistence and 
production. 69 The dominant assumption of  the last century, Willem van Schendel has observed, was 
the “progressive replacement of  unfree labour by free labour – or the progressive proletarianization 
of  the world’s workers.”70 
As Amin and Linden have noted, this presupposition was not limited to adherents of  Marx, who 
coined the term “doubly free,”71 but rather enjoyed “a broad consensus regarding the characteristics 
of  proletarians among intellectuals in the first half  of  the twentieth century.” This popularity was 
due to the fact that proletarianization did in fact appear to be increasing rapidly across the world, 
especially in the Euro-American regions where labor studies originally gained traction.72 In the mid-
twentieth century, scholars of  India also attempted to collapse the experience of  Indian 
industrialization into this model of  doubly-free proletarianization. M.D. Morris, for instance, argued 
69 Thus, “proletarians are working people without property, and therefore compelled to sell their 
capacities for money, but at the same time personally free to choose whom to sell their capacities 
to.” Willem van Schendel, “Stretching Labour Historiography: Pointers from South Asia,” 
International Review of  Social History 51 (2006), 229.
70 Schendel, 229.
71 “For the transformation of  money into capital, therefore, the owner of  money must find the free 
worker available on the commodity-market; and this worker must be free in the double-sense that as 
a free individual he can dispose of  his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the other 
hand, he has no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of  them, he is free of  all the objects needed 
for the realization of  his labour-power.” Marx 1976, 272-273.
72 Shahid Amin and Marcel van der Linden, eds., “Introduction,” in “Peripheral” Labour?: Studies in the 
History of  Partial Proletarianization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1.
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in an early piece on Indian industrialization, “The group tensions which will confront Indian 
industry … will remind [the scholar] very much of  those which affected other regions in early 
periods of  economic development.”73 Morris subscribed to an “evolutionary schemata,” Rajnarayan 
Chandavarkar wrote, in which “patterns of  social change and economic development in India were 
moving broadly along tramlines towards ‘industrialism’, or ‘modern capitalism, familiar in the 
‘Western’ experience.”74
Similarly, in the Chinese history context, Jean Chesneaux’s landmark study of  the Chinese labor 
movement (1968) explicitly chose to focus only on those workers that were deemed fully 
proletarianized in the doubly-free sense. “Not to be included,” Chesneaux explained, were “wage 
earners in petty urban trades (barbers, tailors, launderers) and in craft industries (makers of  baskets, 
brushes, and bamboo articles), or shophands and building workers, in spite of  the fact that their 
social status was much the same as that of  the industrial and transport workers.” His reasoning was 
that “because they were involved in a system of  production or of  services that belonged to the past, 
they ... were not really part of  the new forces in Chinese society.”75 Chesneaux’s definition relied on a 
“fundamentally functionalist” argument that equated the working class, and hence the possibilities 
of  a socialist movement, with a particular “mode of  production (large-scale industry).”76 With his 
language distinguishing “the past” versus the “new,” Chesneaux was also clearly intent on sketching 
his own “evolutionary schemata” of  working-class consciousness.
This isomorphism between teleologies of  development and teleologies of  proletarianization was 
73 M.D. Morris quoted in Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, The Origins of  Industrial Capitalism in India  : 
Business Strategies and the Working Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 12.
74 Chandavarkar, 12.
75 Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1962), 25.
76 Arif  Dirlik, “Workers, Class, and the Socialist Revolution in Modern China,” in Global Labour 
History, ed. Jan Lucassen (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 376.
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not a simple coincidence, of  course, but rather reflected the deep set of  shared assumptions across 
studies of  growth and of  labor.  For a certain type of  leftist historian, studying the working class 
was crucial because workers would serve as the vanguard for socialist projects. For others, the 
formation of  a proletarian class was an important stage in the trajectory of  economic development. 
Brenner once again provides a clear demonstration of  the claims I am outlining: in this case, the 
claim that development could only be facilitated by doubly free wage labor: 
…pre-capitalist class structures … tend to fetter the application of  the means of  production in 
relation to the development of  co-operative production. …
On the one hand, where labour is organized by means of  force exerted by the ruling class on the 
direct producers, the effectiveness of  collecting labour for co-operation is muted because of  the 
lack of  interest of  the direct producers in the productive process. … On the other hand, where 
labour is organized by the direct producers on the basis of  their property in the means of  
production, as exemplified in peasant freeholder production, the tendency (general among all the 
peasant producers) to relate their individual development of  the productive forces to the goal of  
maintaining their family and keeping their property tends to fetter the development of  co-
operative labour, ….77
In recent decades, however, the stranglehold of  the Euro-American model of  proletarianization 
has come under scrutiny, as historians of  Indian labor have begun to instead argue that the 
experiences of  laborers in South Asia differed from that of  the classical examples, especially Britain. 
Both Dipesh Chakrabarty’s study of  Calcutta jute workers (1989) and Chandavarkar’s work on 
Bombay cotton mills (1994) — two of  the most prominent labor studies in recent decades — 
opened with a theoretical and historiographical critique aimed at paradigms of  class formation 
proposed by Marx, Morris, and E.P. Thompson. Despite their methodological disagreements, both 
authors advanced a plea to de-essentialize the global working classes by paying attention to the 
77 Brenner 1977, 35-36.
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historical particularities of  India.78
But though both men offered incisive objections to older homogenizing models, they also clearly 
inherited and retained many assumptions from that first generation of  labor historians. In particular, 
both continued to privilege urban, industrial, and male labor as the focal point of  their studies, a 
choice that revealed a deeper assumption that the urban proletariat represented the most advanced 
and hence politically promising segment of  the workforce. “[P]ride of  place in Indian labor history 
was given to factory labor,” Prasannan Parthasarathi observed in a recent review essay. Chakrabarty 
and Chandavarkar’s critique therefore remained “incomplete,” insofar as both remained trapped 
within the same questions of  an earlier generation: the emergence of  urban class consciousness, the 
viability of  labor union politics, etc.79
Nevertheless, Parthasarathi commended both studies as milestones, for their historiographical 
interventions opened up a space for a newer generation of  labor historians. Starting in the second 
half  of  the 1990s, new Indian labor history scholarship expanded the scope of  research to include 
casual and informal workers, overseas migrant workers in the west Indies, maritime labor, female and 
children workers, and -- easily one of  the most frequently discussed topics -- indentured tea labor.80 
78 Chandavarkar, 19. Chakrabarty was interested in “culture” and the ways in which caste and village 
relationships shaped the experience of  jute workers in urban Calcutta. Chandavarkar, by contrast, 
paid more attention to “political history” and the ways in which colonial policies accentuated 
divisions and conflicts within the Bombay working class.
79 Prasannan Parthasarathi, “Indian Labor History,” International Labor and Working Class History 82 
(2012), 129. For instance, Chandavarkar argued forcefully that Chakrabarty’s attempt to establish a 
theoretical and historical space for the role of  Indian culture ultimately wound up serving as an 
explanation for why “precapitalist culture” had “blocked the emergence of  liberal subjects who 
formed associations on the basis of  class interests.”Although Chakrabarty attempted to refute 
Eurocentric readings of  Indian labor, then, his argument ultimately mirrored colonial discourses 
about the incomplete modernization of  Indian society. Parthasarathi 2012, 127.
80 Furthermore, these works benefited from institutional support. In 1995, the International 
Institute of  Social History in Amsterdam hosted the first conference devoted to Indian labor, and it 
directly helped lead to the creation of  the Association of  Indian Labour Historians (AILH) the next 
year, an organization that has hosted an annual conference ever since. These organizations have 
begun to champion a new field of  “global labour history.” Cf. Marcel Van Der Linden, Workers of  the 
World: Essays Toward a Global Labor History (Boston: Brill, 2010), 1-16.
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Parthasarathi speculates that the recent marginalization of  urban proletarian labor is linked to the 
relative decline of  factory work in contemporary India itself.81 This trend, furthermore, only 
magnified an older historical truth: that the formal, urban labor sector has always represented only a 
fraction of  the total workforce of  modern India.82 No example underscores this point better than 
the tea industry, which grew alongside the late nineteenth-century creation of  the Calcutta jute and 
Bombay cotton industries and whose numbers actually outnumbered both in the first India-wide 
labor survey, the Royal Commission on Labour in India (1929).83 Because tea was not considered an 
“industrial” or “factory” concern, the workforce was rarely included in classic studies of  Indian 
labor. In practice, however, even the authors of  the Royal Commission report acknowledged that the 
distinction between factory and plantation was arbitrary:
[The plantation], while it is predominantly agricultural, has many features in common with 
industry. The plantation represents the development of  the agricultural resources of  tropical 
countries in accordance with the methods of  Western industrialism; it is a large scale enterprise 
in agriculture.84
This incoherent geographical distinction, along with the fact that the workforce for Assam tea was 
recruited largely through the indenture contract and was hence “unfree,” meant that tea was rarely 
studied alongside the urban proletariat of  Bombay cotton or of  Calcutta jute. However, once 
81 Parthasarathi 2012, 132.
82 Parthasarathi 2012, 129, 132.
83 According to the report, the average work daily workforce in Assam tea numbered 557,484, larger 
than both cotton (338,000), centered in Bombay, and jute (347,000), centered in Calcutta. And if  we 
include the total workforce for tea in both Assam and upper Bengal (196,899), then tea alone would 
feature a larger workforce than cotton and jute combined! Bear in mind that cotton and jute were, 
according to the authors’ criteria, by far the largest “factory” and “industrial” commercial sectors 
across India. Royal Commission on Labour in India., Report of  the Royal Commission on Labour in India. 




historians began to displace an earlier singular concern with urban class consciousness, then new 
dimensions of  labor history were suddenly viewed as legitimate questions for research.85 Historical 
work on the Assam labor force, for instance, has eschewed the language of  class consciousness by 
asking a more elementary question about how the work force came to exist in the first place, with a 
particular emphasis on the peculiarity of  the indentured labor contract and all of  its political and 
economic ramifications.
I am highly sympathetic to the spirit of  this push for “global labour history,” but once again, it is 
instructive to ask what are the limitations of  extant scholarship. In particular, the study of  Indian tea 
labor has taken for granted the historical conditions under which the Government of  India, in 
collusion with the tea industry, sought to craft policies of  labor indenture. The majority of  such 
research has focused on disaggregating the various indenture laws without putting into question the 
idea of  indenture itself. The mobilization of  a formal (albeit unfree) workforce in Indian tea has 
been seen as a given, rather than directly historically interrogated. Just as scholars of  Chinese tea 
have tended to analyze the history of  tea from the perspective of  an early modern efflorescence, 
historians of  Indian tea have emphasized the later aspects of  industrialization at the expense of  
seriously analyzing its earlier origins. But the colonial Indian state at the turn of  the nineteenth 
century was almost unrecognizable compared to what it would become at the turn of  the twentieth, 
similar to the distinction I have just outlined between early modern versus twentieth-century models 
of  economic development in Chinese history.86 For this reason, it is problematic that scholars have 
85 “With this framework, the focus of  Indian labor history shifts from a single category of  
workers––factory labor––to a set of  analytic themes or problems that may be applied to almost any 
category of  labor in the past. This framework also helps to bring some order to the bewildering 
diversity of  laborers and their contexts and conditions in Indian history and allows for both the 
comparison and integration of  laborer experiences, making possible larger statements about change 
over time in the world of  Indian labor.” Parthasarathi 2012, 132.
86 This difference of  temporal emphasis also helps explain the larger thematic and political 
disagreements between the Cambridge School (early Company rule) and Subaltern Studies (late 
colonial state) historians. I realize that I will need to expand this note in future drafts.
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not directly asked the question of  why and how the Government of  India reneged on its earlier 
commitment to free labor and instead adopted indenture by the second half  of  the century. 
Here, a comparison with China is illuminating. The Chinese tea trade relied upon another type 
of  non-classical, “singly-free” labor, that of  the peasant household and the casual worker (often still 
attached to a family farm). Unlike in India, discourses surrounding the Chinese tea trade were almost 
completely silent about the role of  tea producers and tea labor until the twentieth century, as Qing 
officials pored most of  their attention onto the merchant classes. But if  tea, just like any agricultural 
commodity, is always the byproduct of  some form of  labor, whether indentured Indian coolie or 
Chinese peasant, then why was the category “labor” so absent in Chinese history and so prevalent in 
Indian history? Put another way, why was “labor” such an important category in India to begin with? 
Was there ever a time in the history of  Indian tea when labor was not a critical category, and when 
and how did it subsequently ascend to become the central organizing concern for the whole 
industry? 
These questions bring us back to the problem of  economic activity and its historically specific 
appearances and forms. If  India historians today have tried to understand Assam tea as a history of  
labor, then their choices were shaped by the historical archive: the historiographical tendency has been 
a symptom of  deeper historical problems. Indeed, starting in the 1850s, Government of  India 
officials were themselves preoccupied with the question of  “labor.” Only when planters and officials 
identified “labor” as the greatest limitation on the growth of  Indian tea did they begin to discuss and 
rationalize plans for labor indenture. But just as the penal labor contract succeeded in expanding the 
industry, it also invited fierce criticisms from Bengali critics who accused planters of  enslaving 
migrant “coolies.” The “labor question” thereby seemingly became the only issue worth discussing 
with regards to Indian tea.
A similar process did not arise in Chinese tea until the 1920s and thirties, when a new generation 
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of  reformers, led by Wu Juenong, identified producers, peasants and laborers, as the “foundation” 
for refashioning a competitive, industrialized form of  tea production. This new valorization of  
production and producers went hand in hand with an increasingly hostile suspicion towards the tea 
merchants as superfluous social parasites. The subsequent 1930s movement to reorganize tea 
producers into agrarian cooperatives yielded the first detailed surveys of  conditions of  tea 
cultivation and manufacture, as well as in-depth profiles of  the lives and hardships of  peasants and 
casual laborers themselves. 
But beyond simply identifying “labor” as a political problem, thinkers in India and China further 
specified that labor must also be free. In India, critics of  indenture, led by the efforts of  Dwarkanath 
Ganguli and Ramkumar Vidyaratna, argued not only that penal contracts were dehumanizing but 
also inimical to economic growth. In his novelistic account of  tea garden life, Vidyaratna paid 
special attention to female tea coolies, who were often targeted by predatory recruiters, and who 
bore the double burden of  privately caring for their families while also publicly working for a wage. 
These critics reasoned that, if  only the government and planters assented to free labor contracts, 
they would unleash the powerful regulatory laws of  “demand and supply”: workers would remain on 
gardens because they would be better paid, and planters would spend less money on recruitment and 
punishment. Thus, in response to a colonial theory of  rule that justified indenture, these critics 
offered their own liberal theory which championed free markets, free migration, and free labor.
In China, Republican-era studies on tea labor spotlighted the plight of  the most marginalized 
groups, that of  women and casual “floating” laborers, often the same individuals. Powerless, 
underpaid, and subject to the whims of  their employers, these workers were stuck in “feudal” 
arrangements.87 Researchers promoted producer cooperatives in order to organize peasants and 
workers in order to “free” them from their dependence on merchant loans and low wages. In both 
87 “...the relationship between workers and factory managers is stuck in a condition of  feudalism 
(fengjian qingkuang ǜī8ƫ).” Chasheng Banyuekan [The Voice of  Tea Bi-Monthly Magazine] (Tunxi, 
Anhui: Chasheng Banyuekan She, 1939-1940), issue 12, 147.
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regions, “free labor” became both a political goal and also a theoretical foundation for new theories 
of  political economy adequate to a burgeoning age of  Asian industrial capital. 
In summary, a critical reexamination of  the history of  the world tea trade challenges older 
assumptions that Chinese merchants were bound by indigenous tradition and hence not responsive 
to changing global economic forces (in fact, the very fact that Chinese reformers could so severely 
castigate merchants for being out of  date was already a clear sign of  “modern” thinking). Further, it 
also challenges the common depiction that labor indenture in India, a microcosm of  late colonial 
rule, was some inevitable byproduct of  undifferentiated imperial ideology. The result is a combined 
history of  change grounded in the mutually-determining dynamics of  global competition: economic 
crises, labor-intensive production practices, and new “productivist” theories of  political economy.
Chapter outline
The next chapter provides a historical background for the long history of  the world tea trade. It also 
provides concrete macro-level numbers and figures in order to help readers make sense of  the 
regional analysis in the following sections. Part II features four chapters spanning the nineteenth 
century and covering the direct competition between Chinese and Indian tea producers. Each region 
shall be featured in two chapters each, one focused on labor practices and one on crisis and political 
economic thought. Chapter three opens by analyzing the political economic foundations behind the 
tea experiments in Assam, especially the intellectual debt to Smithian conceptions of  “commercial 
society.” After several decades of  arrested development, planters and officials began to revise their 
earlier assumptions. The work of  one official in particular, W.N. Lees, crystallized the new sentiment 
that the government must prioritize “labor” policies when markets fail. Chapter four turns to the 
labor process behind tea production in China, where, as the Indian industry struggled, trade 
boomed. I focus especially on the “labor-intensive” methods of  increasing productivity in Huizhou, 
Anhui and the Wuyi Mountains of  Fujian. In response to increased competition, inland producers 
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organized work around more abstract notions of  time. Chapter five turns this question of  social 
practice back to India, where the industry took off  in the second half  of  the century. After tracing 
how the industry rebounded from a speculative bubble in the sixties, I provide a comparative 
analysis of  labor-intensive methods across India and China together. Finally, chapter six rounds out 
Part II by analyzing the political economic paradigms of  the late Qing administration. As in India, 
an economic crisis forced officials to critically reevaluate received ideas about the primacy of  market 
circulation. One particular voice who weighed in on the tea crisis, Chen Chi, emphasized that the 
government should encourage the improvement of  production techniques.
Part III features one chapter each on China and India at turn of, and into the twentieth century. 
Whereas Part II highlighted similarities between the two regions, part III follows each national 
industry as they coped with their respective, divergent fates. In chapter seven, the Indian industry 
had to confront the consequences of  legalizing indentured labor and recruitment. I analyze the 
writings of  Bengali critics who championed the cause of  free labor, and I demonstrate the role “free 
labor” played in the eventual downfall of  indenture. Finally, chapter eight follows a new generation 
of  agricultural reformers in China who attempted to modernize the Chinese industry by organizing 
producers into rural cooperatives. Led by the charismatic Wu Juenong, these reformers targeted the 
tea merchants as a predatory and feudal form of  capital which needed to be eliminated in order to 
lift up the peasant and worker. If  “labor” was the key concern for Bengali critics, then for Chinese 
reformers it was “capital.”
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Chapter Two
The two tea countries: An overview of  two-thousand years of  tea
“Truly she is a goddess worthy of  the sacrifices the world has made for her.” 
Marshall Sahlins
“Cosmologies of  Capitalism: The Trans-Pacific Sector of  ‘The World System.’”
The beverage we call tea comes from the leaf  of  the plant species Camellia sinensis. Second to water, 
tea is the most consumed drink around the world today. It is also big business, with over 4.7 million 
metric tonnes produced in 2012, a value of  about five billion dollars.1 Tea has been incorporated 
into a variety of  highly-ritualized and well-known customs, including English afternoon tea and Zen 
Buddhist ceremonies in Japan. But mostly, tea is consumed as part of  the daily rhythm of  work and 
rest, a source of  stimulation or an occasion for socialization. This almost universal demand has not 
relied upon a single supply source but rather a variety of  producers in tropical and subtropical 
climates, including Argentina and Kenya, but with the majority from across Asia: China, India, Sri 
Lanka, Iran, Turkey, Japan, etc. The following map of  net export tea producers which accompanied 
the encyclopedic two-volume All About Tea (1935), published by the The Tea and Coffee Trade Journal, 
demonstrates the deep connection between tea production and Asia.




Figure 1. Tea exporting and importing map by Ukers.  This 1935 map indicated which regions of  the 
world were net importers and exporters of  tea. Note that although tea is produced in many places 
today, only regions across a major “tea belt” in Asia were net exporters (lighter gray shade). Besides 
China and India, the list included Ceylon, the Dutch Indies (Indonesia), French Indochina (Vietnam 
and Cambodia), Japan, and Taiwan.2
At various points over the last two centuries, tea production and sales reshaped the regional 
economies of  coastal China and eastern India, which were pitted into direct competition for 
consumers around the world. In China, tea was not only the basis for the creation of  the treaty-
system (along with opium), it was by far the most important export commodity for the majority of  
the nineteenth century.3 In India, tea climbed to become one of  five most valuable exports.4 And inn 
2 William H. Ukers, All About Tea, 2 vols. (New York: The Tea and Coffee Trade Journal Company, 
1935), Vol. 1,  332.
3 For basic Maritime Customs figures on exports, cf. Liang-lin Hsiao, China’s Foreign Trade Statistics, 
1864-1949 (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University), 1974.
4 I will need to later produce more systematic numbers, but a quick survey of  the annual “Statement 
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the first systematic calculations for both national economies, tea employed more workers and 
peasant cultivators than any comparable urban industries.5 
But before the export tea trade had disseminated worldwide, British officials in eastern India 
were the first to successfully emulate production of  export teas and thereby challenge the Chinese 
marketplace.6 For the purposes of  understanding this particular competitive dynamic, the best map 
comes courtesy of  Robert Fortune, a botanical collector for the Horticultural Society of  London 
(below). In 1847, the Government of  India reached out to Fortune and asked him to explore the 
interior mountain districts of  China in order to obtain “the finest varieties of  the Tea-plant.” Before 
Fortune’s journey, no European had ever extensively traveled through these regions, despite the 
import of  Chinese tea into Europe for over two centuries. Before he had even set foot in China, 
however, Fortune already had in mind the two destinations indispensable to his itinerary: “the great 
green-tea country of  Hwuy-chow (huizhou ǻĤ)” in Anhui province and “the far-famed Bohea (wuyi 
Ɩɨ)” mountains of  northwest Fujian.7 These two proximate, mountainous regions in central and 
south China had for centuries been the chief  producers of  overseas export teas, a fact well reflected 
in the consumption habits of  European and American drinkers. Black teas, known as Bohea (wuyi), 
Congou (gongfu), and Souchong (xiaozhong), primarily came from the Wuyi mountains, and green teas, 
sold as Singlo (songluo), Twankay (tunxi), and Hyson (xichun), were associated with Huizhou. 
exhibiting the moral and material progress and condition of  India” published by the Government of  
India consistently ranked tea among the top five most valuable export commodities, alongside 
industries such as jute, cotton, and grains. Land under acreage is another potential figure to count.
5 Gardella, 154; for India, see the note on the report of  the Royal Commission on Labor in the previous 
chapter. 
6 Tea production and consumption had long spread to Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia of  course, 
but my focus here is on the creation of  a world export market. Most Asian tea markets were smaller 
and domestic until the early twentieth century, when Japan and Indonesia in particular also joined in 
the world competition. 
7 Robert Fortune, Two Visits to the Tea Countries of  China and the British Tea Plantations in the Himalaya 
(London: John Murray, 1853), 20 and 208.
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Figure 2. Robert Fortune’s map of  the “Principal Districts for the cultivation of  the Tea-Plant” 
spanning eastern India and coastal China.8
Naturally, European traders involved in the trade shared a great curiosity about these interior 
lands they could not visit.9 The Government of  India eagerly hired the Scottish traveler Fortune to 
scientifically investigate the famed districts because they were attempting to cultivate their own tea in 
Assam and, later, the Himalayan mountains. Unfettered by political and provincial boundaries, 
Fortune conceived of  China’s great “tea country” as a single unified chunk of  land. “The principal 
tea districts of  China lie between the 25th and 31st degrees of  north latitude,” he wrote, and in his 
books he inserted a map that detailed his own vision of  Chinese tea. In the corner of  his illustration 
of  China, he also included a map of  what he believed was the key tea-producing belt spanning 
eastern India all the way to the southeast Chinese coast. It was these regions, of  coastal China and 
eastern India, which played the largest roles in the competition between the Chinese and Indian tea 
industries, and it is these regions which shall be featured in the following chapters.
8 Fortune 1853, back page.
9 French Jesuit writer Jean-Baptiste Du Halde (1735) wrote extensively about tea, basing his content 
solely on translating Chinese classics on tea culture (a genre known as chashu, or, tea literature). 
Among writers and merchants in China, Huizhou and Wuyi were famous for their tea, and thus, they 
became famous among speculative European capitalists as well.
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The “chief  districts” of  China
Today, experts agree that the tea plant originated in a tropical belt that overlaps with western China, 
eastern India, and northern Myanmar.10 The exact origins and circumstances under which tea was 
first consumed remain a mystery, but two legends persist among Chinese writers.11 The first suggests 
that tea was first picked by the “god of  agriculture” Shennong Êǁ, who cited tea as an effective 
antidote against toxic plants. This legend was preserved in the Tang scholar Lu Yu’s The Classic of  Tea 
(chajing ĠZ, ca.760 CE), and remains popular today. The second legend comes from the disciples 
of  Chan, or Zen Buddhism. In the sixth century, the legend goes, an Indian prince attempted to 
achieve perfection through meditation but struggled to stay awake. He cut off  his eyelids in 
frustration and threw them to the ground, and from his eyelids grew the first tea plant, an herb that 
allows its drinkers to remain awake and alert continuously.12
Leaving these legends aside, H.T. Huang estimates that tea was first consumed sometime during 
the Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE) as a medical concoction, and mostly in Sichuan province in 
western China.13 The first written records documenting tea consumption that survive today date 
from about 59 BCE.14 There is lack of  clarity, however, that arises from the fact before the current 
character for tea cha Ġ was established, tea was probably one of  several plants referred to by 
another character tu ʇ, which resembles cha, save for one stroke. Before the end of  the Han 
10 Hoh and Mair conjecture that the plant probably was originally first consumed as a beverage in 
“northern Burma.” Victor H. Mair and Erling Hoh, The True History of  Tea (New York: Thames & 
Hudson, 2009), 28.
11 The following sections on the history of  the origins of  tea come from H. T. Huang, Science and 
Civilisation in China: Fermentations and Food Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
503-570.
12 H.T. Huang, 506.
13 H.T. Huang, 513.
14 H.T. Huang, 508.
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dynasty, tea consumption spread from Sichuan to the north China plain and to the lower Yangzi 
Valley, where tea cultivation and production began to take root in Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, 
Anhui, and Fujian -- the “chief  district” on Fortune’s map.15 Clear and unequivocal references to cha 
as tea began to appear in the sixth century, but the true “coming of  age of  tea” must be the 
publication of  Lu Yu’s Classic of  Tea. The first book specially dedicated to the plant, its ten chapters 
discuss cultivation, plucking, utensils for preparation, the art of  drinking, and a list of  locations 
within the Tang empire (618-907 CE) where the best tea was being grown.16
At the time Lu Yu published his small handbook, most tealeaves were steamed and pressed into 
cakes before they were prepared for consumption. Indeed, through the sixteenth century, Buddhist 
monks and urban merchants in China preferred to transform the leaves into a cake form, or 
sometimes in a powder form. Both of  these versions survive today in some local variations (for 
instance, pu’er cakes in Yunnan province or powdered maccha tea in Japan). However, since the 
middle of  the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), tea producers have generally prepared the drink in loose 
leaf  form (sancha ƗĠ), which has entailed only three basic steps: to stir and fire over a pot (chao Ɠ), 
to roll (rounian ɠʉ), and to bake in an oven (bei ɿ). The main goal was to extract as much 
moisture as possible and avoid molding. 
The story of  teas produced for European export began not long afterwards. The first creation 
was the Songluo teas (Singlo in English), named after the Songluo mountain of  Xiuning county in 
Huizhou, Anhui. According to the gazetteers of  Shexian, Huizhou, “during the reign of  Longqing 
(1567-1572), the Buddhist Dafang lived in the Songluo mountains of  Xiuning. His technique was 
15 H.T. Huang, 513.
16 H.T. Huang, 516-518.
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refined and skilled, so everyone emulated it, and it was called ‘Songluo tea.’”17 Another source 
speculated that the Huizhou teas first traveled from Huqiu, Suzhou.18 Soon, others began to imitate 
the Songluo tea. One book from 1609 wrote: “Today, in every mountain, everyone imitates the 
method, and it’s hard to separate real from fake.”19 Another writer, in 1621, however, criticized the 
imitations: “Across this expanse of  a dozen mu, no one makes authentic Songluo tea. It is still the 
case that only one or two houses in the mountains make it with the right skill.”20 
The craze for Songluo tea traveled southwards, eventually hitting the Wuyi mountains in Fujian. 
The late Ming Wuyi miscellanea suggested that the Songluo method came to Fujian in response to the 
high market price for Huizhou teas. Although people on the mountain did not know how to make 
tea, it recorded, they experimented with the “Songluo method” in order to pursue profit.21 Around 
the same time, literatus Zhou Lianggong penned a poem in praise of  Wuyi tea, in which he wrote 
the monasteries learned the “Songluo” methods from “Xin’an,” the old name for Huizhou.22 The 
Songluo teas arrived in Fujian at a time when the tea industries of  the past had already disappeared. 
During the Yuan and Ming periods, the region produced older style “wax” and tribute teas, but the 
darker export teas that eventually made the region famous “owed nothing to the old wax tea 
17 Chen Chuan, Anhui Cha Jing [The Classic of  Anhui Tea] (Hefei, Anhui: Anhui Technical Publishers, 
1984), 35.
18 “[Songluo] tea began from a Daoist master in Huqiu. The master lived in Huqiu, learned how to 
cultivate and process tea, and then later moved to a monastery in Huizhou. He picks tea from the 
mountain, prepares it in the monastery. People from afar fight to buy it, and prices have surged.” 
The text was quoted in Lu Tingcan’s Continuation of  the Classic of  Tea (xu chajing) (17XX), quoted in 
Zou Yi, “Ming-Qing Yilai de Huizhou Chaye Yu Difang Shehui (1368-1949)” (Fudan University, 
2006), 45.
19 Luo Lin Cha Jie 1609, quoted in Zou Yi, 52.
20 Wen Zhenheng 1621, 413, quoted in Zou Yi, 52.
21 Wu Shizhuan quoted in Chen Zugui and Zhu Zizhen, eds., Zhongguo chaye lishi ziliao xuanji [A 
selection of  historical materials on Chinese tea] (Beijing: Nongye Chubanshe, 1981), 336.
22 Zou Yi, 49.
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technology; there was no continuity.”23 
Years later, Wu Zhenchen, in his 1710 travelogue of  Fujian, retrospectively summarized the story 
of  how Huizhou tea traveled to northwest Fujian: 
One day, someone [in the Wuyi mountains] tried out the Songluo method, and the color and 
flavor were pleasing. . . . The teamakers today are still the monks. Recently, there was one who 
summoned monks from Huangshan [a mountain in Huizhou] who prepared teas with the 
Songluo method. They were no different from Songluo teas, and in fact the flavor was superior. 
Sometimes, they are called Wuyi Songluo teas.24
Almost no details survive regarding the monasteries that first sold the loose leaf  teas of  Wuyi, now 
known as “cliff  teas” (yancha ɉĠ) because they were grown on the sides of  mountains. Twentieth-
century researcher Lin Fuquan speculated that “the Wuyi tea trade began with the circulation (liu) of  
Buddhists and Daoists in the mountains. In the earliest usages, it was used for medicine, as a 
refreshment for locals, or sold as a luxury good. It is unlikely that it was produced at a scale for 
profitable business.”25 Regardless of  the monasteries’ original attitudes towards commerce they were 
by the nineteenth century fully engaged in the massive export boom. Late Qing literatus Jiang Heng 
contravened the romantic images of  the monks as pre-commercial artisans: “The Buddhists and the 
Daoists on the mountain monopolize and hoard the tea. They emulate the behavior of  brokers 
(zangkuai mianmu ʕʎeø). The worst are licentious peddlers, and they flee their debts. They 
23 Michael Robbins, “The Inland Fukien Tea Industry: Five Dynasties to the Opium War,” 
Transactions of  the International Conference of  Orientalists in Japan 19 (1974), 137.
24 Quoted in Chen and Zhu, 360-361.
25 Lin Fuquan, “Wuyi Chaye Zhi Shengchan Zhizao ji Yunxiao (1943)” in Wuyi Chajing [The Classic 
of  Wuyi Tea] (Beijing: Kexue Chubanshe, 2008), 638.
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smash images of  Buddha, melt down bells and gongs, and they sell them and their mountain 
cottages to the merchants.”26 
The Wuyi Mountains became famous not simply for producing a large amount of  tea but also 
for producing a high-quality, darker tea. The region supplied the first popular oolong tea (wulong cha) 
recorded in Chinese records. An anonymous author in the 1735 compilation Continuing the Classic of  
Tea [Xu Chajing] wrote that the leaves of  Wuyi tea are picked and then “placed on bamboo baskets 
and exposed to the wind and sun.” After, the “green color is a little faded they are stir-fried and oven 
dried.”27 This process known as fermentation, although technically an oxidation process, changed the 
flavor of  the green drink.28 The Supplement to the Compendium of  Materia Medica said that Wuyi tea is 
“black and its taste sour.” And the 1790 Recipes from the Sui Garden noted that the Wuyi drink is 
“heavy and bitter….The tea leaves may be infused up to three times, yet their flavor is not 
depleted.”29
It was these semifermented oolong teas, rather than the fully fermented black teas of  today, that 
became so popular among European drinkers during the eighteenth century. Teas from the Wuyi 
mountains in Fujian, known as “Bohea” black teas, together with the green teas of  southern Anhui, 
became one of  the most sought after commodities in Europe over the course of  the seventeenth 
through mid nineteenth centuries.
Buyers from Europe and America
Commercial traders from around the world began to drink Chinese tea starting in the sixteenth 
26 Jiang Heng, quoted in Peng Zeyi, ed., Zhongguo Jindai Shougongye Shi Ziliao (1840-1949) [Historical 
Materials on Modern Handicrafts in China, 1840-1949], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian 
shudian, 1957), 304. Also partially quoted in Robbins, 137-138.
27 Wang in H.T. Huang 2000, 539.
28 On fermentation versus oxidation, see H.T. Huang, 536-537.
29 H.T. Huang, 540.
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century. The first traders arrived from the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and they bought their 
first shipment of  teas in 1609, from the port of  Hirado in Nagasaki, Japan.30 They continued to 
purchase teas and import them into Europe through the eighteenth century, as tea was “easily the 
most profitable product” that the VOC dabbled in at this time.31 A large portion of  the VOC teas 
were also repackaged and smuggled into the English market, where the goal was to avoid the 100 
percent import tax that the British Parliament enforced.32 
American traders also joined in the trade. The first American ship, the Empress of  China, 
arrived at Canton in 1785.33 Tea fluctuated between sixty and eighty percent of  total exports from 
China to the US. However, tea consumption never caught on in the U.S. as much as it had in 
Europe, however, and over one-half  of  the tea purchased by American ships were re-exported to 
Europe.34
Undoubtedly, the biggest overseas market for tea was England. Standard tea histories recall that 
Catherine I (1638-1705), the Portuguese wife of  Charles II, was “England’s first tea-drinking 
queen.”35 Not long after, tea supplanted other beverages such as home-brewed beer, sugary wines, 
and gin, and it joined a group of  other colonial beverages imported from overseas tropical locations, 
such as chocolate and coffee. Tea soon proved itself  not only more economical but more open to 
30 In all likelihood, these were Chinese teas, for there was no major export tea production in Japan 
at this time, certainly nowhere in Kyushu.
31 Yong Liu, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 
145-6, emphases added.
32 Liu, 141-142.
33 Zhong Weimin, Chaye yu yapian: shijiu shiji jingji quanqiuhua zhong de zhongguo [Tea and opium  : China in 
the process of  economic globalization in the nineteenth century] (Beijing: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian 
shudian, 2010), 66.
34 Zhong Weimin, 66-67.
35 Strickland 1878 quoted in Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of  Sugar in Modern History 
(New York: Viking, 1985), 110.
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combination with sugar and other additives.36 The East India Company, founded in 1600, was able to 
expand operations mainly due to its tea business, and one of  the most authoritative historians of  tea 
declared in a triumphal tone that the Company “was so powerful that it precipitated a dietetic 
revolution in England, changing the British people from a nation of  potential coffee drinkers to a 
nation of  tea drinkers.”37
For the English working class, anthropologist Sidney Mintz claimed, “[t]ea with sugar was the 
first substance to become part of  a work break.”38 It was pushed hard by the monopolizing 
Company and became a cheap “substitute to the middle and lower classes … for malt liquor.”39 The 
ritual of  tea time in England necessitated hosts serve tea not only to sweeten the bitter drink but 
also to flavor the various cakes, cookies, candies, and fruit desserts that accompanied it. Thus, tea 
from China in the east and sugar from slave colonies in the west reinforced each other in England to 
become what Mintz called a “tea complex.”40 
The story of  the British trade at Canton began to accelerate starting in 1784. Prior, the English 
East India Company charged a one hundred percent tax on tea, which encouraged lucrative 
smuggling activities both to England and America (the Boston Tea Party, after all, was enacted in the 
name of  preserving business for American smugglers).41 The 1784 Commutation Act reduced the 
tax to 12.5 percent and also secured the Company exclusive trading rights at Canton, while also 
36 Mintz, 112.
37 Ukers quoted in Mintz, 112.
38 Mintz, 141.
39 MacPherson in Mintz, 114.
40 Mintz, 121-123.
41 Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H Mui, The Management of  Monopoly: A Study of  the English East India 




stipulating that an entire year's supply of  tea be kept in warehouses in case of  emergency.42 British 
taste for tea was codified into law, a gradual process that culminated “not only [in] the expansion of  
overseas trade, but [also in] the commercialization of  rural life.”43 
In exchange, they exhausted the silver mines of  Potosí, Peru and the poppy fields of  eastern 
India, whatever they could get their hands on in order to acquire tea, that “god to which everything 
else was sacrificed.”44 When the eighteenth century began, Canton merchants exclusively sought 
silver bullion from overseas traders. Over the course of  the century, the British learned to copy the 
Dutch practice of  exporting opium, and traders stationed in colonial India began to grow the poppy 
seed commercially.45 In 1775, Warren Hastings announced the Company's official exclusive rights 
over opium produced in Bengal.46 The advent of  two East India Company monopolies, one over 
India opium and one over Chinese tea, amplified tea sales for the next fifty years. From the 1780s to 
1833, total tea imports more than doubled from 16 to 33 million pounds, with well over 60 percent 
coming from the Fujian Wuyi Mountain region, and much of  the rest from Anhui.47 
The role of  tea in financing these early years of  the British empire is difficult to overstate. 
Figures showed that by the end of  the tea monopoly in 1834, tea represented one-tenth of  all 
revenue generated in England and the entirety of  the East India Company’s trade profit.48 On the 
42 Mui and Mui, xi.
43 Hobsbawm, Eric, Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (New York: Penguin Books, 
1990), 28.
44 Pritchett 1930, quoted in Sahlins, 418.
45 Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of  China 1800-1842 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 9.
46 John F. Richards, “The Opium Industry in British India,” Indian Economic & Social History Review 
39, no. 2–3 (September 1, 2002), 153. Richards also notes that the official agencies created to 
manage the monopoly existed nearly unchanged until British decolonization in 1947.




opium side, that opium profits until 1840 represented five to ten percent of  the Company's total 
revenue including land taxes, and that opium's share peaked at around 16 percent in the last half  of  
the nineteenth century.49 Without opium, Trocki has declared, “there probably would have been no 
British Empire.”50 Even during the heyday of  the East India Company, its Auditor-General T.C. 
Melville stated bluntly in 1830, “I am prepared to say that India does entirely depend upon the 
profits of  the China trade.”51
However, the success of  the double monopoly eventually risked its own demise. By the 1820s, 
private merchants who were already shouldering three-quarters of  the trade with Canton, grumbled 
for greater autonomy outside the Company. Duties remained too high, and Company stipulations 
requiring that cotton goods only be shipped indirectly via Singapore cost them time and fuel.52 Free 
traders got their wish when the East India Company monopoly was dissolved in December 1833. 
But success did not follow. No longer under the umbrella of  Company agreements with the Canton 
merchants, known as the cohong (gonghang {\), the traders faced marked-up prices and middlemen 
who knew that the British depended upon their cooperation. 
Although the British parliament tried to sell the public that the Qing empire was unwilling to 
freely sell their teas to Europeans, and hence invited military confrontation, the Daoguang emperor 
(1821-1850) had actually only sought to prevent the importation of  harmful opium. Nevertheless, 
the British navy opened fire on Canton in late October 1839, and three years later, the first Opium 
War had ended with the ratification of  the Treaty of  Nanjing (1842) and the inauguration of  the 
treaty-port system along the coasts of  China. “Britain was able to overcome the unfavorable trade 
49 Richards, 159-161.
50 Carl Trocki, Opium, empire and the global political economy: a study of  the Asian opium trade, 1750-1950 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), xiii.
51 Greenberg, 14-15.
52 Greenberg, 15, 102.
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balance it contracted from its tea habit,” Sahlins has written, “only by inflicting an even greater 
addiction on the Chinese in the form of  opium imported from India: an illegal traffic backed up in 
1839 by an infamous war.”53 For tea traders, the opening of  more treaty ports promised greater 
opportunities, as exports and profits soared to unprecedented levels in the coming decades. The 
“golden age” lasted for several generations, until sales came to a dramatic halt by the last decades of  
the twentieth century, coinciding with the rise of  the Indian industry. The following chart 
summarizes the overall trajectory of  exports out of  China compiled from various national records 
over the course of  the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries.
Figure 3. Total tea exports out of  China, 1700-1937.54
53 Sahlins, 415-416.
54 Sources: Thomas P. Lyons, China Maritime Customs and China’s Trade Statistics, 1859-1948 
(Trumansburg, NY: Willow Creek of  Trumansburg, 2003), attached computer files with statistics; 
Earl Hampton Pritchard, Anglo-Chinese Relations during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (New 
York: Octagon Books, 1970), 216-217; United States Dept. of  the Treasury, Bureau of  Statistics, 
Imports of  Coffee and Tea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), 18-21; British House 
of  Commons Parliamentary Papers. “India and China (exports and imports). Returns relating to the 
trade of  India and China, from 1814 to 1858.” 1859 (38) XXIII.313, 6-7; and “India and China 




As I have argued elsewhere, the attempt to cultivate tea in eastern India should be viewed as a 
continuation of  the first Opium War by other means.55 It was in 1834, at the same moment when 
British officials began to express their dissatisfaction with the Qing empire and drum up support for 
war, when the British government officially announced plans to experiment with tea cultivation in 
India. The governor-general of  India Lord William Bentinck delivered a minute memorandum that 
year in which he declared the necessity of  “our Empire” to “annihilate the Chinese monopoly” by 
providing British consumers tea grown in its colonies.”56 For years, the British had worried that they 
could not fully depend upon the Qing empire to satiate their growing demand for tea at home, and 
they had attempted to grow tea elsewhere in places such as “Carolina, Corsica, Brazil, Penang, St. 
Helena and Java.”57 Speculation about growing tea in India started in the late eighteenth century 
when botanist Sir Joseph Banks claimed to see a wild tea plant in the hills of  India. In 1816, John 
Walker and Edward Gardner spotted a Kathmandu plant in Nepal that resembled tea. Seven years 
later, major Robert Bruce and his brother Charles A. Bruce discovered that a plant similar to tea was 
being consumed as an herbal beverage the Singpho people in the military contested territory of  
Assam. Samples of  this plant were sent back to Calcutta and London, and for years, officials debated 
whether or not the Assamese plant was identical with the Chinese variety. Finally, in January 1834, 
Bentinck issued a minute declaring the formation of  a group called The Tea Committee, a group of  
fourteen officials and businessmen. Most of  these men were English, but the Committee also 
included two prominent Bengali merchants, one of  whom, Raja Radhakant Deb, was active in 
(347) L.529., 4. 
55 Andrew B. Liu, “The Birth of  a Noble Tea Country: On The Geography of  Colonial Capital and 
The Origins of  Indian Tea,” Journal of  Historical Sociology 23, no. 1 (2010): 73–100.
56 H. A. Antrobus, A History of  the Assam Company, 1839-1953 (Edinburgh: T. and A. Constable, 
1957), 12.
57 British Parliamentary Papers, “Papers relating to Measures for introducing Cultivation of  Tea 
Plant in British Possessions in India,” 1839 (63) XXXIX.223, 19.
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promoting liberal education in Calcutta at the time.58 By Christmas eve of  that same year, the 
Government of  India affirmed that the plant found in the upper reaches of  Assam was “beyond all 
doubt” an indigenous “tea shrub.”59
One of  the major problems facing the Tea Committee, however, was that fact that upper Assam, 
located hundreds of  miles from Calcutta, remained a relative mystery to English traders in India. 
When the English East India Company won the Bengal diwani, or the right to collect revenue, from 
the Mughal Empire in 1765, Assam was still under jurisdiction of  the five-hundred-year old Ahom 
kingdom, which had reconsolidated its position by fighting off  Mughal forces only earlier in the 
century. Assam remained on the periphery of  the Company's cognitive radar at the outset of  
occupation, and British contact began only lightly. As governor-general Lord Charles Cornwallis 
wrote in 1792, “we know little more of  the interior parts of  Nepal and Assam than those of  the 
interior parts of  China,” and little had changed in the intervening decades.60 Not only was the 
administration unfamiliar with Assam, it lacked deep understanding of  China’s “tea country.” 
Despite trading opium, tea, and silver with the celestial empire for decades, the British had little idea 
of  what tea was, how it was grown, or how it was made. The tea business in China was kept 
exclusively in the hands of  Chinese merchants. Samuel Ball, the inspector of  customs at Canton 
during the 1820s, confessed in a footnote to his manual on tea, “I have never seen tea made for sale, 
or which was fit for sale. The tea districts are a distant eight hundred or more miles from Canton.”61 
Thus, the Assam experiments not only aimed to replace Chinese tea imports with Indian tea but also 
58 Ukers, 135-139; and Antrobus 1957, 16.
59 “Papers,” 30.
60 Cornwallis, quoted in Banerjee, A.C. in H.K. Barpujari, ed., The Comprehensive History of  Assam  : 
from the Pre-historic Times to the Twelfth Century A.D. (Guwahati: Publication Board, Assam, 1990), 301.
61 Samuel Ball, An Account of  the Cultivation and Manufacture of  Tea in China Derived from Personal 
Observation During an Official Residence in That Country from 1804 to 1826 (London: Longman, Brown, 
Green, and Longmans, 1848), 105.
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to extemporaneously learn the art of  making tea while also familiarizing themselves with a strange 
land.
Committee members believed they could not market Assamese tea without Chinese assistance. 
As a result, Bentinck requested that “an intelligent agent should be selected, who should go down to 
Penang and Singapore, and in conjunction with the authorities there, and the most intelligent of  the 
Chinese agents, should concert measures for obtaining the genuine plant, and the actual cultivators.” 
G.J. Gordon, a former opium trader with the firm Mackintosh & Co. was subsequently sent off  with 
the twin mission of  garnering Chinese seeds and Chinese manufacturers.62 
Tea seeds came easily enough. Gordon obtained them from Canton and sent them to Charles A. 
Bruce, who had been vested with full responsibility for tea cultivation. In 1837, he received the first 
shipment of  1,609 plants.63 Over the next year, he received shipments of  eight, seventeen and fifty-
two thousand plants. It was no surprise that by 1855 records noted the growers in Assam had “tea 
seed, mostly China, in excess of  what they could use for their own plantings.”64
As for labor, Gordon had not followed Bentinck's original proposal to search Penang and 
Singapore. Instead he found men from Canton. The first group arrived in October 1836; three 
laborers total, and two were tea makers.65 The second group of  Chinese laborers arrived in February 
1838, five men in total: two green tea makers, two box makers and one canister maker. The men had 
insisted the Committee pay their entire trip from China, including food and board. As a result, they 
left their advances with families back home and packed “barely sufficient clothing for the voyage,” 
fully assuming they would return to Canton. Upon arrival, they “were virtually destitute” and did not 
62 “Papers,” 6. Gordon’s opium connection is from Sharma, 436.
63 Bruce in Antrobus 1957, 467.
64 Antrobus 1957, 34.
65 Antrobus 1957, 375. Antrobus speculates that two were tea makers based upon the tea they 
produced. More on this in later sections.
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have all of  their tea-processing equipment. Perhaps even worse, they learned upon arrival that two 
of  the three original men from the first group had already perished.66
Workers continued arriving in waves. In November 1839, a “batch” of  fifty were sent from 
Penang; in January 1840, 64 followed. Finally, in February, Ekay's “large batch” of  247 Chinese from 
Singapore arrived in Calcutta.67 Most of  Ekan’s men were laborers simply looking for jobs, not the 
desired Chinese tea makers from the reputable Chinese tea countries, and many problems followed 
them in their travels to Assam. In January 1840, Bruce warned that too many Chinese were being 
sent to him and that Bengali workers could satisfy labor demand for the time being.68 In 1841, the 
Friend of  India wrote, “A large number of  Chinese labourers was brought round from Singapore; but 
they were selected without discretion. Every man with a tail was supposed to be qualified to 
cultivate, manipulate and prepare tea.”69 The experiments with importing Chinese tea labor ended 
soon after, with several men killed in fights with locals and others abandoned en route to Assam. 
The disaster of  wholesale importing Chinese labor left a bad taste in the Company's mouth, and the 
subsequent labor policy focused only on finding select Chinese tea makers and local Indian workers 
to apprentice under them.70 
From the beginning, then, officials and businessmen connected to the Assam tea industry were 
vexed by the shortages of  cheap and high-quality laborers. As I document in part II, this labor 
shortage eventually forced these men to rethink their assumptions about the normal laws of  political 
economy, so much so that “labor,” rather than the operation of  markets, became the most pressing 
66 Antrobus 1957, 375.
67 Antrobus 1957, 375.
68 Antrobus 1957, 378.
69 Quoted in Sir Percival Joseph Griffiths, The History of  the Indian Tea Industry (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1967), 64.
70 Antrobus 1957, 379-380.
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concern for the industry. Only once the labor question was resolved in the second half  of  the 
century did officials and planters successfully challenge their Chinese rivals. As the following two 
charts indicate, the Indian industry was able to surpass their counterparts for total exports to the 
British tea market, by far the largest in the world, in 1888. This minor breakthrough coincided with a 
growing sense of  panic among Qing officials who for years had witnessed falling prices and, now, 
dwindling activity at the treaty ports. Finally, in what must have felt to industry observers as a 
foregone conclusion, India overtook China as the leading overall exporter of  tea around the world 
for the first time in 1901, a fitting date that symbolized what felt like the passing of  an older, 
traditional era -- the “golden age” of  the Chinese tea trade -- and the dawn of  a new, modern one.
CHAPTER TWO
59
Figure 4. Tea exports from China and India compared.71 
71 Top chart: The Indian Tea Association, Detailed Report of  the General Committee of  the Indian Tea 
Association for the Year Ended 28th February 1893 (Calcutta: W.J. Pinheiro, Cones and Co.’s Press, 1893), 
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PART II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY COMPETITION
Chapter Three
Adam Smith in Assam? Liberal political economy and 
the original Assam tea experiments, 1834-1863
Introduction: the long trajectory of  political economic thought in Assam
On Christmas eve of  1834, the Government of  India confirmed, after eight years of  speculation, 
that the plant found in the upper reaches of  Assam was “beyond all doubt” an indigenous “tea 
shrub.”72 The news was a minor milestone for British officials in their quest to cultivate a 
commercially viable tea in the colonies. Only eleven months earlier, the governor-general William 
Bentinck had issued a minute announcing his commitment to tea experimentation in the Indian 
territories resembling the “tea countries” of  China, places like Nepal and the Himalayan Mountains. 
Similar measures had already been attempted in “Carolina, Corsica, Brazil, Penang, St. Helena and 
Java.”73  The experiments in Assam, first in Lakhimpur and later in the Sibsagar district, were the 
best prospects so far. Some government officials, however, openly questioned whether they should 
273.
Bottom chart: Lyons, supplementary data file on CD; Indian Tea Association annual reports for 
1920, 403; 1931, 375; and 1941, 201
72 “Papers,” 30.
73 “Papers,” 19. On the significance of  the tea trade for the East India Company, one need only 
note that the auditor- general of  Company had declared just four years earlier, “I am prepared to say 
that India does entirely depend upon the profits of  the China trade.” Greenberg, 14-15.
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play any role in a commercial undertaking. In 1837, for instance, the state-appointed Tea Committee, 
located in the Company’s Botanical Garden in Calcutta, notified the government that it hoped to 
“engag[e] eight apprentices from the Lower Orphan Institution” to learn tea manufacture from two 
recently-arrived Chinese teamakers. R.D. Mangles, secretary to the Government, sternly reminded 
the Committee that state intervention should terminate at the “the point of  ascertaining that 
marketable tea could be grown and manufactured in British India.” The original “sentiments of  the 
Government” were that tea cultivation was to remain “strictly experimental,” and it had “never 
contemplated” to render tea production a “mercantile speculation.” Instead, the government 
intended tea to be “immediately taken up by individual enterprise.”74 
But the Committee experiments continued expanding. By 1840, the government not only 
retained rights over the experimental tracts, it also employed “several hundred extra labourers 
engaged during the manufacturing season.” The monthly staff  had grown to 135 men, including 
thirty-nine brought over from China and their seventy-six “native” apprentices. In total, the labor 
force cost the government nearly 40,000 rupees in annual salary. The new governor-general George 
Eden, Lord of  Auckland, was anxious to hand over the tracts to “private enterprize,” for the tea 
experiments had already “gradually reached a scale” which exceeded the limits of  “a full, fair and 
efficient experiment.”75 Henry T. Prinsep, respected member of  the government council, expressed 
his own reservations over the problem of  migrant contract labor, both from China and eastern 
India. “The Government,” he wrote, “should be careful of  establishing a precedent for the transfer 
or laborers for a consideration which eventually may assume a shape not easily distinguishable from 
the transaction so much cried out against in Mauritius and in the Slave Colonies.”76
There is a deep irony reading these words from the standpoint of  the end of  the nineteenth 
74 “Papers,” 94-97.




century. By that point, the very fears of  men like Mangles and Prinsep -- namely the dissolution of  
free exchange and of  free labor -- had been realized in the large-scale, industrial-style, and labor-
intensive tea plantations scattered across the Brahmaputra Valley. The rapid spread of  the 
plantations, known as “tea gardens,” had transformed the economic and physical landscape of  
Assam into “the most spectacularly successful colonial enterprise.”77 Contra the original 
“sentiments” of  Eden and others, these efforts relied upon the strong hand of  government. “The 
British private enterprise in Assam,” historians have noted, “was not the outcome of  a laissez faire 
policy.”78 Besides shouldering the original experiments, the government also promoted land sales to 
corporate firms and later passed a series of  contract labor laws that facilitated the mass recruitment 
of  workers from across eastern India. In 1859, about eight thousand workers were employed in 
Assam tea, mostly Kachari locals from the Darrang district. By 1869, over one-half  of  the forty-
thousand person labor force was imported, and at the turn of  the century, the majority of  the 
247,760 individuals on the plantations -- a six-fold increase -- had arrived via contract from outside 
Assam.79 Against the warnings of  Prinsep, these labor policies encouraged reckless and unseemly 
recruitment practices, earning scrutiny from concerned officials, missionaries and nationalist critics. 
One observer wrote that the recruitment system reminded him of  “the palmy days of  the slave trade 
in New Orleans.”80 During this late nineteenth century period, officials in India grew obsessed with 
tea labor. Stacks of  correspondence, labor reports, and enquiries were consumed with, first, how to 
effectively recruit labor and, subsequently, how to regulate the abuses of  the recruitment system. 
77 Samita Sen, “Questions of  Consent: Women’s Recruitment for Assam Tea Gardens, 1859–1900,” 
Studies in History 18, no. 2 (2002): 231.
78 Amalendu Guha, “Colonisation of  Assam: Second Phase 1840-1859,” Indian Economic & Social 
History Review 4, no. 4 (1967), 306.
79 Guha 1967, 295; Guha 1968, 207; and Behal 2006, 143.
80 Letter written in 1887 recorded from the West Bengal State Archives, in Samita Sen, “Questions 




This colonial paperwork has served as the foundation upon which the historiography of  Assam tea 
labor has been written.
Policies that encouraged penal labor contracts in Assam swam against the tide of  political 
liberalism that gained momentum around the world and throughout the nineteenth century. In the 
same year that the government began experimenting with tea, 1834, the British parliament officially 
abolished slavery across the empire. Throughout the remainder of  the century, in theory, older 
forms of  coerced, unfree work gradually disappeared. How and why did the Assam tea industry 
move in the opposite direction?
Existing historiography has suggested two possibilities for explaining the Indian government’s 
adoption of  contract tea labor: that local groups detested wage work and that they were insufficient 
in number. These arguments were summarized by Behal and Mohapatra: “Assam was sparsely 
populated, and the absence of  a substantial class of  agricultural labourers, as well as the alleged 
reluctance of  Assamese peasants, led to the search for a source of  labour outside the province.”81 
The face value of  these explanations cannot be disputed, for government documents throughout the 
nineteenth century emphasized the laziness and sparseness of  groups in Assam. However, an 
empiricist reading that offers the government’s own stated line of  reasoning falls short of  explaining 
how that ideology evolved and consolidated itself  over time. Labor shortages, after all, do not always 
81 Rana Behal and Prabhu Mohapatra, “‘Tea and Money Versus Human Life’: The Rise and Fall of  
the Indenture System in the Assam Tea Plantations 1840–1908,” Journal of  Peasant Studies 19, no. 3 
(1992), 145.
Samita Sen also restated this formula, adding qualified skepticism towards the observations of  the 
Indian government. Labor shortage, she wrote, “was to become the justification for introducing a 
draconian contract system,” but this shortage was, arguably, “was more perceived than real.” Samita 
Sen, “Commercial Recruiting and Informal Intermediation: Debate Over the Sardari System in 
Assam Tea Plantations, 1860-1900,” Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 1 (2010), 6.
Similar explanations can be found in other studies of  Assam labor, such as Kaushik Ghosh, “A 
Market for Aboriginality: Primitivism and Race Classification in the Indentured Labour Market of  
Colonial India,” in Subaltern Studies X: Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Susie Tharu, 
Gautam Bhadra, and Gyan Prakash (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Jayeeta 




result in policies of  indentured labor. Government officials had recognized some elementary aspects 
of  the “labor question” from the beginning, but indentured labor policies did not emerge for three 
more decades. In other words, government officials at the outset of  the Indian tea experiments 
clearly shared a different set of  priorities.
Throughout the nineteenth century, government officials routinely invoked the stock categories 
of  political economy, namely, land, labor, and capital. The original 1834 minute to begin tea 
experimentation, for instance, stated that “Tea, like almost all other articles, is the produce of  land 
and labour.”82 But treating those categories transhistorically would be a mistake. In the policies of  
government and in the heads of  planters and officials, the relative weight of  each factor, and the 
relationship between them changed over time. Though labor was a consideration in the 1830s, it was 
not a central one -- it was not yet the foundational and organizing category for government policy 
that it would become during the period of  indentured labor.
This chapter seeks to contextualize the ideological foundations of  that later period by describing 
two distinct philosophies of  political economy and then explaining how, in the minds of  
government officials, one overtook the other. First, during the early years of  the tea experiments 
from 1839 to 1842, officials subscribed to a liberal, Adam Smithian system that prioritized a 
competitive marketplace of  smallholder cultivators as the best vehicle for maximizing commercial 
value and improving society. The tea commodity, and the soil it grew out of, was the implicit source 
of  value in this philosophy, but the innovation of  the doctrine was that it prioritized the creation 
and extension of  a market featuring free exchange and free labor. The expansion of  the market, in 
short, dictated the growth of  production. Further, because officials in those early years knew little 
about Assam, they based a striking amount of  their policy upon speculations concerning societies 
other than India, especially weighing the virtues and vices of  the tea trade in China, which, as I show 




Second, years after the Government of  India transferred the experimental tracts to private 
business, planters in the region recognized that waged labor was the most crucial factor for 
successful enterprise. Whereas Smithian doctrine claimed that the extent of  the market limited the 
division of  labor in society, the planters turned Smith on his head by arguing that it was labor which 
limited the scope of  capital investment and market exchange. The current chapter concludes by 
examining two sources who recognized the “labor problem” as the crucial issue facing the Assam tea 
industry. First, the letters of  the Assam Company in the 1850s demonstrate the commercial 
hardships they faced without a cheap and affordable supply of  labor. Second, W.N. Lees, a 
bureaucrat in Calcutta who also owned several tea gardens, wrote an extended tract that pleaded 
with the Government of  India to help the tea planters develop their industry through policies of  
“labor colonization.” 
In the next section, I describe the political economy of  the Assam experiments by highlighting 
the influence of  Smithian doctrine and of  the Government’s attitudes towards the China trade. At a 
basic level, they paid attention to China for the obvious reason that tea was synonymous with the 
Chinese market. But their image of  China during these early years played a more influential role than 
previously acknowledged. China was not simply the place where tea happened to be grown. A close 
reading of  how British officials spoke about China, I argue, also reveals some of  the finer contours 
of  their political economic vision. In short, the Government of  India hoped to avoid the Qing 
government’s policy of  sanctioning a trade monopoly, but it also sought to foster a society of  
industrious and smallholder commercial farmers similar to the kind they believed existed in China. 
The former guided their attitude towards the accumulation and concentration of  capital, and the 
latter revealed their faith in the natural and spontaneous migration of  labor. Instead of  pairing large 
concentrations of  capital with an army of  waged labor, officials held out hope that Assam tea could 
take the shape of  competitive smallholder commercial farmers, idealized in the images of  China 
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which animated political economic texts. Of  course, officials in fact knew little about China 
firsthand, and if  they fantasized about reproducing Chinese society in Assam, they did so less out of  
veneration for the exceptional qualities of  China but because their image of  China corroborated a 
vision of  human nature that was universal. 
Because of  the twentieth-century divergence between Chinese and Indian tea, historians often 
fail to mention how closely the two regional trades resembled each other during the early years of  
the Assam experiments. The first tracts in India were modestly-sized, used Chinese plants, and relied 
upon the manual skills and tools of  Chinese workers who grew tea on a modest scale. When the tea 
industry later turned away from its earlier Smithian economic doctrines, it also turned its back on the 
Chinese model. If  the first political doctrine was designed around the speculative model of  
“commercial society” in China, the latter catered to the geographically specific circumstances facing 
planters in Assam. 
The tea experiments of  1834-1842 and their doctrines
Smithian theories in a new land
In 1834, the governor-general William Bentinck proposed the formation of  a Tea Committee to 
investigate and eventually experiment with cultivation in India. The committee was composed of  
eleven British officials and two Indian men, one of  whom was the famous Calcutta capitalist 
Dwarkanath Tagore.83 Between 1834 and 1839, the Committee founded an experimental tea garden; 
hired a veteran of  the eastern frontier, C.A. Bruce, as superintendent; imported thousands of  plants 
from China; and recruited a workforce from the local population as well as hundreds of  teamakers 
from the southern districts of  China. By the end of  the process, the Committee members formally 
requested to become a private enterprise, known as the Assam Company, and take over the 
government tracts. In the following sections, I expand on previous research by focusing on what the 
83 On Dwarkanath Tagore’s involvement in tea, cf. Blair B. Kling, Partner in Empire: Dwarkanath 
Tagore and the Age of  Enterprise in Eastern India (Berkeley: Univ of  California Press, 1977), chapter VI.
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experiments revealed about the doctrines of  political economy underlying government policy.
When the Committee formally began experiments, colonial presence in Assam was minor. 
Officials were strangers to the region, where two-thirds of  the population had been decimated in 
civil wars and where commercial activity, they believed, was almost non-existent.84 Not only was the 
administration unfamiliar with Assam, it lacked deep understanding of  China’s “tea country.” 
Despite trading opium, tea, and silver with the celestial empire for decades, the British had little idea 
of  what tea was, how it was grown, or how it was made. The tea business in China was kept 
exclusively in the hands of  Chinese merchants. Thus, the Assam experiments not only aimed to 
replace Chinese tea imports with Indian tea but also to extemporaneously learn the art of  making 
tea while also building a society on a site where formerly, they believed, none existed. 
In their correspondence, colonial officials constantly returned to two related themes: free trade 
and free labor. Administrators, steeped in the classics of  political economy, wished to mold Assam 
into a Smithian “commercial society” of  spontaneous labor. These ideas reflected the education of  
colonial officials. The Indian administration was deeply shaped by the required syllabus on political 
economy taught at the East India College in Haileybury, a syllabus that centered on the ideas of  
“Adam Smith and his followers.”85 Officials in the Government of  India “had been inculcated in 
their formative years with a reverential faith in political economy.”86 As such, policy tensions during 
the first decade of  the tea experiments also mirrored distinct trajectories that long existed in the 
study of  political economy itself. Namely, was commercial development spontaneous and natural or 
84 Amalendu Guha, “Colonisation of  Assam: Years of  Transitional Crisis,” Indian Economic Social 
History Review 5, no. 2 (1968), 125, 129.
85 Srinivasa Ambirajan, Classical Political Economy and British Policy in India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 25. The class was taught by Thomas Robert Malthus until 1834. Despite 
Malthus’ disagreements with Smith, notably his anti-industrial emphasis upon the inelasticity of  land 
to support growing populations, Malthus taught the science faithful to Smith’s Wealth of  Nations, 
“the students being given an elementary course on the production, distribution and exchange of  




did it only appear under specific conditions?
The first dimension to this question was the belief  that human nature was itself  dynamic and 
oriented to the accumulation of  wealth by means of  a division of  labor. In the opening pages of  his 
Wealth of  Nations, Smith labeled this process “Improvement.” He believed that the “natural liberty” 
of  “commercial society” would foster the “improvement” of  productive activities by those involved 
in free exchange. Smith went on to suggest that improvement was a tendency located from within: a 
“certain propensity in human nature,” he wrote, to “truck, barter, and exchange one thing for 
another.” As an innate attribute, this propensity was not limited geographically or culturally. Further, 
Smith initially presented the social division of  labor as though it had already occurred, as a fully-
developed machine with interdependent parts. Society would be composed of  individuals who acted 
in self-interest, but who, by doing so, contributed to the overall wealth. Ultimately, given the full 
development of  the social division of  labor, everyone would live “by exchanging, or becomes, in 
some measure, a merchant, and the society itself  grows to be what is properly a commercial 
society.”87
However, Smith also suggested that this type of  improvement, although natural, was not a given. 
Indeed, these types of  activities had to be fostered over time, a process that was natural yet “slow 
and gradual.”88 In the earliest stages, “exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and 
embarrassed in its operations.”89 And in Smith’s own time, many countries, indeed the majority of  
the world, remained in a “rude state,” long “stationary,” and without improvement.90 The crucial 
precondition for improvement was the existence of  a marketplace that facilitated free exchange. The 
87 Smith, 22-33. “It is not from the benevolence of  the butcher the brewer, or the baker that we 






division of  labor, he wrote, was “limited by the extent of  the market.”91 In many parts of  the world 
that were isolated and landlocked, such as the “Highlands of  Scotland,” markets simply never 
existed. But there were also many regions, such as “the provinces of  Bengal” and “the eastern 
provinces of  China” that thrived in “very great antiquity” but had since grown less vibrant.92 In the 
latter cases, the relatively “stationary” and “backward” status of  formerly dynamic Asian civilizations 
was a byproduct of  artificial limitations on market exchange.93 Smith attributed their reversal of  
fortune to overseas colonial monopolies, and he was especially critical of  the destructive impact of  
East India Company rule in Bengal. For instance, Company officials had monopolized the inland 
cultivation of  opium (which was destined for China). Although monopoly artificially raised 
Company profits, it also depressed prices and revenue for poppy cultivators in Bengal. “Nothing,” 
Smith wrote, “can be more directly contrary to the real interests of  those companies.” Instead of  
thinking like jealous and self-interested merchants, the Company needed to behave like benevolent 
sovereigns who looked out for the interests of  all commercial society. He wrote that “it is the 
interest of  such a sovereign” to “abolish, not only all monopolies, but all restraints upon the 
transportation of  the home produce from one part of  the country to another.”94 Smith’s harsh 
words for trading monopolies in Asia deeply resonated with Government of  India officials tasked 
with governing Assam. As heirs to the East India Company, they did not want to foster anything 
akin to the Company monopoly over opium in Bengal.
These two strands of  thought within the canon of  political economy -- a natural propensity to 
exchange that was conditioned upon the existence of  established markets -- appeared sensible on 







to engage in market exchange ultimately determined by an innate drive or by external circumstances? 
And if  exchange first required the prior existence of  a market, how did the first markets ever arise? 
Smith wrote that “the accumulation of  stock must, in the nature of  things, be previous to the 
division of  labour,” but he shed little light on that process of  previous accumulation. Circulation 
presupposed production, which presupposed capital, which presupposed circulation and production. 
“The whole movement,” Marx would later comment about Smith, “seems to turn around in a never-
ending circle.”95 
Officials in Assam fared no better at solving this riddle, constantly juggling the task of  
establishing an infrastructure for commercial markets alongside the imperative to allow exchange to 
flourish on its own. In texts, political economists laid out the theory of  commercial society by first 
detailing wide-ranging, abstract descriptions of  the most basic elements of  wealth, and only 
afterwards did their analysis enter into discussions over urgent questions of  governance, such as the 
Company monopoly in the east Indies. For the administrators in Calcutta and upper Assam, 
however, the order of  thinking had to be reversed. Men like Bentinck, Eden, and Prinsep framed the 
Assam question through policies of  proactively fostering a market society in Assam before stepping 
back and allowing local groups to “improve” themselves through exchange. Thus, at the beginning 
of  British rule in Assam starting in 1826, officials actively implemented policies to stimulate the 
commercial capabilities of  the Assamese people. The government built bridges and roads, reformed 
the revenue system into a monetized rather than service or barter-based one, outlawed labor 
relationships of  personal dependence, and tried to settle public rent-free lands into private property 
rights.96 They also held out hope that eventually their responsibilities would end and Assamese 
society would take off  and “improve” on its own. The puzzle of  how to distinguish between actively 
95 Marx 1976, 873.
96 Amalendu Guha, “Colonisation of  Assam: Second Phase 1840-1859,” Indian Economic & Social 
History Review 4, no. 4 (1967): 289–317.
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fostering exchange versus simply encouraging the natural process of  improvement never 
disappeared from the records of  Assam tea, especially during the later years of  indentured labor. 
Of  course, although these men had, at one point, perused the works of  Smith and his disciples, 
and though the air of  Fort William was thick with the ideas of  political economy at this time, 
officials did not simply spend their days studying the classic works of  theory. I provide this 
background simply to articulate the kernel of  the problem that dogged colonial officials in the 
unfamiliar terrain of  Assam. In India, issues of  political economy came alive in the form of  specific 
policy debates. In the eastern edges of  empire, few issues were more pressing than the status of  the 
East India Company, recently defunct, and the opium for tea trade with Qing China. Much of  the 
initial correspondence for the tea experiments was inspired by memoranda and testimony by men 
who understood the magnitude of  the China trade. By contrast, the tea experiments marked one of  
the first times top officials were ever asked to seriously consider conditions in Assam. Many lower 
officials had lived in the “north-east frontier” for some time, but it is doubtful that men like the 
governor-general or secretary of  India ever made the journey from Calcutta to Assam, one that 
required weeks of  travel. Understandably, when these men wrote about tea, they relied less upon 
their experiences in Assam than upon abstract models of  human behavior, or, their closest point of  
reference for commercial tea cultivation: their speculative impressions of  China.
The idea of  China influenced government thinking about the tea experiments in two ways. First, 
against the backdrop of  a public opinion that decried both the East India Company and Canton 
merchant monopolies, officials in India strove to curtail their own role in tea cultivation and to guard 
against the formation of  large, corporate firms that could dominate the Assam industry. Second, 
however much officials detested the Qing government for limiting foreign trade, they also, logically, 
admired the commercial vitality of  the Chinese people. After all, if  China were not a thriving 
mercantile civilization, then why should the British make such a fuss over doing business with it? 
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When officials spoke about employing Chinese teamakers to impart their craft to the Assamese, they 
revealed a deep admiration for commercial society in China. Although Chinese teamakers were 
mostly hired on a temporary basis, officials also speculated about measures to facilitate their 
permanent migration into India. Together, bureaucratic attitudes towards the Qing government and 
Chinese society revealed a deeper vision for how to organize capital and labor, respectively, in a 
harmonious and expansive vision of  free markets.
On capital: haunted by the specters of  monopoly
Decades before the tea experiments began, the British public had already embraced antimonopoly 
sentiments. Pamphleteers, journalists, and politicians originally aimed their vitriol at the East India 
Company’s own exclusive trade, and political economy featured centrally in these campaigns. During 
this time “no pamphlet or essay or speech that was written or spoken against the East India 
Company’s privileges was complete without a reference to Adam Smith and political economy.”97 
The late eighteenth century witnessed a mainstream acceptance of  this position, and in 1813 the 
new Charter ended the Company monopoly, save for the tea and silk trade. The logic and language 
of  free trade continued to spread, and by 1833, the “demolition of  the China trade monopoly was 
relatively easy.”98 However, British traders were dismayed to find that Chinese merchants in Canton, 
known as co-hong merchants, continued to behave like a cartel, marking up prices and taking 
advantage of  their special position.99 The same energy invested into the abolition of  the East India 
97 Ambirajan, 36.
98 Ambirajan, 41.
99 The co-hong (gonghang) merchants gained primacy in the 1760s when the Qing state bent its 
anti-trade policies to allow restricted trade at Canton. The agreement reached between the Company 
and the co-hong companies, which numbered no more than a dozen at a time, was formed 
haphazardly. Samuel Ball claimed that the co-hong system owed its eighteenth-century origins to 
British ‘ignorance of  the [Chinese] language’ and the subsequent inability to prevent ‘the efforts of  
the Chinese to establish some form of  monopoly.’ Samuel Ball, An Account of  the Cultivation and 
Manufacture of  Tea in China Derived from Personal Observation During an Official Residence in That Country 
CHAPTER TWO
73
Company monopoly was now diverted to the Qing government’s authorization of  the co-hong 
cartel. The “logic of  free trade,” put simply, “required the abolition of  the Cohong.”100
Historians of  Asia have focused most of  their attention on the ensuing military collision 
between the British and Qing empires, in which “the cry for free trade was the trumpet call of  the 
Opium War.”101 But during the period building up to the war, parliamentary debate supporting tea 
cultivation in Assam also expressed the same urgency to abolish the Qing monopoly on tea. 
Bentinck’s original 1834 minute included a memorandum denouncing the uncertain character of  
commercial relations with China “by no means corresponding to the importance of  the trade, or 
consistent with the dignity, of  the British empire.” The author attributed the Qing empire’s attitude 
to “the jealous policy of  the Chinese Government in her intercourse with all nations; the 
apprehension which she has always entertained of  our formidable empire in the East Indies; the 
ignorance, pride, and prejudice of  the Government; a consciousness of  her own strength in some 
points, and her weakness in others; the rapacity and corruption of  her officers, and occasionally the 
misconduct of  our own people.” Thus, it was a matter of  “considerable national importance” that a 
“better guarantee should be provided for the continued supply of  this article.” Although the Qing 
empire had long maintained a monopoly, “it will be easy for us to destroy [it],” he concluded. After 
all, “The arms and science of  the Europeans have so far outstripped those of  her subjects, that the 
forces of  China would be almost powerless against European tactics.”102
Though Smith was an optimistic philosopher of  liberty, he had also spoken of  the need to 
from 1804 to 1826  : and Illustrated by the Best Authorities, Chinese as Well as European  : with Remarks on the 
Experiments Now Making for the Introduction of  the Culture of  the Tea Tree in Other Parts of  the World 
(London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1848), 342, 345.
100 Greenberg, 191.
101 Carl Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910 (Ithaca: Cornell 




“abolish” monopolies, and the author here echoed that sentiment.103 The theory of  free trade had 
been appropriated and brandished as a weapon to topple monopoly and to reform anticommercial 
activity, first in India and then in China. If  antipathy towards the East India Company monopoly in 
India formed the backdrop to the Chinese Opium War, then the specter of  Chinese monopoly, too, 
played a similar role in policy discussions concerning Assam tea.
Although the first five years of  experiments in Assam were relatively peaceful, disagreements 
between government and business interests came to a head at the end of  the decade. In the summer 
of  1839, Tea Committee members, many of  whom were capitalists by profession, suggested that 
they inherit the land from the government and operate it as a “private enterprize.” Although the 
Government had planned to eventually parcel out the lands to private interests, the Committee 
surprised the governor-general by entreating him to grant them the entirety of  the tracts as well as an 
act of  incorporation, which would help them expand their initial capital of  five-thousand pounds. 
The proposition was debated in June 1839 -- just months after the Qing government had begun 
confiscating and dumping British opium two thousand miles to the east. The British government 
was well on its way to launching a war of  free trade against the Qing empire’s trade restrictions, and 
the Tea Committee could not have chosen a worse time to submit a proposal resembling monopoly.
In response to the Committee, the Government expressed anxieties about the proposed transfer. 
Governor-general Eden “laid stress on the necessity of  guarding especially against the introduction 
of  anything like a monopoly of  tenure & cultivation, and on the absolute expediency of  ensuring 
competition.” Further, there was “no ground for assuming that tea culture can with most national 
benefit be carried on by joint stock associations, and therefore nothing must be done by 
Government to force the trade into that or any other arbitrary Channel.” For this very reason, the 
Government wished to open up the competitive field and not allow simply “three or four great 
103 In his own text, Smith had already criticized the Qing restrictions on foreign trade. Cf. 864-865.
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associations” to “parcel out the whole Province amongst themselves.”104 They warned against the 
distribution and allocation of  “large landed possessions for the purposes of  tea cultivation.” This 
was because conditions “were not sufficiently known to render it safe to make large grants of  land 
in positive possession either permanently or for any long periods.”105
The government response disappointed the Tea Committee, which had hoped to convert the 
experimental tea baris into large and economical plantation arrangements. In late February 1840, the 
Committee members reiterated their original plan to develop the tracts as capitalist plantations. In 
anticipation of  receiving the lands, the Committee wrote, “we lost no time in employing our large 
capital in the prosecution of  this object, procuring at great expense, and building an Iron Steamer 
for the navigation of  the Bramapootra [sic], & sending to Assam large bodies of  men, natives, and 
Chinese, together with every requisite for their location and employment.” Given the government’s 
hesitation at transferring the lands, the Committee “fear[ed]that much of  this exertion will be 
thrown away.” They expressed “heavy disappointment” that “so little encouragement should have 
been afforded to so great an undertaking.”106
Eden replied four days later, first dutifully lauding the Tea Committee’s “zealous exertions” and 
expressing his “general & hearty approbation of  the vigor and diligence with which their measures 
have been prosecuted.” However, he noted, the government’s consistent position had always been 
that “the cultivation and manufacture of  tea” would “more directly take the sounder and the safer 
course of  the ordinary pursuits of  commerce and of  industry, in conferring benefits upon the 
community.” This meant that “special care” needed to “be taken so as to exclude any hazard of  our 
granting a monopoly to the first extensive speculation.” In this regard, he outlined three key 
104 National Archives of  India (NAI), Home Department, Revenue-Agriculture Branch, 15 June 
1839, Nos. 1-10, “Transfer of  the tea plantations and established in Assam to private enterprise.”
105 IOR/F/4/1882/79965, 35-36.
106 IOR/F/4/1882/79965, 57-58. 18 February 1840.
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safeguards: first, to give only a “defined and moderate” limitation of  land to each speculation, “so as 
to leave full room for the enterprize of  others.” Second, the government would continue 
experiments in order to encourage the entry of  more capital. And, finally, the government would 
retain the remainder of  the lands while also entertaining offers from other speculators, men of  
ability and capital to give the tea enterprise the industry it deserved.107 
The government’s stated aims at this time, then, could be described as an indeterminate middle 
position between the promotion of  capital as a force of  “improvement,” and an uneasy wariness of  
the tendency of  capital to concentrate into large monopolies. In the words of  Henry Prinsep, 
commenting upon the dispute between the government and the Assam Company, the core question 
of  political economy was to locate “the point where the Government experiment should terminate 
& that of  the private speculator commence.”108 In this sense, the government’s disagreement with 
the Tea Committee also reflected the central tension of  policy in Assam. The government had 
already taken great measures to create the basic infrastructure for commerce in Assam, but they 
feared they would spoil those efforts if  they allowed a single, large firm to inhibit the development 
of  smaller cultivators. But if  Eden and Prinsep wished to nip future monopolies in the bud, what 
was their actual vision for a successful and developed Indian tea economy? If  not joint-stock 
companies, who were the real cultivators, and how would they find the labor and capital to run their 
business? Although these men never gave an exhaustive answer, they provided clues in their 
discussions about Chinese tea labor.
107 The government, he wrote, “shall retain in its hands” the “power of  assisting and instructing all 
persons who may be desirous, with an adequate amount of  Capital, of  embarking in the undertaking 
when these objects shall have been provided for, it must, as I have said, be a matter of  earnest 
congratulation with the Government to see the rapid employment of  private Capital and industry in 
the extension and improvement of  the cultivation.” IOR, 67-70.




On labor: in pursuit of  a skillful and laborious Chinese tenantry
Antimonopoly anxieties about British and Qing foreign policy had reflected one side of  the 
Smithian formula: the importance of  creating markets to facilitate exchange and the division of  
labor. By contrast, Indian officials’ attitudes towards Chinese workers reflected the other side: the 
natural disposition towards commerce. The main problem facing the Committee was that it needed 
manual labor but could not find a permanent supply of  willing workers in the sparsely populated 
region. They tried multiple solutions, attempting to employ workers from local groups like the 
Singphos and also contracting Chinese workers from overseas. But neither appeared a permanent 
solution, and the labor question lingered for decades after the end of  the experiments.
From the perspective of  modern-day industrial capitalism, with its endless demand for waged 
labor, the Government’s policies appeared counterproductive. Besides ruling out indentured labor, it 
also tried to prevent the spread of  corporate capital, which could have paid the wages to entice 
unattached labor. I shall show in this section, however, that officials such as Eden and Prinsep were 
uninterested in fostering a society founded on the principles of  industrial capitalism and waged 
labor. Rather, they hoped that in the future, a healthy tea economy could rely upon the organization 
of  smallholder farmers who provided their own capital and labor to agricultural production. The 
appeal of  vital commercial opportunities would, in theory, naturally resolve “the labor question” by 
attracting farmers and their families to the Brahmaputra Valley. “In new colonies,” Smith had 
written, “the high wages of  labour encourage population.”109 Eden had called this “the ordinary 
pursuits of  commerce and of  industry.” As with their earlier remarks about the Canton monopoly, 
these officials revealed their idealizations of  political economy through discussions of  tea 
production in China.
When they first looked around Assam, officials did not believe they could find the parsimonious 




his 1834 minute that the “The East India Company are much at a loss to provide some reasonable 
occupation for the natives, to promote peaceful habits of  industry amongst them.” He hoped that 
by establishing the foundations for commercial tea, the government could gradually cultivate those 
“habits of  industry” within the Assamese: the “inhabitants of  India have little or no occupation 
excepting that of  agriculture; and the cultivation and preparation of  tea would admirably accord 
with their sedentary and tranquil habits.”110 His observation did not invalidate the thesis that 
exchange was a natural disposition. Rather, it suggested that the Assamese had remained in a “rude” 
state for too long. Officials shared a liberal optimism that under the right conditions the Assamese 
groups would begin to improve their society through the production and exchange of  tea. For 
instance, Francis Jenkins, placed in charge of  the north-east frontier, excitedly wrote in May 1836 
that Raja Poorunder Singh, the local king of  the Singphos who first brought wild tealeaves to the 
Company’s attention, “is anxious to retain one-half  of  the hill, that he may carry on the cultivation 
of  the tea plants, ... and overseers of  the Government should instruct his people in the management 
of  the plant and manufacture of  tea.”111 Nathan Brown, a missionary who had followed Jenkins 
around the tea tracts, added his prediction that the “tea trade will produce a great change in the 
country - will fill it with a dense population, and convert these almost impenetrable jungles into the 
110 “Papers,” 11.
111 Jenkins endorsed this plan, adumbrating that it would be “very desirable to carry with us, in the 
important measure before us, the goodwill of  all the native chiefs, and the proposals of  Rajah 
Poorunder Sing appear to me so perfectly unobjectionable.” “Papers,” 70. From Captain F: Jenkins, 
Agent to the Governor-general, North-East Frontier, to N. Wallich, Esq. dated 5 May 1836.
In October of  the same year, Charles A. Bruce, who was given primary responsibility for scouting 
tea plantation locations and also negotiating with the disparate groups, recommended “giving up the 
Suddeeah [Sootea] tea plants, and distributing them among the native chiefs and others that may 
wish to take them.” Jenkins also added that, at this early date, he could not foresee government 
involvement in commercial tea extending much longer: “I do not contemplate the Government wish 
to do more themselves than to show the feasibility of  producing a marketable tea within our own 
provinces, and thence I should judge that the sooner they can abandon the proposed tea plantation 
to private enterprise the better.” “Papers,” 86. CAB to F. Jenkins. Gowhatty. 1 October 1836.
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happy abodes of  industry.”112
But it did not take long for these buoyant predictions to crash upon the shores of  colonial 
realities. One year later, in 1837, Jenkins relayed that superintendent Bruce “complains of  the apathy 
of  the Singphoos; for this evil it will not be difficult to find a remedy, I hope, when the tea becomes 
to be largely worked, by encouraging the emigration of  more industrious races from Chota Nagpore, 
or elsewhere.” Jenkins later added that “in the present state,” there was no immediate necessity to 
take steps in this direction.”113 Indeed, any talk of  encouraging internal labor migration was 
premature. The Tea Committee’s first priority was to soundly learn the art of  tea cultivation, which 
at this point was a complete mystery to the British. For this task, they made plans to hire contracted 
Chinese teamakers from Canton. Those schemes also yielded their share of  difficulties.
Officials were only willing to hire Chinese workers on a trial basis, often with disastrous results. 
In 1836, the Indian government made an uneasy pact with four teamakers who called their home 
Jiangxi, near the Wuyi Mountains of  Fujian. Between the end of  1839 through the following year, 
“batches” of  fifty, 64 and 247 Chinese workers arrived from various parts of  Malaysia to Calcutta, to 
be sent up to Assam. Predictably, the British came to regret this policy of  indiscriminately hiring 
hundreds of  workers with whom they could not communicate.The entire experiment was later 
recalled in mocking terms:
Acting presumably on the belief  that every Chinaman must be an expert in tea cultivation and 
manufacture, they transplanted all the Chinese shoemakers and carpenters that they could induce 
to go from Cositollah and other bazaars in Calcutta to Assam; these men were nearly all from 
the sea-port towns of  the Celestial Empire, and many had never seen a tea plant in their 
112 Nathan Brown, quoted in Sharma 2011, 44.




The government’s position on Chinese workers appeared contradictory on the surface. On the 
one hand, officials understood that contracting Chinese workers was not a permanent solution. First, 
it was not economical. Besides the expenses of  continually importing labor, officials consistently 
noted that Indian wages were but a fraction of  those anticipated by the Chinese “artificers.” 
Officials therefore asked the Chinese workers not to simply make tea but also to teach the art to their 
Indian apprentices. Further, the Chinese teamakers would not even follow these instructions. The 
contracted Chinese laborers were too difficult to manage, and just as the British sought to end their 
dependence upon the Chinese tea market, so they sought independence from the teamakers: 
“Captain Jenkins adverts justly to the great difficulty of  managing the people of  that nation, the 
importance of  adopting early means to render ourselves as soon as possible independent of  
them.”115
On the other hand, despite the embarrassing episodes of  recruitment, officials also evinced 
optimism that the right worker -- industrious and parsimonious -- could be found. Governor-general 
Eden remained confident that free migrants from China could help push the Assam industry 
forward. In 1839, he issued a resolution on tea and announced the government’s commitment to 
fostering a society of  free tea farmers modeled after Chinese society: “If  any of  the Chinese are 
inclined to settle as tea cultivators on their own account, they should meet with all possible 
encouragement. Nothing would be so beneficial to the Province as the introduction of  a skillful and 
laborious Chinese tenantry.”116
In his complaints about Chinese men brought in on contracts, Jenkins had cited the cost and 
114 J. Berry White, quoted in Sir Percival Joseph Griffiths, The History of  the Indian Tea Industry 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), 50.
115 IOR, 395.
116 NAI, Home Department, Revenue-Agriculture Branch, 15 June 1839, Nos. 1-10, “Transfer of  
the tea plantations and established in Assam to private enterprise,” 72-73.
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unruliness of  the hired men. By contrast, Eden had spoken of  cultivators who would “settle” on 
“their own account.” A steady stream of  tenant farmer migrants would cost the government 
nothing, and those men, along with their families, would have every incentive to pour their energies 
into improving tea agriculture. Such ideal teamakers would represent the sort of  permanent, 
parsimonious class of  merchants that Smith saw as the foundation for social “improvement.” These 
were the ideal conditions to foster a commercial society.
Once Eden issued his resolution, the Tea Committee forwarded a letter concerning a Fujianese 
man, known as Ting Kwoe (also written as Teng Kwoe), who wished to move to Assam and become 
an independent tea grower. The author of  the letter, signed “Chas. Gutzlaff,” was the famous 
Prussian missionary and orientalist Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff, who had worked as a freelance 
translator for years and later served as an interpreter for the British government during the Opium 
Wars. The intermediary between Gützlaff  and the Indian government was the Jardine Matheson 
Company, the largest and most famous opium trading house in Canton. Jardine Matheson had 
already successfully made contracts with thirteen workers from Fujian and sent them off  to 
Assam.117 Thus, by continually exhausting their resources in the eastern reaches of  Asia, the 
Government of  India government had been rewarded with a fortuitous encounter with Ting Kwoe. 
Gützlaff  introduced his man to the government: 
Ting Kwoe a very nice Fokeen man has extensively been engaged in the Cultivation and 
manufacture of  tea, and therefore wishes to proceed with a quantity of  seeds entirely on his own 
account to Bengal to plant them himself  and the only advance he stipulated in two hundred 
dollars. He takes with him two Brothers and a lad his son, and wishes to establish a free tea 
colony. If  however the Tea seeds are all spoilt on the road he requests you to employ all three 
like the other Tea Labourers as this is the first instance of  free emigration to the Tea hills, Mr. Matheson 
thought it prudent to encourage this man that others may follow his example. If  this however 
should not take place as there are great disturbances between the Chinese and the English, and 
117 The contracts for these men can be found in the Jardine Matheson archives in Cambridge 
University Library. Cf. MS.JM/F11. The migration schemes are also mentioned in Government 
archives. Cf. West Bengal State Archives, Board of  Revenue-Agriculture. “Tea Department Original 
Consultations”; and British Library, IOR/F/4/1882/79965, “Papers regarding the promotion of  tea 
cultivation in Assam, Vol 2.”
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the Port of  Canton nearly closed against our Vessels; there are besides ten other tea Cultivators, 
4 for the black or Bohea + 6 for the Green, who will likely embark on your account at the end 
of  this month.118
When he read Gützlaff ’s letter, Governor-General Eden expressed “much satisfaction the 
likelihood of  a case occurring of  free emigration from China to the Province of  Assam of  a 
Chinese family for the purpose of  settling and Cultivating Tea on their own account as mentioned in 
Mr. Gutzlaff ’s letter.” He was “prepared to afford every ligitimate [sic] encouragement to such 
letters.” Unfortunately, Teng Kwoe reneged on his promise. He took the advances from Gützlaff  
but failed to show up on the arranged day to sail to Calcutta: “It appears that some fraud has been 
practiced on the Revd W. Gutzlaff  with regard to the case of  free emigration of  a Chinese family,” 
the government soberly noted. Further, the seeds that “Teng Kwoe the pretended emigrant” had 
sold to the company for 200 dollars, turned out to be “entirely useless and unfit for being sown.”119
As embarrassing as the Ting Kwoe incident was in the end, the colonial archive also indicates the 
government continued to pursue this elusive “free emigration” through other avenues. For years, the 
government had speculated about employing Gützlaff  to wear “a Chinese dress” and “penetrat[e] 
from Canton through Yunnan to Assam,” “exploring the interior of  China, and ascertaining the 
facilities which exist for such communication between it and Calcutta.”120 Moreover, when Tea 
Committee officials persuaded the Indian Government to a hire a Chinese translator, the Committee 
advertised that he was “capable, better perhaps than any one else, to cause that speedy introduction 
into Assam of  a skillful and laborious Chinese tenantry, than which nothing would be more 
beneficial to the province according to the recorded sentiments of  His Honor in Council.”121 Once 
118 Emphases added. Gützlaff  ended his letter by nothing that he had no choice but to “rely upon 
the word of  the brokers, nor can we go and pick out the best workmen.” He closed with the prayer 
“we trust upon Almighty God, to open a wide and effectual door to this country.” BL, IOR/F/
4/1882/79965, 559-561.
119 BL, IOR/F/4/1882/79965, 17 Feb 1840, 577.
120 “Papers,” 44-45. Various letters exchanged March to April 1835.
121 BL, IOR/F/4/1882/79965, 399-400, Tea Comm, 18 July 1839.
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again, the phrase “skillful and laborious Chinese tenantry” was the crucial idea behind all such 
schemes. Government officials like Eden and Prinsep seemed to hold a prior image of  the Chinese 
farmer in their head. If  British officials were laudatory towards Chinese migrants, their logic was not 
premised upon their racial qualities but rather because of  their practices and habits, which were 
steeped in commerce. To them, the Chinese farmer confirmed a much more abstract and universal 
idealization of  all societies.
Praise for the commercial classes of  China was something of  a running tradition within political 
economy and the European enlightenment writ large. Men like Leibniz, Voltaire, and Quesnay 
expressed views that historians have labeled a “Sinophile faction.”122 Their contemporary Adam 
Smith wrote that China was “the exemplar” of  “the natural progress of  opulence,” in which “the 
greater part of  capital” was “first, directed to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of  all 
to foreign commerce.”123 He continued to write elsewhere that in China, agriculture was dominant, 
and “the great ambition of  every man is to get possession of  some little bit of  land, either in 
property or in lease.” The condition of  agricultural laborers there was “said to be as much superior 
to that of  an artificer, as in most parts of  Europe, that of  an artificer is that of  a labourer.” 
Smith’s admiration for China as an industrious agrarian society was striking. Although Smith had 
begun his treatise with the famous discussion of  a pin factory -- an example of  manufacture that 
could only occur in an urban setting with its many specialized trades -- he still placed great value on 
agriculture. In his formulation, the urban market may have represented the apotheosis of  
commercial improvement, but “the natural order” of  improvement originated in the countryside. 
The differences between urban manufacture and rural agriculture played a crucial role in the ideas of  
the Indian government during the Assam experiments. The above phrase “Chinese tenantry” 
suggested that Eden did not envision the tea plantations as a highly-specialized arrangement like an 
122 Arrighi, 58.
123 Arrighi, 57; Smith, 486.
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urban pin factory but rather as a farming family in the countryside.
The best way for us to understand the Indian government’s attitude towards this “Chinese 
tenantry” is to briefly contextualize the Chinese farmer within the larger system of  Smithian political 
economy and his ambivalent attitude towards agriculture. Smith had at times advanced contradictory 
remarks about the source of  economic value in society. Smith initially suggested the determinant and 
source of  commercial value in society was productive labor, or, the production of  a good that could be 
sold at the market. However, when discussing the evolution of  societies from the initial stages of  
agriculture, he revealed that his theory of  value was closer to the ideas of  the French Physiocrats, a 
school of  political economy that was dominant in the mid-eighteenth century. The Physiocrats 
famously claimed that the basis of  a productive economy was not manufacturing labor but only 
agricultural labor. The activity of  manufacturers, industry, and commerce did not produce new value 
but was merely “sterile.” Smith attempted to move beyond this exclusively agro-centric philosophy, 
but when pressed on the question of  which types of  commercial activity were most productive, 
Smith revealed a bias towards agriculture. He followed the Physiocrats’ convention of  giving 
cultivators the “honourable appellation of  the productive class.” Although sympathetic to free trade 
and manufacture, Smith agreed that “expence” for “artificers and manufacturers, does no more than 
continue … the existence of  its own value, and does not produce any new value.”124 In this respect, 
Smith’s political economy remained, in the words of  Stephen Gudeman, “post-Physiocratic.”125
The phrase “Post-Physiocratic” also describes the attitudes of  officials promoting tea 
experiments in Assam. These men suggested that the most crucial aspects of  the Assam enterprise 
were not human activities of  manufacture but rather the physical, sensuous properties of  tea itself. 
Governor-general Bentinck’s original proposal stated that “the desideratum has been a peculiar soil, 
united to a particular climate.” And he speculated that “it is not perhaps possible upon the face of  
124 Smith, 847.
125 Stephen Gudeman, “Ricardo’s Representations,” Representations no. 5 (1984), 97.
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the globe to find a country so admirably situated as the districts of  India; where the soil, climate, and 
low price of  labour” offered ideal conditions for tea cultivation. The ultimate expression of  this 
materialist approach was Bentinck’s boast that when “the skill and science of  the Europeans, aided 
by thermometers, &c, shall once be applied to the cultivation and preparation of  tea in favourable 
situations, the Chinese tea will soon be excelled in quality and flavor.”
But although Smithian political economy adhered to agriculture as the basis of  value, it also 
sought to shed the skin of  the conservative landed gentry. Smith made the clear distinction between 
traditional and commercial agriculture by opposing two categories of  farmers: “merchants” and 
“country gentlemen.” The operative distinction was that the merchant was willing to “employ his 
money chiefly in profitable projects,” that is, deploy money as capital, instead of  merely employing 
money “chiefly in expense.” As a result of  these “different habits,” the merchant, was commonly 
“bold,” whereas the “country gentleman, a timid undertaker.” A merchant’s “habits … of  order, 
economy, and attention,” rendered it “much fitter to execute, with profit and success, any project of  
improvement.”126 If  Smith remained with one foot in the door of  Physiocracy, then, he also 
theorized the radical transformation of  agriculture into an expansive capitalist enterprise. 
Here is where the “skillful and laborious Chinese tenantry” could be located in political 
economy: they represented the possibility of  a form of  agriculture that both produced value but also 
was dynamic and expansive. When Eden expressed hope for a steady stream of  “free emigration” 
from China, he did not have in mind a workforce of  waged labor. After all, he was at the same time 
taking measures to prevent the consolidation of  large concentrations of  capital that could actually 
employ large waged workforces. Rather, he hoped the Chinese migrants would constitute a body of  
“merchant” farmers who rented land and “boldly” improved tea cultivation. Government men such 
as Eden were probably aware of  recently published accounts of  Chinese society. During the first 




such occasions were restricted to the largest firms in Canton. “All commercial men who go to 
China,” complained Walker in the original tea memorandum, “see about as much, and know about 
as much of  China as a Chinese would of  England, or of  London, if  he was confined to Wapping, 
and not permitted to go beyond the Tower.”127 Thus, not only were accounts of  Chinese society 
based upon interactions with only a narrow segment of  the population, such interactions were also 
restricted to the most commercially-minded sector of  China! Influenced by this selection bias, 
British officials looked at the Chinese farmer and saw a reflection of  their own desires. “When the 
opportunity was given me of  observing the character of  the Chinese adventurers there,” wrote 
Bentinck, “their superior energy, their industry, their spirit of  speculation and calculation of  profit, 
quite equal to that of  any European nation” instilled in him the “conviction … that this or any other 
scheme was perfectly practicable through Chinese agency.” Other accounts of  the period also 
praised the “commercial disposition” of  the Chinese people. John Deans, a “resident in the Eastern 
Archipelago for twenty years,” testified to Parliament in 1830 that the Chinese “are keen, 
enterprising traders, extremely expert in their dealings, and understand the nature of  the trade of  
those countries in which they are settled, perhaps better than any other people.” And a Mr. 
Finlayson, who traveled to Siam in 1822, wrote of  the laborers that the “most prominent feature in 
the character of  the Chinese emigrant, is industry: the best and highest endowment which he has 
attained.” In the eyes of  the Indian government, China represented a collection of  industrious 
merchants and laborers.
To summarize, officials in India believed the Chinese commercial farmer had two valuable 
qualities. Most concretely, he knew how to make tea, and nothing was more commercially valuable 
than that. More abstractly, he embodied the spirit of  smallholder capitalist agriculture prescribed by 
political economy. In other contexts, Ranajit Guha famously argued that the specter of  the French 




Permanent Settlement of  Bengal.128 Analogously, the Chinese farmer, as the reflection of  Smith’s 
merchant farmer and juxtaposed against the figure of  the country gentleman, represented the best 
possible scenario for Assam tea in 1839.129
Taken together, the Government of  India disdain for monopoly and its admiration for the 
Chinese commercial farmer revealed a vision for Assam tea premised upon commercial agriculture 
rather than urban, or plantation, industry. In his fear of  monopoly, Eden threatened to block the 
creation of  the Assam Company, holding out hope for a competitive market of  small family farms. 
And with their faith in the dynamism of  commercial agriculture, Eden and Prinsep tried to sidestep 
the problem of  labor by facilitating the spontaneous “free migration” of  “skillful and laborious” 
farmers from China. These men believed, along the lines of  Smith, that the abundance of  land and 
capital would naturally attract workers to man the industry. On both fronts of  capital and labor, the 
government’s idealism would be tested by hardships in the following decades.
The first decades of  private tea cultivation 
From Tea Committee to Tea Company: the golden years of  the Assam Company
In 1840, the Tea Committee officially declared itself  a private joint-stock company. Despite political 
reservations about monopoly, the newly established Assam Company convinced the government to 
transfer two-thirds of  the government tracts, which included about 159,940 plants that could 
produce over 4,000 lbs. of  tea. The Company, with a nominal capital of  five-thousand pounds, also 
acquired the right to hire superintendent Charles Bruce to continue leading the cultivation efforts. It 
also became one of  the earliest joint-stock companies under British law in January 1840, with nearly 
128 Ranajit Guha, A Rule of  Property for Bengal: an Essay on the Idea of  Permanent Settlement (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1963).
129 Admirers of  the Chinese specifically pointed out that the Chinese people were not to be 
confused with the Qing government. The Chinese tenant represented a perfect compromise of  
progressive agriculturalist who was not monopolistic. They were “exceedingly anxious to extend 
their commercial dealings, in spite of  any restrictive regulations that may be imposed upon them by 
the Chinese government.” Edward Gibbon Wakefield, The Collected Works of  Edward Gibbon Wakefield, 
ed. Muriel F. Lloyd Prichard (London: Collins, 1968), 597.
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eighty percent of  its shares in London.130
We can mark this as one of  the decisive moments when Assam tea broke away from the model 
of  small, individual farms that officials earlier hoped they could mold in the image of  Chinese 
society. The Assam Company not only possessed the capital but also the land, the tools, and the 
infrastructure (potentially at least. At the time, the assets included only bamboo structures with 
“mud-and-wattle walls”131). Workers, whether Assamese or Chinese, provided only their labor. This 
stood in contrast to the government’s original wishes for Assamese farmers to personally take up 
cultivation on their own land, or for Chinese farmers to settle in Assam and grow tea just as their 
families had done for generations in China. Under the Assam Company, these individuals became 
waged workers who would cultivate, pluck, and process tea without owning any of  it. 
Over the next decade, any physical reminders of  Chinese teamaking gradually faded from 
Assam. The Assam Company remained the lone tea grower in India until the late 1850s. The 
Company minutes provide an index for the slow disappearance of  Chinese teagrowing: the 
Company stopped importing workers, and the remaining workers died or returned to China.132 
Superintendents experimented with their own, self-consciously scientific methods of  tea cultivation, 
abandoning Chinese methods of  sowing plants in clusters and instead placing them in rows.133  Most 
130 A total of  fifty-thousand pounds. They had four main tracts (two at Tingri, one at Keyhung, and 
one at Chabwa and Deenjoy) with 159,940 plants, which could produce some 4,220 lbs of  tea, or 
120 lb. per acre. No buildings or infrastructure, only bamboo structures with “mud-and-wattle 
walls.” Antrobus 1957, 45-47.
131 Antrobus 1957, 47.
132 NAI. Home Department. 19th May 1849. Nos. 15-17. “Sanctions the deputation of  Lum Ping 
Yung to promote resort of  Chinese merchants into Assam,” pg. 7. In 1840, the two Chinese 
translators they had brought into Assam to work with the coolies, Lam Qua and Ekan, both died. 
Lum Qua’s son, Lum Ping Young, worked as an assistant through the decade but finally left in 1849.
133 Assam Company Archives in London Metropolitan Archives. Company Minutes. MS 9925/5 
(1848). pg. 128. In 1850, the Superintendent of  the gardens wrote that he “does not think favorably 




improbably, the Company decided to abandon imported Chinese plants and instead emphasize 
cultivating indigenous, Assamese varieties.134 
But as the Company gained confidence with each season, learning to master tea cultivation that 
was specific to Assam, it recognized that finding adequate numbers of  labor was now its most 
glaring problem. 
In mid-decade, the superintendent of  the gardens wrote a letter that “attribute[d] the failures” 
of  the gardens to “Small plants” and “Want of  labourers.”135 What were the most pressing problems 
with labor recruitment during this period? First, as documented, attempts to bring in Chinese labor 
ended disastrously. Second, as they turned to local, so-called “Hill Coolies,” these workers made a 
habit of  absconding back to their nearby homes. Without stronger contracts, recruitment entailed 
paying an advance without the ability to enforce specific performance.136 Competition from other 
employers constituted the third problem. As the government of  India built infrastructure in Assam, 
the Tea Company could not match wages.137 Also, would-be workers busied themselves growing 
134 AC archives. Company Minutes 9925-7 (1853-1855). 144. In June 1854, the company Secretary 
suggested “that as the decided inferiority of  the China tea plant in Assam both in rateable produce 
and its quantity as well in regard to flavor as strength as compared with that of  the Assam variety is 
now an ascertained fact it might be a desirable measure to emasculate the plantations of  the China 
sort by a gradual process….”
In fact, planters became so convinced of  the superiority of  the indigenous Assamese variety, 
camellia Assamica, that starting in the 1870s, they began to widely publish that the tea plant 
originated in India and that there was no proof  that it had been grown in earlier periods of  Chinese 
history!
135 AC archives. MS9925-1/871. And in fall 1847: “The deficiency of  labor in Assam has obliged 
Mr. Mornay to close the harvest prematurely .... But for this there seems little doubt that at last 
10,000 lbs. more tea might have been secured. It is advisable that the question have early 
consideration in order that arrangements may be made to procure coolies and dispatch them to 
Assam with as little delay as possible.” AC archives. 9925-1,1014
136 In a letter from 1845: “Upwards of  250 Kacharies having absconded at different times 
particularly after receiving their May wages altho’ every means were resorted to, to keep them.”
137 In 1847: “Great difficulty is experienced to secure a full complement of  Coolies owing to Public 
Works and Roads being carried on by Government.” AC archives. 9925-1, 1136.
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other crops, whose seasons overlapped with tea. In September 1847, an indigo planter wrote that 
“labourers and their families” from “the districts of  Beerbhoom and Burdwan” “can be obtained in 
any number after the middle of  November,” after indigo season ended.138 Tea season, of  course, 
spanned spring and summertime. 
But, at their essence, these individual problems boiled down to the same matter: workers were 
faced with more enticing options. It would seem the Company could address this with greater pay. 
When the London Board of  Directors suggested that “the Bengalee Coolies” had absconded due to 
excessive work, the Superintendent replied “that such is not the case, those of  the Kacharies have 
left on account of  the reduction in their rate of  pay.” What about paying them more? The 
superintendent “abstained from returning to the old rate of  pay under the conviction that such a 
course would encourage the coolie to further demands. Has preferred fighting the battle out.”139
“Fighting the battle out”: this phrase characterizes the attitude of  the tea industry in the years 
prior to, and also throughout the era of  the indentured labor contract. The issue at stake was not the 
absolute shortage of  labor but rather labor economics. How much were planters willing to pay? These 
issues bubbled to the surface in a tense exchange years later. A shareholder in London, fed up with 
the intractability of  the “labor question,” declared “in the strongest manner that it was idle to say 
that labour could not be readily obtained, - that he had lived for 15 years in India, & would pledge 
his word that sufficient labour could be obtained.” He then “warned the Shareholders that unless 
more vigilance was used with reference to this matter, the Company’s plantations would soon 
become a mass of  jungle.” In reply, the leaders of  the Assam branch wrote that the man must “have 
left this country nearly 15 years ago, since which time circumstances have changed materially, and his 
experience is now of  little real value.” They added in a sarcastic tone that the man “[should have] 
been good enough to point out the ‘right means’ which should be adopted to secure us a sufficient 
138 AC archives. 9925/1. 1190.
139 AC archives. 9925-5 (1848),111.
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supply of  labour of  the kind that we require, & at a cost that the Company can afford.” The board added, 
“We can procure any number of  unsuitable people if expense is no object.”140
Were the company willing to pay greater rates, they could find more workers. Fearing precedent, 
however, they lowered wages to keep costs low.141 By May 1850, labor appeared to planters as the last 
remaining barrier to growth, as plantation managers had begun to figure out the mechanics of  
cultivation and processing. “The confidence of  the proprietors in those who have the management 
of  the Company,” it was recorded, “is for the first time established.”142 In a bitter twist, this 
confidence magnified the dispiriting prospects for mobilizing a proper labor force: “[t]he Company 
has perhaps never been in a more unfavorable position regarding labor than at this moment.”143
The decade-long process whereby the Assam Company pinpointed labor as the central question 
of  Indian tea was crystallized in 1853 by a retirement letter from the outgoing director. In the letter, 
H. Burkinyoung offered advice and philosophical ruminations on the direction of  the company. He 
suggested that the initial years of  the private company provided a warning about the application of  
capital and a lesson in political economy:
In all cases Capital, which has been considered a primary, has proved to be only a secondary 
object, and that the primary want in all enterprize is the practical ability by which the application 
of  capital is to be effected …. 
140 AC archives. 9925/11.276-278. Emphases are in the original.
141 As a result, because the gardens were so understaffed, Board members were also confident that 
expenditures on labor would yield great increases of  marginal profit: “Increased labour will be 
required to continue [clearing out land], the expense of  which will be counterbalanced by the 
augmentation of  the crops.” AC archives. 9925/1.1195.
142 AC archives. 9925/5.143.
143 AC archives. 9925/6. 1852.
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Capital alone did not yield profit -- only its application did. What did Burkinyoung mean by 
“application of  capital”? He named “the supply of  labour” as the “most substantial ground of  
prosperity for the future.” Limiting himself  to his concrete experiences in Assam, Burkinyoung 
confidently identified the abstract property of  labor, the most obvious “application of  capital,” as 
the “primary” concern that superseded even capital in the hierarchy of  tea economics. In this sense, 
Burkinyoung’s observations indirectly rebuked the post-Physiocratic assumptions of  Bentinck, 
Eden, and the other men responsible for leading the tea experiments of  the 1830s. For those men, 
the materiality of  the tea and the soil itself  was the original source of  economic value. In 
Burkinyoung’s experience, however, it had become clear that labor occupied supreme importance 
insofar as the company, without enough labor, was unable to properly apply its capital. As proof  for 
his statement that capital was in fact “only a secondary object,” he cited personal difficult 
experiences: “no more striking illustration of  the fact exists than in the Assam Company itself, when 
with twenty lacs of  capital it failed to accomplish any significant practical results.”144
The Assam Company continually discovered that labor circumvented their ability to generate 
value out of  the land. One year after Burkinyoung’s retirement, the company superintendent, 
George Williamson, recommended the company cease its expansion of  land clearances, for labor 
had limited his ability to properly cultivate the plants in the soil. After listing several difficulties with 
the local Assamese groups, he concluded “I am convinced that a steady influx of  labour from 
Bengal can alone enable the Company to advantageously extend its operations, and that until this 
can be accomplished … it would be more profitable in every way to discontinue making further 
additions to the area under cultivation.”145 In response to Williamson’s observations, the 
representative of  the London board commented that the “great impediment” facing the Company 
was “present inadequate supply of  labour.”  Soberly, he noted that with this drawback “it would be 
144 H. Burkinyoung, quoted in Antrobus 1957, 477-478.
145 G. Williamson, quoted in Antrobus 1957, 485. February 16, 1854.
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imprudent for us to expend money upon new clearances with but little chance of  having sufficient 
labour to cultivate them afterwards.”146 Finally, later in the decade, when more firms had joined the 
tea business, they wrote to the Government of  Bengal with the unanimous opinion that “the first 
and most important factor which militated against the more rapid expansion of  tea planting was the 
acute shortage of  labour in the province.”147
In all these examples, individuals came to realize the importance of  labor through its absence. 
The scarcity of  labor acted as a limitation on the other factors of  political economy, capital and land. 
In Smith’s own doctrine, he had attributed the original powers of  economic improvement to 
exchange and the market, writing, “As it is the power of  exchanging that gives occasion to the 
division of  labour, so the extent of  this division must always be limited by the extent of  that power, 
or, in other words, by the extent of  the market.”148 In the context of  Assam, planters inverted 
Smith’s formulation. Instead of  pointing to “exchange” as the limit on improvement, “labor” was 
now the precondition for land and capital to accumulate greater value.
Although the Assam Company had successfully cobbled together a profitable system of  
cultivating tea, labor shortages hampered the industry for years. During the intervening years 
between the end of  the government tea experiments and the sixties, Indian tea had failed to live up 
to officials’ earlier optimism. After several bad harvests in the forties, “the Company tottered on the 
brink of  utter ruin.”149 Even after the Company had begun to recover and pay dividends, production 
remained relatively small, and it relied upon manual techniques not dissimilar from those of  the 
peasantry. Thus, “until the ‘sixties the tea industry was hardly a carrier of  the fruits of  the industrial 







In order to remedy this frustrating situation of  untapped potential, the Government of  India 
passed a series of  laws in the late 1850s and early sixties aimed at encouraging greater investment 
into Assam. The economic consequences of  such policies will be featured in chapter five, but for 
now, the remainder of  the current chapter seeks to analyze logic behind those new policies. 
Departing from the originally stated goals of  the Government of  India, officials now decided to 
actively promote investment into tea and the sale of  lands to the highest bidders. After a decade-
long false start in the branch of  Assam tea, Indian government officials and potential capitalists, 
many of  whom were retired officials, had begun to agitate for more government intervention. They 
displayed a new confidence in supporting capitalist agriculture on a large scale, rather than the 
smallholder commercial farms that Eden and Prinsep idealized in their correspondence over 
Chinese teamakers in the 1830s. The balance had begun to tip decisively in favor of  actively creating 
a marketplace, rather than passively allowing one to take shape, and “Improvement” was now 
dressed up in the idiom of  “colonization.” 
William Nassau Lees’ radical critique of  political economy
The new sentiments were best captured in a tract written by William Nassau Lees in late 1862 and 
early 1863. Lees was employed as an orientalist at Fort William College in Calcutta, with dozens of  
publications translating Arabic and Persian texts. But he was also an amateur student in political 
economy. Arriving in Bengal in the 1840s, he undoubtedly received the same training in political 
economic science at Haileybury College as had generations of  colonial officials before him. Lees 
also benefited from occupying a curious position both as a government official well-versed in 
doctrinaire political texts and as a private investor. While looking for information on the 




attempts to invigorate the stagnant tea industry. Intrigued, he collected all the information on tea he 
could, and he also invested his savings into owning several small tea tracts. As such, he occupied a 
vantage point particularly well-suited to grasp the twin objectives of  “political economy” implied in 
the title of  the science: governance and wealth creation. Unlike officials who were removed from the 
daily problems facing planters, Lees could sympathize with businessmen such as Burkinyoung, head 
of  the Assam Company, who had clearly voiced the vexing “labor question” in 1853. But Lees was 
also closer to the halls of  power than Burkinyoung, and he could translate the labor question from a 
practical concern into a theoretical puzzle that dogged political economy as a science. His was a 
voice that perfectly captured the sentiments of  a nascent planter industry that was gradually 
asserting more influence in government. In his own words, he wrote “both from the settler’s or self  
interest stand-point, and from a higher point of  view.”151
In his tract Tea cultivation, cotton and other agricultural experiments in India (1863), Lees encouraged the 
investment of  British capital into the stagnant Indian industries of  tea in Assam and cotton in 
Bombay, both to provide an outlet for idle capital back home but also to promote wealth in the 
colonies.152 The actual degree of  influence that Lees exerted on tea policy is difficult to measure, but, 
as I describe below, he did successfully attract the attention of  the highest political powers in India. 
Further, his name and ideas periodically surfaced in colonial correspondence during the sixties. 
Rather than trying to connect Lees’ writings with specific policies, however, I present Lees’ ideas 
because they most clearly demonstrated a new confident attitude that government should exhaust its 
resources to secure a waged labor force for the gardens. If  the observations of  the Assam Company 
constituted an early articulation that labor was the “primary” element of  industry, then Lees’ 
151 William Nassau Lees, Tea Cultivation, Cotton and Other Agricultural Experiments in India: A Review 
(London: W.H. Allen, 1863), 211. Henceforth “Lees 1863a.”
152 Many of  the sections from this first book were reproduced in a longer book on Indian 
agricultural policy as a whole in 1867. William Nassau Lees, The Land and Labour of  India: A Review 
(London: Williams and Norgate, 1867). 
CHAPTER TWO
96
publication was the next step in the evolution of  an idea. He served as a sort of  bridge between the 
immediate concerns of  planters in Assam in the 1830s and the new indentured labor policies that 
eventually achieved consensus in the Indian government by the late seventies. Neither Burkinyoung 
nor Lees were directly responsible for the indentured labor laws of  the 1880s, but they were 
forebears of  the sentiments that undergird those policies. Further, if  it is true that those later laws 
cannot be directly attributed to either individual, then it must also be acknowledged that no one was 
singly responsible for their passage. Rather, by the time officials passed the laws of  1873 and 1882, 
officials framed them as an objective necessity for the colonial administration. The history of  the 
transformation from non-interventionist political economy to labor colonization, therefore, is best 
understood as the emergence of  a new logic that seemed natural and self-evident to all in 
government, and no individual better articulated the philosophical contours of  that logic than Lees.
In his text, Lees began at the level of  abstract political economy, attacking the Smithian doctrine 
of  laissez-faire government policies. He argued that the liberal belief  that commerce “is best left in 
the hands of  individuals, without any interference from Government” was “tantamount to telling a 
ship-wrecked man that he must not catch hold of  his neighbor.”153 Although he professed great faith 
in functioning markets, Lees claimed that in times of  crises, government must intervene. He had in 
mind the American Civil War, which had shut down the cotton industry of  the American south and 
left British investors without profitable opportunities to invest their savings. He believed that Indian 
cotton and tea were the perfect outlet for this idle capital, and the Government of  India’s duty was 
to actively promote their growth. “It seems almost ludicrous to be talking ‘first principles,’ at this 
hour of  the day,” he wrote, “but if  people will preach, and act, as if  they supposed the pharmacopeia 
of  Economic Science, contained remedies for all the ills that trade is heir to, and pertinaciously 




outside and beyond the control of  its laws, there is no help for it.”154
Lees then specified the man whose philosophy was behind such irresponsible governance: Adam 
Smith. What made Smith so influential, according to Lees, was not the profundity of  his insights but 
their early date. He had published his ideas before others, but many had already revised them with 
greater rigor. Lees then made the methodological claim that political economic knowledge should 
not be merely abstract but also “progressive” and “dynamic”:
… [E]xperience has shown that Adam Smith’s knowledge was defective; and that his opinions, 
on very many points, were erroneous . . . . Certainly, looking at the very long time it has taken 
Europe to acknowledge the general truth of  many sound theories propounded by the elder 
Smith, they will admit that, had the writings of  Mill, Ricardo, De Quincey, and many others who 
have since successfully attempted a practical adaptation of  the theories of  this science to the 
progressive advance in knowledge and social philosophy of  succeeding periods, been exhumed 
from the debris of  some ancient ruin, a century before the birth of  Adam Smith, they would not 
have been received as Gospels….155
Far from a purely academic slog through the giants of  economic thought, Lees’ underlying 
motivation was to posit a historicist justification for greater European influence in an uncivilized 
land such as India. In a country of  “many stages of  civilization,” in which “the great bulk of  the 
middle and lower classes of  the people of  the mofussil of  India, may be said to be in the Agricultural 
stage of  civilization,” government surely would need to draw upon different resources than its faith 
in self-regulating markets.156 The “duty” of  government was to encourage greater flows of  British 
capital into India. This would fulfill the promise of  wealth for locals and also benefit a mother 
country (Britain) that had dangerously relied upon foreign countries for raw materials. 
Central to his vision was tea: “There is no feature, as I said in introducing this subject, in the 
commercial policy of  the Government of  India of  which it has a right to feel more justly proud 
than the introduction of  the TEA PLANT into India.” Tea cultivation, he estimated, would best 
154 Lees 1863a, 108.




accomplish “that end which all profess to have so near at heart ... - the introduction into India of  
British Capital.”157
The significance of  Lees’ logic was twofold. First, he introduced the idea that political economic 
thought must react accordingly to crises and irregular market patterns. This theme would reappear 
with each boom-bust cycle, not only in the Indian tea industry but worldwide. Second, his logic 
reflected the actual thought process which led investors and companies to enter Assam tea during 
the sixties. When tea capitalists looked at Assam tea country in the 1860s, as I shall detail in chapter 
five, they saw the exact picture Lees described: a safe outlet for idle capital. This offered the benefits 
of  “affording her [England] a safe investment for some millions of  her surplus capital - and as 
offering her a suitable outlet for a large portion of  her middle class population.”158
Finally, near the end of  his tract, Lees traced the movement of  overseas capital to the actual 
operations of  tea concerns on the ground. There, he admitted that capital seemed to be stifled by 
the inadequacy of  local labor. In a clear contrast with the officials of  the 1830s, who were optimistic 
about their prospects for fostering commercial farming habits among locals, Lees instead 
emphasized that “the peoples of  Assam are not like Hindustánis, nor yet like their neighbours, the 
Bengálís.”159 Officials had falsely assumed that local Assamese groups would eventually participate in 
commercial cultivation, and this mistake was the chief  reason that labor recruitment had always 
remained an issue of  secondary importance. Officials had fallen back upon the latent assumption in 
Smith’s writing on the colonies, that the high ratio of  land and wealth to labor meant that wages 
would remain high and naturally attract sufficient bodies to work the plantations. Lees declared that 
this assumption had been unfounded. Thus, because labor recruitment had been a peripheral 
157 Lees 1863a, 168-9.
158 Lees 1863a, 173-4.
159 William Nassau Lees, A Memorandum Written after a Tour through the Tea Districts of  Eastern Bengal in 
1864-65 (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press, 1866), 7.
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concern, government had never applied a consistent and effective solution. 
This reorientation towards labor marked a further break from the post-Physiocratic assumptions 
of  the 1830s. Tea labor displaced the focus on the tea farmer, earlier imagined as a Chinese farmer, 
as the new subject of  the tea economy. Lees framed this plea for paying attention to labor as a 
decisive shift away from framing tea exclusively as a matter of  the soil. In his original tract, he 
discussed the failures of  the Physiocrat-influenced Permanent Settlement of  Bengal. He then 
argued, “that which first merits attention, and is of  far more pressing importance than the title of  
property in the soil ... is Labor.”160 He pointed out the circumstances of  the tea countries of  
northeast India, in which a “soil of  which will literally produce any crop in luxuriant abundance.” 
The land there was beset not only with the problem of  underpopulation but also the curse of  a 
population that “so indolent and lazy, that the productive powers of  the soil are, comparatively 
speaking, allowed to lie almost wholly dormant.”161
Lees then returned to his earlier theme: the irresponsibility of  a non-intervening state and the 
inadequacy of  abstract political economy. In place of  an outmoded theory of  commerce, Lees 
proposed his own political economy of  tea as a solution to the vexing “Indian question”:
Now for the attainment of  this much desired end, two things are vitally necessary. Population and 
Capital; but primarily population. In these two then, consists the real wealth of  India; and of  the 
two population is the most valuable, for without labor, in this matter, Capital is as it were, locked 
up and useless.162
Lees’ articulation shared an uncanny resemblance with Burkinyoung’s own formulation written years 





before: that the “application” of  capital -- labor -- was primary, and capital itself  was secondary. Lees 
believed that older political theories were inadequate because they did not recognize the proper 
hierarchy between these two elements.  The government’s crime had been to treat the Assam 
question as “one of  labor and capital, instead of  one of  Colonization, into which the relation of  these 
elements, from the Government point of  view, did not enter at all.”163  In other words, the 
government had considered labor and capital as Smith had, as two independent factors that obeyed 
the rational principles of  supply and demand. A theory of  colonization, on the other hand, 
recognized that labor was a prerequisite that enabled capital to do its job.
With the mention of  “colonization,” Lees brought to mind the work of  Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, who was known as the foremost champion of  policies of  colonization. Lees bemoaned 
the Indian government’s failure to apply Wakefield’s colonization plans, and he repeatedly cited his 
policies with admiration. “The most approved plan— that which has been attended with so much 
success in Australia and New Zealand,” he wrote, “is that called the Wakefield system.” 
Unfortunately, this “excellent system” appeared “unknown, or altogether set aside in Bengal.” The 
Indian government had failed to consider colonization because of  a failure to “treat” the labor 
question “philosophically.”164 The philosophical principles of  colonization and its relationship to the 
labor question were treated most clearly in Wakefield’s essay “The Art of  Colonization” (1834). 
There, Wakefield mounted a critique of  the hallowed place of  free labor in political economy. I will 
briefly spell out one critical thread of  his argumentation.
Wakefield criticized Smith’s assumption that the  mechanisms of  supply and demand would 
naturally solve labor shortages. Free labor, he claimed, did not necessarily obtain in a colony, 






compared these areas to raw materials which required extra elements before they could fully rise. “As 
flour is an element of  bread, so is waste land an element of  colonization,” he wrote. “But as flour, 
which has been turned into pie-crust, will not make bread, so neither is waste land, which has 
become private property, an element of  colonization.”166 What was the missing ingredient? For 
Wakefield, the implication was clear, and he would have approved Marx’s later characterization that 
“Labour is the yeast thrown into it, which starts it fermenting.”167
Wakefield’s most incisive observation about the shortcomings of  political economy arrived in a 
footnote to his essay on colonization. In the main body, he addressed the objection raised by others 
that colonization schemes were too costly and hence a drain on capital. In his footnote, Wakefield 
argued that, to the contrary, capital without labor was useless. He proceeded by closely reading 
towering figures such as Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and David Ricardo. Then, he pinpointed what 
he called a “non sequitur” in their line of  reasoning. These writers had begun from the premise that 
capital was the foundation of  wealth creation, and hence, productive activity was limited by the 
amount of  capital available for investment. Again, this resembled Smith’s line that the division of  
labor was limited by the extent of  the market. Those writers, however, seduced themselves into 
believing that because only capital could employ labor, then capital necessarily would find labor to be 
employed. That, Wakefield thought, was a logical fallacy.168 Elsewhere, Wakefield stated his position 
more forcefully: “it is not true that all capital employs labour. To say so, is to say that which a 
166 Wakefield 1968, 526.
167 Marx 1973, 298.
168 Wakefield, 517. “This one principle is stated as follows in the first paragraph of  Bentham’s 
Manual of  Political Economy. ‘No kind of  productive labour of  any importance can be carried on 
without capital. From hence it follows, that the quantity of  labour applicable to any object, is limited 
by the quantity of  capital which can be employed in it.’ Doubtless; but then the principle is, ‘the 
limitation of  production and trade by the limitation of  capital’ of  which there is employment. The words 
which I have added, in italics, make all the difference. It does not follow that, because labour is 
employed by capital, capital always finds a field in which to employ labour. This is the non sequitur 
always taken for granted by Bentham, Ricardo, Mill, M’Culloch, and others.”
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thousand facts prove to be untrue. Capital frequently increases without providing any more 
employment for labour.”169
In this “non sequitur of  political economy” lay, for Wakefield, the fatal oversight that 
shortcircuited mainstream theories of  political. In the specific sector of  tea, W.N. Lees had 
pinpointed the same non sequiter when he accused the Indian Government of  viewing capital and 
labor as equal considerations, failing to prioritize labor as the foundation for “colonization.” Lees 
pushed his argument further by speculating that the Indian Government’s failures were rooted in a 
methodological failure. Specifically, officials had not yet learned to adapt to the exceptional 
conditions in eastern India: “It is a common idea, adopted perhaps more generally by Englishmen 
than by the people of  any other country, to suppose that the principles of  good government are the 
same all over the world,” he admonished. This “fatal error” had “cost perhaps more money and 
bloodshed in India than any other, and the evil effects of  which meet the traveller at every turn in 
Assam.”170 This observation only strengthened the resemblances between Lees and Wakefield’s 
respective intellectual paths, for Wakefield had himself  developed his theories of  colonization while 
spending time abroad, living in Australia and reading about the Americas. For both men, their 
overseas experience had taught them about the necessity of  expanding upon the virtues of  Smith’s 
abstract political economy by adjusting it to changing historical and geographic circumstances. Lees 
concluded that “taking into account the great increase to our knowledge of  the true principles of  
169 Wakefield, 515.
170 Lees 1866, 6-7. Lees echoed this sentiment in the preface to his second work on agriculture in 
India: “My chief  object in writing at all was, that I believed then, as I believe still, that though the 
principles of  political economy are the same all over the world, it is to their judicious application to 
the circumstances and conditions of  things around us, rather than to a blind adherence to the bald 
principles of  the science itself, that we must look for the happiest results. I thought, therefore, that I 
might serve some useful purpose by attempting to show how widely different are the conditions and 
circumstances of  this great Empire and its peoples to the conditions and circumstances of  Europe 
and the peoples of  any of  the great nations it contains; and how it was the in ability of  Englishmen 
generally to appreciate this fact, which rendered so many well conceived projects for the benefit of  
India barren of  good results.” Lees 1867, iv.
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colonization within the last quarter of  a century,” namely, the theories expounded by Wakefield, “it 
seems almost incomprehensible, that, with such very willing helps as the tea planters of  Assam and 
Cachar, no attempt whatever should have been made to take advantage of  the opportunity to put 
them into practice.”171
Lees’ original tract on the tea countries of  India was read far more widely than Lees anticipated, 
and it was also reviewed positively.172 It also attracted the attention of  his superiors in the 
government of  India.  In the winter of  1864, Lees prepared to reward himself  for working thirty-
three consecutive months in the colonial administration by traveling through the tea districts of  
“eastern Bengal” and Assam for three months -- his first visit to the region. On the eve of  his 
departure, he “breakfasted with the Governor General of  India, and His Excellency did me the 
honor to evince an interest in my approaching tour.” Lees felt compelled to first confess to the 
governor-general that “I was myself  carrying on very large operations in tea, and was very deeply 
interested in what was commonly called the ‘labor question.’” Without flinching, the governor-
general “added that that was precisely the reason why he had been induced to ask me to look into 
the matter, because, sharing the confidence of  both tea planters and Government, and going 
amongst the former as one of  themselves, I would be looked upon with less suspicion than one sent 
officially by Government to report on the question.”173
Lees bragged about this encounter in his own publications, a sign that he saw himself  as a sort 
of  pioneer whose unique status as both bureaucrat and planter allowed him to recognize the acute 
problems facing eastern India. His writings aimed to give voice to a silent majority of  capitalist 
interests whose time had come. “It seems to me preferable to incur individually the odium which 






remain silent on a point “ a very large and influential section of  the mercantile community of  
Calcutta, and both the English and Indian public, are very deeply interested.”174 Lees’ views attained 
a wider acceptance within the government soon after the publication of  his works. By the late 1870s, 
the same logic of  colonization -- that the government needed to adopt an Assam-specific policy 
shifting its focus to labor mobilization -- had become common sense, even if  it was not attributed 
specifically to Lees.
Debates over labor policy in the 1870s merely began where W.N. Lees had left off  one decade 
earlier. In his forceful and prescient appeal for paying greater attention to labor, Lees had delivered a 
eulogy for an earlier era, wherein Physiocratic assumptions remained latent among colonial 
policymakers. In doing so, Lees and others had set the table for a new period in the history of  




Incense and industry: Strategies of  labor intensification in the 
tea districts of  Huizhou and the Wuyi Mountains
Introduction
Officials in eastern India had sought, and failed, to reproduce the Chinese commercial farmer in 
Assam. They had idealized this figure as a model of  the industrious tenant cultivator outlined in 
Adam Smith’s descriptions of  commercial agriculture. This chapter endeavors to demonstrate that 
although British traders and officials failed in their mission, and although they could not have 
meaningfully understood Chinese society at the time, their characterizations of  commercial 
agriculture in China were surprisingly accurate. As the Indian tea industry struggled to expand 
during the first few decades after the initial 1830s experiments, the Chinese export tea trade climbed 
to new heights over the same period, growing steadily for nearly a full half-century following the end 
of  the first Opium War (1842). This immense expansion of  production was enabled both by an 
increase in the absolute numbers of  people, lands, and resources poured into the trade but also the 
emergence of  more efficient methods of  production. Through an analysis of  changing patterns of  
commercial tea production in Huizhou, Anhui and the Wuyi Mountains of  Fujian, this chapter 
demonstrates that increased opportunities for commerce over the course of  the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries resulted in greater specialization and productivity gains in the cultivation and 





Indeed, rural tea production in late Qing China was far more dynamic than previously imagined 
by historical scholarship. Tea producers in Huizhou and the Wuyi Mountains, despite exhibiting few 
signs of  technological breakthroughs, became enmeshed in the social dynamics of  endless capital 
accumulation, distinguished by an obsessive fixation on productivity. In order to survive in a world 
market increasingly crowded by domestic and overseas competition, inland tea merchants assumed 
greater control over production, contracting out work to factory managers who supervised seasonal 
workers. Those managers in turn chased increased levels of  productivity by reshaping the labor 
process to become more efficient, coordinated, and specialized. Thus, the inland factories relied 
upon a two-pronged strategy of  time measurement and labor discipline to finely map out the 
coordinated movements of  tasks such as picking, roasting, sifting, and sorting leaves. This emphasis 
upon productivity -- squeezing out a greater rate of  outputs (tea) per labor input -- constituted a 
strategy of  “labor-intensive industrialization.”2 Inland tea merchants, in other words, attempted to 
remain profitable in a world of  falling prices by asking seasonal laborers to work harder, faster, and 
for less reward.
Although seemingly basic, this process, I believe, can help resolve an enduring problem within 
the historiography of  Chinese capitalism that I briefly introduced in earlier chapters: how to 
reconcile the competing images of  early modern commerce with modern industrialization? Whereas 
scholars of  Ming and Qing China have emphasized the sophisticated nature of  past institutions of  
exchange -- for instance, market networks for grains, textiles, and salt -- twentieth-century Chinese 
history remains animated by attempts to “catch up” with global competition by improving methods 
and tools for production. The question of  transition between these two eras has often been addressed 
2 This general concept of  “labor-intensive industrialization” has previously been explored through 
wide-ranging surveys of  late imperial Chinese history, and this chapter seeks to develop and specify 
the concept through a more in-depth examination of  the production processes in the two major 
export tea-growing regions of  the nineteenth century. Pomeranz 2000, 91-106. Also, cf. Kenneth 
Pomeranz, “Labour-Intensive Industrialization in the Rural Yangzi Delta: Late Imperial Patterns and 
Their Modern Fates,” in Labour-Intensive Industrialization in Global History, ed. Gareth Austin and 
Kaoru Sugihara (New York: Routledge, 2013), 122–43.
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by marking the earliest instances of  mechanization in late Qing China.3 As a result, labor-intensive 
Qing agriculture was viewed by an older Sinological tradition as trapped in a holding pattern. 
Without the arrival of  truly modern industry from America and Europe in the form of  machines 
for processing cotton, silk, and tea, it was claimed, Chinese society remained stagnant and 
“involutionary.”4 If  peasants and laborers worked harder back then, they did so not in order to 
accumulate capital but simply to keep their heads above water in the face of  Malthusian population 
pressures and Ricardian diminishing returns from the land.5
But the question of  why late imperial Chinese society failed to independently develop labor-
saving devices faces analytical and logical limitations. Namely, it is “modular” in two senses: 
temporally and spatially.6 First, it anachronistically views the early modern world through the lens of  
twentieth-century industrialization. Second, it places Chinese history in an impossible comparison 
with Europe, where the only (circular) conclusion can be that China did not share the same historical 
experience of  capitalist transformation as their counterparts to the west. Certainly, no one would 
dispute that in the last century, capital-intensive, labor-saving technologies became the sine qua non of  
economic growth; however, it would be an inductive fallacy to equate the lack of  those technical 
benchmarks with the lack of  development in earlier periods, whether in China or elsewhere.7 Thus, 
rather than asking whether late imperial China developed as modern Europe had (clearly, “no”), it 
3 For instance, Albert Feuerwerker’s China’s Early Industrialization (1970) Kwang-Ching Liu’s essays 
collected in China’s Early Modernization and Reform Movement: Historical perspectives (2009). 
4 Huang 1990, 11-17.
5 Elvin 1972. Cf. Mark Elvin, “The Historian as Haruspex,” New Left Review, no. 52 (August 2008), 
92, fn16: “Economists will recognize Ricardo as the chief  source of  the idea of  the ‘high-level 
equilibrium trap’.…”
6 I have borrowed this critique of  “modularity” from Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: 
Culturalism in the Age of  Capital (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2008), 71.
7 Banaji 2011, 255-256. Kaoru Sugihara, “The Second Noel Butlin Lecture: Labour-Intensive 




would be more instructive to ask in what ways integration into global markets was reshaping Chinese 
society?8 As Frank Perlin observed long ago, development has meant different things in different 
eras: “economic development in the period before industrialization was mainly characterized by 
changes in the size and organization of  circulating [as opposed to fixed] capital, and in its increasing 
control over large quantities of  labour extensively dispersed through space in households and large 
workshops.”9  
Along similar lines, Kaoru Sugihara has recently argued that labor intensification was not always 
a sign of  “involution,” as Huang argued, but rather could feature an expansive, “developmental” 
character. The “prevailing account” of  economic history that “focused on capital rather than 
labour,” Sugihara claimed, only narrowly told the story of  the “Western path” of  growth, “with 
emphasis on capital-intensive and resource-intensive technology.”10 As a result, it has ignored the 
possibilities of  labor-intensive growth, which has animated much of  Asian history since the 
nineteenth century. Producers and firms in Asia who relied primarily upon human labor were able to 
improve efficiency despite the relative paucity of  new labor-saving technology.11 Such strategies, in 
hindsight, prepared Asian economies for unprecedented growth in the late twentieth century, the 
result of  labor-intensive methods fused with capital-intensive industrialization and whose success 
became known as the “flying geese pattern of  economic development.”12
8 Sartori, 71.
9 Perlin 1983, 91. 
10 Sugihara 2007, 121-123.
11 Suighara 2003, 90. A clear instance of  this strategy was the shift from single to double-crop 




The wide-ranging ramifications of  Sugihara’s thesis have caught the attention of  historians 
working across the globe.13 Most recently, sociologist Giovanni Arrighi (2007) cited it as a departure 
point for his own study on China, and he declared correctly that Sugihara had advanced a historical 
hypothesis rather than an exhaustive empirical account.14  As a work of  speculative theory, Sugihara’s 
claims about labor-intensive growth should be considered a provocation for more research, a 
formulation of  new questions rather than a solution to old ones. 
In the same spirit, this chapter aims to demonstrate how circulating tea merchant capital in Qing 
China, accumulated through patterns characteristic of  early modern commerce, could intensively 
reshape rural production in synch with greater productivity driven by competition, a phenomenon 
we typically associate with modern industry.15 Tea merchants over the course of  the nineteenth 
century consciously reorganized the labor process to become more productive, long before the 
arrival of  steam-driven machines imported from Britain and Germany. Domestic and overseas 
competition regularized trade, caused prices to fall, and compelled merchants to cut costs by raising 
productivity. Pace Elvin and Huang, labor intensification in this sense was driven not by the “natural” 
laws of  overpopulation and land quality but rather the social tendencies of  capital accumulation to 
compel greater output at less cost. Tea merchants were not compensating for falling productivity but 
13 Jan de Vries (1994) was inspired to study the labor-intensive “industrious revolution” of  early 
modern Europe, and Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) mobilized de Vries’ model as a counterweight to 
Philip Huang’s “involutionary growth.” Cf. Jan De Vries, “The Industrial Revolution and the 
Industrious Revolution,” The Journal of  Economic History 54, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 249–70.
14 “If  we identify ‘evolution’ and ‘development’ as the displacement of  labor-intensive household 
production by capital-intensive production in units employing wage labor, as Huang and Brenner do, 
then this disappearance [of  wage-labor-based farms] should indeed be characterized as 
‘involutionary.’ But if  we leave open the possibility that labor-intensive production may play a lasting role 
in the promotion of  economic development, as Sugihara hypothesizes, then such a characterization is 
unwarranted.” Arrighi, 39. Italics added. 
15 This phenomenon that I focus on here resembles what Banaji called “the subsumption of  labour 
into merchant-capital” (273), or, what Perlin simply called “commercial manufacture” (43). Among 
Chinese historians, Wong (37-52) also described a process of  expansive “proto-industrial” 
production before the advent of  capital-intensive labor-saving technologies. N.B. my approach, 
however, is indebted to Perlin’s critique of  the “proto-industrialization” category.
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aiming to raise it.
If  these findings can withstand scrutiny, then they also suggest that the history of  Chinese 
capitalism cannot be reduced to the physical emergence of  labor-saving devices, as has been one 
tendency, but rather hinges upon the very social question of  capital itself. How did merchants 
integrated into global circuits of  exchange pursue profit by rationalizing social activities? This 
mention of  “rationalization” undoubtedly brings to mind Weber’s classic essay on the “capitalist 
spirit,” and, indeed, my argument is in many ways an historical specification of  Weber’s acute 
observation that notions of  productivity -- the recognition that “time is money” -- could emerge in 
social contexts which nevertheless lacked visible technological breakthroughs.16 If  a historically 
specific notion of  productivity and time can displace a singular focus on machinery as the crucial 
marker of  a modern, industrial social dynamic, then it becomes possible to imagine how methods of  
human labor could itself  be reorganized more efficiently and “industrially.” Herein lies a crucial 
difference between capital versus labor-intensive growth. Whereas the former creates technologies 
that exceed physical limits on speed and power, the latter economizes activity within those limits. The 
temporal dimension of  labor intensification emerged sharply in the analysis of  economist Michel 
Aglietta, who described “the intensification of  labour” as an increase in the amount of  time during 
which workers produce surplus value, instead of  merely replacing the cost of  inputs, within a 
constant working period.17 Historically, he observed, “an increase in labour intensity is obtained 
16 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of  Capitalism and Other Writings (1905), trans. Peter 
Baehr and Gordon C. Wells (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 9-14.
17 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of  Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London: New Left Books, 
1979), 49-50. Notably, Aglietta also suggested that because labor intensification relies upon old 
technologies to achieve new levels of  productivity, it is too “complex” for easy classification as either 
extensive or intensive growth. This question, however, appears less of  a problem once we remind 
ourselves that the concepts in question are relative rather than absolute. For both the Marxian 
tradition and a neoclassical economist such as Sugihara, extensive growth (relative surplus-value) is 
defined based on what intensive growth looks like (absolute surplus-value) at a given moment, and 
vice versa (Marx 1976, 646 and Sugihara 2007, 135-136). Rather than attempting to pin down the 
exact contours of  where different forms of  growth begin and end, the more interesting question for 
studying intermediary processes such as labor intensification is their long-run historical significance. 
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chiefly by subordinating labour-power to the continuous and uniform movement of  the machine 
system and increasing the system’s speed of  operation.”18 
It is this relationship between time and labor that serves as the cornerstone of  my argument 
about the expansive, rather than involutionary, nature of  labor intensification in the late Qing tea 
trade. Huizhou and Fujian tea merchants consciously sought to rationalize production time. In order 
to earn profits from a world market flooded with new teas grown domestically and, later, overseas, 
merchants measured the amount of  necessary time spent on tasks such as roasting and rolling tea, 
designed instructions to minimize wasted activity, and used wages to provide workers incentives to 
work as hard as their bodies physically allowed. A dearth of  quantitative data prevents us from 
making definitive conclusions about the outcomes of  this strategy, but a combination of  private 
handbooks, photographs, and social surveys shall demonstrate how merchants held a clear notion of  
productivity and, consequently, consciously sought to economize labor through fixed measurements 
of  time. 
In particular, I demonstrate that the Huizhou merchants deployed a millennia-old device for 
keeping time -- incense sticks that burned at a regular rate -- in order to keep pace with the very 
modern, very dynamic world market for tea. My argument does not hinge upon the degree of  
technical sophistication behind the sticks themselves, for they were certainly less accurate than 
The implication of  my argument is that labor intensification, formerly seen as a type of  extensive 
growth, can be seen as a form of  intensive growth. In Marxian terms, it should also be considered 
part of  the repertoire of relative surplus-value creation. 
Because these definitions are not fixed but historical, their boundaries constantly shift depending 
upon the latest conditions of  world commodity production. Therefore, attempts to make sense of  
real historical description by pinning down the exact contours of  where absolute surplus-value ends 
and relative surplus-value begins appear arbitrary and, in their extreme versions, the stuff  of  
solipsistic debate. The more interesting question for studying intermediary processes such as labor 
intensification is their historical significance. On the incoherence of  the concept of  “transition,” see 
Étienne Balibar, “The Basic Concepts of  Historical Materialism.,” in Reading Capital (London: New 




mechanical clocks. Rather, I believe merchants used the sticks to organize a regimen of  abstract 
“timed labor” resembling the systems of  work discipline which Thompson recognized in his classic 
article on industrial-capitalist conceptions of  time in England. It is the social context of  the tea 
factory, then, rather than the incense sticks themselves which endowed this pre-mechanical labor 
process with an “industrial” character. I will also analyze similar processes of  time discipline in the 
tea workshops of  the Wuyi Mountains. 
In real historical terms, labor-intensive accumulation has meant nothing less than pushing older 
arrangements to their limits. Understandably, de Vries has warned that despite the optimistic title, 
the labor-intensive “the industrious revolution” was not “an admirable thing.” In Europe, it resulted 
in the “self-exploitation” of  women and children, the neglect of  family, lower literacy rates, and 
greater incidences of  “binge drinking and binge leisure.”19 Undoubtedly, similar tales can be found 
around the world and up through the present, not the least of  which in China today.20 
My analysis will proceed in two halves. First, I describe how tea merchant capital in Ming and 
Qing China expanded its sway over rural production in the inland tea districts. Starting in the late 
eighteenth century, itinerant inland merchants traveling between Canton and Anhui or Fujian 
gradually took over control over the processes of  tea cultivation and refinement. As a consequence, 
second, the merchants and factory overseers reshaped the labor process in order to raise 
productivity and efficiency. I substantiate this second claim through a detailed exploration of  how 
time was kept and measured in comparative early modern contexts. My argument will hinge upon 
the distinction between a sense of  time that is concrete and task-oriented versus one that is abstract 
and independent of  tasks. Abstract time, I claim, became a prevalent feature of  late Qing rural tea 
production, the clearest evidence for which will be an analysis of  how labor overseers in Huizhou, 
Anhui used a traditional system of  incense stick timekeeping to closely regulate and encourage the 
19 Jan de Vries, 260.
20 Cf., for instance, the ethnographic work of  Anita Chan, Ching Kwan Lee, and Pun Ngai.
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efficient completion of  teamaking tasks. In northwest Fujian, overseers did not regulate labor with 
physical timekeepers but nonetheless regulated productivity through a system that observers labeled 
“material encouragement and emotional stimulation” (wuzhi guli jingshen ciji).
Finally, I should add that although my arguments are not exclusive to the tea trade, I am not yet 
prepared to generalize them to all of  late Qing China. Instead, what my analysis may be said to 
accomplish is a modest validation of  Fu Yiling, a founder of  Chinese social history, who claimed 
decades ago that the most capitalistic activities “in China did not appear first in the economically 
developed riverine and coastal areas but in some economically backward, mountainous, and rural 
feudal locales.”21 The story, then, begins in the mountains.
The long trajectory of  nineteenth-century tea production
From guest merchant to tea factory
Local historians in China have traditionally recounted the dramatic story of  tea from the 
perspectives of  individual provincial histories. However, each tea country really constituted only one 
particular part of  a general, trans-provincial process, one made visible in the following map dating to 
the turn of  the century. Over the course of  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both the 
Huizhou and Wuyi Mountain regions underwent similar experiences of  integration into the world 
market, albeit with regional differences. Because of  their important roles, they will be treated here as 
representative, but not exhaustive, of  the empire-wide trade. Many other regions also grew tea for
21 Fu Yiling, “Capitalism in Chinese Agriculture: On the Laws Governing Its Development,” Modern 
China 6, no. 3 (1980): 314. Translation modified.
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Figure 5. Tea production map by the British Royal Geographical Society. 
The darkest section on the right overlaps the two regions of  Huizhou in Anhui and the Wuyi 
Mountains in Fujian.22 
overseas markets, and their general patterns of  activity largely mirrored the stories of  Huizhou and 
the Wuyi mountains. These include the Yangloudong region in Hubei and the Ningbo tea districts in
22 J.G. Bartholomew, The Atlas of  the World Commerce Maps, Text and Diagrams (London: George 
Newnes Limited, 1907), 71.
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Zhejiang.23 Local materials on tea from Yongjia, Zhejiang, in fact, provide one of  the most 
comprehensive, albeit highly speculative, statements about the evolution of  tea merchant practices 
over the course of  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:
Based on local legends and partial records, we know tea was first produced from peasants who 
casually plucked and produced tea themselves then sold them to merchants who transported 
them around the country. During the middle of  the Qing, as tea exports increased, tea 
merchants began to further refine leaves in order to meet the desires of  foreign consumers. This 
type of  of  technique, a sort of  tea factory, would buy raw leaves from tea peasants and add 
some processes of  refinement. This was not the same as merely brokering purchases.…In 1895, 
the merchants of  Yongjia, Zhejiang attempted to get more foreign business, so they invited 
Huizhou merchants to come from Shanghai and teach the peasants in the tea districts how to 
cultivate leaves in the tea gardens, how to properly fire the leaves, etc. They sent these leaves to 
Shanghai and enjoyed great business.”24
The passage outlined three key periods in the history of  the trade: first, local peasant producers 
sold their goods to itinerant “guest merchants”; second, during the nineteenth, the merchants then 
became more involved in tea production; and finally, the merchants themselves undertook nearly full 
responsibility for the design and management of  production. This transformation of  inland 
merchant activity can be characterized, to use the Chinese terms, as that from “guest 
merchant” (keshang) to “tea factory” (chachang). The following sections are an attempt to give 
substance to these claims through a detailed exploration of  available materials. First, I look at local 
history materials to give an account of  merchant activity during the years of  the Canton trade (ca. 
1757-1842). Second, I describe developments during the second half  of  the century, during which 
the trade reached new heights of  sales and inspired new levels of  involvement in production.
23 For an excellent thesis on similar issues as they arose in the Yangloudong region, see Ding 
Guangping, “Yangloudong Chaqu Jindai Xiangcun Gongyehua Yu Difang Shehui Jingji 
Bianqian” (Central China Normal University, 2004). This region was the main source of  commercial 
tea that flowed through Hankou, as featured in Rowe 1984, 122-157.
24 Zhongguo Shiye Zhi, Republican Era, quoted in Wang Tingyuan and Zhang Haipeng, Huishang 




The early years of  trade 
As outlined in previous chapters, commercial export teas were originally produced in the sixteenth 
century by monks who resided atop the mountainous regions of  southern Anhui and, later, 
northwest Fujian. But although the monasteries produced the first export teas, they did not 
spearhead the expansion of  tea production. Their job was “entirely of  turning around and selling it 
to the tea guests (chake Ġù).”25 The term “guest,” short for “guest trader” (keshang ùĵ) recurred 
constantly in materials on the tea trade during the early years, before its late nineteenth century 
transformations. The “guest” aspect implied both that the merchant was not settled in the place of  
production but also that he specialized in transporting goods between different locales while 
investing minimal capital into production. Through the mid-nineteenth century, the tea trade was 
organized and directed by outside guest traders. During the period of  the Canton trade, outsiders 
“entered the mountains and fought their way through brambles and bushes, moving hills and turning 
stones, growing plants in weeded areas.”26 Robert Fortune described the country in the 1840s: “As 
the traveller threads his way amongst the rocky scenery of  Woo-e-shan, he is continually coming 
upon these plantations, which are dotted upon the sides of  all the hills. The leaves are of  a rich dark 
green, and afford a pleasing contrast to the strange and often barren scenery which is everywhere 
around.”27 
Merchants from the neighboring province Jiangxi opened many of  the local manufactories for 
sorting and distributing tea, and the long-distance trade to Canton was planned and coordinated in 
conjunction with Cantonese and Shanxi merchants, who became known as “western guests” (xike). 
25 Lin Fuquan, 632. 
26 Lin Fuquan, 638.
27 Fortune 1853, 259.
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“Each merchant house had about two to three million yuan of  capital,” Lin recorded, “and the travel 
of  goods formed an unbroken thread.”28 
In Huizhou, meantime, trade with Canton had a similarly transformative effect on the peasantry 
and traders. Unlike the Wuyi Mountains, however, Huizhou suffered no shortage of  local merchants. 
In fact, the merchants of  Huizhou, famously known as the Huishang (Huizhou merchants), were the 
largest, most successful regional group of  merchants in late imperial China. Huizhou’s most famous 
son, the modern Chinese reformer Hu Shih, recounted the legend of  the land: “So rugged is the 
district that there is very little cultivable land — very little farming land….Thus my people, the 
people in the mountainous area, have had to choose between starvation and going out to trade in the 
cities. They chose trade.”29 The Huizhou merchants grew to prominence in the fifteenth century, and 
almost all literati and gazetteer writings since that period cite the the oft-quoted phrase “many 
mountains, sparse fields” (shanduo tianshao Ùǔ) to explain the disproportionate popularity of  
trade among the region’s men. So widespread were the Huizhou merchants that another popular 
idiom emerged: “it’s not a town without Huizhou merchants” (wuhui bucheng zhen >ǻ3Ȃ). As 
Hu Shih explained, “when my people, the Hui-chou people, get to a place, they will start a small 
store which will soon become a general store that will transform the village into a town.”30 
Thus, a robust network of  experienced merchants had already been installed in south Anhui 
before the emergence of  the export tea trade. As in Fujian, when prices for Songluo teas 
skyrocketed in the eighteenth century, families all around Huizhou began to harvest and sell teas that 
were modeled after the artisanal teas found on Songluo mountain. Although they continued to name 
the tea after the mountain, the newer products became known as “garden” rather than “hill” teas. A 
28 Lin Fuquan, 632.
29 Hu Shih, “The People of  Hui-Chou,” Chinese Studies in History 14, no. 4 (1981), 4.
30 Hu Shih, 5.
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tea merchant in Canton named Tien Hing, explained to a British inspector in the early 1800s: “the 
green tea grown in the towns of  Moo Yuen [Wuyuan], and Hieu Ning [Xiuning] differs in its 
cultivation from that of  other places.” In short, he said, “The garden tea was first brought down to 
Canton in the present dynasty [Qing] to be sent to foreign places. The quantity then gradually 
augmented until every village began to plant it [that is, from the hills] and to manure the ground.”31
Green teas spread out from Songluo mountain into the other counties within Huizhou. In the 
1840s, Robert Fortune confirmed that the actual Songluo mountain was no longer the center of  
production. Instead, it was “very barren, and, whatever may have formerly been the case, it certainly 
produces but little tea now.”32 Two counties in particular became well-known for their teas: Wuyuan 
in the southwest and Shexian in the east. An amateur history of  Shexian, for instance, recalled:
Besides engaging in salt, the great business of  Shexian was tea. They reached as far north as 
Beijing, and as far south as Canton, making great profits. The tea they sold was Songluo. In fact, 
Songluo is a mountain in Xiuning county, outside Shexian. Cultivable land there is sparse, and 
annual production was low, so it was hard to fully supply merchants. Today, the tea known as 
Songluo is mostly grown in the north region of  Shexian. The color and aroma are as good as the 
original, and so guest traders come to buy it from Shexian. Xiuning mountain is now 
abandoned.33
Shexian also was the home base of  by far the most intact and illuminating body of  materials 
from the late Qing tea trade: the personal archives of  the Jiang family of  Fangkeng village. Although 
officially a village, Fangkeng is barely more than a shaded row of  houses that lies some thirty 
kilometers east of  the central market town Tunxi. Even today, finding Fangkeng is nearly impossible 
without catching a ride on a small motorboat across the Xin’an river, which winds across all of  
Huizhou. In the 1980s, historians from Anhui Normal University received an informal tip to contact 
31 Quoted in Ball, 211-212. He also said, whereas “the leaf  of  the hill tea is of  a yellow colour, small 
and thin, and vapid in flavour, and makes middling and common Hyson,” the garden tea, on the 
other hand, “is grown in vegetable gardens, and also on the borders and embankments of  fields.”
32 Fortune 1853, 87.
33 Xu Chengyao, Sheshi xiantan, quoted in Wang and Zhang 2010, 171.
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the Jiang descendants, who had boasted to friends about their trove of  Qing-era documents that 
numbered in the thousands.34 The materials turned out to provide, as far as I am aware, the most in-
depth and personal access to late imperial economic life available to Chinese historians yet.
The Jiang tea merchants from Fangkeng village in Shexian could trace their business activities to 
the middle of  the Wanli era of  the Ming empire (1572-1620). Their family genealogy lists their 
ancestor Jiang Tianwen as “engaged in trade.” His grandson Jiang Kejian (1659-1712) “landed in 
Kengkou village, with red dirt and many hills. He used a license to become a peddler in order to 
acquire some accumulation (qiqu weiji).” The “license” here referred to a “salt license” (yance), for the 
salt trade constituted the “financial backbone” of  the Huizhou merchants through the middle of  the 
nineteenth century.35 Since the late sixteenth century, Shexian merchants relied upon their close ties 
with the government salt administration to obtain licenses and eventually achieve a stranglehold over 
the trade.36 Only with Jiang Qihuan’s grandson Jiang Youke Ł	š (1792-1854) did the clan enter 
into the export tea trade at Canton.37
In the early eighteenth century, Jiang Youke and his son Jiang Wenzuan Ł`ʖ (1821-1862) 
opened a tea shop (chahao) in Shexian. There, they bought leaves from locals, refined and sifted them 
in their makeshift workshops, and brought them to Canton to be sold overseas. Among surviving 
34 Although the Anhui Normal professors and Shexian county archivists have seen most of  the 
documents and informally indexed them, the majority of  the documents themselves remain 
inaccessible. I have seen a fair number of  them, but I will confine myself  to discussions over the 
most important published documents. The family told me they are interested in selling the archive 
some day, but as of  this writing I have heard of  no concrete plans.
35 Qitao Guo, Ritual Opera and Mercantile Lineage: The Confucian Transformation of  Popular Culture in Late 
Imperial Huizhou (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 51. Cf.  Wang and Zhang, 7.
36 Wang and Zhang, 173-179.
37 Before, an ancestor Jiang Qihuan (1733-1776) entered the domestic tea trade by acquiring a 
license to sell it to the northeast: “he sold tea to Liaodong for ten years, … passing through Jinzhou 
all the way to Beijing.” This tea trade was a domestic one, and it was short-lived as one of  many 
different ventures the family passed through.
CHAPTER FOUR
120
materials, a travel guide titled simply “Route from Huizhou to Canton” (huizhou zhi guangzhou lucheng) 
(1827) marked the first certain date when Jiang Youke began selling tea to Canton.38 
Eventually, the two Jiang men settled down and created a relatively permanent life for 
themselves in Canton. In this respect, theirs were no different from the general practices of  other 
Huizhou merchants. On average, businessmen from Huizhou would allow themselves one month 
per year to return home and live with their families. A Huizhou proverb declared “A married life 
lasts only three and a half  years,” or, “it takes forty-two years to get forty-two months of  leave of  
absence to go home to be with one’s wife, and a married life rarely lasts more than … forty-two 
years.”39 Jiang Youke married two concubines in Canton and also built a separate home. In 1843, he 
spent 105 yuan and acquired an eleven-year old girl, named Xiulan, for his son to marry.40 
If  the Jiang family epitomized the trend among Shexian merchants to first engage in salt, before 
pivoting over to tea, then the merchants of  Wuyuan mirrored their patterns almost exactly, with the 
exception that they had begun with timber. Historian Shigeta Atsushi pored through the Qing-era 
gazetteers of  Wuyuan and first established the connection between Wuyuan tea merchants and the 
earlier timber trade.41 The timber trade was historically important, not just because it chronologically 
anticipated tea, but also because it provided the template for local merchants to establish a foothold 
in production. Timber was distinguished from trades such as salt, which was extracted in Yangzhou, 
because the timber itself  was actually grown in and supplied from within local limits. “In the 
38 See longer discussion of  these documents in Wang Zhenzhong, Huizhou Shehui Wenhuashi Tanwei 
(Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chu ban she, 2002), pp. 408-445.
39 Hu Shih, 5-6.
40 Wang and Zhang, 582.
41 “Originally, great numbers of  merchants emerged out of  Huizhou. Huizhou land was filled with 
mountains and was not appropriate for agriculture, so it could not nourish the population. Thus, 
timber became the greatest export good from the region. The fir trees (cedar? J: sugi C: shan) of  
Wuyuan were famous across the country, and in this way, the timber merchants began to use 
Wuyuan as the departure point for timber.” Shigeta Atsushi, Shindai Shakai Keizaishi Kenkyū [Research 
on Modern Economic History of  the Qing] (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1975), 312.
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production areas,” Shigeta wrote, “the merchants would buy up materials and carve them into 
different types, and in the consumer areas downstream, they would sell them and draw a profit from 
the differences of  price.” Although they added labor to the product, therefore, they concentrated 
their efforts on transportation and price differentials. Shigeta wrote that, at this early moment of  
itinerant domestic trade, “the most representative form (J: daihyôtekina keishiki, C: daibiaoxing xingshi) 
for the Huizhou merchants was that of  the ‘guest trader’” (keshang). In these earlier periods, the 
“guest trader” crystallized how “merchants expended almost their entire energy into the activities of  
transport and circulation, and from there they extracted the greatest amount of  profit.”42 
The Wuyuan tea merchants borrowed this “representative form” of  guest trading and applied it 
to tea. During the years of  the Canton trade, to be clear, merchants did become involved in 
production, but their intervention was minimal. Although they undertook some responsibility for 
sorting and lightly refining tea, Wuyuan tea merchants focused their attention on the activities of  
purchasing, selling, and transport.43
So subsidiary was tea production to matters of  transport that Tien Hing, the early 1800s Canton 
informant, did not even mention refinement processes in his account of  the trade: “In about a 
fortnight, every farm has completed its harvest, and sends its tea to market; at the same time the 
numerous factors attend the different villages to make their purchases….When the factors have 
concluded their purchases they carry their tea home, where it is sifted, winnowed, and assorted into 
different kinds suited to the foreign markets.”44 Tien Hing implied that when the merchant bought 
tea from peasant households, the leaf  was a finished product practically ready to be sold. Further, 
the factors purchased both unprocessed and processed leaves. In future years, as consumers 
42 Shigeta, 312. 
43 Shigeta, 309. Shigeta’s study focused solely on merchants from Wuyuan, but there were also many 




demanded greater particularity and specialization, shops would only buy the unprocessed leaves they 
could use as raw materials for refinement. In other words, in Tien Hing’s time, the merchants were 
not yet fully specialized. Their main focus was to indiscriminately stock up on goods and unload 
them later.
Other descriptions from the period did not omit merchant-side efforts at refinement, but 
emphasis remained on the acts of  buying and transport. When Robert Fortune traveled through the 
Wuyi mountains of  Fujian in the 1840s, he described the relationship between peasants and agents 
this way: “A tea-merchant from Tsong-gan [Chongan ș] or Tsin-tsun [Xingcun ǀ] goes 
himself  or sends his agents to all the small towns, villages, and temples in the district, to purchase 
teas from the priests and small farmers …The large merchant in whose hands it is now has to refire 
it and pack it for the foreign market.” Processes like “refiring,” if  conducted at all, took place on a 
smaller scale than they would in coming decades. Jiang Youke’s family shop, for instance, was set up 
on a remote village road. His firm refined the leaves in a rented building, in borrowed space within 
the family shrine, or simply in a room in their house.45
If  the itinerant merchants who collected leaves from the inland households mainly focused on 
activities of  circulation, with only a subsidiary interest in production, then they also constituted 
merely one node in a larger network of  distribution. The tea trade was multi-tiered, and within the 
merchant body, the most important division was between the coastal merchants who dealt with the 
foreigners and the inland merchants who depended on coastal merchants for advance loans. Thus, 
the thirteen co-hong merchants in Canton “simultaneously played the role of  dealers as well as 
creditors to the Wuyuan merchants.” The credit arrangements also resulted in complications. 
Oftentimes the smaller merchants would not be immediately paid for their deliveries until long after 
the tea season ended. Other times, they simply accrued debts they could not repay. In one example, a 
45 Wang and Zhang, 579.
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merchant named Cheng Xigeng went broke due to bad loans, and he sold his wife in order to repay 
his debts. Thus, “the Cantonese co-hong merchants, backed by foreign firms … stood in a position 
of  great power.”46 Undoubtedly, the Canton merchants played the same role for tea merchants from 
other parts of  Huizhou and for the itinerant guest traders traveling to Fujian as well.47 The powerful 
coastal merchant who acted as broker and creditor was a figure that would persist in future 
generations of  the trade under the identity of  “tea warehouses” (chazhan).
The late nineteenth-century factories
For both northwest Fujian and Huizhou, the creation of  the treaty-port system (1842) and the 
subsequent rerouting of  the markets from Canton eastward toward Fuzhou and Shanghai facilitated 
a massive expansion in trade volume and thereby subtly transformed the nature of  business itself.
Although the Canton trade appeared relatively unchanged in the immediate years after the 
ratification of  the Nanjing treaty, the scale of  the empire-wide tea trade would explode within a 
decade. For Huizhou tea merchants, located near the Yangzi River and reasonably close to the 
eastern coast, moving their trade to Shanghai was a relatively easy decision. For the Wuyi tea 
districts, Shanghai was still a highly inconvenient destination, and it would remain so until the ports 
Hankou and Jiujiang (formerly spelled “Kiukiang”) opened in the 1860s. In the meantime, the 
turmoil from the Taiping Rebellion proved disastrous to the Wuyi districts, which, without inland 
access to Canton, had to shut down for a handful of  seasons. Finally, in 1853, Tao Chengzhang, 
magistrate of  Fuzhou and Min county, decided to encourage businessmen to reroute their 
transactions through Fuzhou. Here is a copy of  the memorial preserved in the archives of  the 
Jardine Matheson Company in Cambridge: 
46 Shigeta, 315.




Recently, the tea business has flourished in many of  the upstream towns, and foreign dealers 
come to buy the tea. Before each spring, they come in clusters. The two largest groups are 
Cantonese and Suzhou merchants, and, together with local merchants, they bring the leaves to 
Shanghai, Hankou, Suzhou, and Hangzhou and set up shop there. Because historically Fujian has 
banned tea export, the foreigners go to Canton and Shanghai. The annual profit is at least 
millions of  dollars, and dozens of  thousands of  laborers depend on the work.
This year, the Cantonese thieves and criminals have greatly disrupted the traffic on the Yangzi 
river. Thus, during this year’s tea season, merchants couldn’t travel, and they’re all worried that 
the Suzhou and Cantonese merchants won’t be able to travel. Local merchants don’t dare move 
forward, and so local farmers also will not pluck leaves or hire workers because they don’t have 
the capital (ziben).48
In order to circumvent the dilemmas that the Taiping Rebellion presented, the Fujian 
government lifted an earlier unofficial ban on trade at Fuzhou and then encouraged tea merchants to 
conduct business there. The Qing government also established a system of  tea taxation by tolls 
(guanka) throughout the province and Taiwan in order to raise revenue lost from the rebellions.49 In 
1854, one year following the government’s proclamation, the American Firm Russell & Co. was the 
first foreign firm to buy teas in Fuzhou.50  According to Foreign Office reports, only five British 
subjects lived in the port town Fuzhou in 1850, a remarkable number considering the frantic activity 
in surrounding ports.51 As Fuzhou slowly began to thrive over the next decade, merchant groups in 
the neighboring coastal market towns Zhangzhou and Quanzhou took advantage of  their strategic 
location and tried their hand in the tea business. Before long, “the business of  western merchants 
(xike, from Shanxi) gradually fell, and the three cliques of  the ‘lower-province’ (xiafu), Canton, and 
Chaozhou (in Guangdong) continued to grow. From the end of  the Daoguang period (1850), the 
foreign trade was dominated by these three cliques.”52 
48 Jardine Matheson archive, Cambridge University Library. MS. JM/H5/4/1. 
49 Ling Dating, Zhongguo chashui jianshi (Beijing : Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe , 1986), 119.
50 Yen-p’ing Hao, The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of  Sino-Western 
Mercantile Capitalism (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1), 177.
51 Gardella, 50.
52 Lin Fuquan, 632.  
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Just as all foreign firms first had to deal directly with the thirteen cohong merchants during the 
Canton years, the newly opened markets of  Fuzhou and Shanghai required foreigners establish good 
relationships with these cliques. Furthermore, during the early years of  the post-Taiping collapse of  
the Canton market, the landscape appeared frightful to many foreign firms. In order to minimize 
risk, some of  the larger firms decided to contract with individuals to buy tea in advance of  the 
season. Those involved in this advance payment system were known as “teamen” in the letters of  
their American and British employers. Although the teamen never represented a majority share of  
the tea markets, their rise and fall provide a useful angle for understanding the expansion of  the 
sixties and seventies.
For instance, the Jardine Matheson Company, the largest foreign tea dealer in China -- as well as 
the Scottish trading company which helped facilitate the transfer of  Chinese laborers to eastern 
India in 1839, as detailed in the last chapter -- relied upon teamen during the first decades of  the 
treaty-port era. Employing a trusted individual appeared a superior option than trying to negotiate 
fair prices in an untested market. In September 1854, correspondence within the Fuzhou office of  
the Jardine Matheson Company acknowledged, “[t]he river is very dangerous in some places, being 
full of  rocks and the Teamen are well aware of  this and attach considerable importance to it, that is 
to say many of  them are afraid to bear the risk of  bringing the teas here, preferring Shanghae or 
Canton.”53 However, by 1867 the Fuzhou market grew so quickly, and trade became so regularized, 
that the Shanghai foreign customs commissioner wrote that the teamen system had run its course, 
and that it would “throw all the advantages of  trade into the hands of  the Chinese.”54 In June 1871, 
the Shanghai office of  the Jardine Matheson company declared, “the system of  advances to the 
Chinese for upcountry purchases must be finally abandoned for there is never any profit obtained 
upon them worth the risk. We encourage the Chinese middlemen to raise the prices of  [tea] leaf  
53 JM archives. B2/9, p. 7.
54 Quoted in Hao, 173.
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against us in the Country, not only to the extent of  our advances, but by promoting their credit 
outside, and however cautious we may be, we cannot avoid every now and then being made the 
subject of  a heavy loss.”55 The teamen system had been useful when foreign firms lacked reliable 
options for purchasing tea and guaranteeing supplies. As the market ballooned and became more 
prone to competition, the firms valued flexibility more. 
Correspondence between the company and its teamen also provided a peek into the scenes of  
the upcountry trade. Most often, they simply brought their advances to an extant local market in the 
tea countries.56 In 1860, just a few years after the teamen expressed misgivings about traveling the 
Min River, the teaman Taising wrote that prices “had gone up in consequence of  there being 
considerable competition among the Teamen and agents of  Foreign Houses.”57 In 1866, as the trend 
continued, the Jardine agents attributed “puzzlingly” high prices to the fact “that the teamen are 
alive to the fact that foreigners will give high prices.”58 That same season, clerks in Fuzhou received a 
description of  the hectic scene of  the country marketplace: “Taising has returned from the country 
…. He says the state of  affairs was fearful, that the leaf  only came to market catties at a time & for 
which 50 or 60 buyers would directly appear bidding over one another.”59 A week later, Taising 
added, “[t]he state of  things here just now so very extraordinary, the number of  special agents and 
55 F.B. Johnson, Shanghai, to William Keswick, Hong Kong. Quoted in Hao, 98.
56 Jiangxi and guest traders had already created regular market towns during the years of  the Canton 
trade. In Chongan, the city adjacent to the Wuyi mountains, the old market town had been Xiamei. 
With the redirection of  tea from southwest to the southeast coast, the merchants moved their 
activities to a new town, Chishi. Lin Fuquan, 632.
57 JM Archives. 2 Oct 1860 letter. B2/9
58 JM Archives. 9 May 1866. B2/9
59 JM Archives. 14 May 1866. B2/9
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extra aids recently arrived is surprising, and therefore no wonder that the dealers are looking for high 
prices.”60
The correspondence with the teamen also disclosed the dynamic relationship between price and 
production. One of  Jardine’s hired men wrote that he had been instructed by a European agent to 
proceed cautiously with the first crop, for “high prices will stimulate production” for future crops. 
The teaman continued, “my conviction is that it is a question of  price, and that buyers will be found 
to pay sufficient to make this season’s export the largest on record, and quite equal to the demands 
of  the world.”61  This off-hand comment crystallized the relationship between expansive markets 
and expanded production in the Fujian tea districts. This dynamic was driven by market exchange, 
with the end result greater production and, consequently, increased specialization and production. 
During this “golden era” of  endless demand for tea, the Chinese tea trade embodied the Smithian, 
circulation-driven dynamic of  commercial capitalism. 
If  supplies were indeed elastic, then more land, more tea bushes, and more workers were being 
mobilized in response to high prices. How did the demand for more tea get transmitted to the 
interior? The market could not have been transparent enough to naturally attract the peasant families 
and seasonal workers needed for production. Large firms like the Jardine Matheson company 
probably enjoyed the fastest form of  communication via their army of  contractor middlemen, and 
even they were regularly caught off  guard by abrupt developments. Instead, merchants needed to 
serve as proactive intermediaries between world demand and the supply districts. The inland 
merchants in particular took a more active role to encourage production. If  they had formerly 
concentrated almost all their efforts on transportation, they now shifted more of  their energies on 
refinement. Higher involvement in production entailed the benefits of  greater control over the final 
product and more economic management of  costs. Ultimately, however, their main impetus must 
60 JM Archives. B2/9
61 JM Archives. 6 June, 1868. B2/9
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have been the simple reality that they needed to intervene and assert more control over production 
in order to simply meet runaway demand. Creating new facilities became a physical necessity, for the 
existing number of  farms and monasteries producing tea had reached their limits, and the market 
was growing too fast for them to keep up. 
In fact, overseas demand had been slowly reshaping the countryside for almost a century already. 
As the market for export teas overwhelmed demand on the domestic market, the workshops began 
to cater production to foreign tastes. In the 1840s, Fortune noted in the green tea districts, “In those 
districts where the teas are manufactured solely for exportation, the natives are very particular in the 
rolling process, and hence the teas from these districts are better divided and more even.”62 And in 
Fujian, he wrote “the natives seem more particular in the rolling process, especially when it is for the 
foreign market.”63 He was also aware that the scope of  the trade had expanded in recent years, 
before his arrival. “Thousands of  acres were observed under tea-cultivation, but apparently the 
greater part of  this land had been cleared and planted within the last few years.”64 
The late nineteenth century was distinguished from these earlier processes by the new scale of  
expanded production. In Guangze county, just across the Jiangxi border, gazetteers reported “ever 
since the reigns of  Xianfeng and Tongzhi (1850-1875), everywhere people grew tea.”65
Expanded production required more workers, who were recruited from neighboring towns in 
Jiangxi. When the Taiping Rebellion interrupted communications through Jiangxi in 1850, Ahee (A 
Xing), the comprador for the Jardine Matheson Company, reported from the tea districts that 
62 Robert Fortune, Three Years’ Wanderings in the Northern Provinces of  China: Including a Visit to the Tea, 
Silk, and Cotton Countries: With an Account of  the Agriculture and Horticulture of  the Chinese, New Plants, Etc 
(London: John Murray, 1847), 211.
63 Fortune 1847, 217.
64 Fortune 1853, 263.
65 Guangze gazetteer, quoted in Shui Haigang, “Jindai Minjiang Liuyu Jingji Yu Shehui Yanjiu 
(1861-1937)” (Xiamen University, 2006), 59. 
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because of  the rebellion, “no one is plucking the tea, there is no good tea to be bought in the 
markets. The tea laborers are all from Jiangxi, places like Hekou. Because Jiangxi is in chaos, very 
few of  their workers come over. Thus, wages are too high, and tea prices are not sensible.”66 The 
Hekou to which Ahee referred was a town located in the county of  Shangrao, just across the Jiangxi 
border. Ever since the trade outgrew the sparse local population of  the Wuyi mountains sometime 
during the eighteenth century, it relied upon the local capital and labor of  groups from Jiangxi 
willing to make the journey each spring. Recall, for instance, that when the Tea Committee of  India 
employed “black tea makers” to teach the art of  tea manufacture to officials in Assam, the 
Superintendent of  inspection noted: “The place these Chinamen speak of  is called ‘Kong-
see’ [Jiangxi], on the mountains, about 40 days journey by water to Canton, and two days journey 
from the great Tea country ‘Mow-ee-san’ [Wuyi mountain].67 These men were likely also from 
Shangrao. 
The flood of  workers from Jiangxi also suggested that the endless demand for Wuyi teas 
resulted in larger buildings for refinement and more land under cultivation.68 In the 1850s, the 
literatus Jiang Heng confidently declared that “in the town of  Ouning alone [in the plains near 
Wuyi], there are over one thousand factories. The big factories employ over one hundred people, 
and the small ones several dozen. If  there are a thousand factories, there must be 10,000 people.”69 
In the late eighties, the governor-general Bian Baodi wrote, “in the northern Fujian tea districts, 
66 MS.JM/H1/57/2.
67 C. A. Bruce, An Account of  the Manufacture of  the Black Tea as Now Practised at Suddeya in Upper 
Assaam, by the Chinamen Sent Thither for That Purpose: With Some Orservations on the Culture of  the Plant in 
China, and Its Growth in Assam (Calcutta: G.H. Huttmann, 1838), 9.
68 Taising, one of  Jardine Matheson’s teamen, wrote to Fuzhou in 1866 that “Coolie labour is very 
scarce, and he fears that teas will not arrive as soon as suspected.” 28 April 1866, MS.JM/B2/14 
(Kienning letters)
69 Jiang Heng in Peng, 430-431.
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during every tea season since the Xianfeng reign (1850 to 1861), hundreds of  thousands of  tea 
workers come over from Jiangxi.”70
The most striking changes were concentrated on the activities of  the tea shop (chahao), which 
also separately operated a tea factory (chachang). The factory bought leaves from peasants and quickly 
processed and packaged them to be shipped. In general, tea cultivation remained within the purview 
of  the small peasantry, as land arrangements remained unaffected. In the 1840s, Robert Fortune 
observed: “The tea-farms about Tsong-gan [Chongan], Tsin-tsun [Xingcun], and Woo-e-shan are 
generally small in extent. No single farm which came under my observation could have produced a 
chop of  600 chests.”71 In the twentieth century, researchers confirmed that many of  the tea districts 
looked the same: “The large-scale gardens are still small. The output of  every tea household is also 
scattered and sparse (lingxing).”72 The researchers carefully noted, however, that although most “[t]ea 
peasants usually undertake tea as a secondary occupation, and their management is often crude and 
rough,” this was not the case everywhere. “The one exception is Chongan.”73
Chongan was the town nearest the Wuyi mountains. There, merchants in the last half  of  the 
nineteenth century began to experiment with the scale and organization of  cultivation in unique 
ways. Such experiments coincided with the appearance of  the lower-province clique, namely, groups 
from Quanzhou, Xiamen, and Quanzhou on the Fujian coast. Much like the Wuyuan and Shexian 
merchants who enjoyed geographical proximity to the sites of  timber and tea production, these 
Fujianese merchants found it more convenient to travel and monitor their investments in the Wuyi 
mountains once foreign trade moved to Fuzhou. Over time, those cliques became the key source of  
70 Bian Baodi, Bian Zhijun Zouyi [Official Records of  Bian Baodi], 1900, volume 11, 9.
71 Fortune 1853, 260-261.
72 Tang Yongji and Wei Deduan, eds., Fujian Zhi Cha (Fuzhou: Fujian sheng zhengfu tongjichu, 
1941), 60.
73 Tang and Wei, 70.
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capital for inland tea manufactories: “the inland tea shops in the past all relied upon Fuzhou, 
Xiamen, Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou warehouses as suppliers of  circulating capital,” surveys 
reported.74 Eventually, they also established a new system that combined cultivation with precisely-
monitored processing. This became known as the “cliff  tea factory” (yanchachang): “merchants from 
Zhangzhou and Quanzhou arrived, from no further than one thousand li, and further developed the 
trade. They did not hesitate to spend large amounts of  capital, and atop the cliffs of  the Wuyi 
mountains, they established factories, in which they pluck and process tea by themselves.”75
Twentieth-century surveyors hinted that tea dealers needed to invest into fixed infrastructures 
atop the Wuyi mountains because the precarious topographical conditions of  cliff  tea required 
better tools, housing, and labor. Compared to other tea varieties made in Fujian, the cliff  teas 
required the most capital.76 One survey recalled, “because the owners of  the mountains saw 
profitable opportunities, they did not hesitate to invest large amounts of  capital (haofei jujin) and 
engage in business…. After one hundred-plus years of  this type of  development and improvement, 
the Wuyi Mountains have become a unique (teshu) tea district.”77 I shall discuss the cliff  tea factories 
with more detail in the following section. For now, what needs to be highlighted is that the cliff  
factories were an outgrowth of  an already extant institution: the tea factories (chachang) that had long 
been attached to the inland merchant shops. The original tea factories had sprung up in all tea 
districts during the Canton trade, in both northwest Fujian and Huizhou. 
Unlike the Wuyi mountain cliff  factories, however, the Huizhou merchants never took over 
control of  the cultivation and plucking of  tea. Nevertheless, the tea factories of  Huizhou did 
74 Tang and Wei, 64.
75 Lin Fuquan, 638.
76 Tang and Wei, 65.
77 Lin Fuquan, 643.
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undergo their own process of  enlarged scale and complexity, a process that accompanied the 
maturation of  the late nineteenth-century Shanghai tea market.
Publications from local Huizhou society confirmed this massive transformation. In official 
gazetteers published in the late decades of  the century, Shigeta noted, “it would be almost 
impossible to find someone not involved in the tea trade somehow.” He found over one hundred 
new tea companies founded over the last third of  the century, as tea replaced timber as the 
“representative industry for the Wuyuan merchants.” Consequently, the phrase “carving out a career 
through tea” (yecha qijia ¼Ġ%,) became “the most ubiquitous phrase in the gazetteers’ biography 
section,” and “the tea trade became the most magical industry of  the time.”78 
So magical was the industry that, when the Canton trade gradually diminished, there was no 
question for Jiang Youke and his son Jiang Wenzuan that they too should reroute their business to 
Shanghai. It was not a smooth process, however. As the Taiping rebellion grew more serious, Jiang 
Wenzuan wrote to his concubine Xiulan in Canton: “This year we planned on going to Canton to 
sell our tea. This would be best for everyone. But we didn’t predict that the long-haired rebels 
(changmao lĽ, a reference to the Taiping Rebellion) would cause a disturbance and they would 
block the roads through Jiangxi … As a result, none of  the Wuyuan teas can get to Canton.”79 In 
1854, Youke brought his concubines with him back to Shexian and left Canton for good. At that 
point in time, the team of  father and son could no longer survive in an increasingly hostile and 
competitive climate. In his one year at Shanghai, Jiang Youke encountered difficulties adjusting to 
the new market, and he died less than twelve months later, at age fifty-two. 
Afterwards, Jiang Wenzuan attempted to continue the family business in Shanghai. In another 
letter to Xiulan, he wrote, “for the last few years, the foreign merchants have been trading for tea at 
78 Shigeta, 316-317.
79 Quoted in Wang and Zhang, 584. 
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Shanghai.” Therefore, he concluded, “I have also been heading to Shanghai to unload our teas.” 
Business at Shanghai, however, was tough. “As far as the tea we are selling in Shanghai, we were 
caught off  guard when the foreign merchants refused to pay higher prices. The opening prices were 
very low, and business has not been smooth. All the tea shops are in the same predicament.” Finally, 
indebted to numerous other merchants, Wenzuan declared “matters are extremely tight, I cannot 
fight off  the complaints. The family business is in crisis, it is vanishing into nothing. It’s hard to get 
enough to eat, our family struggles to survive each passing day.”80 In 1860, Jiang Wenzuan died while 
on the road transporting tea to Shanghai. His oldest son, Jiang Yaohua ŁȦÿ, was only 15 and 
unready to continue the business. Instead, the family survived by selling off  their property, and Jiang 
Yaohua left Shexian to look for jobs elsewhere.
As further testament to the magical pull of  the tea trade during this era, Jiang Yaohua found 
little alternative but to try his own hand at tea when he grew older, despite having witnessed the ruin 
of  his father and grandfather. At first penniless, Jiang Yaohua worked for several years as an 
accountant, saved some money, and then left home to open his own retail tea shop in Suzhou. 
There, according to family legend, Jiang Yaohua one day crossed paths with the famous Qing official 
Li Hongzhang. When Li visited the shop, Jiang Yaohua seized the opportunity to make a good 
impression, and Li introduced the younger Jiang to a large tea merchant in Shanghai. The man, Tang 
Yaoqing, ran a large tea warehouse company. 
The tea warehouses (chazhan Ġɰ) served as the coastal brokers and creditors in Shanghai, and 
hence they were the successors to the traditional Canton cohong system. It was perhaps more than 
coincidence that Tang Yaoqing was himself  Cantonese. Jiang and Tang worked out a business 
arrangement: Tang Yaoqing was interested in buying more teas from Shexian, and Jiang willingly 
provided Tang information about which tea shops were creditworthy and which were unreliable. 
80 Quoted in Wang and Zhang, 584. 
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Eventually, Jiang was able to save enough capital to open up another tea shop back in Huizhou, on a 
scale much larger than the retail store he ran in Suzhou.81
For over four decades, Jiang Yaohua set up tea shops and tea factories every spring in the market 
town Tunxi. The location alone indicated a consolidation of  production and circulation, as nearly all 
tea-related transactions across Huizhou had now been centralized into one location. During this era, 
the factories were said to employ between one hundred to one thousand people per season. He 
employed nearly twenty permanent staff  members in management and service positions -- 
accountants, labor overseers, scale managers, etc. -- as well as dozens of  temporary manual workers 
for roasting, fanning, sifting, and sorting leaves. The younger Jiang used at least thirteen different 
names to run his activities, and he did business with over a dozen Shanghai-based tea warehouses. 
Sometimes, he entered into partnership agreements with the warehouses, working especially closely 
with Tang Yaoqing and other trusted connections. Here is one representative letter:
As far as shares, I have sent my buddy Song (Cheng Songzhi) to inquire for me. If  there are 
people he trusts, then adding more shares would be good, and if  not, then that is not 
ideal….For now, we will distribute all our shares to the Qianshun’an warehouse, and when Song 
returns to Tunxi, we’ll discuss again.
Even after distributing shares, Jiang Yaohua also needed to take out loans each season to finance 
the outlay on raw materials and workers. He employed nearly twenty permanent staff  members in 
management and service positions -- accountants, labor overseers, scale managers, etc. -- as well as 
dozens of  temporary manual workers for roasting, fanning, sifting, and sorting leaves.82
81 Wang and Zhang, 585.
82 Wang and Zhang, 584-586.
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In short, Jiang Yaohua grew along with the Shanghai trade, and eventually he operated an 
enterprise far more sophisticated than that of  his father and grandfather. His story gave substance to 
a general observation that Shigeta had glossed from gazetteers biographies: that in the late 
nineteenth century, those involved in tea were no longer “simply (tan ni) tea merchants who 
specialized in traveling back and forth between the production districts and the trading ports.”  
Instead, they were “brokers (C: yahang) who were not simply middlemen (okonau dake denaku) but 
who also undertook the production process of  refinement to the end. They realized features of  
intensive production” (J: shûyaku teki C: jiyue de).83 Already in 1967, when Shigeta conducted the first 
special study on Huizhou tea, he could speculate on the modern, intensive techniques of  production 
in the factories. Subsequently unearthed materials, the next section shall show, would vindicate his 
claim.
A history of  labor intensification
Inside the tea factory
This final section will look more closely at the institution of  the tea factory (chachang) and practices 
of  labor-intensive production deployed inside. Where was the factory located in the chain of  value? 
From the eighteenth century onwards, merchants in China consistently maintained a two-layer 
pattern of  trade: the coastal merchant in Canton, Shanghai, Fuzhou, etc. -- known as “warehouse 
merchants” (chazhan) -- and their inland partners. The inland merchants used the misleadingly simple 
label of  “tea shop” (chahao ĠÎ, chazhuang ĠȆ, chahang Ġ\). Sometimes they were indeed mere 
retail stores, but oftentimes the shops were also responsible for production as well. The ambiguity 
behind the name suggests that these shops really began as brokers who bought and sold goods then 
later added teamaking to their responsibilities. The phrase chang Ȗ, or “factory,” was a relatively late 




literally meant ovens to dry leaves, but it was also used metonymically for the entire process, an 
indication of  the small scale of  production at the time. By the nineteenth century, chang had replaced 
bei.84 
In both regions, the tea shops undertook responsibility for processing the leaves, but regional 
differences influenced the degree to which they intervened. Although various teas require different 
finishing processes, as any connoisseur knows, production could always be roughly divided into two 
halves: “initial processing” (chuzhi Ťť), followed by a “reprocessing” (zaizhi hť), more 
commonly called a “refinement” (jingzhi Ãť). The initial process turned raw leaves into a 
semifinished leaf  known as maocha (ĽĠ), meaning rough and unprocessed tea. In general, the goal 
of  initial processing was to halt oxidation processes that would brown or ruin the leaf  within the 
first twenty-four hours of  plucking. This entailed an initial light dry-roasting stage. Most often, 
peasants who plucked the tea would stir the leaves inside the same kitchen woks they used to cook 
dinner. The precise procedures differed based upon the intended final product, but the creation of  
maocha served as the practical division between the first and second stages. Once maocha had been 
created, the first process was over, and the leaves would be handed over to factories to undergo 
refinement operations.
In Huizhou, factory managers only controlled the second stage, and merchants and overseers 
implemented strategies of  labor intensification for refining maocha bought from peasants. In the 
Wuyi Mountains, by contrast, managers oversaw the entire process from cultivation onwards, and 
they also intensified the labor of  plucking and initial processing. Over the following several sections, 
I will address these respective histories, and I shall also incorporate a brief  theoretical excursus in 
84 Robbins, 139. Etymologically, chang originally meant a shed-like building, but in modern times it 




which I expand upon the crucial concept of  abstract time that is fundamental to understanding 
intensive production.
Huizhou: incense and industry
Although the earliest Huizhou merchants could earn a comfortable living based solely on the 
differentials between the cost of  leaves at home and the prices paid in Canton, greater competition 
over time eroded the rate of  profit, and margins could only be salvaged by developing more efficient 
methods of  production. If  abstract time began to seep into the labor process, it did so not because 
of  a conscious cultural bias for numbers and linearity, but because factory owners felt compelled to 
respond to prices.
Again, the Jiang family archive illustrates the point most clearly. The first two generations of  tea 
traders, Jiang Youke and his son Jiang Wenzuan, fared reasonably well when the Canton market was 
artificially limited by the monopoly of  the thirteen co-hong merchants. When the two men moved 
their business to Shanghai, they encountered a much different business climate. In Shanghai, Jiang 
Wenzuan wrote, “the profits are not great, but the business is fast” -- the signs of  a glutted market. 
“Compared to the Canton business,” he noted elsewhere, “it’s extremely tough to make money. One 
tough year just leads to another!”85 Jiang Youke and Jiang Wenzuan had relied upon relatively loose, 
makeshift workshops that could fit inside a few rooms of  their home. When their grandson Jiang 
Yaohua reentered the trade decades later, he increased the scale of  the tea factory in order to better 
compete on the Shanghai market. 
In years both good and bad, efficient manual tea production was crucial to the collaboration 
between Jiang Yaohua in Tunxi and his partner Tang Yaoqing in Shanghai. Take, as an instance of  a 
good year, a letter Tang addressed to Jiang. Tang opened by saying “reserves for export green teas 
are low” and his company needed new supplies from inland:
85 Wang and Zhang, 584.
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If  we are not early, then we need you to be decisive and pay attention to manpower (renshou), to 
act with guts (dadan) and move quickly to supply us with one thousand dan of  leaves. Quickly 
ship them to Shanghai, and we can definitely get fat profits (houli). … We hope you can quickly 
get us tea supplies. Find your men and get to work (xian zhanren xiashou), and if  prices stay 
strong and your goods are high quality, then we will ask for eight hundred more dan of  tea. We 
will act with guts and without hesitation (danda bufang).”86
When prices were high, merchants prioritized tea factories that could act quickly and could 
mobilize “manpower” to work efficiently. Aside from speed, merchants also stressed that tea 
factories pay attention to precision and skill. In 1905, when tea prices were depressed, the poor 
quality of  leaves compounded financial difficulties: 
This year, the handiwork of  the Tunxi and Wuyuan tea merchants were normal as usual, but the 
smaller merchants [who processed the leaves before selling them to the tea factories] were not 
precise in their work. As a result, in general, the emei and fengmao teas were rough and crude, with 
too many seeds inside them. Given that foreign bids were already low, what chance was there to 
fetch good prices? The losses Chinese merchants suffered were not light … This year, the 
English market has slowed and was unreliable. We relied entirely on selling to America, but if  the 
teas were flawed and not up to American standards, we had no choice but to sell them for cheap 
to English dealers.87
If  speed helped Jiang Yaohua respond quickly to high prices in good years, then in poor years, 
efficient production reduced production costs and preserved hopes for profit. Many letters 
concluded, “next year, the big merchant groups need to pay attention to their merchandise, carefully 
choosing goods and relying upon low production costs (di chengben) to recoup profits. This is what 
we pray for.” “Next year,” Tang Yaoqing wrote to Jiang Yaohua in 1906, “our soundest strategy is to 
be more selective about quality, push down mountain prices and cut costs (chengben 3c).”88  
86 Quoted in Wang and Zhang, 592. 
87 Wang and Zhang, 597-598.
88 Wang and Zhang, 597-598.
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The phrase chengben means the general outlay of  capital and expenses, but historically it has often 
referred to production costs in particular. Chengben was always a concern to merchants, whether 
industrialists or itinerant brokers, but as tea shops took over production of  the final product, they 
paid even more attention to the costs of  materials and labor. In a small handbook that Jiang Yaohua 
wrote, entitled, “An outline for buying tea” (maicha jielüe), he described the importance of  calculating 
costs prior to buying maocha from peasants. “Before buying tea, first use the scales to determine how 
much and what quality silver one has,” he wrote. “Count up the total costs for charcoal, labor 
(rengong 
¢), packaging, transport and lijin taxes, and boat fees. Use these to calculate the total 
outlay (chengben) and only then begin to talk prices.” Besides emphasizing prices, Jiang also went into 
detail to specify the types of  leaves that could be successfully sold. One should “inspect tea” (kancha 
Ġ) by looking for leaves that are “fine and young, with a dark green color, round body, tightness 
(jinjie). The lines on the leaves must be nice and taut, with a clear aroma, these are the best.” 
Conversely, he also warned against leaves “whose flavors are not right, with yellow stems, are thin 
and weakly bent, with red spots and red stems, are dead or rotten, hard and white, with old veins, 
without sweet flavor when steeped in water, without aftertaste, or even with a astringent flavor that 
rushes through the nose — these types are not worth buying.”89
Though all tea shops aspired to stand firm by these principles of  purchasing, prices were beyond 
their control. A quick survey of  the Jiang account books demonstrated that during the 1898 season, 
Jiang Yaohua paid an average of  0.192 yuan per jin of  raw leaves, but in 1906, he paid at a rate of  
0.297 yuan.90 In a year when other merchants were bullish on tea, bubbles grew and drove prices out 
of  control. Furthermore, just as inland tea factories could not fully tame “mountain prices,” or, the 
cost of  maocha sold by peasants, neither could they fully prepare for Shanghai prices, which began to 
89 Wang and Zhang, 587.
90 Wang and Zhang, 588.
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creep lower starting in the 1870s. The opacity of  the treaty port was compounded by the fact that 
more producers and consumers were crowding the world tea market. In the 1903 season, the 
Shanghai warehouse merchants reported, “with Ceylon now producing so much tea, the foreigners 
haggle on the pretext that Ceylon tea is high quality and very flavorful, and the Chinese dealers don’t 
know if  they’re telling the truth. This makes it even harder for the Chinese dealers to sell their 
goods.”91 Surrounded on both sides by unpredictable markets, inland tea merchants realized the 
importance of  controlling the only costs they could directly govern: the costs of  production in the 
refinement processes. Thus, production costs moved from the margins of  their consideration to the 
center. 
Such concerns shone through clearly in another manual Jiang Yaohua penned during the last 
decades of  the century. In the 10,800-character document titled “An Outline for Making 
Tea” (zuocha jielüe IĠáƥ), Jiang meticulously detailed every step for producing the various green 
teas of  Huizhou. Whereas earlier connoisseur texts merely outlined the steps of  teamaking in a 
decontextualized setting, Jiang’s handbook outlined how to efficiently produce large amounts of  tea 
in the minimal time necessary. 
91 Wang and Zhang, 598. 
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Figure 6. A basic illustration of  the incense stick timekeepers.92
In order to manage the hundreds of  workers hired every season, businessmen such as Jiang 
Yaohua contracted out factory management to local men. These positions included specialized, and 
awkwardly-translated, titles such as tea sorting overseer, roasting pot manager, maocha scale manager, 
the applier of  dyes, and, of  course, the shop manager (guanhao ýÎ). Central to these jobs was a 
regimen of  work organized around timed intervals, the central mechanism for which was a particular 
type of  non-mechanical timekeeping device: incense sticks that burned at a regular speed. 
Consider the futility of  lighting sticks of  incense in a factory for processing tea. The woody 
smell of  wilted tealeaves, especially a roomful of  them, is intense, almost nauseating to novices. This, 
combined with the steady stream of  smoke emanating from burning stoves, impaired the original 
function of  the incense, as factory workers were likely only vaguely aware of  the aroma. 
Nevertheless, for twelve hours each day, when operations were under way, everyone in the factory 
92 Silvio A. Bedini, “The Scent of  Time. A Study of  the Use of  Fire and Incense for Time 
Measurement in Oriental Countries,” Transactions of  the American Philosophical Society, 53 (5) (1963), 24.
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remained constantly mindful of  the slow-burning sticks. The timekeepers were available in various 
lengths and burning speeds, but they were generally designed to last forty minutes per stick. Incense 
regulated every job and movement in the teamaking process: roasting, sifting, weighing, sorting, 
dyeing, and packaging.
Of  all the tasks, the tea roasters shouldered the most important duty in the teamaking cycle, and 
they were also saddled with the most onerous and exacting instructions:
Once the maocha are brought into the tea shop, they undergo their first roasting. In Wuyuan, this 
is known as “pulling out dampness” (tuo chaoshen), and in Xiuning and Shexian, this is called 
“expelling the little ones” (chu xiaohuo +#Ǩ). 
In every pot, 1.85 jin of  leaves (on the Songluo scales, this is between 2.5 to three jin) can be 
fired in the time it takes to burn two and a half  to three sticks of  incense. When the leaves are 
first placed into the pot, instruct the roasters (qiachazhe) to stir around the leaves in cool air 
(liangfeng) to shake out the sour, musty smell (suanre zhi qi) from the leaves. Do this until about 
eighty percent to a full stick of  incense has been finished, then do not air out the leaves any 
further. The roasters then must concentrate and use a light touch to rotate the pot as they press 
down the leaves, evenly distributing the heat. Do this for half  a stick of  incense.
Lay the pot directly over the furnace and roast until two and three-quarters of  a stick of  incense 
are burnt, rub them one more time and take them off  the pot. By now, the leaf  colors must be 
vibrant and green, tight but not crumbling. The maocha that first come into the shops cannot be 
packaged. In order to avoid causing the leaves to lose their original green color and become red 
and yellow, they need to be quickly taken off  the flame and packaged quickly.93
At first appearance, relying upon incense sticks to regulate industrial production is puzzling. 
Considering the low level of  technology required for these non-mechanical timekeepers, Chinese 
peasants must have used incense sticks for centuries prior to the nineteenth century. How novel, 
then, could this labor arrangement really have been?
Indeed, the first documented record of  incense timekeepers in China can be traced to the sixth 
century, when the poet Yu Jianwu (487-550) wrote:




Figure 7. “Drying tea leaves, circa 1885.” A late nineteenth-century photograph of  tea roasters 
housed in the Harvard Baker School library. Notice the incense sticks behind the head of  the man in 
the middle.94
By burning incense [we] know the o’clock of  the night, 
With graduated candle [we] confirm the tally of  the watches.95
Presumably, from at least the Tang empire onwards, incense sticks were regularly used through the 
twentieth century, when several foreign sources confirmed their presence in the daily life of  China. 
An American diplomat traveling in the late 1800s noted that rich farmers would sell water to 
peasants and calculate prices based on the “quantity of  water which flowed from the wheel during 
the burning of  a given length of  an incense stick.” Farmers in Gansu used incense sticks to measure 
94 For a brief  introduction to the larger set of  unspecified photographs in the late nineteenth 
century, cf. Robert Gardella, “Tea Processing in China, circa 1885: A Photographic Essay,” The 
Business History Review 75, no. 4 (2001): 807–12.
95 Quoted in Silvio A. Bedini, The Trail of  Time: Time Measurement with Incense in East Asia, Needham 
Research Institute Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 54. Thanks to Dorothy 
Ko for pointing out this valuable text.
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the necessary amount of  time to pour water for irrigating their land. And Rudolf  Hommel, a 
German photographer traveling in the 1920s, noted that coalminers “stay underground continuously 
for about 3 hours, and to tell the time they carry with them an incense stick which glows for about 3 
hours. The Chinese call it ‘Time-piece.’”96 Again, given the widespread custom of  incense 
timekeepers, how noteworthy was their deployment in the Jiang tea factory? To answer this question, 
we must delve deeper into the relationship between labor and different conceptions of  time.
Concrete and Abstract Time
The phenomenon of  labor-intensive capital accumulation that I have articulated describes a process 
of  efficiency, which in turn hinges on measuring activities within time. It is thus unsurprising that 
historians and anthropologists have frequently remarked how the rise of  industrial capitalism 
coincided with qualitative changes in the perception and consciousness of  time among workers and 
farmers. For instance, time in the English countryside appeared to the farmer as something 
contingent upon external, natural phenomena, such as the crow of  the cock or pastoral chores: 
“labour from dawn to dusk,” Thompson wrote, “can appear to be ‘natural’ in a farming community, 
especially in the harvest months: nature demands that the grain be harvested before the 
thunderstorms set in…. sheep must be attended at lambing time and guarded from predators; cows 
must be milked; the charcoal fire must be attended,” etc. Thompson described this natural time as 
“task-orientation.”97 The category clearly also applied to the demanding schedules of  rural life in 
imperial China. Natural events linearly organized the tea trade: tea plucking only began after the 
Qingming festival in April, raw leaves needed to be dried immediately after plucking, and maocha 
needed to be roasted again within twenty-four hours of  preparation. Tea production was always task 
96 Bedini 1994, 55. Rudolf  P. Hommel, China at Work: an Illustrated Record of  the Primitive Industries of  
China’s Masses, Whose Life Is Toil, and Thus an Account of  Chinese Civilization (New York: John Day 
Company, 1937), 4.
97 E.P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.” Past & Present, no. 38 
(December 1967): 60. 
CHAPTER FOUR
145
oriented. Imperial China, Joseph Needham forcefully argued, was not one of  those primitive, 
timeless societies. Rather, “linear concepts [of  time] were the elements that dominated the thought 
of  Confucian scholars and Taoist peasant-farmers alike.”98
A great divergence between west and east, however, appeared to emerge with the advent of  
clock time in Europe. Alongside the rise of  industrial capitalism, mechanical timekeeping displaced 
natural time as the regulator of  daily life. Greater attention to accurate clocks was necessary for the 
mechanical, calculable work of  industry, what Thompson called “timed labor.” Until now, the 
horological history of  China -- or, the study of  the history of  time -- has been dogged by pessimism 
and failure. In one of  the few attempts to explicitly address the topic, David Landes, citing the work 
of  Yang Lien-Sheng, claimed that daily activities in Tang and Song China were regulated “by the 
diurnal round of  natural events and chores,” or, patterns of  natural time. Imperial China never 
graduated to the modern usage of  accurate, commensurable time units until the arrival of  European 
technologies. This failure appeared paradoxical, furthermore, since academic scientific knowledge 
during the Tang and Song was sophisticated enough to accurately keep independent measurements 
of  time, and yet these devices were not used to regulate daily activities throughout the populace. 
That early tradition culminated with the polymath Su Song (1020-1101) and his water wheel-
powered clock, paired with an escapement mechanism, which beat drums and rang bells at every ke 
(quarter-hours of  14 minutes and 24 seconds) and every shi (double hours).99 The juxtaposition of  
accurate time-keeping devices with the predominance of  task-orientation suggested to Joseph 
Needham that technological progress in a vacuum was insufficient without a corresponding cultural 
desire to popularize it. Abstract time was not useful for a society that did not prize productivity. 
98 Joseph Needham, Science in Traditional China: a Comparative Perspective (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1981), 131.
99 Joseph Needham, Wang Ling, and Derek Price, Heavenly Clockwork: the Great Astronomical Clocks of  
Medieval China (Cambridge: University Press, 1960), especially pp. 28-48.
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Thus, Landes wrote, “[p]roductivity, in the sense of  output per unit of  time, was unknown [in 
imperial China]. The great virtue was busyness—unremitting diligence in one’s tasks.”100 
The most obvious lacuna in this version of  history was its reliance upon Tang and Song texts to 
generalize about all of  imperial China. The implicit suggestion was that nothing had changed for 
one millennium. More troublesome, furthermore, was the account of  motivation. For both Landes 
and Needham, a nebulous concept of  Chinese culture served as a convenient default explanation for 
how devices that kept accurate, abstract time failed to overtake daily practices. This thesis mirrored 
larger conclusions from Needham’s famous project on the history of  Chinese science. He found 
himself  haunted by the question, retrospectively known as the “Needham problem,” of  why 
“Chinese civilisation did not spontaneously develop modern natural science as Western Europe did, 
though China had been much more advanced in the fifteen pre-Renaissance centuries”? By isolating 
out technology, Needham had formulated his question in such a way that suggested the problem was 
mental rather than material, what he called “ideological factors.”101
In contrast to an emphasis on culture, Thompson connected the prevalence of  clock time with 
the rise of  early modern mercantile and industrial capitalism: the necessity to efficiently circulate and 
produce goods spurred greater attention to productivity. Of  course, the study of  capitalism is not 
mutually exclusive with an emphasis on culture. But the type of  capitalist activity Thompson 
highlighted did not neatly conform to the categories of  technology or culture but rather focused on 
the practical dimensions of  commodity production that cut across these divisions. His model of  
social practice encompassed both the material and mental aspects of  daily life. Rather than looking 
in scholarly manuals or religious texts as Needham had, Thompson located the transition from task-
orientation to timed labor in the quotidian practices of  farmers and rural workers, snapshots of  their 
100 David S. Landes, Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of  the Modern World (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 25. The article he relies upon is “Schedules of  work and rest in 
imperial China,” Lien-sheng Yang (1955).
101 Needham 1981, 131. Cf. Landes 23-24.
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existence culled from poetry, public pamphlets, preserved account books, diaries, and 
correspondence.102 
Contrasted against this sophisticated analysis of  social practice, Landes and Needham’s 
culturalist opposition between a time-disciplined Europe and a task-oriented Asia appears less 
tenable. Both scholars seemed to exaggerate and absolutize the difference between premodern and 
modern forms of  timekeeping. Postone helpfully reinterpreted the relationship between the two, 
offering the category of  “abstract” time, premised as the inversion, rather than the opposite of  
“concrete” time. The operative distinction was “whether time is a dependent or an independent 
variable.” Concrete time was a “function of  events” and referred to “particular tasks or processes.” 
Abstract time, by contrast, was “independent of  events.”103 Many critics have disputed this 
opposition for being simplistic and mechanical.104 Although valid, such concerns, I think, can be 
allayed with the caveat that the history of  abstract time has been highly context dependent. Abstract 
time did not emerge from nothing overnight. Rather, it derived from earlier methods of  time 
measurement, such as those based on the rise and fall of  the sun (the day), the phases of  the moon 
(the month), and the passage of  the four seasons (the year). Such natural events once determined 
the duration of  time, but eventually time units began to determine the expected pace and quantity 
of  work. The passage from concrete to abstract time, was therefore subtle. Rather than inventing a 
new system of  time keeping, abstract time inverted the relationship between human activity and time 
measurement.105
102 Sugihara also made the point that the practical necessity for productivity in the modern 
industrial economy is a phenomenon that transcends cultural explanation, or becomes “culture-
neutral.” Sugihara 2007, 131.
103 Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of  Marx’s Critical Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 201-202.
104 Cf. Alfred Gell, The Anthropology of  Time: Cultural Constructions of  Temporal Maps and Images 




Given the logical coexistence of  concrete and abstract time, then, the general predominance of  
the former in the Chinese countryside should not preclude the possibility that there may have 
emerged specialized realms of  life wherein the latter achieved major significance. In particular, 
although the pace of  the tea trade was constrained by the seasonal and physiological limits of  the tea 
plant, merchants also attempted to increase productivity during operation hours by imposing a 
disciplined regimen of  abstract timed labor. 
Such processes can be clearly demonstrated through a closer examination of  the practical effects 
of  using incense sticks to regulate tealeaf  roasting in Huizhou. The rationale for the amounts of  
time Jiang specified — such as cooling the leaves for the duration of  one stick — appeared dictated 
by the physical properties of  the leaves. Fanning the leaves for one incense stick was an ideal period 
of  time because it resulted in the best-tasting tea that fetched good prices. Through years of  
experience, Jiang Yaohua, and the industry as a whole, must have observed that a roaster, on average, 
could most efficiently finish roasting 1.85 jin of  tea in the time required to burn three sticks of  
incense. These measurements were based upon natural processes and thus constituted a 
determination of  concrete time. 
Given these physical limits on productivity, however, Jiang had proceeded to design a work 
regimen that maximized the amount of  time spent roasting leaves in a continuous manner 
throughout the working day. Strategies of  labor intensification, recall, do not so much raise 
productivity by overcoming technical and physical limits but rather by maximizing the amount of  
time spent producing commodities in a given work period (this was Aglietta’s point). The tea 
factories mapped out the precise movements of  tea roasting because they expected roasters to work 
all day, and they wanted them to roast as many baskets as possible within those hours. According to 
the handbook, the working day was measured, more or less, by eighteen sticks of  incense, or six 
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baskets of  leaves per roaster.106 In the 1930s, social surveyors found that tea factory production 
remained essentially the same as during Jiang Yaohua’s day, and factories still burned the eighteen 
sticks per day. The surveyors further noted that this period of  time took an immense toll on the 
workers’ bodies: “The time it takes to burn all eighteen sticks of  incense spans from approximately 5 
AM to 5 PM, in total just over twelve hours. During that time, however, one day of  roasting labor 
completely depletes (jin) all muscle strength (jinli).”107 
The work schedule, in other words, was designed to push against the physical limits of  human-
based tea production as it stood at the time. Roasters needed to complete each basket of  leaves 
within the specified three-incense stick unit in order for the factory to remain on schedule and 
squeeze in six cycles of  roasting. Thus, it was integral for factory managers to “instruct” (zhu) the 
roasters to perform certain movements at specified intervals. Those intervals -- eight-tenths of  a 
stick, half  a stick, two sticks, etc. -- had now been transformed from a measurement of  activity into a 
“normative measure for activity.”108
Because incense sticks were such an old technology, observers could easily be tempted to dismiss 
this new function as historically insignificant. But precisely because of  its long history, the 
deployment of  incense to finely regulate specialized tasks clearly demonstrated that the emergence 
of  abstract time did not require the invention of  new technologies such as a mechanical clock, and 
capitalism as a social dynamic did not need to wait for the arrival of  new machines. Thompson made 
this point when he suggested that the earliest periods of  English industry featured “no Cadillacs, 
steel mills, or television sets to serve as demonstrations” of  the onset of  a new era.109 
106 Hu Wulin, 166.






The subtle inversion between task and time in the Huizhou workshops does not merely 
contravene Landes’ assertion that the cultural standard of  “busyness” inoculated imperial China 
from western notions of  “productivity.” It also turns the Needham problem on its head. Rather than 
remaining baffled at why Chinese society wasted its opportunities to exploit accurate timekeeping 
technology, the Jiang handbook demonstrated how the most traditional and purportedly primitive 
technologies could be, and were, deployed as tools of  industrial labor management. The emergence 
of  abstract time was less a matter of accuracy than a desire or need for accuracy. What was crucial in 
these burgeoning social forms, then, was not the appearance of  new mechanical clocks but the 
different functions to which technologies, old and new, were put to use.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that roasters did not waste time or sacrifice quality, the factories 
also assigned two men to tend to the stove during the roasting process. The manual outlined the tea 
roasting process twice. First, it described the job of  the worker who moved the leaves around the 
pot. Later, it described the same process with the same cues, except from the standpoint of  the men 
in charge of  lighting and monitoring the stove:
The chief  person in charge of  the fire and his assistant need to frequently adjust the charcoal in 
the fire. The fire cannot be too heavy, for fear it will burn the leaves and make them crumble. 
When they have roasted the leaves for as long as the time to burn one incense stick, then 
instruct the roasters to use a light touch to fan the leaves while rotating the pot….
The chief  person in charge of  the fire and his assistant need to frequently adjust the charcoal in 
the fire. The fire cannot be too heavy, for fear it will burn the leaves and make them crumble. 
When they have roasted the leaves for as long as the time to burn one incense stick, then 
instruct the roasters to use a light touch to fan the leaves while rotating the pot. The fire can be 
made slightly bigger. Roast until the second incense stick is burnt, make sure the fire is evenly 
distributed, the hands must concentrate on rotating the leaves appropriately. The chief  and the 
assistant also need to monitor the fire.  Up until the third incense stick is burnt, allow the leaves 
to rest evenly and naturally. The big and small flames will concentrate on the bottom, middle 
point of  the pot, it will not climb up the edges. If  the roasters are too inattentive, the fire will die 
out. When appropriate, they must lightly rotate the pot and turn over the leaves without breaking 
them. After three incense sticks are burnt (sometimes people can finish this in two and a half  
sticks’ time), flip the leaves out of  the pot and run them through the other steps: sift them, 
shake them, fan them.110
110 Hu Wulin, 162.
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Given the twelve-hour ceiling on work, owners like Jiang Yaohua carefully mapped out the shape 
and duration of  each physical motion in order to maximize the amount of  leaves his men and 
women could churn out in one day. As teas were roasted in one room, they were sifted next door, 
then cooled and sorted in another area, then finally weighed and packaged. Each of  these steps was 
also timed by incense sticks so that, in theory, wasted motion was minimized.
Besides creating time guidelines for work, the tea factories also tried to maximize efficiency by 
fostering an atmosphere of  work discipline. For the tasks of  sorting leaves, the factories exclusively 
hired local women. But because the workers in charge of  weighing the final packages of  leaves were 
men, Jiang Yaohua feared that the mix of  sexes could hinder production. In his instructions, he 
wrote, “The man in charge of  the scales in the tea sorting area must be serious. He cannot be 
chatting, laughing, bothering, and playing around with the women sorters, for fear it will lead to a 
misunderstanding or incident (shifei koushe ñµɂ).” The manual also instructed that the man in 
charge of  fanning the leaves must have hands that were “steady and even, neither too heavy nor too 
light (shoufa qingzhong yunjing @ åȓŦ). He mustn’t roughly lift up the leaves. And he must 
trust his own personal judgment (xinnei zhujian ©[z) to treat the product appropriately…If  his 
mind is unclear and scattered (xinnei liaoluan ©ɺŏ), then his technique will be unsteady, and he 
won’t be able to cleanly distinguish the best from the lowest grades.”111
Finally, the radical implications from the subtle emergence of  abstract time became more visible 
decades later, when field researchers provided new information about the system of  wages. In the 
1930s, Fan Hejun, a reformer looking to improve the rural tea industry, took extensive notes on tea 
production in Tunxi.112 The particular factory he observed still used incense sticks to regulate labor, 
111 Hu Wulin, 153-176.
112 Fan Hejun, 120-122.
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eighteen sticks in total divided into intervals of  two or six. Although the specific figures differed 
slightly from those in Jiang Yaohua’s manual, the system remained similar:
Eighteen sticks of  incense are one work unit (gong ¢). Because the supplementary firing requires 
more time, six sticks of  incense count as one shift (lun Ŷ). The workers who are more skilled 
can roast four baskets of  tea in one shift. Those who are not skilled can only roast two baskets. 
When they are done roasting one shift, the skilled roasters then roast four more baskets, but 
there are still six sticks of  incense remaining, and so they burn four more baskets. Finally, all 
eighteen sticks of  incense are burnt up….
Taking four baskets as one shift, the skilled workers can earn four units of  wages (sige danwei 
gongzi ¸¿¦¢ę), with each unit worth one jiao four fen four li. The unskilled workers who 
can only roast two baskets per shift only earn, in the span of  eighteen incense sticks, two units 
of  wages. This is the situation of  the supplementary roasters….
Thus, wages are calculated this way: for a given amount of  baskets (ruogan lou ƌĔʆ) roasted 
during each shift, they receive a given amount of  wages (ruogan danwei gongzi ƌĔ¿¦¢ę).
In other words, the tea factories used a piece wage, as opposed to a time wage system. Again, at 
first glance, piece wages appear to escape the element of  productivity and time-discipline -- the 
sense of  “time is money” -- which forms the basis for the modern and industrial labor process. 
Whether one roasts a basket of  leaves in one hour or two should be immaterial to the basket’s price. 
The idea that piece rates were a symbol of  preindustrial, unhurried work charmed Thompson, 
among others.113 A nineteenth-century British political economist even claimed that, “Piece-workers 
are in fact their own masters, even whilst working upon the capital of  the employer.”114
But the distinction between piece and time wages in this sense is a red herring. In practice, it did 
not matter whether wages were calculated by the hour or by the piece. Rather, what matters was the 
underlying basis for how much a “piece” was really worth, and the basis for this was productivity, 
which, ultimately, was also a time-based determination. If  the piece work of  the past felt so leisurely 
and comfortable, workers did not owe their comfort to the system of  payments but rather to the 
fact that they were still independent of  disciplined work. For instance, the tea peasants who brought 
113 Thompson, 75 and 92.
114 John Watts quoted in Marx 1867, 692.
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their leaves to market grew them on their own land with their own tools and labor. The market price 
for tea compensated them, with a profit, for both their labor and capital inputs (fertilizer, seeds, 
etc.).115 By contrast, the seasonal workers in the tea factories had no pretensions of  owning any of  
the tools or raw materials, so their only contribution was their labor. Their wages were calculated 
based purely on the going rate of  labor itself, which was determined by both the availability of  
workers -- never in shortage in Huizhou -- and by average productivity. Although masquerading as 
something distinct, then, piece rates for seasonal factory workers were simply another version of  
time wages: money paid to compensate labor.
Furthermore, contra Thompson’s expectations, piece rates were actually more conducive to the 
intensification of  labor. If  the tea roasters were paid only a normal day rate based upon working 
eighteen incense sticks, i.e., twelve hours, the clumsy roaster would be paid the same amount as his 
skilled colleagues despite producing half  the output. But because piece wages were determined by 
the total number of  baskets, the factory paid the skilled worker twice as much as it paid the clumsy 
one. The wage system rewarded individuals who worked more quickly and efficiently, even though 
all the individuals labored for the same number of  hours. To illustrate this point with a 
counterexample, the labor overseers in Fujian actually did pay their workers by the day. The structure 
of  that system, however, provided them incentives to bully the workers to go beyond contractual 
limits:
Normally, the tea laborers work for over eleven hours a day, sometimes up to fourteen hours. It 
is even worse in the contract system. The overseer pays one hundred yuan for each contract, 
everyday distributing five yuan of  wages. The work day is supposed to be eight hours, for twenty 
days, and the contracts compel the workers to labor fruitlessly without reward (tulao wuhuo). The 
result is that overseers will force (bishi) the workers to extend working hours, in order to reduce 
115 Cf.  Sun Wenyu, ed., Qimen Hongcha Zhi Shengchan Zhizao Ji Yunxiao [The Production, Manufacture and 
Sale of  Qimen Black Tea] (Nanjing: Jinling daxue nongye jingjixi yinhang, 1936a), 22-35; and Sun 
Wenyu, ed., Tunxi Lücha Zhi Shengchan Zhizao Ji Yunxiao [The Production, Manufacture and Sale of  Tunxi 
Green Tea] (Nanjing: Jinling daxue nongye jingjixi yinhang, 1936b), 7-14.
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the amount of  work days. Or, they use child labor and older workers to reduce wages. From this, 
the overseers can squeeze out a surplus profit (zhaqu yurun).116
For the authors of  the report, and for most observers, the overseers’ tactics were an illegitimate 
attempt to extract unpaid work beyond the limits of  the eight-hour work day specified in the 
contract. With piece wages, however, such extra-economic tactics would be unnecessary, for the 
overseers could simply set wages lower and push for greater productivity. This would create 
contractual incentives for the men and women to continuously work upwards of  fourteen or more 
hours, without the stink of  bullying or illegality. 
Seen in this light, piece wages appear as a more ruthless system than time wages. This 
recharacterization of  the piece wage even held true for the English context that Thompson wrote 
about. Although Thompson believed that industrial capitalism would phase out earlier instances of  
piece work in England, the piece rate system in London not only persevered into the nineteenth 
century but actually enjoyed a renaissance. This was because factory labor legislation limited the 
working hours in the day, which put a premium on efficiency, and piece wages “provide an exact 
measure of  the intensity of  labour.” Factory managers seeking to increase productivity through 
labor intensification, whether in London or in Huizhou, could use the piece wage to reward fast 
workers and to punish slow ones. Hence, in English sweatshops subject to the Factory Act, four-
fifths of  workers were paid by the piece. “The piece-wage,” Marx concluded, “is the form of  wage 
most appropriate to the capitalist mode of  production.”117
Unsurprisingly, overseers reserved the harsh conditions of  the piece rate system for the most 
abject, undervalued workers in the factories: women and migrant workers. In general, the majority 
of  factory workers were local men who gravitated towards the least arduous jobs, such as sifting 
leaves. Those men received a stable daily wage, including food and lodging, and their meals were 
“high quality, and every meal they are served some meat.” The female tea sorters and the migrant tea 
116 Tang and Wei, 74.
117 Marx 1976, 694, 698-699.
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roasters, by contrast, were employed in a “casual labor system” (sangong, lit. “scattered labor”), and 
neither food nor housing were provided. As with the roasters, the women were paid by the piece: 
“Every day, if  they sort four shifts worth of  leaves, or ten jin, then they receive wages of  four 
hundred wen. The Wuyuan sorters have the best technique, and in one day they can sort five shifts 
for a total of  six hundred wen.”118
Fan Hejun, the researcher from the 1930s, was most noticeably disturbed by the work conditions 
of  the tea roasters. Tea roasting was reserved for seasonal workers from the impoverished town of  
Anqing west of  Huizhou. Because employers skimped on food and housing costs, the roasters 
needed to pay one yuan out of  pocket per day to stay at a hostel, about one-third of  their wages. 
They also ate poorly. For lunch, “because they must busily prepare for the afternoon shifts, they 
cannot eat much. At around 11 AM, they bring out some uncooked rice they have brought with 
them, place it inside an enamel container inside an iron can and place it atop the fire to slowly cook.” 
And the work itself  routinely pushed the roasters to their bodily limits. Just reading descriptions of  
their daily routine was enough to make the reader sweat:
Of  all the work for producing export tea, roasting is the most bitter. This is because roasters are 
required to lean into the stove fire, and during the spring and summer, the intense sun blazes 
mercilessly from above, and the sun and the stove gang up on the worker….
The factory we observed had eighteen total rows of  stoves, with six stoves per row, for a total of  
ninety-eight. At the busiest time, they could employ forty-nine men working at the same time. A 
fire is lit between two stoves that stand back to back, with the fire heating the pots from below, 
and the men standing on the outside. But next to this pair of  stoves is another pair, and so 
groups are staggered one after another, with only a narrow space separating each row. Two back-
to-back stoves are separated by only 53 centimeters, and only seventy centimeters separate them 
from the next row. The workers stand in between the rows facing one another, a whole row of  
men directly facing fire. The heat is extremely strong, but if  the stoves can be spaced apart 
further, then the heat is slightly reduced. Based on studying this one factory, the rows are too 
packed, and the spaces where the men stand is nothing less than a steam basket …..
Because the labor is so strenuous, sometimes the workers will come down with sunstroke, to the 
point where they fall over dead. There are no shortages of  these cases.119
118 Fan Hejun, 120-122.
119 Fan Hejun, 122.
CHAPTER FOUR
156
By the twentieth century, survey accounts such as these depicted the tea labor process with an 
unprecedented degree of  detail. But even in the late nineteenth century, unpublished personal 
documents already provided a window into the daily life of  factory workers. Among the materials in 
Jiang Yaohua’s personal collection was a thirty-six stanza folk song (zhuzhi ci) that described the tea 
trade in colloquial, rhyming couplets. In particular, four stanzas in the middle focused on the 
workers in the tea factories, and they suggested that even during the best years of  the trade, the 









25. The wok manager must be most dignified, shouting commands and raising his voice.
Watching the fire raptly, in one day he burns many incense sticks.
26. Industrious, the most pitiable tea roaster, sweat stains his shirt, now half  red.
Bent back, crooked waist, both hands busy, in a past life he must have been a loafer.
27. The tea sifters line up in order, just like the shakers and fanners.
The overseer wants them to work harder and puts out some cold food.
28. The roaster works night after night, three shifts and he still hasn’t gone home.
He agrees to come in early tomorrow morning, wages to chase away the sleep demons.
120 Hu Wulin, 199-203. Explanation of  the passage is on pp. 172-176. 
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The cliff  tea factories of  Wuyi
The incense stick system in Huizhou provided the clearest example of  how the production patterns 
in late Qing China could become attuned to, and hence reshaped by, the drive towards productivity 
found in industrial economies around the world. What connected the disparate circumstances of  
rural China with other industrializing regions in this period was market competition on a global 
scale. Tea production in Fujian followed a similar pattern, and although arrangements did not 
explicitly use timekeeping devices such as the incense stick, similar tactics of  labor intensification 
were widely deployed.
The cliff  tea factories were a unique institution. Whereas in Huizhou tea merchants intensified 
production during the second stage of  refinement (zaizhi hť or jingzhi Ãť), the Wuyi cliff  
factories monitored and regulated labor starting from the inaugural stages of  tea plucking. This was 
because cliff  teas continued to be grown on the mountains, where few peasant families lived. “The 
entire Wuyi area is covered with abrupt, hanging cliffs, deep holes, and large valleys, the terrain is 
very complicated,” Lin Fuquan, the twentieth-century surveyor reported. “In terms of  tea-growing 
conditions, it is truly an ideal environment, but it also has geographical limitations.”121 The cliff  
factories were designed to mitigate such problems by virtue of  their location atop the mountains. 
Thus, Wuyi tea merchants aimed capital and labor at the initial processes of  production (chuzhi Ť
ť). “Before they leave the mountains, the leaves are already far superior to other maocha, thus, the 
procedures for refining the leaves after they are handed to the shops (zhuang) are comparatively 
simpler.”122
121 Lin Fuquan, 643.
122 Lin Fuquan, 690.
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Surveys indicated that almost all of  the tea shops in Chongan maintained their own factories on 
the cliffs. Only the Cantonese, who lived too far away, and the locals, who lacked sufficient capital, 
did not set up a permanent factory.123 Most commonly, the tea shops contracted labor to overseers, 
or jobbers, known as baotou Ès.124 Their name referred to how they “undertook responsibility 
(baolan Èɧ) for the tea garden from the cliff  owners.”125 Tea merchants also hired a team of  other 
managers to efficiently run the labor-intensive tea factories. The baotou needed to meet one 
important occupational requirement: the ability to communicate with both workers and merchants. 
“All cliff  tea, whether owned by merchants or by monasteries, all rely upon the management of  a 
baotou,” surveys reported. “The baotou is usually from Jiangxi towns such as Shangrao, Qianshan, 
Guangfeng, etc. They usually speak a Minnan dialect. This is because in the past the owners of  the 
tea cliffs were Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, Xiamen people, and the tea masters were also from Minnan. 
The baotou naturally began to learn the language of  the factory owners, in order to minimize the 
distance between the owners and staff. The workers hired by the baotou were also from Jiangxi.”126 In 
the peak days of  the nineteenth century, over 130 cliff  tea factories were set up, although this 
number had shrunk to about 55 working factories by the 1940s.127
The seasonal work staff  arrived from Shangrao every spring, and over time local legend had 
begun to endow Jiangxi workers with a special reputation for their skill. “These workers definitely 
123 Lin Fuquan, 642.
124 Rajanarayan Chandavarkar wrote extensively about the “jobber system” in colonial India, and its 
contours greatly resemble the baotou system in China. Chandavarkar 1994. The baotou system is also 
referenced in Paolo Santangelo, “Urban Society in Late Imperial Suzhou,” in Cities of  Jiangnan in Late 
Imperial China, ed. Linda Cooke Johnson, SUNY Series in Chinese Local Studies (Albany: State 
University of  New York Press, 1993).
125 Lin Fuquan, 165. Baolan means to undertake.
126 Tang and Wei, 70-71.
127 Lin Fuquan, 639. 
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have a special touch with producing the cliff  tea, but there is also a logic behind this centuries-old 
tradition. The locals of  Chong’an county all say: ‘the old Jiangxi folk are the ancestors of  the Wuyi 
Mountain tea, and without the old Jiangxi, Wuyi cliff  tea would not be so loved.’”128 Since the 
eighteenth century, the Jiangxi workers had also acquired the nickname bishu, or, “jade-green 
servants.”
The cliff  factories relied upon the overt enforcement powers of  the baotou and his staff  as well 
as a repertoire of  mythologies and customs to keep workers on task. Lin Fuquan called it a 
combination of  “material encouragement and emotional stimulation” (wuzhi guli, jingshen ciji ¯äǐ
ǎÃÊƦņ).129 Perhaps because of  its unusual remote location, the Wuyi mountains entertained a 
plethora of  origin myths connected to the legend of  its world-famed tea. Specifically, much of  the 
labor process revolved around traditions tied to the mythical founder of  Wuyi tea, a man named 
Yang Taibai who purportedly came over from Jiangxi centuries before to prepare the first batch of  
cliff  tea. No written records about Yang Taibai have ever been unearthed, but workers nevertheless 
felt his presence in the bundle of  rituals organized around his legend. “Whether relying upon 
‘customs’ (xisu ûȐ) or upon ‘mystical power’ (shenli ÊX), the rules and modes of  labor 
management are completely detailed and thorough,” the surveys reported. “Every day of  every 
spring, the amount of  power extracted from each worker far surpasses the limits of  a normal 
person.” The mythologies of  Wuyi tea helped quell any potential disquiet. “No one complains,” it 
was reported, for the regulations were considered a “sacred law” (shensheng falü ÊȀ ǉ). Although 




marketers were correct that the Wuyi cliff  teas derived their unique flavors from geography and 
weather, Lin also believed the tea “derived its flavor from human labor.”130 
This unique feature of  the Wuyi labor process was put on full display from the very first day of  
tea season, when pluckers first climbed up the mountain to begin collecting leaves. The ritual was 
called “opening the mountains” (kaishan), and it required workers conform to customs of  docility:
On the day of  opening the mountain, all the workers wake up at the crack of  dawn, and the 
baotou will light some incense to the mountain god Yang Taibai. During this ritual, there are a few 
rules. Most importantly, one cannot talk. According to legend, they do not talk in order to avoid 
the god of  illness and in order to have a rich, bountiful harvest. Breakfast is eaten standing up, it 
is forbidden to sit down and eat. After breakfast, the baotou and several leaders bring workers up 
the mountains to the tea gardens and begin picking, and the baotou leaves. The workers are 
supposed to walk straight to the garden, still not speaking, and without turning their heads. 
According to legend, if  one turns their head to look back on the first day of  picking, they will 
get an eye disease. Turning one’s head symbolizes not fully committing to the labor, this would 
offend the mountain gods, incurring their wrath. This is truly laughable. After arriving at the 
garden, the tea picking leaders use their fingers to point out where to pick, and after about an 
hour the baotou returns and gives each worker some cigarettes, and after that all the taboos are 
lifted. The workers take a smoke break, begin to chat, and about now the morning fog begins to 
scatter, and the sun begins to illuminate the beautiful mountains. They sing songs and laugh, and 
it is at this stage of  singing and laughing that the process of  tea production truly begins.131
Work songs helped workers pass the time, and they also helped outsiders attain a feel for how 
the men felt about the work process itself. Lin recorded about a dozen such songs, handed through 
the generations and with lyrics that were used repeatedly in different variations. 
%ș5 ȍ,ØǊɟĚØǊǒ, 
ĠƴŖɆǶõC, ưãŖɆǶ¢Ìʞ
Thinking of  Chongan, how pitiable, half  a bowl of  pickles and half  a bowl of  salt,
Working among the bushes for food to eat, working by the fire for wages.
130 Lin Fuquan, 666. 
131 Lin Fuquan, 668-669.
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Whereas in Huizhou, the tea roasters were the ones who suffered the worst conditions, in the 
Wuyi mountains, the tea pluckers bore the brunt of  production. “The entire tea production process 
is highly strenuous and taxing for every worker, but especially for the pluckers,” surveyors wrote. 
The ritual of  opening the mountain set the tone for the rest of  the season, foreshadowing the 
onslaught of  tasks that awaited the men. They worked continuously, and the baotou mobilized 
superstitions to keep them disciplined:
The tea pluckers must arise at the break of  dawn (weiming), and after breakfast must hastily take 
their baskets up the mountains to work until noon. There is no other rest except individual 
permission to take a break and smoke cigarettes. For lunch, a meal is brought up to the 
mountains. According to custom, no matter sun or rain, far or closeby, everyone must eat at the 
top of  the mountain. Even on days when the rain is pouring, they must stay outside the factory 
door by a few paces. When asked why, the reply was this was a rule set by the tea ancestor Yang 
Taibai and no one dares violate it….
For a rational social scientist such as Lin Fuquan, these customs appeared as nothing more than 
utilitarian tactics for asserting control over the pluckers, a trick, he speculated, “concocted by the 
monks and priests who ran the old factories.” In his version of  history, “the factory owners were 
bored and well-fed, and this was one of  the countless ways they thought of  in order to exploit the 
workers: using supernatural forces in order to subdue their minds, and nothing else.”132
Local custom blended with the generalized necessity for efficient production: “Year after year, 
the cost is affected by the stimulus of  the prices of  goods in the outside world.”133  This was 
evidenced most clearly in the system of  wage calculation. As in Huizhou, the cliff  factories relied 
upon a piece-wage system masked as a day wage in order to measure and maximize labor intensity. 
“Wages for plucking labor are determined based upon efficiency (xiaolü Ĉơ),” Lin wrote. In lieu of  
incense sticks or other physical timekeepers, however, the baotou maintained a tradition of  





4), the overseers would randomly measure how quickly the pluckers were collecting leaves and 
use those numbers to calculate wages. The description sounds simple, but the actual operation of  
the “big day” was intentionally shrouded in mystery:
Five or six days [after opening the mountain], when the leaves are fully green and mature, they 
have what is called the “big day” (dari). Every day on the mountain, the tea master (chashi) brings 
up a triangular red flag with the character ling (“order”) written on it (it is about two feet long, 
triangular in shape, and it has “ling” written on it to signify it is the banner of  command of  Yang 
Taibai) and a small scale in order to covertly measure the labor of  the pluckers. When the tea 
leaves are already fully green, everyone must take the amount of  leaves they have plucked and 
weigh them to determine their wages. The start of  the “big day” means “opening the scale.” At 
any given moment during any day, when no one expects it, the baotou will suddenly yell 
“everybody! Time for a smoke break!” The workers will suddenly stop plucking, and the baotou 
will weigh the amount of  leaves in each basket individually and record the weights. This type of  
unexpected weighing is known as “covert weighing” (ancheng Ƥǃ). 
The covert weighing system in the Wuyi Mountains functioned similarly to the incense stick 
wage system in Huizhou. What was most crucial was that the tea masters on the mountains halted all 
tea plucking at the same time. This provided a fixed time unit -- from the start of  the day up to that 
moment -- that served as a baseline for measuring each worker’s output in the morning, and hence, 
their productivity. The tea masters made no attempt to keep time accurately, yet because they 
managed time independently of  the tasks themselves, they practiced a form of  wage calculation 
premised on abstract time.
Also, as the appearance of  the triangular red flag already foreshadowed, the overseers paired the 
basic material incentives of  wages with customs founded on shame:
Afterwards, the worker with the smallest amount of  leaves must take the red flag when he 
returns to the factory at night time, which will draw the attention of  all the other workers, and it 
will give the one worker an emotional stimulation (jingshen shang zhi ciji). Having received this type 




To Lin Fuquan, this combination of  piece wages combined with the red flag ritual represented a 
perfect blend of  material and emotional stimulus. It distracted the workers from the harsh treatment 
by the baotou and his team of  overseers and instead fixed their attention onto the incentives of  
higher wages and the legend of  Yang Taibai. Neither exerted direct, physical pressure, but both were 
designed to induce workers to labor until exhaustion. “These regulations are very good,” Lin 
remarked with acerbic wit. “Because they are offered material encouragement (wuzhi guli) and 
stimulation, the workers do not feel as though they’ve completely sold out their bodily labor (maijin 
qili) to work for the baotou. We suspect that other tea districts do not have such a perfect system.”135
Work songs, however, indicated that workers were not always intimidated by these tactics:
ǣĠŒŖăʡ1Ößǭdɲʡ
s]¢ÌʡÈsǯÇʞ
Without many leaves, resting on the ground, 
who dares grab the flag and ring the bell,
I don’t care about the top wages, 
what can you baotou do with me?
Other songs displayed the workers’ sense of  humor about the wage system:
ǣĠǣƟ'R,  ĭsȧƣ, 
ȟȟǣq,  s]¢Ìʞ
Plucking leaves, look for tender ones, dip the head and bend the waist,
good and bad, pluck a basket, the top wages are what you want.
ǣĠMƩȠ,  ǪƣŪĳƩȽ,
ȟȟǣrq,  s]¢ÌĮÈƋʞ 
Plucking leaves, my friends have no worries, 
with curled backs and bent waists, no sex either,
both good and bad, pluck some baskets,
the top wages will also come with a girl.
135 Lin Fuquan, 674.
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After plucking, many of  the men continued working at night. In the Wuyi Mountains, the cliff  
factories took care of  many tasks that would normally be done in the refinement stages, such as re-
roasting, sifting, and sorting leaves. As a result, many of  the pluckers in the evening transitioned into 
a second job. During the busiest weeks of  the season, these men found their waking and sleeping 
hours dictated entirely by the continuous production process:
Every day, the pluckers work on the mountains from 5 AM to 6 PM at night, about twelve hours 
total, twelve hours of  nonstop climbing cliffs and crossing ridges and valleys, such arduous 
work. Even if  the workers can get some good rest, in order to recover from their fatigue, the 
workers also must spend half  the night roasting and rolling leaves. Therefore, every night after 
eating supper, the workers sleep until the leaves are finished fermenting. The early ones get to 
sleep from around eight or nine until midnight, when they are awoken from their dreams by the 
sound of  bamboo sticks being struck. All the factory workers are mobilized to roast and process 
the leaves plucked that day. Furthermore, the plucking laborers must also do the labor-selling-
activity (maimingchuli) of  tea rolling. After the leaves are roasted, if  they finish early, the workers 
can catch some more sleep. If  the sun has already begun to rise, then the workers will not sleep, 
eat breakfast, and once again bring their baskets up the mountains and recommence their twelve 
hours of  backbreaking labor. These pluckers sleep, at most, three to four hours each night. On 
days when the mountains are filled with mature leaves, then the workers will go several nights 
without sleep. The bitterness of  their lives can be called extreme.136
Night work naturally took a toll on the already arduous schedule of  daytime plucking. The 
following song reflected the cycle of  unending, sleepless work:
¡^!Ȋï·ʡ%ș5 ȍʡ
44ðĠƴ·ʡ=Ó$	QÓƨʞ
After Qingming ends the grain rains begin, 
and my thoughts turn to Chongan, how pitiable,
day after day spent besides the trees, 
three nights pass without two nights sleep.
Inside the factory, the baotou and other managers enforced efficient production through similar 
tactics as they used during the daytime. For sorting tealeaves, for instance, the baotou first selected a a 
batch of  highly skilled workers known as the “tea patrol” (xuncha ɈĠ). Their job was to circulate 
136 Lin Fuquan, 673-674.
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through the factory and point out leaves that their colleagues missed. Again, the individual sorters 
were rewarded and punished based upon speed: “In terms of  work efficiency (gongzuo xiaolü), the 
fast workers can pick through seven baskets (for these half-dry leaves, every basket is about six pans 
of  roasted leaves, or about twenty-five jin). The least skilled workers can pick through four per day.” 
Whereas the factory system rewarded fast workers by letting them sleep until the morning, the “slow 
ones work from dawn to dusk and have to use a oil lamp. They must finish picking through all the 
tea made that day before they can stop.”137
In isolation, each task -- roasting, rolling, sorting -- already demonstrated a commitment to 
efficient, time-maximizing, continuous labor. Only once observers stepped back to view each step 
working in concert with the others, however, could they fully appreciate the remarkable degree of  
cooperation and coordination that the most successful factories could achieve. “Although the 
schedule is very tense (jinzhang ı¹),” Lin wrote, “the division of  labor and cooperation is very 
orderly, not sloppy at all.” 
These principles reached their apex in the highly intricate system for roasting and rolling leaves 
at night. Each basket of  leaves needed to be roasted and rolled two times each and in alternating 
order: roasted, rolled, roasted, and rolled. To accomplish this with top efficiency, each unit was 
composed of  two roasters with one pan each, with alternates standing by to substitute on a rotating 
basis. Each roaster was assigned two teams of  two rollers, who took turns rolling leaves and sending 
them back to the roaster. The same tea master (chashi ĠÁ) in charge of  leading the pluckers to the 
mountains and weighing their leaves now switched hats and became the “commander in 
chief ” (zhushuai [Ɛ) of  roasting and rolling. Here is the process he oversaw: 
Group A receives the first batch of  roasted leaves and rolls them for the first time. After those 
leaves have been roasted a second time, Group B will roll them a second time, just as another 
137 Lin Fuquan, 687.
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batch of  leaves is roasted a first time and then delivered to Group A to be rolled a first time. By 
the time Group B finishes rolling the first batch and sends the leaves off  to another room to be 
baked [the next step in the process], Group A will just have finished rolling the second batch, 
and those leaves will be roasted again and delivered to group B. They are synchronized like a 
machine (ru jixie PSɖ).
Although like (ru) a machine, the operation was still powered by human labor. From the 
descriptions, one can imagine that the rhythm of  roasting and rolling must have sped up and slowed 
down over the course of  an evening. We can imagine that, at the height of  their speed and 
coordination, the workers’ yells would have sounded as regular as a metronome. Yet the timing and 
rhythm of  work was still animated by the sounds of  humans at work with one another: “The sounds 
‘lift from the pan!’ [qiguo! %ƒ] (what the roasters yell to the rollers when they decide the leaves are 
done roasting) and ‘pick up!’ [jiebei!] (what the rollers yell through the window to the baking room 
when they are done rolling) echo all night long [bujue yu er ĩĜƠ].” Inside the factories, “Time 
was organized by the rhythms of  tea rolling [dongzuo zhi jiepai HiNáĘ].” To pass the night but 
also stay on schedule, “the workers all sing songs together.”138
This scene leaves us with an powerful yet ambiguous image. For the workers, time was filled by 
the serial repetition of  individual operations deep into the night. Theirs was a consciousness 
oriented around tasks, an awareness of  the world shaped by the rhythm of  roasting, rolling, and 
roasting again. Activity was organized, one could say, through concrete and pre-industrial time. Yet 
workers were not allowed to completely feel as if  they owned their own time, and the pace never 
slackened much: “even though their bodies are spent from working in the sun and they are 
extremely exhausted, the work is strict, and they have no option to relax.”139 Their program of  
concrete time, in other words, coexisted with the compulsion to keep up with a certain abstract level 
of  efficiency. For one, the division of  labor was a powerful tool for generating work momentum and 
138 Lin Fuquan, 685.
139 Lin Fuquan, 685.
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dissuading workers from casually starting and stopping. Once under way, the rhythm of  roasting and 
rolling impressed upon each worker that the body was larger than any individual part. Further, the 
factory managers intended to completely fill up the workers’ days with tasks, so the workers had 
every incentive to finish quickly and catch some sleep before dawn. And finally, the “commander in 
chief ” (zhushuai) was charged with keeping the workers on schedule, a physical embodiment of  the 
compulsion towards productivity.
The combination of  concrete and abstract sensations of  time suggested a labor process 
governed by an underlying drive towards efficiency yet which did not entirely rob workers of  
opportunities to make meaning out of  their work. Among their work songs, the following mocked 
the authority figures who kept them so busy (and perhaps an overseer with a sense of  humor would 
sing along with them):
RÙIǢĠŋ, "'IÈs, ȺȄȺIɴ, 
Åɱiɕɿ, Ƅ@ƄĪÙə, ʋ@ʋĪIõsʞ
Atop the mountain there’s a building for tea,
raise a child to become a baotou,
he’ll close his nose and eyes to roast the leaves,
shut his ears and ignore his cues,
with dancing hands and dancing feet, the mountain guide,
with busy hands and busy feet, the tea roaster.
That these “ol’ Jiangxi” men and women could work like a machine was an embodiment of  the 
process of  labor-intensive industrialization. The same dynamics that historically provided the 
incentive for labor-saving, capital-intensive machinery also, in these contexts, reshaped the human 
labor process so that it could itself  resemble a machine, albeit one whose component parts were 
human beings.140 This reorganization powerfully increased the productive capacities of  human labor 
without radically improving the technical and physical limits of  their tools. That latter task would not 
140 Cf. Marx 1976, 457 and Postone, 332.
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become a priority until the twentieth century, when foreign-educated researchers attempting to catch 
up with Indian and Japanese production tried to introduce new techniques of  cooperative 
production and labor-saving rolling machines. Traditionally, these new efforts have been seen as an 
outside force that shook a traditional industry out of  its slumber. But, as this chapter has shown, 
twentieth-century industrialization was really a continuation of  an ongoing process since the 
nineteenth century to reshape production along the principles of  efficiency and productivity.
By the last decades of  the 1800s, inland tea merchants had developed systems of  tea production 
that were far more intensive and advanced than only a century earlier. However, those changes took 
place in the relative obscurity of  the inland tea districts, hundreds of  miles away from the political 
and economic centers Beijing and Shanghai. By the time Qing officials decided to more closely 
examine conditions of  production -- spurred by falling prices and a collapsing market for overseas 
buyers -- they compared the labor-intensive methods of  the countryside against what they believed 
were the far more advanced capital-intensive, mechanized techniques of  India. Juxtaposed against 
the spectacle of  Indian tea, older and newer methods in China appeared indistinguishable. 
Compared to the modern and scientific Indian tea, Chinese tea production appeared timeless and 
traditional.
Chapter six shall more closely analyze how the dynamics of  accumulation were grasped by late 
Qing officials in their own time. Although the bureaucracy did not recognize how much methods of  
tea production had changed over the preceding century, they nevertheless followed in the merchants’ 
footsteps by traveling from the world of  circulation into the realm of  production. By the time they 
finally turned their attention to more intensive methods of  production, they were only echoing ideas 
that the inland tea shops had known for decades.
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Chapter Five
The rise of  indentured labor policies in eastern India: 
Tea mania, the labor question, and the managing agency
Introduction
While Chinese tea merchants struggled to keep up with market demands by economizing on existing 
labor processes, planters in India simply struggled to find adequate supplies of  labor necessary to 
begin producing tea in the first place. Around the same time W.N. Lees wrote his tract calling on the 
Government of  India to “colonize” Assam, the Bengal Council passed the first special law allowing 
planters in Assam to engage migrant workers through indentured labor contracts, known as Act III 
(B.C.) of  1863. Eventually, the penal contract became the main tool used by the industry to populate 
the empty factories and barren tracts of  land reserved for tea cultivation, and by the end of  the 
century, the gap between Chinese and Indian tea exports had all but disappeared.
“Ceylon and Indian tea is prepared entirely by machinery, which eliminates all chance of  
contamination from nude, perspiring, yellow men, and preserves its natural aroma, flavour and 
purity.”1 This was how the tea planters of  India, now organized into a body known as the Indian Tea 
Association, sought to account for the astonishing rise of  Indian tea and the attendant collapse of  
the Chinese tea trade. In 1895, the ITA sent the above caption along with an illustrated 
advertisement to American magazines such as Harpers Bazaar and The Ladies Home Journal. The 
centerpiece of  this advertisement depicted “the interior of  a Chinese tea factory, with the process of  
hand-rolling in full operation,” and Chinese workers who were “stripped to the waists” (“but there is 
1 Blechynden quoted in The Indian Tea Association, Detailed Report of  General Committee: Includes List 
of  Members and Proceedings of  Annual General Meeting (1897) (Calcutta: W.J. Pinheiro, Cones and Co.’s 
Press, 1897), 218. 
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nothing in the least bit offensive about it,” added the representative).2 Unfortunately for the ITA, 
this particular advertisement was rejected by several magazines for its “indecent” imagery and 
language. But any objection to this particular advertisement did not prevent the ITA from pushing 
its larger message through their extensive ad campaign (see example advertisements below). Simply 
put, Chinese tea remained stuck in the precapitalist methods of  manual production, and it 
consequently lost its competitive advantages to planters in India, who utilized modern, labor-saving 
machinery. As another ad stated, “It is this scientific manufacture or preparation which gives the teas 
of  these two countries [Ceylon and India] their uncontested superiority over those made by the hand 
labor of  Mongolians in China and Japan.” 
The explanation provided by the ITA in these advertisements was seductively simple. But was it 
true? This chapter shall test this characterization by recounting the various events and processes 
behind the ascendance of  the Indian tea industry in the second half  of  the nineteenth century. In 
section two, I detail how the economic and physical landscape of  Assam was remade by a 
speculative bubble for tea lands in the 1860s. “Tea mania” sucked in dozens of  new companies and 
investors, many of  whom believed, like W.N. Lees, that tea was bound to be the next big thing and 
that, therefore, they needed to “get in on the ground floor.” However, tea mania eventually crashed 
by the end of  the sixties, and the aftermath marked a turning point in the history of  Indian tea. In 
section three, I describe changes at the political level. The mania convinced government officials 
that they needed to focus their efforts on supplying cheap labor to the tea districts, and as these 
officials considered different models of  indentured labor legislation, they emphasized the necessity 
to preserve conditions of  freedom for the indentured worker. In section four, I describe changes in 
the commercial sphere. The end of  tea mania precipitated the rise of  a new form of  corporate
2 Blechynden quoted in ITA Report, 1897, 218. The original ad apparently enjoyed a limited run in a 
few select magazines, but I have thus far been unable to find them. The details of  the ITA’s ad 





Figure 8. Indian Tea Association advertisements. These ads ran in the Ladies' Home Journal, based in 
Philadelphia, PA. Ads are from November and December 1896 and May 1897 issues.
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capital, the management agency. Together, the rise of  the management agency and the government’s 
new willingness to oblige the industry with planter-friendly labor laws created the conditions for a 
mass migration of  indentured workers into the eastern Indian tea industry, with nearly three 
hundred thousand migrant workers in the last two decades alone. As a result, Indian tea expanded to 
entirely new levels of  scale and production, and it was only a matter of  time before it eclipsed the 
Chinese tea trade upon which it had originally been designed to overtake. Finally, section five 
analyzes how the crash following tea mania pushed planters to rethink their approach to production. 
I analyze how planters introduced novel measures to the labor process designed to increase 
productivity, measures that included time discipline, a piece-wage system, and the introduction of  
labor-saving machinery.
The chapter ends with a comparative analysis of  methods of  “rationalizing” production across 
the Indian and Chinese tea sectors. Although the ITA’s advertisements carried some truth insofar as 
tea-rolling and tea-drying devices began to play a larger role on the Assam tea gardens, the overall 
pattern of  tea production in India also shared with their Chinese counterparts a heavy dependence 
upon methods of  labor-intensive industrialization. In both political economic theory and practice, 
then, labor played a featured role in the expansion of  Indian tea.
Tea mania
Since its founding in 1842, the Assam Company had enjoyed exclusive status as the only business 
concern growing commercial tea in eastern India. By 1850, as the industry showed slow signs of  
growth, a certain Colonel Hannay started the first private individual garden, and by 1853, when a 
government judge named Moffat Mills visited, he spotted ten total private gardens. On that visit, 
Mills announced the creation of  new Wasteland rules intended to open up land for commercial 
cultivation. The rules of  1854 were only mildly successful, for although they stipulated highly 
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favorable 99-year leases, they demanded that planters clear the land or else lose their grants.3 The 
incentives succeeded enough that by 1859, some fifty-one private gardens had appeared in the area, 
and future government inquiries would claim “that the foundations of  the present tea industry were 
laid between 1856 and 1859.”4 Nevertheless, planters complained that the clearance conditions were 
too high and therefore hurt the value of  the land by dissuading buyers.5 Planters clamored for fee-
simple land sales, which would allow planters to outright buy the land, providing “absolute fixity of  
tenure and liberty of  disposal.”6
In October 1861, Charles Canning, governor-general of  India, obliged. He proclaimed that land 
in Assam should be sold under fee-simple terms, at a fixed rate between two rupees and eight annas 
to five rupees. At the time, he wrote
As regard the sale of  waste lands, there can be no question of  the substantial benefits, both to 
India and to England, which must follow the establishment of  settlers who will introduce 
profitable and judicious cultivation into Districts hitherto unreclaimed…and whence [European 
Settlers] may direct such improvements as European capital, skill, and enterprize can effect in 
the agriculture, communications, and commerce of  the surrounding country.7 
3 Campbell in Parliamentary Papers, “East India (products). Part I. Reports on the tea and tobacco 
industries in India.” 1874 (C.982) XLVIII.57, 32-34. Specifically: “Certain clearance conditions were 
also attached to these grants; they provided that one-eighth of  the total area was to be cleared and 
rendered fit for cultivation in five years, one-fourth in ten years, one-half  in twenty years, and three-
fourths in thirty years; and that, in default, of  compliance with these clearance conditions, the grant 
was to be resumed.”
4 Edgar in “East India,” 13.
5 Also, given the shortage of  timber in the country, many planters believed it was best not to clear 
the jungles.
6 “East India,” 33.
7 William Nassau Lees, ed., The Resolutions, Regulations, Despatches and Laws Relating to the Sale of  Waste 
Lands and the Immigration of  Labor in India (Calcutta: Military Orphan Press, 1863), 1-2.
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The “Canning Laws,” as they were remembered, liberalized land ownership in order to 
encourage tea capitalists to productively utilize the land. However, the government unwittingly 
created a market for rampant speculation by replacing the original fixed rates of  Rs. 2-8 with an 
auction system that set Rs. 2-8 as the upset, or starting price for bids.8 Industry observer Edward 
Money blasted the plan years later: 
Instead of  Rs. 2-8 per acre for all waste lands (by no means a low price, when the cost of  land in 
the Colonies is considered) and that the applicant for the land (who had, perhaps, spent months 
seeking for it) should have it, the illiberal and unjust method of  putting the land up to auction 
with an upset price of  Rs. 2-8 was adopted, the unfortunate seeker, finder, and applicant, 
through whose labour the land had been found, having no advantage over any other bidder. The 
best, at least the most successful plan in those days, though as unfair and illiberal as the 
Government action, was to wait till some one, who was supposed to know what good Tea land 
was, applied for a piece, and then bid half  an anna more than he did, and thus secure it. It paid 
much better than hunting about for oneself, and it was kind and considerate on the part of  
Government to devise such a plan!9
W. N. Lees agreed that the plan was unnecessary and harmful. Once more, he argued the fallacy 
lay in the insistence by government officials to import the laws of  British political economy into a 
foreign Indian country: “nobody wanted it; if  we except a few persons in two divisions of  Bengal, 
who wished to dispose of  some tea estates in the London Market, and who believed that this kind 
of  title best suited English ideas and would consequently take more readily with buyers, — and some 
others interested in tea land in the same districts, who, not understanding their own interests, were 
led away by popular excitement.”10
Inside the auction house, speculators and agents resorted to unsavory tactics to profit off  an 
opaque market for newly available lands. Investors already believed that Indian tea, still in its nascent 
stages, was bound to be a highly remunerative industry. And as prices for lands escalated, tea further 
gained a reputation as a “money-spinner.” Soon, a “madness comparable in intensity with that of  
8 Edgar in “East India,” 17.
9 Edward Money, The Cultivation & Manufacture of  Tea (London: Whittingham, 1883), 2-3.
10 Lees 1862, 84-85. Italics added.
CHAPTER FIVE
175
the South Sea Bubble seized men’s minds.”11 Exacerbating this madness was a paucity of  solid 
information about the actual lands up for sale. The fee-simple wasteland laws stipulated that before a 
land was put up for sale, bidders and agents needed to properly survey and demarcate the 
boundaries. However, officials discovered “there is scarcely anywhere in the world more difficult 
ground to demarcate and survey than the forest jungles of  Assam and Cachar,” for the “mere work 
of  cutting lines through the jungle preparatory to survey is far more costly and troublesome than the 
actual survey of  any cultivated tract could be; and the jungle grows so rapidly that these lines 
disappear in a few months, leaving no trace of  the boundaries, unless most substantial and durable 
marks have been put up.”12 Instead of  insisting upon fully completed surveys, auction houses were 
content if  buyers simply made a deposit of  money for a future survey. As a result, applicants were 
allowed to bid on land based upon a “rough pen-and-ink sketch.”13 In fact, most bids were premised 
upon “a fancy sketch of  an almost imaginary tract of  land, which was generally found, when the 
professional survey went over the ground some years later, to bear very slight resemblance to the 
real grant.”14 In lieu of  an official survey, applicants marked their land by cutting “a boundary road 
round their lots to keep it open, and [erecting] masonry pillars to mark the line immediately on 
entering into possession, so that the lands might be readily identified.”15
The sloppy administration of  the auctions yielded outlandish stories of  deception and 
speculation. Many agents would advertise land five times its actual size. “Often in those days was a 
small garden made of  30 or 40 acres, and sold to a Company as 150 or 200 acres!,” Money 
11 Griffiths, 96.
12 “East India,” 16.
13 “East India,” 34.
14 “East India,” 16.
15 NAI. Home Department, 1869. Report of  the commissioners appointed to enquire into the state and 
prospects of  tea cultivation in Assam, Cachar and Sylhet (1868), 18. Hereafter referred to as 1868 Report.
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recounted. “I am not joking. It was done over and over again.”16 Other times, the successful bidders 
would simply discover that the gardens “were actually not in existence at all.”17 If  threatened by the 
specter of  a government inquiry, which would devalue the land, many agents made sure to sell the 
land before a proper survey could be conducted.18 Even in cases where some of  the land was good, 
those tracts would be “lumped together” with “three or four inferior jungly tracts and sold … at 
prices twice or three times their true value.”19 In other instances, much of  the land, it was discovered 
later, was already occupied by local Assamese groups. Such groups already had a lease agreement in 
place with the government at a low rate of  several annas per acre. But if  the same land had been 
sold for somewhere between three to ten rupees per acre, the government sided with the new 
European owners and ruled that the local Assamese should be kicked off  the land.20
Ultimately, even if  a piece of  land was able to escape all these dangers of  accuracy and 
accessibility, most planters found the business of  tea-planting too difficult in the extremely crowded 
and competitive business climate. Land prices had skyrocketed, and in “those fever days, with the 
16 Money, 8.
17 “East India,” 34.
18 “East India,” 16.
19 Shyam Rungta, The Rise of  Business Corporations in India, 1851-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), 98.
20 Money, 2-3. J.W. Edgar, a district judge, recalled from personal experience an instance of  multiple 
“evils” combined into a single case:  “It was … found that portions of  the land so demarcated and 
surveyed were occupied by native cultivators, who held under leases dated many years previous to 
the auction-sale, and who had been paying revenue to Government for their holdings.  The fee-
simple grantee brought a case in the civil court to eject these men and the Moonsiff  [a native judge] 
gave a decree in his favour.  This decision was appealed against, and the case came before me as 
District Judge.   On my reading over the papers it struck me that the land in dispute, which I knew 
personally, could not be situated within the boundaries detailed in the title deed; and, on further 
examination it turned out that the land described in the latter was about four miles distant from that 
actually held by the grantee, to which he had no legal title whatever, while he had never seen, and did 
not want, the land actually granted to him. He therefore asked to have the title deed cancelled, and 
to have as much of  the land in his possession as had not been previously settled with natives granted 




auction system, …the most absurd prices, Rs. 10 and upwards per acre, were sometimes paid for 
wild jungle lands.”21 As a result, many planters decided that rather than bringing their new lands to 
full maturity and hoping to reap the rewards of  future harvests, they would cash out when prices hit 
their peak. When Edgar visited lands in 1863, he noted that “there used to be a saying in the mouths 
of  planters that it was very doubtful whether it would ever pay to make tea, but that there was no 
doubt that it paid to make gardens.” Another saying was that “gardens were made to sell, not to 
pay.”22 Planters would clear their land, plant a first crop — which would be inedible and unsaleable 
— and flip it for “an advance of  700 or 800 per cent on the gross expenditure of  the owners and 
cultivators.”23
The number of  new gardens and new companies — “mushroom companies,” as they were 
known — multiplied in a seemingly endless pattern. From 1858 to 1865, according to the historian 
of  the Assam Company, the number of  tea companies jumped from one to twenty.24 By another 
count, historian Shyam Rungta claimed that ninety-two such companies had been registered over this 
period!25 No matter the real figure, the lesson was unmistakeable: the tea industry was growing at an 
untenable rate. Unsurprisingly, the explosion led company managers to act rashly and compete for 
scarce resources, quickly exhausting the tea plants, the labor forces, and the pool of  managers and 
staff. 
The fluctuations of  tea seed sales from existing plantations clearly indexed the rhythms of  tea 
mania. The Jorehaut Tea Company, which was founded on lands that had been cultivated by the 
21 Money, 3.
22 “East India,” 14.
23 “East India,” 14.
24 Antrobus 1957, 134.
25 Rungta, 95. The discrepancy, I suspect, lies in the difference between companies that actually 
operated business and manufactured teas versus the amount of  companies that nominally existed in 
the government registrars of  India and Britain.
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Assam Company for decades, became one of  the main suppliers of  tea seeds to prospective 
planters. In 1860, they sold 173 maunds of  seeds for a gross income of  £520. By 1863, they were 
selling 830 maunds per year for £8,486 — a 480% increase, with a price markup of  340%. Two 
years later, their sales again fell to 182 maunds for £739, a sign that the speculative fever had 
passed.26 Planters exhibited little patience with their new seedlings and plants. Although the best tea 
manuals suggested that tea could not be marketed for three years after initially sowing seeds, the 
mid-sized planters felt pressure to produce as quickly as possible. Directors of  companies 
“demanded the production of  more and more tea,” and the managers complied, plucking “every 
leaf  and would have chopped up the tea wood itself  had it been practicable.” Not only did market 
prices deteriorate, but so too were the plants destroyed from overpicking.27 
As with the seedlings and plants, the pool of  experienced garden managers was similarly 
depleted. Commenting years later, Edward Money pointed to the lack of  guidance among planters 
as a central factor behind the eventual collapse of  the mania. “New gardens were commenced on 
impossible sites,” he wrote, “and by men as managers who not only did not know a Tea plant from a 
cabbage, but who were equally ignorant of  the commonest rules of  agriculture.”28 These managers 
seemed to fall into one of  two categories. First, there were young and inexperienced men who had 
never held a steady job at anything. “The boy fresh from school who knew naught of  agriculture, 
less, if  possible, of  horticulture,” wrote a newspaper at the time, “was pitchforked into a Manager’s 
berth, and told to plant Tea.”29 Subsequent inquiries characterized these managers as “young men 
fresh from England, who had no knowledge whatever of  the business in which they were engaged, 




29 The Englishman’s Overland Mail, quoted in Griffiths, 105-106.
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of  the habits and language of  the people who were under their control, or of  the difficulties to be 
met and overcome.”30 The other men were adventure-seekers who turned to tea after already cycling 
through various other industries and professions with little success. Money wrote, “Tea planters in 
those days were a strange medley of  retired or cashiered army and navy officers, medical men, 
engineers, veterinary surgeons, steamer captains, chemists, shop-keepers of  all kinds, stable-keepers, 
used-up policemen, clerks, and goodness knows what besides!” In short, “people who had failed in 
everything else were thought quite competent to make plantations.”31 Indeed, he declared summarily 
that “those who know least to-day, know more than the best informed in the Tea-fever period.” 
Added to such inexperiences was “the pressure put upon Garden Managers by the Agents and 
Managers of  Companies to make up quantity without reference to quality.”32
These stories paint a picture of  the “demand” side of  the fever, but turning attention to the 
“supply” side — namely, the older companies that provided the seeds and managerial talent for new 
gardens — also provides insight into the pivotal transformations affecting the structure of  tea 
capital. For nearly two decades, the Assam Company had operated as the virtually lone tea company 
in eastern India. By a special legislative act, it enjoyed exclusive status as one of  the few joint-stock 
operations in India at the time. However, the business landscape began to change with the Company 
Act of  1850, which precipitated similar Company Acts throughout the fifties and sixties which 
allowed freer registration of  joint-stock companies. The Act of  1857, in particular, widened the 
possibilities for forming limited liability companies, which in turn attracted investment from less 
capitalized individuals and groups into newly-formed companies.33  
30 1868 Report, 14.
31 Money, 2. Indeed, he declared summarily that “those who know least to-day, know more than the 
best informed in the Tea-fever period.” Money, 7.
32 1868 Report, 14.
33 Rungta, 41-45 and 64.
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The second incorporated tea company, the Jorehaut Company, typified these changes. The 
company emerged from a disagreement within the Assam Company. According to the official 
historian of  both companies, the Assam Company’s London board of  directors refused to 
acknowledge and promote the core talent that had successfully run the Calcutta branch. Rather than 
promoting one man in particular, William Roberts, the board allowed him and others to purchase 
company lands and start an independent concern. Roberts and his friends then also recruited those 
managers who had helped the older company thrive throughout the last decade. It was a move so 
stubborn and irrational that Henry Burkinyoung, formerly of  the Assam Company, wrote on his way 
out the door that the Board’s policy “I can characterize by no other term than that of  suicidal.”34 In 
fact, the internal dispute between the Assam and Jorehaut companies was only the most visible and 
prominent example of  a larger trend, wherein almost everyone on the Assam Company board had 
begun investing in or managing small concerns on the side. “Practically every manager and assistant 
had an interest in, or owned, some other estate,” for capital was now abundant, and a new 
momentum for liberalizing land sales was gathering in the halls of  government.35
New limited liability laws contributed greatly to the willingness of  investors to sink their money 
into tea.36 Although the new laws passed in 1857 applied to all of  India, the only businessmen who 
took advantage of  the new opportunities were those in Calcutta. Some historians have argued this 
was because Calcutta featured so many more Europeans, and “since these Europeans must have 
been better acquainted with the advantages of  the corporate organisation, it was quite natural that 
they should have sought its benefits.”37 Such a hypothesis is difficult to verify, but other government 
34 Quoted in Antrobus 1957, 110-111.
35 Antrobus 1948, 39. The Jorehaut Company for instance took advantage of  the new Company 
laws, expanding its operations after only a few years of  existence by issuing more shares and quickly 





documents at the time did suggest that “native opinion in this country” was unaware of  the options 
of  limited liability, and that “the English law” was “as yet little known amongst the people here.”38 
Even decades later, in 1882, the registrar of  joint-stock companies in Calcutta remarked that 
“combination of  private individuals on the limited liability principle, for the advancement of  trade 
or industry, was unknown in this country until the advent of  British capital, energy, and spirit; even 
now it has not received adequate appreciation from native capitalists.”39
Whatever the cause, the new tea companies which relied upon limited liability to raise capital 
were overwhelmingly owned by European businessmen. Newspapers at the time reported that in 
this “dangerous epidemic,” men who had found it “difficult to make a fortune out of  their shops 
began to launch them on the share market” as limited liability companies.40 Company histories also 
mention that these limited liability companies abused bank credit, contributing to the demise of  
many Indian banks later in the decade.41 Believing that their sources of  capital were endless, the new 
companies made terribly wasteful decisions, a “most reckless expenditure of  money” at the height 
of  tea mania.42 Looking back, government reports characterized many limited-liability ventures 
during this period as a “house of  cards” and “huge superstructures of  fraud, erected to inveigle the 
unwary and imprudent.”43 Although most gardens still had not produced marketable tea, companies 
38 NAI. Home Department, Legislative Branch, February 1866., no. 20. “Bill to amend the Law of  
Partnership in India,” 64-65. Such native opinion, in fact, “cannot understand how he can be 
otherwise than a partner, though it concedes that his partnership will be of  a qualified character 
rendering him liable only to the extent of  the capital invested by him, but without incurring further 
unlimited responsibilities like the actual traders.”
39 WBSA, Judicial Department, February 1882, “The bill for incorporation, regulations, and 
winding-up of  trading companies.” File 794, 297-320.
40 Friend of  India, quoted in Rungta, 94.
41 Antrobus 1957, 145.
42 “East India,” 34.
43 WBSA, Judicial Department, February 1882, “The bill for incorporation, regulations, and 
winding-up of  trading companies.” File 794 pp. 297-320
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behaved “on the analogy of  an unfinished railway line” and paid out dividends to shareholders, 
ranging from five to fifteen percent, without the corresponding revenue. “Fresh companies were a 
matter of  daily formation in Calcutta, and shares rose to an absurd premium,” recalled an industry 
observer. “A perfect mania prevailed for squandering capital in new tea concerns, and it involved 
nearly every one, men of  all sorts and conditions, in its specious net — high public officials even 
throwing up their appointments to embark untrammelled in the industry and speculation.”44 
Confined to rumor and hearsay in Calcutta, weeks of  travel away from the actual operation of  
gardens in Assam, owners, investors, and banks alike were swept up by the idea that every garden 
was “a veritable El Dorado.” One observer noted the irony: “Although tea has the reputation of  
furnishing a beverage that cheers but does not inebriate, yet its cultivation in new districts exercises 
the most strangely intoxicating influences on those engaged in it, equalled only by the sanguine 
dreams of  gold explorers.”45
This behavior naturally exhausted companies’ capital, and investors and banks soon realized that 
such companies were founded upon little more than uninformed speculation.46 In response, banks 
began to curtail their loans, and the rate of  discount for the Bank of  Bengal, for instance, reached a 
historic high of  fifteen percent in 1866, the lowest point of  the post-mania crash.47 Prices for shares 
44 Crole, 36.
45 Crole, 37.
46 A story from the Finlay and Muir company archives tells of  a failed tea company during this 
period. In 1861, Robert Charles Atkinson acquired a deed of  freehold land, benefiting from the 
Canning laws, and in 1863 he sold the lands to the Lebong and Minchu Tea Company for Rs. 
115,000. In 1865, the Finlay and Muir Company, a managing agency hired to settle financles, helped 
the tea company renegotiate a mortgage. The Land Mortgage Bank of  India issued them a loan of  
sixty-thousand rupees with ten percent annual interest. Another loan of  thirty-six thousand rupees 
followed in 1867, another sign of  financial difficulties. Finally, in 1869, the company was wound up 
and their assets liquidated, with the land offered up for auction at a time when prices were only a 





peaked near the end of  1863 into 1864, and then they began to slowly decline. Rungta dated the 
collapse of  the industry to May 1866, noting that two months later, fifty-eight of  seventy-five tea 
companies in India were selling their shares at a discount.48 The numbers were staggering: by the end 
of  that year, ten more companies would fold, and only three years later, thirty-three more were 
wound up. In total, 57% of  companies that were registered during tea mania were finished by the 
end of  the decade. In terms of  capital, almost one half  of  total investments during tea mania had 
been lost, and in a span of  about five years, investors in India and Britain lost over one million 
pounds, or nearly half  the total amount invested.49
Edward Money’s moniker for this three-year decline, “the great smash,” was merely the most 
memorable phrase among many — crisis, depression, collapse — used to describe these events.50 If  
the tea mania represented a moment of  intoxication, the great smash did not immediately startle 
investors into sobriety. Instead, the irrational zeal for tea land gave way to an overreaction in the 
opposite direction, as “the idea, once formed, grew apace, that Tea could not pay at all.” All gardens 
went up for sale, and with no buyers, prices tumbled and exacerbated anic. “Gardens that had cost 
lakhs were sold for as many hundreds,” Money recalled, “and the very word ‘Tea’ stank in the 
nostrils of  the commercial public.”51 W.N. Lees noted that “the tea interests of  Bengal have been 
ruined, or so nearly ruined that people are now hurrying out of  the tea districts as fast as they before 




51 Money, 178-179. W.N. Lees also revisited his warnings against tea mania, which he first wrote in 
1862, with the follow remarks in his 1867 revision: “The truth of  these remarks, written in the latter 
part of  1862, is fully borne out by the ruin that has been brought on countless people in England 
and India, by the collapse, in great part from the causes here indicated, of  tea in 1866.” Lees 1867, 
86 fn.
52 Lees 1862, 67 fn. Elsewhere, Lees attributed the great mortality of  imported workers to the tea 
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In the fallout of  tea mania, government inquiries discovered that the greatest problem facing the 
industry was labor, in two senses. First, planters needed workers to actually clear land and cultivate 
tea: “The cry from Assam, both from speculators and bona fide tea cultivators, during the continuance 
of  the tea mania, was ‘Labour, more labour.’” Second, in their search for labor, planters hired 
professional contractors who recruited indiscriminately from the Bengal countryside and engaged in 
unsavory practices that invited government regulation and intervention:
The contractors and recruiters in Calcutta took advantage of  the emergency to send up as 
labourers any who had sufficient vitality to walk or crawl on board the steamers employed to 
convey them to Assam. The halt, the blind, the insane, the hopelessly diseased—in fact the 
refuse of  the bazaars, were all alike drafted to Assam at a certain rate per head, which, yielded a 
handsome profit to recruiters and others interested in the trade.
The fate of  the majority of  these unhappy people was truly sad. Those who survived the 
epidemics which broke out on the passage up, and sometimes carried off  as many as 20 per cent, 
of  their number during a voyage seldom exceeding three weeks, were landed in a country utterly 
strange to them, with a climate which in their weak state was particularly calculated to generate 
diseases of  the most virulent and fatal type! They were often conveyed to gardens where no 
arrangements had been made for accommodating them, and where no medical aid of  any kind 
was available. Unused to labour, the change of  climate, as well as their new mode of  life and 
diet, created sickness, to which numbers succumbed. In one extreme case the mortality in the 
garden was so excessive that the manager deserted it, leaving the dead unburied and the dying 
without help.53
Both these dimensions of  labor, of  supply and treatment, would consume the attention of  
administrators over the next few decades of  Assam history.
crash: “I am very much afraid that it is to a somewhat similar cause, this Country is partly indebted 
far the destruction of  the Indigo trade in Bengal, for the present very lamentable condition of  the 
Tea Trade in Assam and Cachar ; and for the death by starvation of  a large number of  the million 
of  human beings who perished miserably in Orissa last year: January, 1867” (8).
53 Campbell, 34-35. Other accounts from the period offered equally vivid images. According to the 
newspaper Friend of  India, Calcutta recruiters  “drained the purlieus of  the city to supply the 
demand. The lame, the blind, the insane, the diseased, no matter what so that they could crawl, were 
drafted off  to Assam, whose gardens began to look more like open air hospitals than thriving 
plantations.”As the gardens tried to economize on the costs of  labor, stories emerged of  unprepared 
and disastrous recruiting travels: “on the voyage to their new homes the miserable creatures died like 
flies, the sturdiest alone reaching a haven.” In one instance, “the mortality was so great on a certain 
estate that the manager fled, leaving behind him heaps of  unburned dead and scores of  dying 
creatures unattended by medical aid of  any kind.”(Quoted in Rungta, 100).
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The labor question enters the spotlight
Of  course, the shortage of  adequate local labor was not an entirely new revelation. As far back as 
the original 1830s experiments, officials expressed concern that local Assamese groups were 
unwilling to perform disciplined wage labor. And in the 1850s, the director of  the Assam Company 
had already pronounced labor the chief  obstacle blocking the expansion of  tea. W.N. Lees, too, had 
penned his tract on the significance of  “population,” and his work had been read by government 
officials. Over the years, furthermore, the labor question resurfaced in various official 
correspondence, such as in this 1864 letter from the Commissioner of  Dacca to the Legislative 
Branch: “the general question of  cooly labor ... is undoubtedly the question of  greatest importance 
at present connected with tea cultivation.”54 
The puzzle of  this period, then, was that even as private and government voices constantly 
pronounced labor as the most important concern for tea production, the government seemed 
unwilling to fully devote its attention to resolving the labor question. This inertia, however, was 
finally snapped by tea mania and, specifically, the subsequent crash. In 1867, on the heels of  the 
“great smash,” the government asked the Commissioners of  the territories Assam, Cachar, and 
Sylhet to investigate and report upon the tea labor question in both of  its dimensions: how to 
overcome labor deficiencies and also how to regulate recruitment itself. The report served as a 
systematic accounting of  past strategies for labor recruitment and also presented a new philosophy 
of  private, or free labor recruitment that would shape the next few decades of  the Assam industry.
The commissioners did not begin their report by starting with labor but by first addressing the 
conditions of  the industry as a whole. The tea mania bubble, they emphasized, had the misfortune 
of  coinciding with a general depression in the world market for tea. “The market for China Tea has 
been equally depressed with that for Indian Tea,” they wrote. “Losses in the China trade much 
heavier than in the Indian, large supplies, and the state of  trade generally have depressed the 
54 NAI. Legislative Branch Proceedings, November 1864, no. 30, pp. 679 - 704, “Bengal Bill for the 
protection of  planters and laborers in Assam.”
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market.”55 Nevertheless, international factors aside, domestic practices had tremendous room for 
improvement. Most of  the planters they interviewed emphasized the problem of  economy and 
inefficiency. The Managing Director of  the Jorehaut Company, for instance, “considers that, to 
secure through cultivation, a garden ought to have two persons employe for every acre under Tea.” 
The commissioners agreed “no doubt that the proportion of  labor to area originally, and even now 
prevailing, is below the requirements of  thorough cultivation.”56 They attributed the inadequate 
amount of  workers to the rush land at the height of  tea mania, during which the “the labor difficulty 
was overlooked by speculators.”57 In simple yet incisive terms, the concept “waste lands,” into which 
so much capital had been invested, by definition, “implies the absence of  population.” Thus, any 
“attempt to cultivate waste lands” would logically involve “the necessity of  importing labor,” and the 
failure to do so was the “main cause of  the disasters which have overtaken the cultivation of  Tea.”58 
In other words, the problem was that although government had emphasized increasing the flow of  
capital, and the availability of  land, they had overlooked labor, that third basic element of  production. 
“There is no question which is of  more vital importance to the Tea interests than that of  




58 NAI. Bengal Emigration Proceedings, December 1868, Proceeding no. 39. 1868 - From the 
Hon’ble A. Eden, Secy to the Govt of  Bengal, to the Secy to the Gov of  India, Home Department. 
Fort William, the 28th December 1868. Emphases added.
59 1868 Report, 28.
60 For instance, from the 1868 Report: “On the whole, we see no reason to believe that, as far as soil 
and climate go, Tea cannot be grown profitably in Assam, Cachar and Sylhet. The whole matter may 
be reduced to the one question of  the supply of  labor” (4). 
Elsewhere: “Of  the many difficulties in the way of  the remunerative cultivation of  Tea in Assam, 
Cachar, and Sylhet, the scant supply and high price of  local labor are amongst the most 
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introduced the problem of  labor shortages, but it had endowed it with unprecedented urgency. 
Earlier in the decade, W.N. Lees claimed that the normal laws of  classical political economy did not 
apply to the uniquely underpopulated regions of  eastern India and that “population,” therefore, 
deserved supreme attention. With the tea industry in shambles, government officials and planters 
slowly came around to the same conclusion. As the land bubble burst, so too did the illusion that 
classical political economic models corresponded with the concrete realities of  Indian tea. Looking 
back from the early seventies, J.W. Edgar wrote in his government report: 
The cardinal error which misled the able and well-meaning administrators, whose action did so 
much injury to the industry they meant to foster, seems to have been an idea that they were 
bound to work on some general principles of  economical or political science of  universal application, instead 
of  finding out what were the actual conditions, under which the tea industry would have to be 
carried on in Bengal, and shaping their policy accordingly. At no time does any consideration 
appear to have been given to the question how far the difficulty of  obtaining labour should 
affect the action of  Government in dealing with land.61
Slowly, various individuals had recognized that theories of  political economy in the eastern tea 
districts should center their attention less upon the older, Physiocratic category of  land and instead 
upon the urgent lack of  labor. The 1868 Commissioners Report marks this crucial turning point as 
well as any other document from the period. Fixing their attention on labor, the authors of  the 
report sought to review the history and failures of  past legislation aimed at encouraging migration to 
Assam.62 In 1859, the Lieutenant-Governor of  Bengal recommended to planters that they “adopt 
formidable” (20).  
And: “As early as 1862, the Superintendent of  Cachar wrote that “the whole of  the future success 
of  Tea planting in Cachar rests upon the import of  laborers into the Province. The local labor is 
totally insufficient.” These remarks (which are true for Cachar at the present day) are equally 
applicable to Assam” (20).
61 Edgar, 18. Italics added.
62 The most comprehensive history of  legislation can be found in the appendix to the 1906 report 
from the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee. Cf. Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906 Report.
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the same organized system of  recruitment that was pursued by the planters of  Mauritius.”63 The 
Lieutenant-Governor waited for planters to submit a formal proposal for a centralized and 
organized system, but instead the planters simply proceeded on their own to hire labor contractors 
to bring in workers from other parts of  Bengal. Soon, “a scandalous state of  affairs” arose, as 
contractors dispatched men and women “to the districts without taking any sanitary precautions for 
their welfare on the journey; the result was shocking mortality on the voyage up, while many of  the 
emigrants were of  caste or constitution which precluded all hope of  their surviving for many 
months in the jungles of  Assam.”64 This period was the height of  tea mania, when the planting 
community was at its heights of  inexperience and irrationality. The government finally intervened in 
1863 by requiring all contractors and recruiters to first obtain a government license and to bring 
recruited workers before the district magistrate for inspection. Before proceeding to Assam, the 
worker needed to sign a contract, up to five years, in front of  the magistrate, who verified his 
“willingness to proceed.” However, the 1863 law contained no provision for monitoring or 
protecting the workers after their arrival on the tea gardens. Act VI (B.C.) of  1865 authorized the 
government to monitor both engagements and working conditions on the garden. 
These laws had been passed in Calcutta, and legislators had few resources to ensure that planters 
obeyed the laws in the remote and undermanned tea districts hundreds of  miles away. Officials were 
uncertain how the tea business actually operated, and not until the 1868 Report did they enjoy access 
to such details. The Report declared the previous two laws both unequivocal failures. “The licensed 
recruiters employed a horde of  unlicensed sub-recruiters, coolies were constantly induced to 
emigrate by misrepresentations, and registration in the district of  recruitment was no effectual check 





died on the voyage.”65 Further, “nor had the working of  Act VI of  1865 been satisfactory,” as 
reports proliferated describing unhealthy gardens and coolies who were “overworked and ill-fed and 
not properly attended to in sickness.”66 
The authors of  the report believed these abuses arose from the fact that professional recruiters 
acted as mercenaries, indifferent to the welfare of  workers and not invested in the success of  the tea 
plantations. “Any system,” they wrote, “by which the supply of  laborers is in the hands of  
contractors and recruiters who have no interest in the real good of  the cooly, can never work well. 
The employer and laborer should, as much as possible, deal directly with each other, and the 
existence of  any middleman, whose only object is to make gain out of  both, can only lead to evil.”67 
Ultimately, the authors would like to have seen “all contractors and recruiters for the supply of  
labour to the tea districts altogether abolished.” They knew this was an impossibility, however, as the 
demand for tea labor would not disappear any time soon. Instead, they offered a system they called 
“private recruiting.” In theory, planters would no longer rely upon professional individual 
contractors but instead send out their own recruiters, known as “garden sardars.” Planters would 
directly send the sardar to the district magistrate, who would countersign the sardar’s certificate and 
allow the sardar to make one trip to their home village and personally recruit friends and family to 
travel together back to the tea districts. Because sardars were directly employed by the tea garden 
and because they would be personally recruiting friends and family, then, they would treat workers 
with much greater attention than professional contractors had. As the following description made 
clear, the central strength of  their proposal was that private recruiting ensured the freedom of  labor: 
The advantages of  private recruiting appear to us to be very great. The labourer is engaged for a 
particular employer; he is induced to emigrate by a man of  whom he has some knowledge, who 
65 1906 Report, 138.
66 1906 Report, 138.
67 1868 Report, 44. Emphases added.
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knows what the work on a tea garden really is and the treatment to be expected from the 
manager. He goes of  his own free will in a comparatively small batch, under circumstances which, 
we believe, are much more conducive to health that if  he were passed up through a depot. He 
can travel in many instances by land in a way much more suited to his ordinary habits. He arrives 
a free agent, bound by no contract; and if  he dislikes the work or his master, he has no difficulty in 
finding employment elsewhere. This fact is that best guarantee that he will be kindly and 
considerably treated; and yet, while enjoying all the freedom which the Act withholds, he would, 
under the scheme we have elsewhere recommended, have the benefit of  all the protection which 
proper medical and sanitary supervision can confer.68
In eastern Indian languages, sardar literally means leader, but it also assumed different meanings, 
such as village elder or, in commercial situations, gangleaders.69 The government first cemented the 
sardar’s place in legislation with the following labor law, Act II (B.C.) of  1870, which recognized and 
regulated an extant system of  private, sardari recruitment.70 This recommendation to replace 
professional contractors with garden sardars, along with its attendant emphasis upon “free 
migration” and “free labor,” would become the central policy objective of  subsequent iterations of  
labor legislation. I will revisit the problem of  “freedom” and its seeming contradiction with 
indentured contracts in future chapters. In the remaining sections of  the current chapter, I will 
describe how the tea industry recovered from tea mania through a combination of  relying on a 
combination of  a distinctive form of  management as well as new planter practices aimed at the 
economic recruitment and employment of  migrant labor.
The managing agency: new configurations of  tea capital
If, in the late 1860s, an observer searched amidst the rubble of  tea mania and the subsequent “great 
smash,” one could see scattered optimistic signs of  activity. Government papers reported a steady 
improvement starting in 1867. By 1869, five years after prices had peaked, and three years after they 
reached their lowest point, “it could not but attract attention that nearly all old gardens, 
notwithstanding the severe test which they had undergone during the preceding three years, were 





still not only in existence, but were, by careful management, yielding a profit to their owners.”71 The 
chief  factors behind the rebound were an abundance of  plants, a high level of  cultivation, and 
careful management.72 The overall ratio of  “paid-up” capital, or actual capital invested (versus 
nominal capital), rose. Land speculation also gave way to real cultivation and planting.73 During this 
period of  slow recovery, the physical appearance of  the Assam landscape also began to change, with 
carefully planned rows of  tea bushes replacing wild jungle and barren soil. The terrain of  business 
and management changed as well. Campbell unwittingly recorded this change in his 1872 report. He 
noted that the most recent government commission had only surveyed “very large concerns 
managed through paid agents,” and as a result the reported costs for forming new gardens were 
“exceptionally high.” At the same time, he believed that in this new, saner environment, individual 
planters “possessing a fair amount of  practical experience” and smaller gardens still had many 
opportunities to thrive.74 
History would disprove Campbell’s optimistic predictions for small tea producers. Those “paid 
agents” to which Campbell referred were managing agencies, a form of  business organization that 
during the last third of  the century came to eventually dominate the Indian industry. At the start of  
tea mania, no managing agencies had any stake in the trade. By 1875, fifty-six of  sixty-six companies 
were somehow managed or owned by such agencies, and about seventy percent of  overall Calcutta 
businesses shared the same status.
Past historians have struggled with how precisely to define the managing agency. Shyam Rungta 
wrote the system was “an institutional setting … in which entrepreneurial decisions were made.”75 A 
71 “East India,” 36.
72 “East India,”15.
73 Rungta, 116.




more precise definition, courtesy of  S.D. Chapman, gave more historical depth: the agency was a 
“firm that contracts ‘to organize the activities of  a company, to appoint managers and other key 
personnel, and to conduct its day-to-day affairs, always subject to the overriding control of  the 
company’s board … In many instances the managing agent has taken the initiative in starting a 
company and holds a proportion of  its shares.’”76 This capacious definition helpfully indicates the 
two roles that the managing agency could play: first, as a “commission house” that conducted 
business on behalf  of  other, likely European, firms, and, second, as an investor and shareholder for 
local industry its own right.77 
The rise of  the managing agencies also provides another arena of  speculation about the 
differences between the China tea trade and the formation of  the Indian tea industry. On first 
appearance, the managing agencies appear to be a much more modern, industrial version of  the 
commercial houses in China. Whereas the China trade relied upon small merchant groups who held 
mostly liquid capital and were uninterested in controlling the activities of  production, the Indian 
managing agencies would eventually dominate the landscape of  Indian tea by taking responsibility 
for every aspect of  commerce: land ownership, hiring employees and overseers, investing capital into 
production improvements, transport, marketing, etc. Historically, however, these modern corporate 
managing agencies had their origins in the same types of  small merchant houses that could be seen 
all across eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Asia: “the record of  agency houses’ being active in 
several parts of  the world apart from India is perfectly clear - Mathesons and Swires in China, 
Wallace Bros. and Steel Bros. in Burma, Hendersons in Borneo, Siam and and Java, Mackinnon 
Mackenzie in East Africa, Finlay Muir in South Africa, Guthries, Bousteads, and Symes in Malaya, 
76 Stephen D. Chapman, “The Agency Houses : British Mercantile Enterprise in the Far East C. 




Lloyd Scott, and other houses in Persia, and so on.”78 Indeed, many (most?) of  the major managing 
agencies that came to dominate the Indian industry first had their start acting as buyers and sellers 
of  tea from the Far East. 
In India, these companies began to sporadically invest into local industry starting in the 1840s, 
especially in the indigo factories of  northern Bengal and, later, the jute mills of  Calcutta.79 In fact, 
most managing agencies that eventually invested in tea all predated the mid-century tea boom, and 
many cut their teeth by managing a diverse portfolio of  businesses such as indigo, shellac, jute, 
cotton, silk, etc. How, precisely, they emerged in the tea industry and what role they played is best 
illustrated through a handful of  concrete examples.
In the wake of  tea mania and its crash, tea companies in Assam were consolidated into 
managing agencies through two routes: first, older and larger companies absorbed losses but 
nonetheless survived, eventually hiring managing agencies to help reform their businesses on behalf  
of  the shareholders; second, managing agencies moved laterally from other sectors and proceeded to 
buy up tea property and manage it themselves. In the latter case, observers in the mid-seventies 
described many gardens that had been bought “for a mere song during the panic” and subsequently 
reaped “enormous profits.”80
The Assam Company, the oldest and largest company at the start of  the mania, is a good 
example of  the first scenario. After their most experienced planters left in the late 1850s to form the 
Jorehaut Company, the London board relied upon a motley crew of  inexperienced bureaucrats who 
were poorly trained to run an efficient tea plantation. The Company had previously enjoyed the 
privilege of  an empty field of  competition, but with the exponential rise of  new gardens that 






Company floundered throughout the sixties. At first, the Company was “living on its own fat,” in 
the words of  the company historian, but did not realize this until after the crash of  tea mania.81 For 
instance, in the immediate aftermath of  the founding of  the Jorehaut Company in 1859, the newly-
named Director W.H. Judge made it a priority to oust staff  who ran side businesses. But having fired 
their superintendent, the Board faced difficulties with “planters with any experience of  tea … at a 
premium, for they were either opening up gardens of  their own or in the employ of  other 
companies at higher remuneration.”82 They settled on a man, John Smith, who had only six years 
experience, as their new superintendent. Judge and Smith both proved too inexperienced and 
injudicious during a period when the Company was being tested by rapid expansion. Rather than 
demonstrating veteran wisdom in the face of  the tea rush, the Company instead joined in on the 
irrational exuberance. They opened up more lands than they were equipped to cultivate, and 
expenses ballooned. In 1865, they posted losses of  thirteen-thousand pounds, and the next year 
nearly forty-five thousand. Internal company memos laid the blame “for excessive expenditure on 
the ambitious programme of  extensions which visualised increasing the Company’s area by 2,500 to 
3,000 acres”83 
After the Company posted three straight years without dividends, the Calcutta board 
recommended that the Company hire a Calcutta-based managing agency to take over daily affairs in 
Assam. Judge, Smith, and the other Calcutta employees were replaced in favor of  a new agency. 
Several agencies applied for the responsibility, and the Company eventually chose Schoene Kilburn 
& Co. in May 1867.84 Its sibling and rival the Jorehaut Company had already hired their own 
managing agents, Begg, Dunlop & Co. in 1862. In these two cases, the overall financial affairs for the 
81 Antrobus 1957, 126.
82 Antrobus 1957, 132.
83 Antrobus 1957, 145.
84 Antrobus 1957, 152-154.
CHAPTER FIVE
195
tea company remained the responsibility of  the boards in London, and the managing agencies were 
only tasked with the operations of  that middle space between London and the individual tracts in 
Assam. The agency did not own any (or, only minimal) stake in the company. Presumably, the main 
responsibility was to monitor expenses, ensure economic resource allocation — to trim the “fat” — 
and offer regular reports to the London board.
Whereas this case represented an example of  an agency absorbing an older tea company, the 
story of  Jardine Skinner & Co. typified the other path, wherein a managing agency actively sought to 
establish their own gardens with their own capital. The agency had actually attempted to acquire 
gardens during the height of  tea mania, and it was among the bidders for the Assam Company when 
its  management was in upheaval.85 From the Jardine Skinner company records, the company 
appeared to try to buy tea seeds as early as 1862.86 That same year, the Calcutta office of  Jardine 
Skinner & Co. described to the London board prospects of  tea lands offered for sale by a “Messrs. 
Fitzgerald.” The London office replied with caution:
I trust you have not gone into this hastily, - & without satisfying yourself  thoroughly  as to the 
adaptability of  the soil, climate &c. for the culture of  tea. 
I refer to this point more particular because I remember the Coffee planting mania in Ceylon, - 
when parties went into it, & laid out vast sums in planting & preparing ground which turned out 
eventually utterly useless! - And this purely from ignorance of  the requirements of  the plant, 
which demonstrated not only peculiarity of  soil, but shading & protection from the sun & 
weather!
Now there is a considerable analogy between the Coffee planting rage of  those days, & what is 
now taking place with regard to tea in India - & men seem to be engaging in this latter culture 
evidently in profound ignorance of  the subject. —
The Messrs Fitzgerald, from their antecedents, must clearly be of  this class, - & therefore you 
would require to be doubly careful in ascertaining that their undertaking is based upon solid 
ground, & has the sanction of  experienced tea planters, - before having any thing to do with it. - 
It may all be quite right, & every thing about the estates & country calculated to forward the 
growth of  tea, but we must profit by the experience of  others, & not take it for granted.
85 Jardine Skinner archives, Cambridge University libraries. 9 October 1863, MS JS/10/6.
86 The Assam Company minutes also recorded that the Jardine Skinner agents inquired to buy their 




I look upon this as a most important matter, & certainly before embarking any money in it, we 
ought to have the report of  experienced tea planters, if  possible to be got, on the subject.87
Four months later, with the Fitzgerald case still open, the London office wrote that they had 
heard a friend’s tea company had collapsed: “This shews the necessity of  being prepared with the 
fullest information on all matters, & not coming before the public here in a crude shape that Indian 
prospectuses are got up in.” Skinner concluded that the prices Fitzgerald asked for — £20,000 and 
£60,000 for two estates — should be “simply out of  the question.”88 Later, he reiterated that, though 
the Calcutta office had gone ahead and purchased a new company, “my only fear is that the run on 
tea planting is getting too fast!” echoing many of  the above observations about how tea mania 
unfolded.89 Months later, as prices had begun to stagnate, Skinner again warned that “the time will 
come, & that ere long, when a reaction will ensue, when it will be the ‘devil take the hindmost,’ & 
every one will be striving who shall get out first!” In which case, it would be better for his partners 
to wait out the selling craze for fear of  selling lands at low value.”90
The Jardine Skinner company ultimately succeeded in purchasing lands during tea mania, a 
source of  unease among the more cautious members. From the letters, it seems clear that the agency 
intended to build up uncultivated gardens from scratch. Rather than monitoring costs on behalf  of  a 
board of  shareholders, they would be entirely responsible as owners who bought materials, 
organized production, and hired staff  and labor. Historically, many of  these agencies had already 
involved themselves in matters of  production during the height of  the indigo trade in the mid-
nineteenth century.91
87 JS archives. 26 February 1863, MS JS/10/6.
88 JS archives. 10 June 1863.
89 JS archives. 17 July 1863.
90 JS archives. 9 September 1863.
91 “The other characteristic of  the agency houses that marks them off  from other mercantile 
enterprises, at any rate for most of  the nineteenth century, is that of  heavy fixed capital investment 
in the locality of  the overseas station. This development began with indigo estates. Until about 1790 
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We have no way of  knowing how the Jardine Skinner & Co.’s new gardens weathered the tumult 
of  the tea depression, for the company archive letters specially designated as “private tea letters” 
have been deemed unfit for viewing because of  poor condition.92 In the general correspondence, tea 
remained only a marginal concern relative to the older, viable trade that the agency had operated for 
years: shellac dye, indigo, cotton, etc. In April 1866, however, memos began to appear outlining the 
inventory of  shipments received in London from “your tea gardens,” as well from several other “tea 
companies.”93 It is worth speculating that, given that new seedlings require at least three years of  
cultivation before producing marketable leaves, these shipments represented the fruition of  gardens 
that had been bought and cultivated from scratch during the years 1862 and 1863. The next year, 
1867, the agency also bought two more tea companies, probably at a severe discount given the 
depression of  shares and land prices at the time.94 From then on, the tea business gradually overtake 
the papers of  Jardine Skinner.
The Finlay Muir company provides another example of  a managing agency that eased its way 
into the tea industry during the sixties and seventies. Even its company historians are unsure just 
when or how the Scottish company first involved itself  in tea.  In 1863, the agency helped a newly 
registered tea company, the Lebong and Minchu Company, buy tea lands from a family of  planters 
named Atkinson. The agency also helped the new tea company negotiate a mortgage on the lands. 
In 1866, this new company needed to apply for twenty thousands more rupees in loans, and by 
the production of  indigo was entirely in Indian hands but the quality was thought inferior by 
Europeans and the trade inconsiderable. Then the British became indigo planters and the standard 
so improved and the acreage so extended that by 1830 India became the world’s principal supplier. 
The merchants apparently became directly involved in the plantations as creditors to the planters, 
who often fell seriously into debt. The bankruptcy of  Palmers, once the biggest agency house, has 
been traced to the steep decline in the price of  indigo in the late 1820s” (Chapman, 111).
92 These letters are catalogued as MS JS/8/3, labeled “Private Tea Letters,” but they have been 
deemed off  limits to researchers.
93 JS archives. MS JS/1/112 26 April and 19 December 1866
94 JS archives. Feb 11, 1867 JS/1/113
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1869, it was liquidated. Luckily for the Finlay Muir company, they did not recklessly enter the tea 
industry during this period, and, further, by acting as commission agents for such companies, they 
learned the ins and outs of  the business. Although already in Calcutta during the eventful sixties, the 
company did not officially open an office until 1870. The partners had previously engaged in the 
China trade as speculative merchants, and at first, they entered the Indian tea market in the same 
manner. “At the beginning,” the company history recalled, “the firm were merchants purely and 
simply.”95
 The company remained wary of  entering too rashly into the tea market, as the experiences of  
tea mania still hung in the air like a foul stench. The partners “were chary of  plunging too deeply 
into this attractive but risky speculation. With the instincts of  general merchants, always ready to 
shift the basis of  their trading according to a variable demand, they were reluctant to commit large 
sums of  capital in estates from which it could not be withdrawn.”96 The company began to ship tea 
from India in 1874, and later they undertook responsibility for their first gardens, the Nonoi and 
Sootea estates.97 As of  1875, the firm still juggled many different interests, including piece goods, 
jute, gunnies, shipping, insurance, and the two tea gardens.98 From then onwards, the agency 
gradually added more gardens as clients and investments, transforming the Company “from being 
merely agents to being principals.”99
The main partners for Finlay and Muir relied heavily upon local contacts in Calcutta who 
explained to them the finer details of  tea management. These men included R. Williamson, formerly 
95 Finlary Muir archives, University of  Glasgow. UGD91/11/6/1
96 James Finlay & Company Limited: Manufacturers and East India Merchants, 1750-1950 (Glasgow: 
Jackson Son & Co., 1951), 102.
97 James Finlay, 103.
98 FM archives. UGD91/11/6/1
99 James Finlay, 104.
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of  the Assam Company, and a man named Patrick “P.R.” Buchanan. Buchanan had arrived in India 
in 1863 at the age of  seventeen, one of  those “boys fresh from school” that came to eastern India 
during the rush for tea land. By age nineteen, he was promoted to manager, and by twenty-five, he 
owned gardens in Sylhet. He provided advice to Muir in acquiring more gardens, and the Finlay 
company also began to manage gardens on behalf  of  Buchanan while also providing him financial 
support.100  Known for his ambition and “personal driving force,” Buchanan also expressed “a 
constant anxiety over the matter of  raising a sufficiency of  working capital.” By the 1890s, Buchanan 
asked Finlay Muir, with whom he had long collaborated, to allay his financial troubles by joining him 
as partner in his company. Buchanan’s gardens thus became a subsidiary of  what was already known 
as the “Finlay Group” of  gardens.101 By then, Finlay Muir & Co. had become the managing agency 
with the most acreage under cultivation.102 According to the notes of  historian Percival Griffiths, “it 
was maintained at the time that Sir John Muir of  Finlay, Muir & Co. wished to set up a monopolistic 
Tea Empire in India.”103
Gradually, then, managing agencies had overtaken the Indian tea industry, just as they also gained 
greater control over jute, cotton, and India before. The agencies succeeded through various local 
connections — Schoene Kilburn & Co. were able to win the Assam Company’s business because of  
a personal connection on the latter’s Calcutta board; Jardine Skinner & Co. were first introduced to 
tea through a planting interest known today only as “Messrs. Fitzgerald,” whom the London office 
characterized as that “class” of  men who engaged in tea “evidently in profound ignorance of  the 
subject”; and Finlay Muir & Co. benefited from their friendship with P.R. Buchanan, a self-made 
man who taught himself  the tea trade before he turned twenty. These individual, pioneering 
100 James Finlay, 104.
101 BL. Mss Eur F174/2074.
102 Cf. ITA reports from the 1880s to 1890s.
103 BL. MSS EUR/F174/2073.
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characters seemed to exist everywhere during the height of  tea mania, driving prices endlessly 
upwards. Gradually, by the end of  the century, Indian tea had been organized into large, joint-stock, 
often limited liability corporate managing agencies that sometimes were responsible for dozens of  
individual gardens. 
Planters were clear about the advantages of  relying upon an agency rather than venturing into 
the world of  commerce and finance by themselves. George Barker, who had grown tea in Assam 
throughout the seventies, wrote “[a]gencies of  good gardens are valuable businesses, as all the tea is 
shipped through them, the monetary transactions are conducted by them; they purchase machinery, 
lead, tea chests, and other requisites of  the garden.”104 Nevertheless, he complained that charges 
were too high and that more agencies would be welcome to challenge “the two or three large firms, 
who monopolise all the principal agencies,” a category that must have included Finlay Muir, Jardine 
Skinner, and Schoene Kilburn.
Together, the stories of  these agencies illuminate how dozens of  managing agencies slowly 
gained control over the hundreds of  tea gardens spread across eastern India, either as mere agents 
or as direct owners, over the course of  the 1870s and eighties. In 1878, the agencies formed a 
coalition under the heading of  the Indian Tea Districts Association (ITDA), and they authored a 
joint memorandum to the Government of  India. The memo requested several revisions to the 
existing labor law, all of  which revolved around cutting down the costs of  labor recruitment. These 
costs were the most important factor affecting the success of  the industry, whose profits had been 
declining for years: 
...[E]ffective relief  can only be found in diminished cost of  production. That growers are keenly 
alive to the importance of  this, is fully evinced by their strenuous efforts to introduce greater 
economy in all branches of  the work, and their prompt adoption of  all the mechanical 
appliances invented with that object. The peculiarities of  the culture, however, are such that 
hand labour must always be largely employed, and rank as the governing factor in the cost of  
104 George M. Barker, A Tea Planters̓ Life in Assam (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, 1884), 240.
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production. On the maintenance, therefore, of  an adequate supply of  coolie labour, at a cost 
calculated to leave a fair margin of  profit on the capital invested, hinges the entire question of  
the future of  the tea enterprise.105
The memorandum kicked off  an internal discussion among planters and government officials 
regarding the best method to promote cheaper labor recruitment to the tea industries. The resultant 
law, Act I of  1882, loosened restrictions on sardari recruitment, or, private recruiting by gardens that 
sidestepped regulations over professional recruiters. If  the sardar relied upon informal familial and 
village networks, the law reasoned, then the garden sardars would not engage in deception, and 
therefore magistrate oversight was unnecessary to guarantee the freedom of  contract.
Act I of  1882 was a landmark piece of  legislation that significantly boosted the Indian tea 
industry’s profitability. As the following chart demonstrates, the law helped to reinvigorate an 
industry whose labor supplies had been trending downwards.106 This revival also provided a final 
kick that pushed Indian tea exports to the top of  the world’s leading suppliers of  tea, the 
culmination of  a gradual process wherein Indian industrial production supplanted the formerly 
vibrant commercial networks of  Chinese tea. But this was not simply about access to labor in 
general but rather access to cheap and affordable workers. In line with this greater emphasis upon 
economy, tea gardens also sought to rebound from the disaster of  tea mania with new management 
105 NAI. Home, Revenue and Agricultural Dept, Emigration Branch, 1880. Proceedings 20 to 23: 
Memorial from the Indian Tea Districts Association, London, representing the present state and 
prospects of  the tea industry in India.
106 The unusually strong migration numbers of  1878, the sources indicate, were the result of  a 
particularly poor drought in the countryside which “pushed” many new migrants out to the tea 
districts. That year aside, labor migration had been stagnant for much of  the seventies. 
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Figure 9. Total size of  the labor force in the Assam tea districts and figures for the annual migration 
of  recruited workers by year.107
techniques that squeezed greater productivity out of  its workers. In the final section, I detail how 
these eventful changes in the structure of  capital investment and management impacted the actual 
processes of  tea production.
The rationalization of  Indian tea labor
In this final section, I shall argue that during the 1870s and eighties, the period in which Indian tea 
truly began to compete with Chinese exports, planters in India consciously attempted to overhaul 
and rationalize the tea production process in the aftermath of  tea mania. By rationalization, I mean 
planters sought to reorganize processes of  manufacture in order to maximize their outputs per labor 
and capital input. At the time, machinery had only begun to be employed at minimal levels, which 
107 Sources: Figure 1: NAI, Department of  Revenue and Agriculture, Emigration Branch, April 
1899, A progs., 11-13, pg. 26. “Special Report on the Working of  the Assam Labour and 
Immigration system as carried out under Act I of  1882, as amended by Act VII of  1893, during the 
years 1893-1895”




meant that in practice this rationalization entailed many of  the same strategies of  labor-intensive 
industrialization found in the tea districts of  China outlined in the previous chapter.108 In fact, many 
of  the procedures adopted in India I detail below would have felt uncannily familiar for the 
merchants and managers of  the cliff  tea factories in the Wuyi Mountains or the tea workshops in 
Huizhou. In particular, planters in India closely monitored how their coolie workers spent time on 
the garden. As in China, planters in India relied on a type of  piece wage, here called hazri, which was 
determined by the average amount of  time expected to complete a task. And as in China, managers 
in India divided up all twenty-four hours of  the work day in order to more finely manage their 
schedules and to keep the tea production process running continuously day after day. These 
methods were outlined in several handbooks published by prospective and experienced planters who 
delivered advice to others interested in taking up Assam tea themselves.
But though such materials only emerged starting in the 1870s, the story of  labor-intensive 
industrialization in Assam could be traced back to debates over the “labor question” during the first 
years of  the Assam Company. The Board of  Directors of  the Assam Company had discussed the 
“labor question” amongst themselves during the late 1840s. As outlined in the first chapter, the 
“labor question” boiled down to the difference between the general availability versus the relative 
affordability of  labor. Whereas one zealous London board member had “pledged his word that 
sufficient labour could be obtained,” the Assam board replied that the true problem was that, 
although “we can procure any number of  unsuitable people if  expense is no object,” the going price 
for outside labor at the time was prohibitively expensive.
The downfall of  new investors during the 1860s, industry insiders and government officials 
retrospectively concluded, was that they had spent injudiciously on supplies and labor and ignored 
the principles of  sound economy. After many of  these planters had gone bankrupt and left the 
108 I have found Max Weber’s description of  the “spirit of  capitalism” as good a basic description 
of  economic rationalization as any. Weber 2002, 21-22.
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industry, and after large managing agencies had consolidated the gardens into larger holdings, the 
remaining plantation managers seemed to finally heed the warnings of  the Assam Company decades 
earlier: that labor needed to be employed efficiently.
By the mid-1870s, planters boasted that their success could be attributed to their newfound 
emphasis upon economizing production and squeezing out as much productivity from their laborers 
as possible. Champions of  the industry sharply contrasted the improved regimen of  cultivation, 
plucking, and roasting leaves against the blind and inexperienced methods practiced by the previous 
generation. Edward Money, writing in 1874, prefaced a description of  his tea gardens with the claim 
that “the more manufacture is studied the more does it appear that to make good Tea is a very 
simple process. The many operations or processes formerly considered necessary are now much 
reduced on all gardens.”109 For instance, planters formerly placed leaves in a pan to dry them after 
plucking, a practice they had emulated from Chinese methods. By the 1870s, however, planters in 
India had abandoned “panning.”110 Money then provided a chart detailing how modern planters had 
reduced the number of  actions required for tea production from twelve to only five: withering, 
rolling, fermenting, sunning, and firing. “I thus reduced the twelve operations detailed to five, and 
naturally by so doing much decreased the cost of  manufacturing Tea,” he boasted.111  
Writing a decade later, in 1884, George M. Barker echoed Money’s sentiments that planters were 
learning to better rationalize production costs.112 “Formerly thousands of  acres were carelessly put 
out,” he recalled, “the seed in the first instance being any rubbish that could be obtained, and the 
109 Money, 109.
110 In particular, Money talked about a method of  firing leaves called “panning” that he attributed 
to Chinese methods. Samuel Baildon wrote in 1877: “The old plan of  ‘panning’ is, I believe, a 
Chinese one, but Planters in Assam are fast giving it up.” Samuel Baildon, Tea in Assam: A Pamphlet 
on the Origin, Culture, and Manufacture of  Tea in Assam (Calcutta: W. Newman & Company, 1877), 35.
111 Money, 110-113.
112 Barker, like most planters in India, wrote that he “devoured with much eagerness” Money’s 
famous treatise on tea before he left his home in England for India.
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distance when planted out between the rows absurdly wasteful.”113 By contrast, newer gardens were 
designed much more meticulously: “In the competition between the old and new gardens there can 
be only one result — the failure of  the old gardens.”114 Whereas in the 1870s Money had estimated 
that the average garden had already improved its average yield from 2.5 or three maunds per acre in 
the old days to four maunds in his day (eighty lbs. per maund), Barker declared that the industry had 
taken an even greater leap by the 1880s: “for modern gardens seven or eight maunds would not be 
an excessive computation.”115 He emphasized that the improvement of  yield was not the result 
simply of  extra work but rather of  greater efficiency: “How is it possible, therefore, for old tea 
gardens to compete, with a chance of  success, against new? The same amount of  labour is required 
for the one as for the other.”116 This type of  growth was intensive rather than merely extensive, and 
the industry owed its success to extracting more out of  its workers per unit of  work-time, rather 
than solely paying more for extra workers.
Central to the planter’s new methods of  organizing work was paying greater attention to time 
management. By the 1880s, planters had instituted a regular schedule of  tasks organized around the 
periodic striking of  gongs and enforced by garden managers and lower-level employees known as 
sardars:
During the rains, the gong is beaten at five o'clock every morning, and again at six, thus allowing 
an hour for those who wish to have something to eat before commencing the labours of  the day. 
In the cold weather the time for turning out is not so early; even the Eastern sun is lazier, and 
there is not so much work to get through. Few of  the coolies take anything to eat until eleven 
o'clock, when they are rung in. The leaf  plucked by the women is collected and weighed, and 
most of  the men have finished their allotted day's work by this time, so they retire to their huts 
to eat the morning meal and to pass the remainder of  the day in a luxury of  idleness. …except 







leaf  is ready it must be fired off, else it would be completely ruined. At two o'clock the women 
are turned out again to pluck, and those men who have not finished their hoeing have to return 
to complete their task. About six o'clock the gong sounds again, the leaf  is brought in, weighed, 
and spread, and outdoor work is over for the day.117
Barker’s description was echoed in the Bengali social novel Kuli Kahini (1888), written around the 
same time as Barker’s own handbook, but also colored with some extra local details:
… The gong in the middle of  the garden rang out and announced it was six o’clock. In almost 
every garden, six o’clock PM is the time for rest (chuti). However, when the gong strikes six 
o’clock, it is not actually six o’clock. In this country, it is often the case that six o’clock is set to 
whenever the sun sets. In this manner (edike), when it strikes six [actually 5 PM], the coolies bring 
their baskets of  leaves on their head and come in from the gardens, lining up in rows to enter 
the tea-house (cha ghar).118
The novel’s author Ramkumar Vidyaratna was a missionary associated with the Calcutta-based 
Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, and he was one of  the few writers during his day to have spent extensive 
periods of  time living among and talking to the tea coolies of  upper Assam. Based on his personal 
experiences, Vidyaratna was able to provide insight available almost exclusively to those who had 
actually spent time in Assam. By noting that six o’clock was “not actually” six o’clock, Vidyaratna 
suggested that clocks on the gardens were set differently from clocks used elsewhere in Assam and 
across India. This practice was known as “garden time.” The principle was similar to the modern 
concept of  daylight savings: in order to maximize the amount of  time one could spend working 
while the sun was up, companies adjusted clocks backward by one hour so that the coolies woke up 
and completed every task one hour earlier. This particular passage in Kuli Kahini remains one of  the 
only historical documents to record this practice. For instance, Rana Behal, who has also discussed 
“garden time” in his research, claims he only learned of  the idiosyncratic practice through private 
117 Barker, 134-135.
118 Ramkumar Vidyaratna, Kuli Kāhinī [Tale of  the Coolies], Originally Translated as “Sketches of  Cooly 
Life” (1888) (Kolkata: Yogamāẏā Prakāśanī, 1982), 33. Emphases added.
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conversations with contemporary planters.119
This practice of  waking up the pluckers as early as possible was similar to the customs of  the 
Wuyi Mountain cliff  factories, where workers were awoken at the same time each morning during 
plucking season. Whereas in Fujian the workers were managed by headsmen known as baotou, in 
Assam the responsibility fell to garden sardars: “Early in the morning, after the second gong has 
rung out the coolies, the women, provided with baskets in which to put the leaf, are marshalled by 
the sirdars, and directly they have been all got together, are conducted to the part of  the garden that 
is to be plucked. By the time that eleven o'clock comes round, if  there is a good flush on the bushes, 
it is no unusual thing for them to bring ten seers of  leaf  each (a seer weighs two pounds) - no light 
weight to carry about on a hot day.”120  The sardar’s job was to “parade up and down between the 
rows of  tea bushes, armed with a small stick and the dignity that his position of  authority gives him, 
in and out amongst his pluckers, yelling at the top of  his voice, encouraging or swearing at them, and 
always inciting them to make haste and get along faster.”121 The sardars constituted but one part of  
the largely native intermediary staff  of  doctors, clerks and runners placed in between the workers 
and the European planters atop the hierarchy. 
Another similarity with China was the use of  piece wages, a system that only emerged after the 
passage of  late 1860s labor laws. By the late decades of  the century, most planters paid their workers 
through a system known as hazri. “The hazri represented a specific task which might be expected to 
take the field worker, according to his or her diligence, about four to five hours to perform and for 
119 Personal correspondence. Cf. Behal 2006, 159, fn 65. “The sun rises much earlier in eastern 
India compared with other parts of  the Indian subcontinent. The garden-time device made it 
possible to utilize the extra daytime available to lengthen the working day. A uniform work regime 
enforced and strictly regulated short durations of  water and lunch breaks in the tea gardens. Under 
the supervision of  a hierarchical power apparatus headed by the managers and established during 
the indenture period, this work regime has sustained its rigour in the tea gardens even to this day. 





this task the standard daily wage was paid,” wrote Griffiths, the official historian of  the Indian 
industry. “After the completion of  the hazri, provided the manager was able to make more work 
available, the labourer was allowed to perform a further task, known as ticca, usually at a higher rate 
of  payment.”122 
Although this description aptly details the conventional notion of  hazri in Assam, the system 
itself  actually resulted from a willful misinterpretation of  policies intended to protect the tea 
laborers. In 1865, the Bengal Council had passed a law known as Act VI, which stipulated that 
workers were guaranteed a certain minimum salary for performing a certain amount of  hours of  
labor per week. The planters had reinterpreted those numbers, which guaranteed a minimum salary, 
and converted them into a system where wages were wholly contingent upon the completion of  
individual tasks. One need only look closer at the term “hazri” to notice clues about this 
transformation of  meaning. In eastern Indian languages, the term hazri means attendance or 
attendance registry. In the context of  the 1865 law, hazri probably designated a system of  wages that 
were guaranteed for workers who were “in attendance” working, regardless of  productivity. Over 
time, planters and managers began to use “hazri” to denote individual and specific tasks, 
remuneration for which would not be delivered until the task was done.123 Rather than guaranteeing 
workers a minimum income, then, the policy now pegged all payment to productivity. Here, the 
parallels with the piece-wage system discussed in the previous chapter are unmistakable, and the 
transformation of  hazri from a time to task-based system — or, from a time to piece-wage 
accounting system — was designed to maximize the productivity of  its workers. As in China, this 
piece wage system allowed planters to manipulate accounting in all sorts of  minor ways. For 
122 Griffiths, 298.
123 Griffiths writes that “The hazri system, which grew up as a sensible misinterpretation of  the 
minimum wage section of  the 1865 Act, soon became the basis of  wage fixation in Assam” (298). 
Behal, however, has argued that the phrase “sensible misinterpretation” sanitizes the intentions of  
the planters, who willfully changed the laws to accommodate their interests. He makes this argument 
in his forthcoming book.
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instance, in Griffiths’ own description of  the system, he mentions the arbitrary nature of  setting 
hazri rates: 
Although a fair degree of  uniformity in wage rates was maintained in each local area, the tasks 
constituting a hazri or a unit naturally varied from garden to garden or from day to day. In the 
case of  hoeing, for example, the stiffness or lightness of  the soil necessarily determined the task, 
while in plucking, the fineness or coarseness demanded had to be considered in fixing the rate 
of  payment - allowance also had to be made for the weight of  the moisture content of  the leaf  
on wet and fine days. Some of  the methods adopted to allow for deduction of  moisture content, 
as well as for the weight of  the basket, involved the use of  'distorted scales' in which the unit 
shown as a seer or a pound was in fact somewhat more than the statutory weight.”124
Another dramatic description of  hazri fixing comes from Vidyaratna’s novel Kuli Kahini. In one 
early scene, Vidyaratna narrates how an upper-class passenger traveling from Calcutta to Assam has 
stumbled upon an ex-coolie who has been captured trying to flee from the tea gardens. This was a 
scene that Vidyaratna also included in his non-fictional travelogue of  his journeys through Assam, 
which suggests that part of  this conversation was as much journalism as fiction. In the scene, the 
imprisoned ex-coolie, Kailash Chakrabarti, describes how planters manipulated hazri rates in order 
to keep coolies indebted to the gardens and unable to leave after their contracts expired:
Kailash: The sardar led me out into the fields, and I followed behind him. Then he showed me a 
piece of  land and said, ‘look, today you will be hoeing this chunk of  earth. If  you are able to 
finish this, then that will count as one day’s worth of  work. If  you can finish it within six hours 
[two prahar, a measurement of  three hours], then you will receive one payment of  hazri, that is, 
one full day’s worth of  work. If  you can do more, then you will get “double hazri.”’
Passenger: That’s a very good policy.
Kailash: According to this policy, one would have to hoe twenty nalas125 of  land in one day, and 
that is impossible. And if  I am still hoeing this land, will any other work be done? No matter 
how long I work hoeing land, I cannot finish one full hazri …. Even before I was done, my body 
was exhausted, and I wasn’t able to work hard anymore, my entire body fell sick. What could I 
do? But by then the overseer had gone away, and with great difficulty, I finished one-quarter 
hazri by the time the lunch gong rang at 11 o’clock. In the afternoon, I finished another quarter 
124 Griffiths, 299.
125 A customary measurement of  length, which is equal to “eighteen hands.”
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hazri. One full day’s work left me pouring sweat from head to foot, just to finish one-half  of  one 
hazri. In other words, based on how much I could work in one day, I was due a monthly wage of  
five rupees, or about five paisa per day. But in Assam, one cannot pay for goods with anything 
less than ten paisa, therefore on the first day I already accrued a debt of  five paisa for food and 
lodging. Thus, day by day, my debt increased, and when my agreement expired, the sahebs 
calculated that I was thirty to forty rupees in debt. In theory, when a coolie finishes their 
contract, they can return to their home (desh), but this was impossible.126
For this reason, Vidyaratna’s characters declared that the coolie agreement was in fact a “note of  
slavery” (daskhat). The hazri system was designed to extract as much labor as possible for every hour 
of  work completed by each coolie, and it simultaneously immobilized — and hence guaranteed — a 
permanent labor force.
Vidyaratna’s story of  Kailash’s hardships on the tea garden was a dramatic illustration of  life in 
Assam. But even in the purely non-fictional writings of  the planter Barker, readers could encounter 
curious passages that suggested how harsh and physically taxing the coolie system was in practice. 
For instance, Barker’s description of  the tea roasting system brings to mind the stories of  the tea 
roasters in Huizhou, documented in the previous chapter, who would sometimes collapse and die 
from the heat. In Assam, Barker wrote, tea gardens needed to constantly rotate men working at the 
stoves, which usually reached temperatures “ranging between 110 and 130 Fahr”:
Among the men engaged in tea-firing, a system of  continual change week by week is often 
compulsory, although there is serious fault to be found with this arrangement, seeing that 
(putting aside all considerations of  the ill-effects wrought upon the coolie by continually living in 
the hottest part of  the tea-house, without a change to outdoor work, in order to recuperate his 
relaxed condition), an enormous inconvenience arises in having to teach a number of  coolies the 
same work over and over again….None of  the imported coolies could stand seven consecutive 
days at this trying labour. …127
From Barker’s perspective, the expectations placed upon workers were not extreme but rather 
necessary measures to deal with the the lazy Indian population. “Ah me! what a host of  past troubles 




that one little word ‘coolie’ conjures up!” he wrote.128 Throughout his handbook, he catalogued that 
“both men and women are lazy,” that they suffered from a “phlegmatic indifference to everything 
and anybody,” that they had no propensity for saving or extra work, and that coolie-driving rapidly 
“multiplies a manager's grey hairs.”129 He also echoed the observation that W.N. Lees had made 
earlier: that the normal laws of  supply and demand and of  rational incentives did not apply in India. 
“Sometimes even the prospects of  an increase to their incomes will not allure these people, so 
curiously are they constituted,” he wrote. Rather than being disposed towards accumulation, “a 
native troubles not about the future, for he can always obtain employment, and if  the worst comes, 
his people will support his declining days.”130 Thus, Barker responded to complaints from outsiders 
concerned with the treatment of  coolies by pointing out the character differences between 
Europeans and Indians: “it is simply ridiculous to hear the remarks made by people in England, as 
to how they would alter the existing arrangements and change the management of  affairs, if  they 
had anything to do with natives. There is no similarity on any one point in the two modes of  looking 
after European and Eastern labour, nor will any amount of  theorizing be able to break through the 
intensely practical manner in which natives have had to be dealt with for the last one hundred and 
fifty years.”131
128 Barker, 153.





Figure 10. Two images from Barker. Top caption: “Coolie lines.”
Bottom: “Tea house.”132  
Finally, it is worth analyzing the role played by new tea processing machinery in the gradual 
improvement of  the production process. As with the “labor question,” the suggestion to use 
machinery to expedite tea production was raised very early in the history of  Indian tea, but almost 
no progress was made until after tea mania and the subsequent crash added urgency to the venture. 
When the governor-general Lord William Bentinck originally proposed experimental cultivation in 




aided by thermometers, &c., shall once be applied to the cultivation and preparation of  tea in 
favourable siutations, the Chinese tea will soon be excelled in quality and flavour.”133 More 
concretely, during the actual experimentation phase the superintendent of  the Tea Committee, 
Charles A. Bruce, suggested mechanizing the steps of  tea processing by machinery. As he sent back 
a shipment of  leaves in 1837, he hoped his colleagues in Calcutta and London could study the leaves 
and begin devising plans for new devices: “it might be left to the ingenuity of  the Englishman to 
roll, soft and clean the tea by machinery,” he wrote.134 However, according to Griffiths, tea 
machinery only began to make an appearance “three decades” later, and it would not find 
widespread acceptance until the 1880s.135
Griffiths had in mind the year 1867, when James C. Kinmond, an English civil engineer, 
invented his first rolling machine. Several men had earlier attempted very crude machines, such as 
one which placed leaves into a bag and then crushed them together, but few planters were optimistic 
about the results. The Nelson roller, for instance, only prepared leaves for the final stage of  hand 
rolling, but it did not replace it. Kinmond’s innovation was to design a machine that rolled each 
individual leaf  by placing it between two large plates that rotated along the surface of  the leaves. 
This was a simple apparatus that was still operated by hand and without much control over pressure. 
Six years later, William Jackson, a planter in Assam, improved upon the Kinmond model, and after 
the two men settled a patent dispute, the Jackson model became the industry standard.136 Edward 
Money (1874) commented on the differences between the Kinmond and the Jackson models in the 
footnotes to his handbook. “It was the best,” he wrote of  the Kinmond design, “but is superseded 
133 “Papers,” 11.
134 Quoted in Griffiths, 487.
135 Griffiths, 487.
136 Ukers, 467-471. Griffiths, 492-497.
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by a new rolling-machine (Jackson’s) I have seen quite lately.”137 Whereas the older model still 
required human workers to finish the last stages of  the rolling process, the Jackson model could do 
all the rolling “entirely.”138
To be sure, the new machinery greatly alleviated the “labor question” that constantly dogged 
planters in Assam. For such men, the introduction of  machinery was inseparable from the problem 
of  labor. For instance, a planter named Samuel Baildon published a pamphlet on Assam tea in 1878 
in which he stated that “The greatest disadvantage at which the Planter is placed is through 
insufficient labor.”139 Due to the stinginess of  their owners, he argued, managers were forced to 
regularly extend working hours. “Where a Manager has to get the greatest possible amount of  work 
out of  his people,” he wrote, “they are generally overworked. I know an instance of  this where the 
coolies were working nearly the whole day long throughout the year.”140
It was in this context of  discussing the labor question as a problem of  overwork, that Baildon 
sung the praises of  the newly invented rolling machines. On his gardens, managers had expected 
workers to hand roll some twenty seers (approximately 19.8 kg) of  leaves per day. Before the advent 
of  machinery, “there was seldom sufficient labor to keep to this rule,” he recalled, “and so men had 
to keep rolling until the leaf  was finished.” This meant working from early morning and straight 
through the evening, with breaks only for food. Coolies complained to Baildon personally that they 
“seldom had rest, lived in bad houses,” but “now, thanks principally to the machinery, the men are 
able to have half  the day to themselves if  they are good coolies.” And though machinery could only 
aid in the stage of  rolling, it alleviated pressure on the entire manufacturing process across the 







“more people were on the garden, which, being better cultivated, gave a larger outturn.” He 
concluded that “the introduction of  machinery improved almost everything; and the result is that 
coolies lead easier, and Europeans, I think, less anxious lives than they did in the old days.”141
Conclusion
We can conclude by asking ourselves how accurate was the commonplace assessment, propagated by 
the Indian Tea Association and their peculiar advertisement campaign, that Indian tea eventually 
surpassed Chinese tea exports by virtue of  the introduction of  machinery. The ITA advertisements 
claimed that the distinction between Indian and Chinese tea was in actuality the difference between 
machine and human production, and in a very simple sense, it was true that by the 1880s, Indian tea 
planters relied more upon mechanized, steam-driven tea rollers than their counterparts in Anhui and 
Fujian did. But this difference was one of  degree, not of  kind, for the Indian planters’ owed their 
larger commercial success to their ability starting in the late 1860s to economize the entire production 
process, which remained almost entirely a labor-intensive one. The more accurate characterization 
would be that the Indian tea industry began to earn profits through a combination of  both labor and 
capital-intensive industrialization measures, and, furthermore, capital-intensive gains were historically 
dependent upon prior advances in labor discipline.
As Money’s handbook laid out starkly, planters in the 1860s and early seventies looked to extract 
more out of  one hour of  work than they had previously. First, they cut out unnecessary tasks, 
reducing, for instance, the overall production process from twelve to five steps. Second, planters 
were able to triple the yields of  raw tea cultivation in the garden, a process that relied entirely upon a 
smarter application of  human labor. Third, because rolling machines were expensive, they could 
only prove cost-effective if  they were inserted into an already smoothly-functioning, interconnected 




expensive item for a garden, and figures badly in the capital account,” Barker observed, “but when at 
the end of  a season a balance is struck between the cost of  coolie … and the outlay on a machine it 
will require no demonstration to prove that a machine pays for itself  in a very short time.”142
Many human tasks could not be replaced by machinery, and without them, machinery would be 
rendered useless. During the first two to three years of  creating a profitable garden, owners needed 
to simply swallow the costs of  hoeing, weeding, chopping timber, and building houses and roads 
without any revenue to show. Once the garden was up and running, managers still needed to rely 
upon human labor for almost the entirety of  the tea production process, save for those few steps 
that had been replaced by machinery. Such manual tasks included plant and soil upkeep (tea trees 
deteriorate and must be replaced every few years), plucking, withering, firing and roasting, sorting, a 
second firing to prevent mold, and packing and transport.143 In other words, it would be an 
overstatement to claim that the advent of  rolling machinery held the key to creating profitable 
gardens. Planters relied upon a more economical deployment of  labor throughout the entire process 
of, first, creating a workable garden over two to three years and then of, second, operating the 
garden at profit in subsequent seasons. The tea-rolling machine helped open up the availability of  
workers to complete these tasks, but it alone could not produce tea without the prior recruitment, 
assembly, and discipline of  a large and orderly labor force. Perhaps the best indication that 
machinery had not replaced human labor was Barker’s complaint that more and better machinery was 





Figure 11. An image captioned “Clearing the ground” from Barker.144
…[T]here are so many experimental machines, full of  faults, sent into the country, most of  
which have to be re-modelled before they will work. Wherever machinery can be employed the 
amount of  labour is materially reduced; but for the work that entails keeping a large number of  
coolies, viz., hoeing and plucking, no attempt has been made to substitute other than the work 
of  men's hands. A hoeing machine is most needed, but is as far off  as ever, and would be, I am 
afraid, impossible to construct, on account of  the damage that would be done to the tender 
roots of  the plant.
As for the rolling machine itself, it also depended upon a regular, disciplined workforce and 
industrial schedule for its operation. Baildon noted:
As with everything, careful attention is necessary….A man rolling leaf  by hand goes very slowly 
to the work at first, but the nearer the leaf  gets to the finish, the faster he rolls. Precisely the 
same rule should be followed with machinery….I have noticed that when the afternoon begins 
to wane, engine- drivers, from the first to the last of  a roll, are very apt to let the machine go 
much too fast. This can only be prevented by strict supervision….145





roller. Barker, too, gave the rolling machine human qualities: “It [the rolling machine] is a willing 
labourer that does the work as efficiently and ten times more quickly,” he wrote.146
This anthropomorphic language from two experienced tea planters in India recalls an earlier 
observation made by Chinese social scientists observing the tea rolling process in the Wuyi 
Mountains. There, Lin Fuquan recorded that the rollers and roasters who worked in concert were 
“synchronized like a machine (ru jixie).”147 Together, Baildon, Barker and Lin Fuquan’s choice of  words 
attest to the complementarity and similarities between the strategies of  labor and capital-intensive 
industrialization adopted in Chinese and Indian tea districts. I do not mean to trivialize the historical 
impact of  these machines, for the ability of  Indian planters to more effectively implement devices 
for tea rolling — and later, drying, and packing — were a crucial advantage that eventually helped 
them cement their superiority over Chinese rivals. In isolation, however, machines are just machines. 
Only once they were plugged into the proper social dynamic, of  large-scale production and an 
objective necessity to save on the expenditure of  human power, did they come to life. Thus, 
underneath the technical distinctions between those systems of  production that relied more upon 
human labor (China) and those which relied more upon steam-powered machinery (India), we can 
locate a historical social dynamic that was shared in common. Starting in the late nineteenth century, 
tea factory managers in both China and India sought to increase productivity and cut costs to keep 
up with competition, which was lowering prices and rendering extant methods of  production 
objectively uncompetitive with the leading, cutting-edge manufacturers. 
This dynamic of  maximizing outputs per input took on a greater importance as competition 
flared up. At the outset of  the nineteenth century, when Chinese merchants were only peripherally 
involved in tea cultivation and manufacture and when the directors of  the Assam Company were 
mostly concerned with cultivating a potable and palatable drink, financiers did not prioritize the 
146 Barker, 141-142.
147 Cf. Chapter two.
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production process. Falling prices in the second half  of  the century, however, compelled these men 
to pay special attention to production costs, which in turn lead them to look at all sorts of  different 
measures to economize. The common denominator across both regions was an emphasis on 
measuring time spent at specific tasks and an effort to bind labor remuneration to labor productivity. 
Managers also sought to save costs by constructing elaborate, time-saving machinery, some made of  
steel, as in Assam, and others composed of  humans working in synchronized and interdependent 
production methods, as in China. 
In India, these concrete and practical changes were preceded and accompanied by abstract 
reflections on theories of  political economy. Vocal officials and calculating businessmen alike agreed 
that older principles of  governance and commerce needed to be rethought in a strange land such as 
Assam. By contrast, their counterparts in China seemed to respond to an increasingly hostile world 
market much more gradually. Thus, whereas in India, political economic debates preceded practical 
changes in commerce and production, in China, it was the reverse.
If  we speculate on why these regional differences existed, some obvious hypotheses immediately 
come to mind. First, the Indian industry began from a position of  weakness. In the 1830s, when the 
Assam experiments began, the Chinese export market was the only significant source of  tea in the 
world. A sense of  danger and potential for failure, but also excitement and adventure could be felt 
among officials and merchants in Assam and Calcutta. They could afford to be neither complacent 
nor entirely confident about any aspect of  the business, whether tea cultivation or labor recruitment. 
Every setback was felt as a miniature crisis, and each crisis, culminating with the 1860s tea mania, 
tended to spur some degree of  self  reflection from at least a minority segment of  the planting and 
political classes.
Second, it should not be overlooked how these British-educated officials and capitalists were 
formally educated in the canon of  Smithian thought. Government of  India officials would be 
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especially familiar with, if  not passionately concerned over, evolving debates about the status of  
abstract political economic principles in a land such as India. Certainly, one cannot presume that 
these men mechanically lifted their ideas from textbooks, but economic writings did provide a basic 
vocabulary through which they could voice their personal opinions and practical suggestions. As a 
contrast, Qing officials in China also traded in their own type of  political economic discourses, 
which I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, but the core economic principles in these memorials 
and commentaries required more effort from the reader to clearly discern. 
Those core political economic principles that guided Qing attitudes towards tea had gained 
shape in the span from the eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, as the Qing empire stabilized 
politically and merchants began to flourish commercially. But just as tea mania in Assam precipitated 
wide-ranging changes in the Indian tea industry, the Chinese trade was also beset by commercial 
crises starting in the late seventies — a direct result of  the rise of  Indian tea. Although Chinese 
merchants and inland factory managers had for years taken measures to economize on production 
and labor, Qing officials seemed to ignore tea production altogether until this late 1880s crisis. These 
political economic debates, which I shall describe in the following chapter, then, round out the 
remainder of  our survey of  social practice and economic thought across China and India in Part I.
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Chapter Six
No sympathy for the merchant: The nineteenth-century tea crisis and 
late Qing political economic thought
Tea crisis and confusion
In hindsight, foreign customs officers could see that troubling signs in the tea trade had surfaced 
decades before the real crash. “The deterioration of  Chinese tea was first noticed about the year 
1870,” the Commissioner of  Customs reflected in 1891, while stationed in the southeast trading 
port Fuzhou.1 Such deterioration followed on the heels of  the “period 1864 to 1866,” generally 
acknowledged as the “zenith” of  the Fuzhou trade.2 Indeed, black teas fetched their highest prices 
during those years, a brief  apex quickly followed by a steady decline. Momentum, however, was on 
the side of  supply, and the overall volume of  sales would climb well through the 1880s, even as 
prices continued their descent. It was only after the Indian tea industry unceremoniously surpassed 
its Chinese rivals on the British market in the late eighties — the 1888 season, to be precise — that 
many realized the gravity of  the problem. One Qing official recalled, “in 1887, Chinese tea occupied 
five-sevenths of  the market. In 1889, Indian tea suddenly surpassed Chinese tea on the British 
market. This was unthinkable (chuangjian)!”3 
1 E. Faragó, Commissioner of  Customs, December 31, 1891. Quoted in Imperial Maritime 
Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, Etc. of  the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on 
Conditions and Development of  the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-1891 (Shanghai: Statistical Dept. of  the 
Inspectorate General of  Customs, 1893), 423.
2 Imperial Maritime Customs, Tea, 1888, China. Imperial Maritime Customs, no. 11 (Shanghai: 
Statistical Department of  the Inspectorate General of  Customs, 1889), 104.
3 Ye Yaoyuan, “Wanguo huozhi lun” in Huangchao jingshiwen xinbian (1898), ed. Mai Zhonghua, Jindai 
zhongguo shiliao congkan, ed. Shen Yunlong, 1979, 521.
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Once sales began to dwindle, they fell fast and hard. By the last decade of  the century, 
bewildered provincial governors and foreign customs officers could not ignore the problem. It was 
no exaggeration for them to describe the decline as a “crisis” and “disaster,” one that risked the 
trade’s “prompt obliteration.”4 A tone of  alarm animated correspondence between foreign officers 
in the Imperial Maritime Customs (IMC), who delivered a report on the trade to the Guangxu 
Emperor in 1888. This “falling off  in the quantity of  tea exported from Foochow,” Edmund Faragó, 
the Customs Commissioner from Hungary, reported, “constitutes the most important change that 
has occurred in the province during the last 10 years.”5 Officers who felt compassion for the peasant 
families bemoaned the loss of  a steady income. “In regard to the pursuits of  the people,” Faragó 
wrote, “it is to be feared that, instead of  material progress, there has been a steady decline, and that 
… the outlook is not so promising as it was 10 years ago.”6 He added that many farmers had 
abandoned tea cultivation, a “painful sight,” wherein “sweet potatoes or some other common 
vegetables” grew next to abandoned “tea shrubs.”7
The scenes Faragó painted of  Fuzhou reflected the decline of  the tea trade across the entire 
Qing empire (see figs. 1-3). The other important route connected the central China districts to 
Shanghai via the inland entrepôt Hankou, but Hankou too suffered devastating setbacks.
4 IMC, Tea, 1888, 22, 43, 80, 135.
5 IMC, Decennial, 408-409.
6 IMC, Decennial, 408.
7 IMC, Decennial, 422-423.
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Figure 12. The fall in overall value and quantity of  sales from the port of  Fuzhou (above)




Figure 13. The share of  Chinese exports relative to India and Ceylon on the British market. China’s 
share declined even as total world exports increased through the end of  the century.9
“People say the crisis in the China Tea trade, long impending, has come at last,” the Hankou 
Customs reported in 1887. “Though tea poured in quickly, it went out slowly.”10 
The crisis overwhelmed the tea merchants, who were puzzled why their old business practices 
no longer worked. One Qing official wrote, “last year was the worst season in Hankou so far. All of  
the four big merchant groups counted losses, almost three million liang. This is truly unprecedented. 
Observers and onlookers (pangguan Ǖě) are certainly dumbstruck, but those directly involved 
9 The Indian Tea Association, Detailed Report of  the General Committee of  the Indian Tea Association for the 
Year Ended 28th February 1893 (Calcutta: W.J. Pinheiro, Cones and Co.’s Press, 1893), 273.
10 Hankou Maritime Customs, quoted in Rowe 1984, 153.
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(dangju zhi ren yŮN
) are even more baffled!”11 Another official observed, “those in the thick of  
the trade appear lost (mi ŕ). It is like they are wandering in a foggy haze (yunwu zhong Ĳȳ).”12
The same sense of  anxiety and confusion among merchants also haunted the Qing state, for it 
understood that its fiscal destiny was inseparable from the strength of  the export trade. Some ugly 
truths confronted imperial officials, from the reports of  hardship in the hills of  interior China to the 
astonishing drop-off  in sales recorded by the maritime customs. The tea trade had provided a 
valuable source of  revenue throughout the last century, when the empire had battled through 
foreign wars, internal rebellions, and a jarring outflow of  silver. Tea had been unquestionably 
important throughout these trials, and although officials roundly recognized the trade had collapsed, 
they did not know why, nor how to fix it. 
The contention of  the current chapter is that paying greater attention to this sense of  confusion 
and disorientation in the late nineteenth-century tea crisis yields key insights for understanding the 
transformation of  political economy in late Qing China. As we have already seen, the compulsion of  
domestic and, later, world competition had already forced producers in the main tea districts of  
China to rationalize and economize the tea production process in the first decades of  the treaty-port 
era. However, the Qing administration seemed to underestimate just how much this unprecedented 
volume of  trade and scale of  cultivation demanded new economic principles and a more active 
political response. As with the Government of  India, Qing political officials’ sense of  commercial 
innovation seemed to lag behind the actual participants of  the trade by several decades. And, in 
another parallel with the Indian industry, only once Qing officials realized that Chinese merchants 
were suffering an industry-wide crisis did they begin to question older political economic truisms 
about the primacy of  market circulation and instead seek answers to strengthen the sectors of  
11 “Lun Hankou chawu,” quoted in Chen Binfan, 624.
12 “Lun baoquan chaye,” in Chen Binfan, 621.
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production. Only the major crisis of  the 1890s spurred Qing officials to reconsider their habit of  
endlessly promoting the circulation of  goods and to pay greater attention to production and 
productivity.  
As the final installment of  Part II, the current chapter rounds out our survey of  social practice 
and economic thought across nineteenth-century China and India by closely examining the contours 
of  late Qing political economic ideology. As we saw with “tea mania” in the previous chapter, 
economic crises throughout history have often played the role of  turning points that inspire 
momentous paradigm shifts. However, most crises also tend to be narrated in mechanical terms. 
Philip Mirowski has shown that most descriptions of  economic downturns and speculative bubbles 
are narrated as the interplay of  exogenous forces, like a series of  physics experiments gone awry. 
This is no coincidence, for the economics discipline has long attempted to represent itself  in 
precisely such physical metaphors.13 But if  it is true that “it is the people as a whole that make 
production and distribution decisions,” not the “physical properties of  objects,” then it is also worth 
studying how economic changes appeared to and were initially understood (or misunderstood) by 
observers in their own time.14 How did Qing officials grasp the tea crisis of  the 1890s at the moment 
it was unfolding? Although past historians have helpfully identified the three-pronged strategy of  
“[f]iscal reform, organizational innovation, and technological change” that emerged from this 
period, I believe this standard narration has moved too quickly from crisis to reform.15 Simply put, 
just because officials observed falling prices and a shrinking market does not mean they should have 
necessarily arrived at those particular solutions. Many other viewpoints were also available. First, there 
were market conservatives who opposed all commercial pursuits. One of  the most vocal men was 
13 The argument runs throughout Philip Mirowski, More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, 
Physics as Nature’s Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
14 Duncan Kennedy, “The Role of  Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishim of  




the governor-general of  Fujian Bian Baodi (1824-1882), whom I introduce in the next section. 
Having observed the deleterious effects of  tea production upon the environment and the peasantry, 
Bian preferred a “return to the basics” of  grain and silk cultivation and a retreat from competition 
with Indian tea. Second, Qing officials themselves drew a distinction between different solutions: on 
the one hand, policies aimed at alleviating the burdens of  commerce (such as high taxation) versus, 
on the other, those aimed at improving productive capacities (such as leaf-rolling machines). Those 
latter, production-focused policies eventually achieved a consensus among Qing officials and 
twentieth-century economists. Given the multiple alternatives, it bears asking what, precisely, 
compelled late Qing officials to fight for their position on the world market, rather than retreat from 
it? And how did those men arrive at solutions premised upon improving production, rather than a 
more traditional emphasis upon encouraging commerce?
The following sections attempt to provide a synthesis of  social history and economic thought 
that can account for these questions. An older tradition once emphasized that early modern China 
faced limits to economic growth due to the lack of  economic rationality among imperial officials (an 
argument famously encapsulated in Ping-Ti Ho’s study of  the salt merchants of  Yangzhou). That 
earlier assumption has been belied by a plethora of  recent work that emphasizes the stunning degree 
to which eighteenth-century Qing officials grasped the laws of  economics as they played out in 
domestic society, most notably the works of  Helen Dunstan and William Rowe. The current chapter 
extends the spirit of  this newer work by asking how the integration of  the Qing economy into the 
international division of  labor pushed officials to, in turn, conceive new laws of  political economy 
adequate to a world of  competitive industrialization. If  eighteenth-century Qing officials developed 
a vocabulary that corresponded to the reality of  their times, then how did their successors learn to 
articulate the principles of  a chaotic world market one century later? 
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My analysis proceeds as follows. First, in a brief  excursus on method, I describe how political 
discussions about tea relied upon a metaphor of  “roots and branches,” or agriculture and 
commerce, central to Legalist political thought. The tension between the two can help us index 
changing attitudes towards commerce and agriculture in the late Qing. In section three, I outline the 
initial response to the tea crisis and highlight how officials prioritized circulation in their economic 
theories, largely due to the merchant-centered organization of  the tea trade. Witnessing a mode of  
business dominated by merchant houses, officials naturally concluded that circulation and exchange 
were the key value-creating activities of  economic life. But as trade worsened, officials reinterpreted 
the crisis of  domestic circulation as one of  global competition, one triggered by superior production 
methods from their rivals in South Asia. Finally, in section four, I focus on the bureaucrat Chen Chi 
(1855-1900), whose writings on tea and political economy married the specific concerns of  the tea 
crisis with a broader reconsideration of  political economy as a general science. Chen Chi crystallized 
the burgeoning idea that improvements in production, rather than policies aimed at market 
circulation, would need to serve as the foundation for returning Chinese tea to its former esteemed 
position on the world market.
Roots and branches: economic idioms in Qing politics
No phrase in classical Chinese political thought perfectly corresponded to what we refer to as 
economics and political economy today. In China, as in Europe, “political economy” (fuguo xue) 
emerged as a category unifying disparate political debates over agriculture, trade, manufacture, 
mining, etc, only in recent centuries (the 1700s in Europe and one century later in China), before it 
was supplanted by the term “economics” (jingji xue) not long afterwards. But this fact should not 
lead us to overlook a long, continuous tradition of  imperial bureaucrats who articulated 
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“autonomous and binding” laws regulating the production and consumption of  goods for centuries 
prior to the articulation of  the “political economy” concept.16 
In his reconstruction of  economic thought during the eighteenth-century high Qing, William 
Rowe foregrounded terms and idioms central to Qing political thought, terms such as “feeding the 
people” (yangmin), “circulation” (liutong), “profit” (li), and “wealth” (fu). In the debates over export 
tea in the nineteenth century, one recurrent idiom perfectly captured the contradictions of  a cash 
crop grown on peasant farms then sold overseas through cosmopolitan treaty ports. The idiom was 
the pair ben and mo (cƉ), which literally mean “roots” and “branches” but also connote the 
opposition of  the “fundamental” and the “peripheral” in Confucian thought. In almost all contexts, 
ben refers to agriculture, the foundation of  a Confucian polity, and mo refers to commerce and crafts, 
peripheral and secondary pursuits. According to historian Hu Jichuang, agriculture has been praised 
since the earliest days of  ancient China, but it was not necessarily accompanied by condescension 
towards other fields. Only with the Legalist tradition and the publication of  the Han Feizi (written by 
Han Fei, 280-233 BC) did any writer frame pro-agrarian sentiment through the opposition of  
“roots” and “branches.” Following the Han Feizi, the ben-mo binary attained canonical status, as a 
symbol of  the primacy of  agriculture in Chinese political philosophy17 
The early modern foreign tea trade was located squarely in the middle of  the tension between 
agriculture and commerce, and anyone who said anything about export tea in the nineteenth century 
invoked variations of  the phrase zhongben yimo cȡƉ -- “emphasize the roots and suppress the 
branches”-- to preface their own commentary. For most of  this chapter, the tension between 
agriculture and commerce serves as a proxy for economics in general, and officials’ attitudes towards 
the ben-mo pair function as a litmus test for their devotion, on the one hand, to the Confucian ideal 
16 Cf. William T. Rowe 2001, 187.
17 Hu Jichuang, Zhongguo Jingji Sixiang Shi [The History of  Chinese Economic Thought] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai caijing daxue chubanshe, 1998), 706.
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of  a stable agrarian empire versus, on the other, the degree to which they were won over to the 
benefits of  commerce.
For instance, in looking at the writings of  two officials with diametrically-opposed 
interpretations of  the tea crisis, we find that their views on ben and mo indexed their political and 
philosophical disagreements regarding the tea trade. The first, Bian Baodi, was perhaps more 
qualified than anyone else to comment on the local effects of  the crisis. He had been on the front 
lines of  the Hankou market, serving seven years as the governor of  Hunan and Hubei in the 1880s 
before assuming the governorship of  Fujian and Zhejiang in 1888. In Fujian, he was greeted by the 
same predicament of  a dwindling trade in tea.18 His observations at Fuzhou confirmed those of  the 
Customs Commissioner. “Recently,” Bian wrote, “tea merchants have found sales stagnant. Each 
year is worse than the last.”19 Stagnation was accompanied by social unrest: “each time after the tea 
market closes, all sorts of  people will scatter along the roads to the mountains, where they will hide 
and then kidnap unsuspecting pedestrians.”20 And, just as in Hankou, Fuzhou tea merchants were 
confused: “The big, rich merchants have posted losses. They’re afraid of  what could happen next.”21
Fed up with the crisis, Bian Baodi believed it was “best to let sleeping dogs lie and instead focus 
on the future.” He drew up orders to ban further tea cultivation in areas that could be used for 
growing grains, limiting tea to “those areas which already have tea.”22 He expected wide support for 
his policies: “Right now in the tea-growing districts, the markets are slow and the mountains are 
18 Bian was the Hunan xunfu from 1882 to 1888, with a stint at the huguang zongdu in the middle. His 
memorials on Hankou tea are regularly quoted in Rowe 1984, 122-158. Bian, for instance, wrote a 
memorial on declining tea prices in Hankou in 1885, cf. Rowe 1984, 152-153.
19 Bian Baodi, Bian Zhijun Zouyi  [Official Records of  Bian Baodi], 1900, 12.39-41.
20 Bian Baodi, 11.45-11.48.
21 Bian Baodi, 16.1-4.
22 Bian Baodi, 15.1-3.
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decaying. In the people’s heart, they already feel regret and the need to change ways. We need to take 
this opportunity to effectively guide and exhort the people to abandon tea.”23
Bian Baodi’s proposals, written in the early nineties, stood in contrast to the views of  Chen Chi. 
Chen was a bureaucrat in the Ministry of  Finance (hubu Ċ´) who, in 1896, wrote an influential 
memorial to the Guangxu emperor on how to revive the tea trade. Unlike Bian, Chen outlined 
several paths the Qing state could take to reinvigorate the production of  tea. Chen’s memorial will 
be the focus of  the second half  of  this chapter, so for now it is sufficient to note how Bian and 
Chen disagreed over the meanings of  ben and mo. First, Bian Baodi justified abandoning the tea trade 
by stressing the primacy of  ben (roots):
There is no better source for nourishing our people than clothing and food. Speaking honestly, 
our fundamental task (ben) is to ensure the most important activities, that is, agriculture and 
sericulture….We all know that in times of  a famine, tea cannot be eaten, and in times of  cold, 
tea cannot be worn. It is is an unimportant, “peripheral” crop (mo), and it is detrimental to our 
fundamental task (ben), that is, agriculture.24 
Bian’s remarks demonstrated the ambiguous position tea occupied within the ben-mo system. A 
product of  the earth, tea could be considered a “root” if  the writer included everything grown from 
the soil. But tea was clearly also grown for exchange and profit. Even the most diehard of  tea 
drinkers could not claim that tea was essential for survival like grains for food or silk for clothing. As 
such, tea would have to be considered a peripheral “branch” (mo).
Chen Chi, by contrast, saw no need to adhere to old Confucian adages. He concluded his pro-
commerce memorial by championing the “simultaneous promotion of  the branches and the 
roots” (benmo bingju cƉłŲ):
23 Bian Baodi, 16.1-4.
24 Bian Baodi, 16.1-4.
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Regrettably, in China, bureaucrats and merchants have traditionally remained separate. ‘Worship 
the roots and suppress the branches’ (chongben yimo șcȡƉ), as the saying goes. Bureaucrats 
have been indifferent to the successes and failures of  merchants, feeling neither happiness nor 
sadness in their hearts. But if  we adopt this attitude and try to compete with the Western 
powers, then that would be like trying to catch a thoroughbred by riding a mule. It would wipe 
out all wealthy merchants from China, and we would cede all commercial power to the other 
races. We would be in dire straits, living off  others’ crumbs (lit. “surviving by breathing the 
exhaust from others’ noses”), just like those colonized countries Burma, Thailand, and 
Vietnam.”25
Whereas Bian Baodi wished to reclaim the earth for grain and silk, Chen Chi aimed to redeem 
commerce itself. And whereas Bian represented the views of  a silent majority, the countless peasant 
families and petty merchants who left the collapsing trade, Chen’s perspective stood much closer to 
that of  the state. Most bureaucrats who discussed the tea crisis supported measures to strengthen 
trade, not abandon it. As enthusiastic as they were about the benefits of  commerce, however, they 
remained almost indifferent towards the persistence of  small-scale family agriculture, which 
remained the foundation of  trade itself. It was understandable for a traditionalist like Bian to 
interpret the crisis as a sort of  cosmic revenge: that Qing merchants were being punished for 
verging too far afield from the Confucian ideal of  a stable agrarian society. Chen Chi took the 
opposite tack. He proposed the unification of  commerce with agriculture, circulation with 
production, and in so doing, he anticipated a new era of  industrial economic reform and 
“productivist” economic policy in the twentieth century. But, as with all visionaries, Chen Chi’s ideas 
began originally as an outgrowth of  earlier mainstream ideas that were once considered common 
sense: in this case, the circulationist tendency within Qing politics.
25 Chen Chi, Chen Chi Ji [The Complete Works of  Chen Chi], ed. Zhao Shugui and Zeng Liya (Beijing: 
Zhonghua Shuju, 1997), 350.
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The initial response: the traditions of  circulationist thought
Sympathy for the merchant
Our knowledge of  how the Qing state dealt with the late nineteenth-century tea crisis depends 
largely upon twentieth-century compilations of  exemplary “statecraft” (jingshi Z~) memorials. 
Although many of  these writings are labeled clearly, most lack author names or even precise dates. 
What materials have survived, however, are more than adequate for telling a story of  how patterns 
of  political economic thought were disturbed and reconfigured through efforts to grasp recurring 
commercial hardships.
A good overview of  how the Qing state first responded to the tea crisis can be observed from a 
pair of  memorials written by Liu Kunyi (1830-1902), who served as governor-general in the 
Liangjiang region from 1891 to 1902. His jurisdiction included the tea-rich provinces Jiangsu, 
Jiangxi, and Anhui, and he spent much time contemplating the tea crisis. Among those who 
complained, the powerful tea merchants of  Huizhou in southern Anhui caught Liu Kunyi’s main 
attention.26 Liu recounted that during the 1860s, when tea sales were brisk and profitable, the Qing 
state had begun to levy the lijin tax on the domestic transport of  tea. For centuries, the Ming and 
Qing states had taxed tea by charging merchants exclusive permits for plying their trade. The lijin tax 
was introduced in 1853 as a temporary tax on the transport of  various goods at stations or tolls 
across the empire.27 Liu’s predecessor Zeng Guofan had extended the lijin to include tea, collapsing 
the centuries-old license system into the new one. Zeng Guofan had set the lijin tax rate at one liang 
and two qian, but as tea prices began to fall in the seventies, the merchants successfully lobbied for a 
two qian reduction. In the eighties, the state again agreed to bolster fledgling sales by cutting rates. In 
the nineties, Liu recommended further cuts. “According to reports, the tea merchants face a tough 





reasoned these cuts could solve the merchants’ ills, because “the key is to solicit more business and 
to make the tea trade appear less daunting to merchants.” Rationalizing his decision, Liu explained 
that many merchants were hemorrhaging losses. “Recently the rise of  foreign tea has begun to cut 
into our profits. The prices in Shanghai are now manipulated (cao) by foreigners. Once sales stop, 
losses will spread, and our silver notes (piao yin) will become worthless pieces of  paper. This is a very 
real possibility.”28 
In this memorial written during the early stages of  the tea crisis, Liu Kunyi explained the 
merchants’ losses as losses in circulation, and he addressed the crisis as a problem of  circulation. 
Accordingly, he made tax reductions the central strategy for dealing with declining sales. Liu’s 
comments on foreigners also revealed another aspect of  his thought: too many outside 
intermediaries were skimming profits from the Chinese houses. Liu and his peers suggested that the 
empire could recoup such losses by providing better options for transport and shipping. If  the Qing 
state could strengthen the nascent China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, then “we could 
stop worrying about being controlled and cheated by foreign merchants.” In the adjacent provinces 
of  Hubei and Hunan, seat of  the Hankou tea market, governor-general Zhang Zhidong made 
similar pronouncements. Chinese merchants, he claimed, lost their rightful profits when selling to 
foreigners, and if  merchants could “send their own ships to sell tea” then they could “get the true 
value (zhenji, lit. “reality”) of  tea by avoiding the layers of  foreign middlemen and manipulation.”29
Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong believed that the crisis resulted from heavy burdens on the 
circulation of  tea, chiefly in the form of  domestic taxation and a dependence on foreign shipping. 
The flipside to their logic was that a real profit, a “true value” (zhenji), could be rescued from 
beneath the layers of  skimming middlemen. It was in the realm of  circulation and transport that 
28 Quoted in Chen Binfan 1999, 574. The history and function of  the silver-backed notes are 
recounted in Lin Man-houng, China Upside down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808-1856 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 7-8.
29 Zhang Zhidong in Chen Binfan 1999, 600.
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merchants made their money, and it was here that officials could helpfully intervene and revive the 
trade. But these two solutions, the lijin tax and foreign shipping, only affected those merchants who 
trafficked tea between the inland markets and the treaty ports. There were other groups 
indispensable to the cultivation of  tea who would not directly benefit: most obviously, the peasant 
families who grew raw tea all across central and southeast China, as well as the inland tea merchants, 
known as tea shops (chahao), who purchased the raw tea and processed it in their factories. Only after 
the tea shops had successfully packaged processed tea did the treaty-port merchants, known as tea 
warehouses (chazhan), get their hands on it. Qing officials were most invested in the prosperity of  
this last group, the warehouse merchants who transported tea but who were not directly involved in 
its production.
The writings of  Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong represented a Smithian position that I have 
heuristically labeled “circulationist.” Much like their counterparts in India, Qing officials believed 
that commercial exchange and the circulation of  goods were the cornerstone of  accumulating 
wealth and, by extension, providing livelihood for the general population (“the people” in Qing 
writing). Circulation, relative to an older emphasis upon the cultivation of  plants and animals, or the 
processing of  raw materials into finished production, steadily gained priority.30 Certainly, Qing 
officials did not overlook matters of  production, but they were considered subsidiary to an emphasis 
on creating well-functioning markets, much like Smith had embedded productivity gains within the 
dynamic of  expanding markets. 
For the sake of  clarity – and, admittedly, at the risk of  oversimplification – I will try to clearly 
spell out how we can think about this circulation-centered theory at two distinct levels of  analysis. 
First, politically, an emphasis on markets meant the Qing state was partial to the interests of  the 
itinerant coastal merchants — as opposed to, say, the peasantry or the inland tea factory managers. 
30 This position clearly resembled the Smithian emphasis on commerce outlined in chapter one, a 




Officials held the merchants in high esteem, and they gained most of  their information about the 
trade by talking with the better-traveled, more powerful coastal merchants, so it was almost natural 
that officials drifted towards their perspective. It was unsurprising, therefore, that the governor-
general had concluded his memorial by emphasizing the emperor sought to demonstrate 
“humaneness (ren ȩ) and sympathy with the suffering of  the merchants (su shangkun ǌĵƃ).”31 We 
can call this first level of  political analysis “merchant sympathy.” Second, at the level of  economic 
theory, circulationism entailed the assumption and belief  that the activities which were responsible 
for producing commercial value were exchange and circulation, rather than the activities of  
production. We can call this a “circulation theory of  value,” and I will expand upon it in the next 
section.
First, the political dimension of  “merchant sympathy.” Why did Qing officials align their 
perspectives with the treaty-port warehouse merchants, out of  all the groups involved? Although 
officials were interested in helping merchants regain their old levels of  profit, they did so not 
because of  an inherent stake in the promotion of  private wealth but because a healthy tea trade 
boosted the state’s own economic interest on at least two fronts.32 First, it brought money into 
domestic circulation. The empire had lost nearly four hundred million dollars of  silver from during 
the first half  of  the century, and the empire had suffered mightily from the deleterious impacts of  
inflation, incurring “vagrancy, corruption, poverty, and riots.”33 During this time tea was one of  the 
only commodities to bring in foreign money. And although the silver supply had recovered by the 
1890s, tea still had symbolic value as a tool for “replenishing” (buchong źŎ) silver.34 Further, even 
31 Liu Kunyi in Chen Binfan 1999, 574.
32 Lin Man-houng, 267.




with a recovered silver supply, the state had also increased its expenditure on military and other 
reform measures, relying less upon its old land tax base and increasingly more on the lijin taxes, 
which included tea.35 Thus, the state’s fiscal base relied upon taxing the warehouse merchants, not 
the peasants (at least not for tea), and its fate was materially tied to those merchants’ successes.
But if  tea mattered to the state because it represented a source of  fiscal revenue, then Liu 
Kunyi’s solution to lower taxes appeared puzzling for one foreign customs official who wrote: “it 
seems to me that the course recommended would resemble that of  the dog letting fall the 
substantial piece of  meat to seize the shadow in the water.” Tea taxes, he clarified, were an important 
source of  fiscal revenue, but simply lowering transport taxes was not guaranteed to stimulate trade.36 
For the proponents of  the tax cuts, however, reconciling the policy with the goal was not difficult. 
“There is no better solution than temporarily cutting taxes,” Chen Chi wrote in a mid-1890s 
memorial, “which will bring about a more vibrant traffic of  goods. Within a few years, exports will 
increase, and then the total revenue will naturally compensate” for lower rates.37
In sum, Qing officials understood the tea crisis as one of  malfunctioning markets, and they 
hoped to solve the merchants’ problems by easing the burdens of  circulation and transport. From a 
broader historical trajectory, furthermore, pro-merchant ideas had been steadily developing for over 
a century before the crisis. As early as the eighteenth century, Qing officials had begun to regularly 
cite their “sympathy for merchants,” expressed most often as xushang ʀĵ -- as well as its double-
negative version “not to fatigue the merchants” (leishang Úĵ). In this period, articulations of  the 
laws of  commerce and respect for market dynamics reached an unprecedented degree of  
sophistication in Qing political thought. Sympathy for the merchants became one of  the “pervasive 
35 Lin Man-houng, 141.
36 C. Hannen quoted in IMC, Tea, 128-129. December, 1887.
37 Chen Chi quoted in Ling Dating, 142. As we will see below, Chen Chi ultimately focused less on 
taxes than on improving methods of  production.
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idioms in official rhetoric, powerful discursive weapons used to validate a wide range of  
procommercial policies.”38 If  we step back to examine the broader trajectory of  Qing political 
rhetoric, we can identify two key developments leading up to the tea crisis which shed light on pro-
merchant attitudes: (1) the elevation of  circulation in debates over the granary system in the mid-
eighteenth century, and (2) the metaphor of  a balance of  trade that emerged in the wake of  the 
Opium Wars, a metaphor that placed greater weight on foreign trade in particular.
First, extended market circulation became a key political value by the turn of  the nineteenth 
century. In the 1700s, political support for the exchange and circulation of  goods reached a high 
point, and political discussions over the laws regulating circulation achieved new levels of  intricacy. 
During this period, “the expansion of  population, increased commercialization of  agriculture, and 
extrapolation of  rural subsidiary occupations led to an increase in the number of  markets.” This 
resulted in a “remarkable degree of  commercialization and market integration during the Qing.”39 
High-Qing (1662-1796) attempts to stock the granary system have served as the perfect example 
of  the state’s ability to grasp the laws of  supply and demand and the desirability of  greater market 
circulation. The granaries were intended to provide ample, affordable food for the entire population 
around the year. Officials purchased grains during harvest time, when prices were low, and sold them 
back to the public during the dire winter months.40 As a handful of  recent works testify, imperial 
debates were animated by an intense discussion over the market as a mechanism for redistributing 
goods. Helen Dunstan has argued that these officials demonstrated a mature “market 
consciousness.” Market mechanisms, they believed, were more efficient than government officials at 
distributing affordable grain to all corners of  the empire. For instance, Celeng, the Manchu governor 
of  Guangdong and Guangxi, advised against government intervention into the grain markets 
38 Rowe 2001, 198.
39 Zelin, 37-38.
40 Rowe 2001, 159-160.
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because merchants themselves distributed grain more efficiently than the bureaucracy. Although 
Celeng did not posit the existence of  self-regulating market mechanisms, he obliquely described 
features that suggested their operation. He invoked “abstract principles upholding the superiority of  
commerce, the profit motive, and the pursuit of  self-interest over state attempts to regulate the 
market.”41 He and other thinkers hinted at “an amoral conception of  the market — one in which 
self-interest, refigured as the vehicle of  market forces, was not to be naively thwarted in its normal 
paths.”42 These ideas were “akin to that of  Adam Smith’s classic vindication of  the speculator, 
although much less developed.”43
To be clear, no official ever advocated a fully unregulated, laissez-faire market, for the objective 
“was less one of  letting the market accomplish its task than of  making it do so.”44 Within the 
context of  the granaries, the connection between the positive effects of  circulating grain and the 
imperial mandate to feed its people was transparent. But circulation also became detached from the 
concrete goal of  feeding the people. Officials pivoted from describing the grain markets in particular 
to argue that circulation in general had beneficial properties. Thus, according to William Rowe, 
circulation (liutong ¤ and xiangtong ¤) began to shed its original context as a means to an end, 
and it evolved into a political end in its own right. Circulation “became an unambiguously positive 
keyword in [the emperor’s] administrative correspondence, used to validate a wide range of  policies.” 
The Qianlong emperor (1711-1799) himself  argued that commercial circulation “has the general 




44 Rowe 2001, 162. 
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improved livelihoods, created jobs, and promoted the accumulation of  wealth.45 Rising confidence in 
circulation and commerce may not have been accompanied by bold refutations of  the traditional 
ben-mo hierarchy, but changes of  attitude were evident. On the one hand, although Qing officials 
continued to ritualistically invoke Confucian rhetoric, their “core arguments about market function 
and how state involvement could affect it,” however, “were technical and economic, not 
Confucian.”46 On the other hand, although officials such as Chen Hongmou continued to praise the 
“roots” of  agriculture, they rarely trivialized commerce (qingmo åƉ). In fact, that phrase was often 
replaced by the now-ubiquitous “sympathy for merchants.” Condemnation of  commerce, in other 
words, was conspicuous by absence. 
When officials first began to praise circulation for its positive benefits, tea was rarely mentioned, 
for it was a relatively minor item in the overall domestic economy, and overseas trade was an 
insignificant concern. This situation would change in the middle of  the nineteenth century, when a 
series of  foreign wars and unequal treaties seemed to follow one after another and subsequently 
inaugurated a new concept in political debate: the national balance of  trade. 
The balance of  trade concept is the second key development in our abbreviated history of  pro-
merchant thought. Its pioneer in Qing China was Wei Yuan (1794-1856), a close associate of  various 
high-ranking officials dealing with coastal matters. In the years following the first Opium War, Wei 
Yuan buried himself  in Chinese and foreign sources on the geographic and economic conditions of  
nations around the world. The product of  his efforts, the Geography of  the Maritime Countries (haiguo 
tuzhi *Ƹ) (1844), introduced the balance of  trade concept into the repertoire of  Qing 
political economy. His analysis of  the balance of  trade “opened up a virgin sphere, theoretically 
45 Rowe 2001, 198-199. Cf. 176: “The Qianlong emperor himself  noted in an edict of  1742 that 
both he and his predecessor had repeatedly stressed to their officials their belief  that the single most 




speaking.”47 According to intellectual historian Hu Jichuang, although individual texts had earlier 
broached the idea of  a trade balance in money or a particular commodity, Wei Yuan’s formulation 
represented a new level of  abstraction.48 For the first time, a thinker argued that the balance of  trade 
could serve as an index of  national (or imperial) wealth and strength. 
Wei Yuan’s own analysis was partly indebted to his careful readings of  British texts, which 
carried the mercantilist idea that wealth signified national strength. Synthesizing English ideas with 
the specific conditions of  Qing China, Wei Yuan organized information from the 1837 returns of  
the Guangdong customs and argued that the illicit opium trade into China had caused great damage 
to the national economy. Without the opium deficit, he argued, Qing merchants trading with 
America and Britain should have a trade surplus of  fifteen million silver dollars. Such a surplus 
would then deflate the price of  silver in China, encourage the circulation of  money and 
commodities, and benefit the people’s welfare.49
Recent research has given scholars a more concrete grasp of  the silver crisis during the first half  
of  the nineteenth century. Contra Wei Yuan’s hypothesis about the role of  opium, Lin Man-houng 
has claimed that the real culprit was a worldwide inflation of  silver relative to copper. Nevertheless, 
the result was the same: an outflow of  $384 million between 1808 and 1856.50 The scarcity of  silver 
had wide-ranging impacts throughout Qing society. Silver was used for transactions across provinces 
and as the sole currency for rent payments. In marginal areas such as the southeast, up to ninety 
percent of  the population was unable to convert copper to silver to pay rent. Not coincidentally, 
peripheral areas subsequently gave rise to numerous rebellions and insurgencies. At the same time, 
47 Hu Jichuang, A Concise History of  Chinese Economic Thought (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press : 
Distributed by China International Book Trading Corp, 1988), 524.
48 Hu Jichuang 1998, 676.




domestic markets for silk and cotton stagnated, as money supplies dried up, and officials also 
concluded that the tax burden had doubled or tripled in recent decades. With farmers unable to pay, 
the land tax revenue fell by eight million dollars, which represented a full quarter of  all land taxes 
and about six percent of  the total revenue. 51
All of  these effects combined to magnify the crucial role played by foreign trade in replenishing 
the silver supply.52 The balance of  trade metaphor thereby became the dominant framework for 
economic discussions throughout the century, and it gave rise to two major theoretical 
consequences. First, most obviously, it emphasized overseas trade. Wei Yuan conceived economic 
activity as primarily centered upon the exchange of  goods for foreign specie. A lively market for 
grains between the Chinese hinterland and the Chinese coasts would have only indirect benefits on 
the national balance of  trade. But this emphasis upon circulation came at an analytical price. The 
balance of  trade concept was, by definition, indifferent towards activities such as the production and 
consumption of  goods. Thus, historian of  economic thought Joseph Schumpeter concluded that “as 
a tool of  general economic analysis, it does not work by itself: if  we know nothing except the figures 
of  exports and imports” then “we cannot make any inferences from them.”53 Wei Yuan and his 
successors, for instance, assumed that a favorable trade balance, wherein exports exceeded imports, 
benefited the nation. But, theoretically, this result could arise from a variety of  conditions, such as a 
lack of  buying power among its own population or from an undeveloped industrial sector that relied 
upon unsustainably cheap labor and resources. Such details remained outside Wei Yuan’s frame of  
analysis.
51 Lin Man-houng, 117-133.
52 Lin Zexu quoted in Lin Man-houng, 273.




Secondly, the balance of  trade concept brought thinkers one step closer to systematically 
describing an autonomous realm of  activity that we now call “the economy.” In Philip Mirowski’s 
history of  modern economic thought, the balance of  trade concept was pivotal for the development 
of  a “conservation principle” in economics, which suggested that transactions across a wide range 
of  time and space could not only be connected but also indexed, reduced to a common 
denominator -- in this case, “net value of  exports” -- and added up.54 What was formerly conceived 
of  as a panoply of  isolated, individual exchanges of  money for grain, silk, etc. was now neatly 
summarized into a single figure: imports subtracted from exports. The dizzying motions of  
economic activity could thus be “reified” into a “value index.”55 In other words, Qing officials had 
earlier promoted circulation with the expectation that it would optimally redistribute food and 
wealth, but until now, they lacked that single figure which elegantly measured the aggregate activities 
of  all exchange. This new figure made explicit the assumption that, across acts of  exchange, there 
was an abstract, general substance -- “value” -- that could be conserved. Ten dollars worth of  silver 
and ten dollars worth of  cotton shared physical differences, but they were nonetheless both 
expressions of  ten dollars worth of  value. 
“Value,” the term that the Imperial Maritime Customs assigned to the cumulative amount of  
money earned from export goods, became one of  the highest goals of  Qing political economy. As a 
result, tea enjoyed greater attention as a major export article that could stem the outflow of  silver. 
Calculated as part of  the domestic trade, tea accounted for only 7.7% of  total value, and silk only 
7.1%.56 But when placed in a mercantilist framework, which gave priority to foreign trade, tea and 
silk vaulted to supreme levels of  importance. During the first decades of  the treaty-port era, Qing 
54 Mirowski’s claim about nineteenth-century political economy mirrors Diane Coyle’s recently 
published historical genealogy of  the concept of  “national income.” Coyle 2014, 7-40.
55 Mirowski, 148-150.
56 Philip C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1985), 90.
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exports consisted of  tea and silk alone, about sixty percent tea and forty percent silk. Although Wei 
Yuan did not specifically discuss the tea trade in his 1844 work, it was already present: in the 1837 
maritime customs statistics he used, tea represented sixty percent of  foreign exports.
By the second half  of  the nineteenth century, Qing writers were as vocal about the merits of  
commerce as they had ever been. The writings of  Wang Tao (1828-1897) demonstrated how the 
earlier praise for circulation, compounded by Wei Yuan’s emphasis upon trade balances, had matured 
into a boldly pro-commercial economic theory. In his 1861 essay “The Management of  
Wealth” (licai }Ƃ), he wrote that “the urgent tasks of  managing wealth is to open up and 
accumulate flows of  circulation (kailiu 2), getting rid of  luxuries and practicing parsimony.” 
Independent of  the Qing bureaucracy, Wang felt emboldened to criticize the traditional Confucian 
ben-mo distinction, adding, “This [circulation] is what is fundamental (ben). Everything else is 
peripheral (mo).”57 Wang continued his assault on pro-agrarian ideas in other essays. “Ever since 
ancient times, China has emphasized agriculture and looked lightly upon commerce, valuing grains 
and denigrating money. Agriculture is the fundamental wealth (ben), and commerce is merely the 
peripheral (mo),” he wrote. “In the west, by contrast, the roots (ben) are abandoned, and the branches 
(mo) are prioritized. How can it be that in trying to provide for our own people with our own 
produce here, we still rely on trade with foreign countries?”58
Wang Tao caps this abbreviated history of  the rising importance of  circulation in Qing political 
thought during the two centuries preceding the tea crisis. But there is another dimension to the 
circulationist approaches that Qing officials initially adopted to address the tea crisis. The plausibility 
57 Quoted in Zhao Jing and Yi Menghong, eds., Zhongguo Jindai Jingji Sixiang Ziliao Xuanji [Selected 
Materials on Modern Chinese Economic Thought] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju: Xinhua shudian Beijing 
faxingsuo, 1982), 5-6.
58 Quoted in Zhao Jing and Shi Shiqi, eds., Zhongguo Jingji Sixiang Tongshi Xuji: Zhongguo Jindai Jingji 
Sixiangshi [A Continuation of  an Overview History of  Chinese Economic Thought: Modern Chinese Economic 
Thought] (Beijing Shi: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2004), 182.
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and persuasiveness of  circulationism can be partly attributed to the prominence of  merchant capital 
as the central animating force behind the complex trade.
Tea merchant capital and the plausibility of  a circulation-centered theory of  value
When Qing officials promoted policy solutions geared around greater freedom for merchants to 
trade and circulate goods, they relied upon a deeper set of  assumptions about the role of  circulation 
as a source of  value in social life. For heuristic purposes, I have called this more philosophical 
dimension a “circulation theory of  value.”
Circulationist thought, as I have argued, emphasized easing the burdens of  tea circulation, as 
opposed to its production and consumption. For Qing officials, circulation was the primary wealth-
producing activity of  the tea trade. These men initially responded to the crisis by unburdening 
circulation, removing impediments to the flow of  goods such as taxation and foreign shipping. In 
1888 F. Kleinwächter, Commissioner of  Customs at Ningbo, wrote, “the gentry and merchants 
argue that ... the injury suffered by the China Tea trade is entirely due to the excessive pressure of  
taxation; and that the fact that, in spite of  this heavy taxation, the trade has not been of  late years 
entirely usurped by their rivals, is due to the superior quality (of  China Teas).” Kleinwächter himself  
was less sanguine, stating that the merchants were “in parts incorrect as well as incomplete.”59
Most striking about the positions held by the Qing “gentry and merchants” was how they paired 
a blame on high taxation with an arrogant pride in the quality of  Chinese tea. The flipside to their 
emphasis upon circulation was an attitude that took for granted the production process, as well as 
the sensuous, physical qualities of  the commodity. The “merchants” here were the coastal 
warehouse merchants in Shanghai and Hankou, men who did not directly intervene into production. 
They were confident in the work done by peasants and the inland factories despite the fact that they 
themselves were only indirectly involved in production. Merchant arrogance could also be read as 
59 March 1, 1888 report. Quoted in IMC, Tea, 84-85.
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merchant indifference. By refusing to consider whether quality was part of  the problem, the 
merchants betrayed a personal bias exclusively focused on circulation. 
Their attitude came out clearly in a memorial written by the Hankou tea merchant guild. 
Addressing the Customs officials, the memorial began with generalities: “Tea is a large contributor 
to the revenue of  China and forms one of  her chief  articles of  production.” The authors then 
suggested that, of  everyone involved in the trade, they themselves were the most crucial element. 
“The farmer and his family,” they wrote, could not participate in the tea business on their own. “The 
country-people, from the beginning of  the year to the end, have to devote all their energy and care 
to the setting out and cultivation of  the plants, and yet they cannot secure their daily bread.” The 
merchant, by contrast, was indispensable: “When Tea merchants have lost their original capital there 
will be many difficulties in carrying on the trade.” Whatever Chinese term the merchants used for 
“capital” – for the original text was not preserved in the Maritime Customs Report – they clearly 
meant it as the initial outlay of  money to be invested for profit. They did not mean it as industrial 
capital, as an investment to improve the production process. They thought of  capital purely in terms 
of  savings and expenses, listing the various costs that made them less competitive with “the Indian 
producers”: “a grower’s tax,” “Likin charges,” “local charities,” and “the money paid for carriers, 
freight, boat hire, coolies, purchasing chests and their lining, and providing food for labourers.” In 
conclusion, they wrote, the above facts “show the losses the merchants must suffer in the Tea 
business.”60 
The warehouse merchants conflated their own plight with that of  the entire trade. When asked 
to describe the problems facing the business as a whole, they couched their response in terms of  
damages they personally suffered. Perhaps it is a truism that any sector of  society tends to view the 
whole through their own particular lens, but the tea merchants also had a strong case for their 
egocentrism. Their reasoning boiled down to the matter of  capital in circulation. As they saw it, the 
60 “Translation of  Hankow tea guild’s memorandum on the tea trade,” in IMC, Tea, 48-49.
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peasants who grew tea and the inland factories who refined it could not bring tea to the treaty-ports 
without the merchants and their advances. Hence, the merchant was indispensable for converting tea 
into commercial value. Surely, one could counter that without the peasant producers, conversely, the 
tea merchants would have no tea to sell. But the goal of  commerce was not to produce useful goods 
like tea. It was to generate value, in the form of  money or credit, and only the merchant possessed 
the alchemic ability to transform tea into money through exchange. Besides, such an equivocation 
between peasants and merchants would overlook the fact that merchants, with their versatile capital, 
could invest in other crops or other profitable ventures. “The farmer and his family,” meantime, only 
enjoyed two options: to rely upon merchant capitalists to market export crops, like tea and silk, or to 
sell their own crops in the domestic market by relying upon their own savings. And, as the memorial 
made clear, most tea-growing families had slim to none. 
At this point, we would be best served to heed Mirowski’s observation that “one of  the great 
fallacies of  economic reasoning is to confuse requisite with productive.”61 In other words, when 
conceiving the entire process through which humans produce commercial value, economic theorists 
must disaggregate between things that are merely required and those that are actually productive. For 
instance: water may be required to cook pasta, but the source of  the transformation itself  -- the 
actual productive element -- is the heat that makes water boil.62 Were we to disaggregate the two 
activities of  production and circulation from within the merchants’ logic, which would they consider 
requisite and which productive? For the Hankou merchants, it was clear that the practical production of  
tea may have been a requisite, but it was only the merchants’ capital that made possible the 
production and accumulation of  wealth.
61 Mirowski, 160.
62 In fact, “energy” was the property of  physics that the earliest political economists sought to 
compare with capital and their newly-coined concept of  “value.”
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The teamen’s belief  in the productive capacities of  merchant capital was born out of  their years 
of  experience trafficking tea between inland country and treaty port. What did the merchant do, and 
how did he make his profit? At the start of  each season, the warehouse merchants based in 
Shanghai, Hankou, and Fuzhou assessed their starting capital, accumulated from previous profits or 
loans from modern banks and Chinese native banks. With capital in hand, the merchant traveled 
inland to one of  the numerous tea-growing districts near the treaty ports spread across the central 
and southeast provinces. There, they provided advances to the small inland shops and factories. The 
shops in turn used the advances to pay peasants for their raw leaves. They also split the advances on 
paying seasonal wages and necessities like baskets, firing ranges, fuel, etc. “Substantial amounts of  
liquid capital, usually in the form of  advances, lubricated the production cycle.”63 
Throughout the season, which lasted from April to September, the treaty-port merchants 
received packaged teas from their inland partners, transported it to the major ports, and then 
haggled with foreign trading companies over prices. These port prices were beyond the control of  
the Chinese merchants, who were unable to directly interact with the London or Calcutta markets, 
which had a determinative effect on the Chinese market. Because prices seemed to fluctuate and 
plummet without rational explanation, the tea merchants described the crisis as a form of  foreign 
agents bullying native sellers: subjective behavior as opposed to the objective laws of  supply and 
demand. Zhang Zhidong wrote, “the tea merchants of  Huguang are being bullied and squeezed by 
all parties, and it has caused them to pile up losses.”64 He added elsewhere, “foreigners push down 
prices and try to scam us. They use all sorts of  tricks.”65
63 Gardella, 123. “Financed either directly or indirectly through native banks and foreign branch 
banks, chazhans advanced credit in turn to the tea manufactories, which ultimately financed local tea 
buyers and either prepurchases or open market transactions with peasant growers. This ‘chain of  
continuing credit relationships’ ... sought to ensure a steady commodity flow.”
64 Zhang Zhidong, “Goucha yun’e shixiao youxiao ni reng xiangji chuoban zhe,” 1898, in Chen 
Binfan 1999, 601.
65 Zhang Zhidong, “gouban hongcha yun’e shixiao zhe,” in Chen Binfan 1999, 600.
CHAPTER SIX
249
Thus, the merchant was directly involved in neither the production of  tea nor its consumption. 
Confined to the realm of  circulation, the merchant could speculate about the extremes of  the trade 
-- domestic cultivation and foreign auction-houses -- but he fully inhabited neither world. He earned 
his living through the repeated activities of  purchase and sale, exploiting the price differentials 
between tea bought inland and sold at the treaty ports. Naturally, in the minds of  merchants, it was 
this repetition of  buying low and selling high that generated profits and cumulative surpluses. 
Of  course, to the extent that modifying production could help the merchants gain a competitive 
advantage, they were willing to exert their considerable influence over the inland market. Such 
influence owed to their stranglehold over capital. Most obviously, the tea merchants occasionally 
encouraged more cost-effective methods of  production, as discussed in the last chapter. Recall, for 
instance, the Shanghai merchant Tang Yaoqing, who wrote to his inland partner Jiang Yaohua, “find 
your men and get to work (xian zhanren xiashou þǼ
@)” and to “be decisive and pay attention 
to manpower (renshou 
@), to act with guts and move quickly.”66 The warehouse merchants were 
also responsible for instructing factories to manufacture the darker, more fermented teas that British 
drinkers preferred. But such examples did not signify that merchants were directly investing capital 
into production. Rather, they only demonstrated the extent to which capital was concentrated in the 
hands of  the merchants rather than the producers, so much so that the merchants could influence 
production without seizing ownership of  the land on which tea was grown, nor the tools and 
infrastructure. These late Qing merchants seemed to resemble Braudel’s description of  their early 
modern European counterparts: “With a few exceptions, the capitalist, that is in this period the 
‘important merchant’ with many undifferentiated activities, did not commit himself  whole heartedly 
to production. He was practically never a farming landowner with feet firmly planted in the soil; 
while he was often a rentier owning land, his real profits and concerns lay elsewhere.” Production, 
66 Quoted in Wang and Zhang 592.
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according to Braudel, was merely a “corollary of  what he really was: a man of  the market.”67 Thus, 
the merchant intervened into production through influence but not through ownership. Such an 
arrangement, in which the merchant dictated production and not the other way around, must have 
strengthened the merchant’s confidence in the powers of  his circulating capital.
Qing officials shared the general impression that circulation was the heart of  the tea business. It 
was the organ that pumped life throughout the whole body. First, because capital was concentrated 
in the hands of  merchants, these traders were by far the biggest, and most visible, beneficiaries of  
the most profitable years of  the trade.68 Second, Qing officials must have been acutely aware that, 
even if  peasants and inland shops yielded a large quantity of  good teas one year, their wares would 
be worthless without the transport and brokering services offered by the warehouse merchants. 
Without entering the realm of  circulation, the value of  tea could never be realized. In the case of  
other crops, such as grains or mulberry leaves, the inability to generate market value would be less 
distressing, for these crops could be consumed by locals or sold at one of  the countless domestic 
markets. But tea was grown explicitly for bringing in money from abroad. Black teas pegged for 
London, especially, were too heavy and bitter for local palates. If  tea could not be converted into 
value, it could not help the national balance of  trade, and it served no financial and hence no 
political purpose. Without merchants to provide circulation, tea was just a leaf  without exchange-
value. For this reason, Qing officials agreed: tea production was a requisite, but only circulation was 
productive of  value. If  merchants and sympathetic officials conceived of  economic laws, problems, 
and solutions as merchant-centered ones, this was because the tea trade itself  was centered, entirely 
dependent, on merchant capital. On this point, economic thought and economic practice were 
inseparable. Moreover, this basic overview of  circulation-centered theories can be further 
67 Braudel 1982, 372.




illuminated by asking how the role of  circulation was conceptualized relative to agriculture in late 
Qing thought.
The market versus nature, or, François Quesnay in Beijing?
The maturation of  pro-commercial, pro-circulation thought over the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries was a history of  the “branches” (mo) catching up with the “roots” (ben). But this dynamic 
unavoidably begs the question: how did pro-commercial thinkers deal with the continuing relevance 
of  agriculture? No matter how strongly men like Wei Yuan and Wang Tao downplayed the role of  
the land, they could not deny that goods came from the land, that land was a prerequisite for 
circulation. For this reason, the role of  agriculture never disappeared in political debates, even as the 
empire’s estimation of  market dynamics rose considerably. Intellectual historian Hu Jichuang wrote 
that in Qing political thought, the role of  commerce may have increased over time, but the 
significance of  agriculture was a constant.69 Although the empire increasingly commercialized, its 
goods were unmistakably products of  the earth and soil: grains, rice, cotton, silk, tea. 
Certainly, agriculture was at the heart of  eighteenth-century attempts to fill state granaries with 
enough food to feed the empire. One eighteenth-century idiom best captured the sentiment of  
officials who sought to cultivate the wastelands: “exhausting the earth” (jin dili ů-÷).70 Chen 
Hongmou frequently used the phrase, urging the emperor “not to allow any of  nature’s potential 
benefits to go untapped.”71 Besides the “exhaust the earth” (jin dili) idiom, many writers in the 
nineteenth century wrote about “extracting sources of  profit” (jun liyuan), which carried the 
figurative image of  dredging up sediment in order to open up passages for the free “flow” of  profits 
from the earth.
69 Hu Jichuang 1998, 706.
70 Cf. Peter Perdue’s study of  the same name (1987) and also Rowe 2001, 217.
71 Rowe 2001, 217.
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The continued emphasis upon the capacities of  the earth, paired with an increasing respect for 
market dynamics and trade, is one reason why so many historians of  China have highlighted the 
uncanny similarities between Chinese political thought and the eighteenth-century French school of  
economic thinkers known as the Physiocrats.72 Even François Quesnay, founder of  the Physiocrats, 
made the connection. He wrote that Bourbon France ought to take a cue from Qing China, where 
“agriculture has always been held in veneration, and those who profess it have always merited the 
special attention of  the emperors.”73 
As I discussed in chapter one, the Physiocrats responded to then-dominant mercantilist views 
about circulation by emphasizing the role of  productive labor in agriculture and also, by extension, 
the role of  the earth as the sole repository of  value. They credited the towering successes of  human 
society not to trade but to the “gift of  nature,” the “productive power of  nature,” or, as a 
sympathetic Adam Smith phrased it, “the powers of  nature” the “great director of  nature,” the 
“Author of  nature.”74 Across multiple contexts in the global history of  economic thought, the main 
tenet of  the Physiocrats -- that agriculture is the primary source of  economic value -- has always 
found a receptive audience wherever commercial agriculture served an important social purpose, 
72 Cf., e.g., Dunstan 2006, 145; Perdue 1987, 1; Rowe 2001, 213-214; Kang Chao, The Development of  
Cotton Textile Production in China (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1977), 
38-40.
73 Quesnay, «Le Despotisme de la Chine» quoted in Lewis A. Maverick, China, a Model for Europe 
(San Antonio: Paul Anderson company, 1946), 205-206.
“Farmers rank higher than merchants and artisans in China. There is a certain kingdom in Europe 
that has not yet felt the importance of  agriculture or of  the wealth that must be advanced to prepare 
the soil for cultivation, which can only be provided by individuals of  marked capacity and wealth; in 
that country farmers are regarded as simple peasants or laborers, and their ranks fixed below that of  
the common people of  the cities (see the Lois civiles of  Domat, and you will know which kingdom 
this is, and what ideas exist there of  the fundamental laws of  societies). In China, on the contrary, 
agriculture has always been held in veneration, and those who profess it have always merited the 
special attention of  the emperors; we shall not here go into a detailed account of  the prerogatives 
that these rulers have continually accorded them.”
74 Quoted in Ronald L. Meek, The Economics of  Physiocracy: Essays and Translations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), 388.
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whether in France, eastern India, or China. This uncanny similarity could be observed, despite the 
fact that Qing-era Chinese thinkers could not have read the works of  the French school. Intellectual 
historian Ronald Meek suggested reasons why “the claims of  agriculture to preeminence were hard 
to dispute” for the économistes in their own context: “no one could deny that agriculture was 
historically prior to industry and commerce,” “the size of  the agricultural surplus did still effectively 
limit the extension of  industry and commerce,” and further, he pointed out, “the production of  a 
surplus in agriculture could easily enough be visualized in physical terms.”75 Undoubtedly, what was 
true for eighteenth-century Bourbon France also was true for eighteenth-century Qing China. Grain 
and primary products were by far the most traded commodities at the time, up to sixty percent of  
the domestic market, and the stocking of  the granary systems would have appeared to any observer 
as the most vivid manifestation of  “accumulation” imaginable. Despite increasingly sophisticated 
levels of  commerce and manufacturing, Qing China did not experience the radical bifurcation 
between town and country that inspired the classic British political economy of  the nineteenth 
century. Most commercial farmers remained farmers first, confining manufacture to a 
supplementary activity. “The overwhelming majority of  production, processing, and manufacture 
during the first half  of  the Qing took place in rural areas,” Madeleine Zelin has noted.76 If  
similarities between French Physiocratic and Qing political economic thought can be detected, this 
again testifies to the inseparability of  thought and practice: ideas shared uncanny resemblances 
across geography partly because the organization of  economic activity did as well.
But, strictly speaking, the Physiocrats spoke of  the primacy of  nature in order to argue that the 
labor associated with the land, viz., agricultural labor, was the sole productive activity in society. On this 
75 Meek, 362.
76 Madeleine Zelin, “The Structure of  the Chinese Economy During the Qing Period: Some 
Thoughts on the 150th Anniversary of  the Opium War,” in China’s Quest for Modernization: A 




point, the analogies between Physiocratic thought and Qing political economy reach their limit, for 
Qing writers believed that, although agriculture and agrarian labor were highly productive of  useful, 
physical items, circulation alone -- and not agricultural labor -- endowed a commodity with 
commercial value. If  the Physiocrats held a “labor theory of  value,” then Qing officials held a 
“circulation theory of  value.”77 To make this point clearer, we need only recall Mirowski’s 
observation that discussions of  economic theory need to clearly disaggregate what is considered 
“requisite” from what is “productive.” Pro-circulation merchants and Qing officials viewed the earth 
as a repository of  physical surpluses that represented the possibility of  value. The earth was a 
requisite factor for generating wealth, pregnant with potential. The role of  trade was to act as its 
midwife, bringing physical resources into the sphere of  circulation, where value could be calculated 
and profit realized. The earth was a requisite, but only trade was productive. Only through trade 
could the gifts of  the earth be turned into money. Put another way, the earth produced physical 
surpluses of  goods, such as tea, rice, and mulberry leaves, but only circulation could generate surpluses of  
money. As we saw above, the tea merchants of  the 1880s prioritized their capital as the heart and soul 
of  the trade. The “country-people” were unable to “secure their daily bread,” and thus, “when Tea 
merchants have lost their original capital there will be many difficulties in carrying on the trade.” 
Merchants inaugurated the cycle of  commerce, and they reaped its benefits at the end of  each 
season. If  agrarian labor was the productive actor, as the Physiocrats asserted, then why did the 
“farmer and his family” remain so poor, or, in the golden days of  the trade, barely grow richer? To 
these late Qing merchants, any “labor theory of  value” would have sounded absurd.
Wang Tao, one of  the pro-circulation thinkers noted above, perfectly captured the tension of  
this theory: simultaneously admiring China’s rich earth while maintaining that only commerce could 




richest and strongest of  all continents on earth,” he wrote. “However, officials have been unable to 
tame its great resources, unable to fully extract its great sources of  profit in order to pursue profit.”78
Zheng Guanying, the ex-comprador turned political theorist, argued forcefully for the 
indispensability of  circulation and, correlatively, spoke of  the impotency of  society without it:
Without commerce, scholarly learning would not be vast. Without commerce, agricultural 
cultivation would not be expansive. Without commerce, industry could not move its products. 
The merchants use the great principle of  handling wealth (zuocai, lit. “sitting and handling 
money”) in order to connect the web of  four peoples (scholars, merchants, peasants, 
craftspeople). The rightness (yi) of  commerce is great indeed!79
This line of  thinking practiced a balancing act between valorizing the physical gifts of  the earth 
with the social gifts of  trade. The most important practical consequence was that, in the minds of  
merchants and officials, commerce overshadowed the role of  agrarian labor. Or, more accurately, 
merchants believed that the quality of  tea was determined by the physical conditions of  nature itself, 
not by the manipulation of  human labor. In their memorial to the customs service, the Hankou 
merchant guild claimed, “if  at times the flavour and colour are not up to the mark, it must be 
attributed to the weather. Should the weather happen to be unseasonable, either from being too dry 
or too wet at the time when the picking has commenced, the quality and flavour of  the Tea varies 
somewhat accordingly; the result produced does not depend on bad preparation, nor is it in any 
78 Wang Tao. Quoted in Zhao Jing 1982, 17. Wang Tao may be exploiting a linguistic ambiguity with 
his figurative language here. Jun means to literally dredge up something. The phrase junli means to 
dredge up sediment for the purpose of  irrigation (shuili) and to hence open up the flows of  water. In 
this sense, the object of  excavation would be the unwanted sediment. In this sentence, however, the 
pairing lisou literally means “clusters of  profit,” and hence the object of  dredging becomes the profit 
itself. In short, the phrase jun..lisou implies both the extraction of  profit as well as opening up 
blockages to allow for its free circulation.
79 Zheng Guanying quoted in Zhao Jing and Shiqi Shi, 216.
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respect due to the admixture of  extraneous matter.”80 Zhang Zhidong echoed the merchants’ 
emphasis on physical factors: “the merchants all know that the reason Chinese tea remains superior 
to foreigners’ tea is because the quality of  Chinese soil and the weather and climate make it so 
(shiran).”81 
If  the potential value of  production was something determined by the innate qualities of  the 
earth and nature, then the farmer’s job was merely to shepherd tea between the soil and the world of  
commerce. “Real” economic activity took place in the sphere of  circulation. Xue Fucheng 
(1828-1894), for instance, proposed reviving the tea and silk trades by placing more land under 
cultivation, ignoring considerations of  technique. In modern terms, he emphasized extensive rather 
than intensive agriculture. “It would be best for local magistrates and officials to exhort the people 
to grow silk and tea in the most suitable conditions,” he wrote. “Silk must be grown in the highlands, 
and tea should be grown in the valleys between mountains.”82 Xue Fucheng focused his attention on 
the quantity of  land placed under cultivation, ignoring the quality or efficiency of  production itself. 
Of  course, as I argued in the last chapter, tea production was actually very dynamic and 
intensive, but such changes largely escaped the attention of  the bureaucracy. Eventually, however, 
the same forces of  international competition that initially compelled tea producers to focus on 
increasing productivity also forced officials to take a hard look at methods of  production, albeit 
decades later. By that time, the rural economy seemed to pale in comparison to the Indian industry, 
an entity they feared but did not yet fully understand.
The second response: from crises of  circulation to crises of  competition
Price, costs, production
80 “Translation of  Hankow tea guild’s memorandum on the tea trade,” in IMC, Tea, 48-49.
81 Zhang Zhidong, “zha Jiang-han guandao quanyu huashang gouji zhicha,” 1900, in Chen Binfan 
1999, 603.
82 Quoted in Zhao Jing 1982, 59.
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The original proposals by Liu Kunyi and others to stimulate trade through tax reductions enjoyed 
their heyday during the late 1880s and early 1890s. By the end of  the century, Qing officials no 
longer believed that tax cuts alone were an adequate solution. The logic behind the tax cuts were not 
disputed, for officials continued to consistently suggest them as one solution among many, but cuts 
no longer seemed to address the fundamental problems facing tea. As the crisis grew worse, officials 
tried to more deeply delve into the underlying causes behind the decline of  the trade, and the 
circulationist response lost its plausibility as they learned more about the global factors responsible 
for the crisis. 
Earlier, merchants and sympathetic officials presumed that as long as merchants could bring tea 
to the ports, they would encounter a sufficient amount of  foreign traders clamoring to buy their 
products. Supply would find demand. Why should they have doubted this? The experience of  
foreign trade up until then had demonstrated to them that the more tea and silk they brought to 
market, the more the foreigners would buy. Even when overwhelming demand had led some tea 
factories to pad their products with branches, old leaves, dust, and other non-tea plants, the 
foreigners continued to buy anyway! As prices for tea began to fall in the 1870s, however, merchants 
realized that their old pattern of  exploiting price differentials was becoming less profitable.
With merchants no longer able to simply bring tea to market and expect a profit, Qing officials 
began to analyze the factors behind price more closely. In the most basic terms, merchants 
envisioned their craft as a combination of  buying cheap tea from the inland districts and selling it at 
a higher price to British and American traders. If  the selling prices had begun to fall -- a result of  
foreign bullying, they believed -- then naturally the best remedy was to mitigate the various costs 
they incurred while delivering tea to the market, hence a focus on taxes. But this solution was a 
superficial one. As the crisis deepened, individuals realized that reducing taxation alone did not 
address deeper weaknesses in the rural tea economy, weaknesses made visible only through 
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comparison with the industrial tea plantations of  South Asia. Officials eventually concluded that the 
tea crisis could not be explained through barriers to circulation. Rather it was a crisis stemming from 
their competitors’ production methods. If  the nature of  the problem did not originate in the 
domestic realm but rather stemmed from the behavior of  other producers on the world market, 
then the tea crisis, in simple terms, was a crisis not of  domestic circulation but of  global competition.
To summarize, here was the logical journey from circulation to production traveled by Qing 
officials. They began with considerations of  (1) price, whose outer layers they peeled back to reveal 
(2) production costs, from which officials could easily pivot to think about (3) the production 
process itself.83 
In practical writings concerned with the trade, Qing officials began to gradually slip in more 
commentary on the conditions of  production. One official extended the scope of  his consideration 
to also include peasant production. “The main principle of  commercial affairs is to sympathize with 
merchants,” he wrote. “If  peasants do not suffer losses in the capital spent on cultivation (zhongben 
Jc), they will naturally grow more, and this will naturally increase the total quantity of  exports.” 
Eventually, “the merchant houses will have a surplus profit (yuli ǧ÷) that can be enjoyed, and 
commercial affairs will naturally be revived.”84
One of  the clearest theoretical expressions of  this new perspective came courtesy of  Zheng 
Guanying, a former tea comprador who fashioned himself  a political commentator. Although 
normally confining his perspective to matters of  circulation and the balance of  trade, Zheng also 
observed: “The successes and failures of  commerce do not depend solely upon the scarcity of  
goods. One must also look at the level of  skill in production. If  one can use industry to buttress 
83 For Marx, considerations over “production costs” logically signaled the advent of  industrial 
capitalism in its nascent forms. Cf. Marx and Engels 1991, 73, 81.
84 “Lun Chawu” in Shao Zhitang, in Chen Binfan 1999, 620.
CHAPTER SIX
259
commerce (you gong yi yi shang 	¢)ţĵ), then the clumsy can be converted into the skilled, the 
coarse can become the refined. If  we can use another country’s goods for our own good, if  we get 
rid of  the bad in order to invest in the good, then we can use our rival’s resources in order to skim 
profit from them.”85
Formerly fixated exclusively on circulation, officials now turned back to the question of  
production. The ensuing debate became a referendum on the circulationist theory of  value that had 
been popularized by merchants and pro-merchant officials.
 
Grasping the challenge of  South Asian tea 
In the last half  of  the 1890s, officials began to fixate more on the methods of  Indian tea 
plantations, describing how they employed tea-rolling machines to ensure a uniform quality of  leaf, 
how they had developed a systematic regime of  labor discipline that ensured high levels of  
productivity, and how planters maintained large plots of  land that were meticulously planned by a 
central authority.86 It is near impossible to determine what Qing officials read, but one source worth 
speculation is the Imperial Maritime Customs survey on Chinese tea in 1888, which was delivered to 
the Guangxu emperor. It included many passages from Robert Fortune’s Tea Districts of  China and 
India (1853), as well two key planter texts which I analyzed in chapter three: George Barker’s Life of  a 
Tea Planter in Assam (1884) and Edward Money’s The Cultivation & Manufacture of  Tea (1878), which 
was considered a bible of  tea planting in India.87
85 Zheng Guanying quoted in Zhao Jing 1982, 90. He uses the phrase chucai yiwei jinyong, lit. “using 
the materials of  Chu for the consumption of  Jin.” An allusion to the Zuozhuan.
86 For more details on the regime of  labor discipline, cf. Behal 2006, 143–172.
87 IMC, Tea, 1888. Fortune appears on 65; Barker, 42; and Money, 73. The actual title of  Fortune’s 
book, incorrectly listed, is Two visits to the tea countries of  China and the British tea plantations in the 
Himalaya. Barker’s is A Tea-Planter’s life in Assam.
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From Barker and Money, Qing reformers learned about Indian tea production and began to 
grew self-conscious about the relative lack of  mechanization in the Chinese districts. Zhang 
Zhidong, who once wrote that Chinese tea “remained superior” due to the quality of  the soil, later 
added that “because our human labor-based methods for firing and processing tea (rengong hongzhi 

¢ɮÄ) are imperfect, they fall short of  the quality of  machine-made tea.”88 Another official 
commented on the contrast between the goods that China imported, such as manufactured cotton 
goods, versus the relatively unprocessed items they exported. “Chinese people do not have 
manufactured goods that attract the attention of  foreign merchants,” he wrote. “It was only tea, this 
natural form of  profit in China (huaren ziran zhi li ÿ
FN÷), that foreigners considered 
indispensable.”89 
For some writers, the fact that foreigners succeeded by means of  industry was a positive sign 
that Chinese tea would again prosper once Chinese farmers learned to imitate industry: 
The myriad of  things (wanwu Ď¯) each have their own appropriate nature. Chinese tea results 
from processing a natural source of  profit (ziran zhi li FN÷). Foreigners, however, use 
human powers to plunder from the work of  nature (tiangong ¢)….Their soil is not suitable 
for tea, so they struggle against nature, and ultimately their flavor is worse. The problem is that 
Chinese processing is not refined yet, and others look down on it. If  we commit ourselves to 
reform, justice will prevail and we will fetch high prices and be competitive.”90
88 Zhang Zhidong, “zha Jiang-han guandao quanyu huashang gouji zhicha,” 1900, in Chen Binfan 
1999, 603.
89 “Lun chawu,” in Shao Zhitang, quoted in Chen Binfan, 619.
90 “Zhenxing chaye chuyan,” in Shao Zhitang, quoted in Chen Binfan, 623.
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For others, new knowledge about the power of  machinery forced them to rethink their 
assumptions about circulation. These writings emerged with greater regularity in the middle of  the 
nineties, as the crisis worsened and earlier solutions aimed at taxation appeared inadequate and 
superficial. Having formerly censured draconian costs burdening merchants, Qing writers now took 
aim at the behavior of  the merchants themselves: 
Westerners work harder, they conduct research, and they use human ability to conquer nature 
(tian). Chinese people, however, are greedy for the fruits of  nature (tian zhi gong), but they are 
content with being lazy. In terms of  what human labor can accomplish, heaven sets no 
limitations. The only concern is whether humans themselves work hard enough.91
The tea merchants, they concluded, had only themselves to blame:
The merchants’ hearts are filled with greed, they do not pay attention to the pros and cons of  
certain practices, they only know they want to turn a small amount of  capital into large profits. 
Thus, in the middle of  the tea, they mix dead twigs and bad leaves and skimp on costs for 
package. . . . The damage that caused by selling fake teas not only hurts westerners, it also hurts 
the Chinese.92
Another memorial suggested that the merchants’ confusion resulted from their inability to 
understand simple supply-and-demand dynamics. The merchants “wasted their time cursing the 
westerners for squeezing prices, or they wasted their time bemoaning how much better things were 
91 “Cha shi” in Shao Zhitang, quoted in Chen Binfan, 621.
92 “Lun zhengdun chashi,” in Chen Binfan, 621.
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in the past.”93 As another memorial put it, “foreign merchants have never once cheated Chinese 
merchants .... Rather, it was the Chinese merchants, in fact, who cheated themselves first! Who 
knows how much their miscalculations have cost them?”94 
Finally, another writer censured the tendency of  Chinese merchants to treat the physical 
bounties of  the earth as the sole determinant of  quality. The westerners had proven to them that 
human effort and human labor were just as crucial as the richness of  the soil. “The number one 
reason why the Chinese have lose their market to foreigners is because we do not fully grasp 
cultivation methods (peiyang zhi fa ǚėN ). Frequently, we just look at whether or not the weather 
is good in order to measure how much tea can be grown. We look for how much it will rain and 
then resign ourselves to simply following our fate.”95 Thus, this writer criticized the Physiocratic 
assumption that the quality of  tea was determined by the quality of  the earth and hence outside 
human control. The British, they argued, had succeeded precisely because they adopted scientific 
methods to overcome weather and nature.
As the crisis deepened, therefore, tea merchants did not so much “exhaust the earth” -- as the 
Qing idiom went -- as they exhausted the sympathy of  Qing officials. But although Qing officials 
began to shift the blame from foreign bullies to native merchants, the character of  their 
interpretation had changed subtly. When decrying foreigners earlier, officials looked for ways to 
explain the seemingly random, chaotic movement of  prices, inevitably settling on a theory based on 
the arbitrary behavior of  the alien bullies. Now, officials began to suggest that impersonal, objective 
laws of  supply and demand, and of  labor and capital inputs, were the core determinants of  price. 
Juxtaposed against the rationality of  such laws, native merchants appeared petty and rash. In short, 
93 “Lun baoquan chaye,” in Chen Binfan, 621.
94 “Lun chashi,” in Chen Binfan, 619.
95 “Chashi” in Chen Binfan, 621.
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if  officials began to scapegoat native merchants instead of  foreign traders, their attitudes were now 
premised upon the objectivity of  economic life, rather than on the subjective whims of  individuals.
This new attitude was tied to the greater attention Qing officials paid to production. In practical 
terms, they interrogated the factors behind uncompetitive prices, focusing on production costs, 
which then gave way to an analysis of  the production process behind tea: planting, fertilizing, 
plucking, rolling, firing, packaging, etc. More philosophically, they began to question older ideas that 
asserted the primacy of  circulation over production. The earth had always been a valued repository 
of  physical surpluses, but now they suspected that the actual labor of  “exhausting the earth” played a 
larger role in the creation of  value than formerly imagined. The bureaucracy hinted at a new 
theoretical position: that because the production process was generative of  economic value, the 
trade had a pressing need for industrial capital, as opposed to merchant capital. Only one writer as 
far as I know made this assumption explicit in the tea crisis debates. His name was Chen Chi.
Some things come from nothing: Chen Chi’s forgotten political economy
The 1896 memorial to the emperor
We have already briefly met Chen Chi in earlier sections. A middle-level official in the Qing 
bureaucracy who enjoyed friendships with prominent reform-minded writers, Chen attained 
provincial graduate status (juren) in 1882 and thereafter occupied various posts in Shandong and 
Fujian for the Ministry of  Finance (hubu). If  Chen held any literary or political clout at the time, it 
came from two sources. First, he was close friends with Zheng Guanying, the ex-comprador turned 
political writer and investor. Chen wrote the preface to Zheng’s opus on political reform and 
economic theory Shengshi weiyan  ǘ~ƭġ (1893), and much of  Chen’s early ideas in his first work 
Yong shu Đâ (1894) mirrored the pro-commercial ideas adumbrated by Zheng. Second, Chen was 
close friends with famed reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, among others, and in 1898 he 
would participate in the famous 100 days reform experiment.
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In late November 1896, however, Chen Chi had yet to join in those fated reforms, and he 
had not yet published the longer works on political economy he was still drafting. Instead, he gained 
the attention of  the Qing bureaucracy that year by submitting two memorials of  pragmatic concern 
to the Guangxu emperor via the Grand Council (junjichu). The first memorial recommended mining 
and minting money, and the second, which I shall focus on, addressed “tea affairs.” Tracing 
correspondence amidst the labyrinthine paper trail of  the Qing government is difficult, but from 
what has remained available in print, it appears Chen’s memorial played a significant role in 
reshaping attitudes towards the tea trade during this period. It traveled through the Ministry of  
Finance to the emperor’s Grand Council, which in turn replied that Chen’s work provided 
“penetrating analysis written with clarity. The proposed solution can be implemented.” The emperor 
ordered that Chen’s memorial, along with a second memorial on tea from Liu Duo, a secretary in the 
Ministry of  Finance, be distributed to all the provincial governments of  the central and southeast 
districts. “In general, tea is one of  the big sources of  profit for China,” the emperor concluded. “In 
the southeast, the livelihood of  merchants depend upon it. Provincial governors and local officers 
can not overlook tea. The best solution is to flexibly respond to individual problems and causes.”96
One recipient of  the emperor’s orders was He Runsheng, local magistrate of  Shexian (She 
county) located in southern Anhui -- and also the hometown of  the Jiang family of  tea merchants 
featured in chapter two. He Runsheng commented that “the opinions on the problems and solutions 
to tea that Chen Chi and Liu Duo outlined are entirely correct. Those solutions are also entirely 
feasible” (yuyu jiezhen, tiaotiao kefa ąąȫ5ªª  ).97 Another official who served in the tea 
districts wrote: 
96 “Hubu yi fuzou zhengdun chawu zhe,” in Yang Fengzao, quoted in Chen Binfan 1999, 633.




Last year I happened to read the memorial on tea by Mr. Chen distributed by the Grand Council. 
In order to recover the financial strength that has been lost, he recommended getting rid of  old 
Chinese customs and adopting new methods from overseas. This way, the tea merchants can 
gain protection and tea trees can be cultivated to the maximum extent. In order to sustain the tea 
market, all conditions for tea prices, all the strengths and weaknesses must be intimately grasped, 
thoroughly understood, and this is enough to rescue the sources of  profit that we have lost and 
to open up future profits. If  we are able to get those involved in the tea business to implement 
these policies, then how could the tea business not be revived?”98
Besides mapping the dissemination of  the memorial, we can also observe that Chen’s writings 
captured a gradual, uncoordinated shift of  opinion among those actively attempting to revive the tea 
trade. As detailed above, provincial governors in charge of  the tea-growing regions originally 
responded to flagging sales by cutting taxes. Chen Chi did not abandon this perspective, and he 
included a plea for government to stand behind the merchants. But Chen’s memorial was not an 
uncritical defense of  the merchant groups, for he listed many ways in which their organization 
required reform. 
Briefly, the memorial was organized into two halves. In the first, Chen described three major 
problems dogging the trade: the rise of  South Asia tea, the scattered character of  Chinese merchants 
with only small amounts of  capital, and the tug-of-war between tea peasants who sold at high prices 
and inland merchants who bought at low ones. He then outlined four solutions: tea-rolling 
machinery, motorized boats for transport, a guild warehouse, and a reduction on lijin taxes. 
Chen Chi’s primary concern was figuring how to unite the various components of  the tea trade 
into an integrated industry. He buried this organizational principle inside his individual, simple 
solutions. He was the first Chinese official to recommend to the emperor a plan to send Chinese 
researchers to colonial India to study tea production there. He wrote, “it would be best to allocate 
funds and to select two tea masters, one Chinese and one foreign, to secretly go to India, to test out 
and study their methods for tea production, buy machines and then set them up in the mountains of  
China.” Once the experiments bore results, then the government should provide extra financial 
support to encourage using machines. “We will order the rich merchants to form a large company, 
98 “Cha shi” in Shao Zhitang, quoted in Chen Binfan, 621.
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buy machines and set up in the tea-producing districts. Eventually, all of  Chinese tea will be 
machine-made, and the quality will surpass those of  our rivals.” The key phrase came at the end: 
“Further, tea merchants and mountain peasants will be entirely united and coordinated (yiqi hecheng 
nŠ3).”99
With the phrase yiqi hecheng (lit. “coordinated through one puff  of  breath”), Chen Chi boldly 
advocated for the merchants to behave like the industrial capitalists of  British India. They should 
sink their liquid capital into the infrastructure and organization of  production and unite production 
with circulation and distribution. Merchant capital already held a strong sway over the peasantry, but 
Chen believed that competition behooved the merchants seize direct control altogether. This idea 
not only implied the technical emphasis upon efficient, capital-intensive techniques of  picking, 
firing, and processing, but it also entailed the social imperative that merchants take the lead in 
integrating economic activities.
Finally, Chen crystallized his broader economic philosophy in the concluding paragraph to his 
memorial. Recall that Chen’s strategy for dealing with the Confucian ben-mo dyad was not to decry it, 
as pro-commercial men like Wei Yuan and Wang Tao had, but rather to finesse its contradictions. “If  
we simultaneously develop both the roots and the branches (benmo bingju), then the tea business will 
improve with each year,” he wrote. As with the phrase yiqi hecheng, Chen emphasized the integration 
of  circulation with commercial production, the unity of  roots and branches. But since when did the 
“roots” also include cash crops like tea?  For Bian Baodi and other traditionalists, agriculture, or ben, 
narrowly signified that which was useful and necessary for survival, such as grains and silk. How was 
Chen able to include tea, a crop much less vital to social survival than food and clothing, inside his 
definition of  ben? Although Chen deployed the same terminology, he had also subtly redefined ben. 
The roots still pointed towards the sector of  agriculture, but rather than useful agriculture, it now 
99 Chen Chi, 348.
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loosely encompassed commercialized, capitalist agriculture as well. Merchants, the mo, would 
continue to deploy capital to purchase a commodity and then to sell that commodity for profit, but 
they would now sink their capital into the production process. Whereas earlier, profits were earned 
by exploiting differentials between buying and sales price, Chen implied that now, in a world of  
vicious competition, profit only arose from refining the processes of  production. His solution 
eliminated the gap between peasants and merchants, an act that would begin to alter the very 
character of  economic life in the tea districts.
Chen’s memorial was warmly greeted by the emperor and local officials. They approved of  his 
veiled criticisms of  the tea merchants, for they themselves had grown fed up with the selfish, 
fratricidal character of  self-interested teamen. He Runsheng, the magistrate of  Shexian, lamented 
that if  merchants were left to their own devices they would never come up with the same solutions. 
“If  we first consult with merchants before implementing these policy proposals,” he wrote, “then 
they definitely will never see the light of  day. This is because out of  every ten merchants, not even 
one will clearly see the big picture.” The problem was that the tea trade was too fragmented. “Sales 
are not predictable, merchants are not committed every year. If  it’s profitable, they’ll join in. If  it’s 
not, then they’ll leave.” Using the same language as Chen, He Runsheng concluded “the merchants 
only do what is convenient for themselves.”100
Chen Chi had gone further than any other bureaucrat in championing the consolidation of  small 
capitals, their investment into production, and the marriage of  peasant producer with merchant 
capitalist. Where did his peculiar perspective come from? Chen Chi’s memorial on tea, in fact, was 
not the first time he had written about the trade. Earlier in the same year, Chen had penned a rough 
draft of  a book on political economy that included sixteen chapters dedicated to agricultural reforms 
and the cultivation of  specific crops that he believed the Qing empire should promote. Tea was one 
100 He Runsheng, 624.
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of  those sixteen. That work, The Supplement to the Wealth of  Nations (Xu fuguoce òő*ǖ), was not 
published until the next year, 1897. For whatever reason, the 1896 tea memorial and the 1897 
Supplement have been studied separately. The former has been included in bureaucratic histories of  
tea policy and the latter included in studies on economic thought. In other words, the former as 
policy, the latter as theory. When viewed together, however, the connections between the tea 
memorial and the Supplement become clear. Furthermore, it also becomes evident why Chen’s policy 
solutions were so unique among the countless men debating the tea crisis: he was not only 
concerned with tea but also with a reconsideration of  political economy as a whole.
The Supplement to the Wealth of  Nations (1897)
The Supplement was Chen Chi’s true contribution to the history of  economic ideas in modern China. 
The heart of  the text was the first volume, which was dedicated to agricultural reforms. These 
chapters were collected in influential late Qing anthologies on practical matters of  statecraft 
(huangchao jingshi wenbian ǱƵZ~`Ǜ), and his Supplement also received attention in circles of  
reformers during the late Qing. He was good friends with the most famous of  these men, Kang 
Youwei and Liang Qichao, both of  whom read and offered praise for Chen’s ideas.101 
Those chapters on agriculture clearly demonstrate the connection between Chen’s analysis of  tea 
in his imperial memorial and his broader conception of  commercial agriculture. With minimal 
variation, each chapter followed the same format: that China enjoyed a rich soil and possessed a 
tradition of  growing fruit, cotton, silk, tea, camphor, etc. If  only merchants concentrated their 
efforts on studying how to rationalize the planting, picking, and processing of  each crop, they could 
compete with other countries. Again, Chen Chi expanded the notion of  agriculture (nong ǁ) beyond 
101 Zhang Dengde, Xunqiu Jindai Fuguo Zhi Dao de Sixiang Xianqu: Chen Chi Yanjiu [A Pioneer in the the 




the narrow purview of  directly useful crops like grains and silk. He explicitly argued for marketable 
goods that would attract overseas consumers. Thus, alongside the old staples of  the Chinese 
countryside, he also advocated jumping into the coffee and wine trades. “We Chinese do not yet 
know how to make coffee, but in America and Europe everyone views it as a daily necessity,” he 
wrote. “Chinese people are developing a taste for it, and it would be as valuable as black tea.”102
The Supplement to the Wealth of  Nations signaled a departure in Chen’s thinking. He wrote it 
starting in late 1895, just one year after the publication of  his first work, Yongshu. Influenced by the 
pro-commercial ideas of  Zheng Guanying, that work was an eclectic mix of  politics, philosophy, and 
economics. At the time he wrote Yongshu in 1893, Chen departed from the problem of  trade 
imbalances and concluded with the question of  production. With The Supplement to the Wealth of  
Nations, however, Chen began from production. His decision symbolized a new emphasis upon 
production that stemmed from the lessons of  foreign competition.103
In his second book, Chen grounded his entire analysis upon the role of  agriculture. At first 
glance, he appeared to have inherited Physiocratic ideas about how nature played a determinative 
role in commercial life. As with his peers, Chen strongly believed that nature was a powerful agent 
that dictated the successes and failures of  agrarian production. However, unlike his predecessors, 
Chen argued that humans, possessed with strong knowledge of  economic science, could alter and 
enhance the capacities of  nature. He laid out his thoughts in his introduction to the Supplement. He 
began with four paragraphs quoting widely from Chinese classics as well as what he understood of  
European political economy. Transitioning from these philosophical passages to more detailed, 
historical analysis of  the economic problems facing the Qing empire, Chen argued in the crucial 
passage:
102 Chen Chi, 171-172.




Back in the day, a friend once told me: ‘ever since the days of  the Three Kingdoms, there have 
been users of  wealth (caiyongzhe Ƃ7×), movers (yi Ʒ) and looters (duo Ȯ) of  wealth, but there 
has not yet been any producers of  wealth (weiyou nengsheng zhi zhe î	"N×).’ Who are the 
movers? those who simply take without producing. Who are the looters? those who tax. 
However, no one has yet figured out a way to move and loot wealth from overseas and return it 
to China. If  one were to conceive of  the principle of  producing wealth (shengcai zhi dao "ƂN
?), then it must be this: where the ground originally had nothing, where among humans 
originally there was nothing, suddenly there are things (jin hu you zhi Bǈ	N). Agriculture, 
mining, industry, commerce, these are how the Chinese people can expand their livelihood, like 
pouring a vast ocean to fill up a goblet. These are how the can open up a source of  profit for the 
common people, to increase taxes for the nation, to expand property at home and reduce the 
power of  foreigners.104
In this passage, Chen used quasi-Daoist language to paraphrase the theories of  productive and 
unproductive labor central to the theories of  Adam Smith and of  classical European political 
economy. The innovation in Chen Chi’s thought stemmed from the distinction he drew between, on 
the one hand, “users, movers, and looters of  wealth” versus, on the other, those who “produce 
wealth” (shengcai zhe). Equipped with this theoretical distinction between productive and 
unproductive activities, Chen could specify that self-interested tea merchants were acting in a self-
destructive manner that merely used, moved, and looted wealth but did not produce more of  it. 
Hence, rather than promoting more circulation, Chen recommended techniques of  industrial 
agriculture. His suggestion that humans could produce wealth from “where the ground originally 
had nothing, where among humans originally there was nothing” pointed to concrete measures such 
as fixing old irrigation projects and installing new ones, setting up a ministry of  agriculture for 
research, planting more trees, more managerial and planning techniques, applying fertilizers, and 
importing tools and machinery used in other agrarian countries, etc. These ideas had appeared in the 
various writings of  his contemporaries, but, as his biographer argued, “the profundity of  Chen’s 
104 Chen Chi 1997, 149.
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understanding of  the relationship between humans and nature was unrivaled in the history of  
modern Chinese thought.”105 
Where did these ideas come from? Certainly, Chen Chi believed there were local, Chinese 
foundations for these concepts. He framed his ideas within the continuum of  Chinese history, the 
periods “ever since the Three Kingdoms” (220-280 CE). But Chen also explicitly tied his ideas to 
the economic science developed in Europe. He wrote that “there is a virtuous man who wrote a 
book called The Wealth of  Nations. He exhaustively described the principles of  commerce (tongshang 
zhi li ¤ĵN}): that without open trade and circulation, commerce will not thrive.” Britain was a 
thriving nation of  incomparable strength and wealth. “Those westerners who understand the 
principles of  commerce owe their successes to this one book The Wealth of  Nations.”106
Chen was likely referring to Adam Smith’s Wealth of  Nations (1776), which held a commanding 
reputation in small circles of  Qing officials and literati. He had not read Smith, but he cited him 
approvingly. His goal was not to mindlessly ape the ideas of  European political economy but to 
marry it with Chinese thought. He explained his method with a passage from the Book of  Change: 
“exhaustion yields change, change yields development, development yields longevity” (qiong ze bian, 
bian ze tong, tong ze jiu ǩŜŜ¤¤Ŝà). From this he concluded that change was the will of  
heaven (tianxin ) and that understanding the necessity of  change was what separated the 
intelligent and the virtuous. At the heart of  the will of  heaven was the Confucian concept of  
“humaneness” (ren ȩ), which was ultimately founded upon human action. Thus, foregrounding 
humanity above nationality, Chen Chi wrote “there is no distinction between the ancient and new, 
inside and outside, Chinese and foreigner, thing and self, there have only been people.” As a result, 
105 Zhang Dengde, 238.
106 Chen Chi, 149.
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“concerning religion in politics, we should use what is good, abandon what is bad. Whatever benefits 
the people, whatever benefits the nation, we will follow it. If  it does not, then we reject it. There are 
no boundaries, only oneness.”107
Chen Chi’s reinterpretation of  the Book of  Change had packaged Smithian concepts concerning 
the universal benefits of  free trade in Confucian idioms. Over the course of  six decades of  the 
treaty port system, the Qing empire had been humbled by competition from other countries 
emulating the production of  their major export commodities. If, for instance, Britain had been 
willing to hire Chinese teamakers to teach the art of  tea production to planters in India, then Chen 
Chi believed it was obvious that China should reciprocally adopt European techniques of  commerce 
in order to compete on the world market. Britain had thrived by dissolving the distinctions between 
“inside and outside, Chinese and foreigner,” and China ought to follow suit. Elsewhere, Chen cited 
even more Confucian classics, like the Rites of  Zhou and the Great Learning, as reservoirs of  
knowledge to be raided for their useful ideas. Then, after he finished describing works of  the 
Confucian tradition, Chen referenced the Wealth of  Nations. What the Confucian classics were to 
Chinese politics, Chen Chi implied, the Wealth of  Nations was to “western” political economy.
However, there are also grounds to speculate that Chen Chi was confused about which 
European author he was speaking about. At the time, the lone European-language work on political 
economy fully translated into Chinese was Henry Fawcett’s Manual of  Political Economy (first edition 
1863), which Wang Fengzao had translated in 1880.108 Chen Chi had read Fawcett but only heard 
107 Chen Chi, 148.
108 There is much confusion regarding which book Chen Chi referred to as Fuguo ce in Chinese. The 
two candidates are Smith’s Wealth of  Nations, which had not yet been translated into Chinese, and 
Fawcett’s Manual of  Political Economy. The Wang Fengzao edition of  Fawcett was titled Fuguo ce (lit. 
“Manual of  Political Economy”), but others, such as the British missionary Timothy Richard, also 
referred to Smith’s tome in print as the Fuguo ce. Chen Chi had read both the Wang Fengzao edition 
and also the writings of  Timothy Richard.
Chen’s biographer Zhang Dengde tried to figure out whose Fuguo ce Chen believed he was writing 
about in his Xu Fuguo ce (lit. “A Supplement to the Fuguo ce”). Zhang’s conclusion was that Chen was 
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about Smith, and thus his impressions of  Smith came mostly from what he had read in partial 
summaries and descriptions from missionaries. He had also surely read Wang Fengzao’s translation 
of  Fawcett’s Manual of  Political Economy, and this work also contributed to Chen’s impression of  
Smith. In the first lines of  his text, Fawcett had written that Smith’s Wealth of  Nations was “the first 
great work on political economy,” a line which reinforced Chen’s belief  that it was Smith, not 
Fawcett, who deserved the credit for pioneering the science of  political economy. But it was 
Fawcett’s work, not Smith’s, that Chen could hold in his hands before him, and so it was Fawcett’s 
that made the strongest impression on Chen.
referring to the entire body of  European political economy and not to a single book (206). His 
warrant was that Chen’s own writing did not religiously adhere to either Smith or Fawcett’s 
arguments but rather eclectically borrowed different arguments across the spectrum of  political 
economic philosophy. Zhang’s conclusion has some merit in terms of  the content of  Chen’s book, 
but it is at odds with Chen’s own choice of  words in his introduction. First, Chen referred to the 
Fuguo ce as “one book” (gui gongyu fuguo ce yi shu). Second, he placed the book in quotation marks, 
suggesting it was a proper title. Finally, it would be an odd interpretation to read the original Chinese 
phrase “there was a virtuous person who wrote Fuguo ce” (you xianshi mou zhu) in the plural, as “there 
were virtuous people.” Although the flexibility of  constructing plurals nouns in Chinese would allow for 
this reading, the phrase mou (“someone”) often refers to a singular unless with an explicit plural 
marker.
Thus, even if  Chen Chi tried to eclectically borrow various theories, the Fuguo ce clearly refers to a 
single book. There are two reasons I think he meant Smith, not Fawcett. First, Chen Chi re-
translated Fawcett’s book one year later, in 1896, in some essays titled “Chongyi fuguo ce” (“A 
retranslation of  the Manual of  Political Economy”). Although Chen’s title could suggest that in his 
mind Fuguo ce referred to Fawcett’s Manual, the first line of  his translation indicates otherwise. He 
wrote: “The British man Smith (Simide) wrote a book The Wealth of  Nations (Fuguo ce yi shu), and 
among western nations it is valuable like a treasure” (this was a rewording of  Fawcett’s own 
introduction: “The first great work on political economy was called by Adam Smith ‘The Wealth of  
Nations’” (4)). The phrasing and wording Chen uses to refer to Smith are too similar to his wording 
in the Supplement to ignore. Second, the reverence that Chen held for Smith conforms much more 
with the legacy and reputation of  the Wealth of  Nations, ritually praised as a bible of  commerce by 
almost all nineteenth-century political economists, than with Fawcett’s middling Manual of  Political 
Economy. In all likelihood, Chen, whose English skills were limited to non-existent, believed he was 
reading the work of  Smith but, because only Fawcett’s work was available in Chinese, he was actually 
reading the latter’s Manual of  Political Economy. However, this should not overshadow the fact that 
different summaries and partial translations of  political economic works were multiplying 
throughout the 1880s and nineties (cf. Zhang Dengde, 133-136). In sum, Chen referred to Smith by 
name, but in terms of  contents and ideas, he borrowed from a mixture of  works, among which 
Wang Fengzao’s translation of  Fawcett stood tallest.
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Chen Chi’s other writings suggest he was deeply influenced by Fawcett’s Manual of  Political 
Economy. There are points of  overlap between Chen Chi’s work and Wang Fengzao’s translation that 
suggest Chen directly borrowed certain concepts from Fawcett’s Manual. Further, Fawcett’s work 
was not particularly unique in its time but was rather a solid representative of  dominant ideas. He 
modeled his book on his Cambridge teacher John Stuart Mill’s Principles of  Political Economy (1848), 
and the text followed the pattern of  much mid-nineteenth century British political, opening with 
stock principles inherited from earlier innovators such as Smith and David Ricardo. For instance, 
Fawcett echoed the distinction that Smith had articulated between the “use-value” and “exchange-
value” of  a commodity. Though Smith had invented the terms, it was David Ricardo who used them 
to show that the physical gifts of  nature were not valuable until brought into commercial exchange. 
Repeated in Fawcett then translated into Chinese, here is the explanation that Chen Chi had read 
from the earlier translation:
Clean air is a definite necessity for living people, but it cannot be exhausted. Because I do not 
have a surplus of  it, because it is not scarce, then it garners no profit from trade. Water, too, 
because there is no land that does not have it, cannot be considered wealth. But in a big city of  
crowded people, because rain water is scarce and people must rely on human power to bring it 
in, then water is profitable in trade, then water is wealth.109
Qing thinkers had long understood the dynamics of  supply and demand, but this particular 
articulation explicitly suggested the primacy of  human activity to determine the economic value of  
nature, not the other way around. This turned Qing ideas about nature squarely on their head. It 
represented the powerful theme that humans could actively shape and intervene into what nature 
provided them. Fawcett never denied that items of  physical value originated from the earth, as an 
109 Quoted in Zhang Dengde, 195.
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element of  land, and the Chinese translation consistently included lines like “in general, the principle 
of  the production of  wealth is determined by heaven (tian).” But that line was followed by the 
addition, “the application of  wealth is determined by humans.”110
Another instance of  Fawcett’s work echoing the ideas of  classical economic thinkers before him 
was his decision to start the book with a section titled “The Production of  Wealth.” By the middle 
of  the nineteenth century, western European political economy long adopted the practice of  
beginning from production and describing its features in the most general terms. In Karl Marx’s 
estimation, the aim was “to present production ... as distinct from distribution etc., as encased in 
eternal natural laws independent of  history, at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly 
smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded.”111 This 
method, too, represented a sharp departure from much of  Qing economic theory, which began with 
distribution and circulation.
Fawcett’s translator Wang Fengzao rendered “production of  wealth” into shengcai "Ƃ. This 
phrase was already an old, stock concept in political writing, and many Qing writers already used the 
phrase, which gained prominence in debates at least as early as the eleventh century.112 The Qing 
tradition emphasized the maximal usage of  land and circulation of  goods. Fawcett’s “production of  
wealth,” by contrast, focused on the inputs of  labor and capital in the production process. In the 
fifth chapter, on the “three requisites of  production,” Fawcett wrote (in translation), “For the 
production of  wealth (shengcai), land, labor, and capital are all equally important.”113 In the third 
chapter on human labor: “The myriad of  things is born from heaven (sheng yu tian "b), but it is 
110 Zhang Dengde, 197. 
111 Marx 1973, 87.
112 Rowe 2001, 196, 287.
113 Zhang Dengde, 196. 
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only assembled by humans (ju yu ren, cheng yu ju ǂb
3bǂ). Just as humans cannot give birth to 
things, heaven also cannot assemble things.”114
We have already seen that shengcai "Ƃ -- or, specifically, shengcai zhi dao, the “principle of  
producing wealth” -- featured centrally in Chen Chi’s thought. In the crucial passage highlighted 
above, Chen had singled out shengcai as the key productive practice of  economic life, which he 
described as: “where the ground originally had nothing, where among humans originally there was 
nothing, suddenly there are things.”  If  we closely reexamine Chen’s specific policy proposals for 
industrializing the cultivation and processing of  crops like tea, silk, cotton, coffee, wine, etc., then it 
is clear that Chen’s interpretation of  shengcai followed the same path that Fawcett had abstractly 
outlined. Although Chen Chi wrote about shengcai in a Chinese idiom, then, he also readily adopted 
the idiom of  “production of  wealth” found in the economic science he read about in translation.
Throughout his work, Fawcett emphasized that although land, labor, and capital were equally 
important in theory, the specific history of  any nation determined the relative importance of  each 
factor. For instance, Britain was an island country with sparse land, and therefore it relied heavily 
upon industry and labor. Rather than indicating that political economy was limited to particular 
regions, Fawcett aimed to demonstrate that “the manufacture of  goods and the production of  
wealth (shengcai) is not limited by boundaries. Rather, in extracting and managing wealth, one must 
look at each nation’s circumstances and social conditions.”115 From this, Chen must have reached a 
dual conclusion. First, that China’s comparative advantage lay in its land and hence the empire 
should focus on agriculture rather than industrial manufacture. Second, in focusing on agriculture, 
officials should nevertheless emphasize capital-intensive production and the rational allocation of  
labor on a grander scale than ever before. Fawcett’s ideas must have persuaded Chen, or merely 
114 Zhang Dengde, 196. 
115 Chen Chi 1997, 195.
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confirmed his inclination, to center his economic treatise around agrarian production as capitalist 
agriculture. This concept had never enjoyed such a forceful advocate in China until now. 
The Supplement, with its deep engagement with British economic thought, was the subtle 
theoretical edifice that supported Chen’s memorial on tea written a year earlier. In that memorial, he 
advocated integrating the spheres of  production and circulation into one, yicheng heqi. The broader 
philosophical ramifications almost certainly escaped the grasp of  the Guangxu emperor and the 
local magistrates who read Chen’s memorial as a practical checklist of  reforms. Only in future years 
would Chen’s minor theoretical revolution gain greater momentum in the form of  twentieth-century 
movements to radically reorganize the tea trade into peasant-owned agrarian cooperatives, the 
subject of  chapter six.
Conclusion
By the turn of  the century, a new paradigm of  economic thinking had taken root, crystallized in 
Chen Chi’s imperial memorial and economic treatise. Around the same time, younger Chinese 
writers were beginning to adopt new vocabulary, mainly from Japanese translations of  European 
terms, in order to more precisely articulate the ideas that Chen Chi could only express through the 
language of  his classical education. For instance, “industry” (shiye p¼, gongye ¢¼) came to 
demarcate the activities of  commercial manufacture and production, as distinct from the activities 
of  “commerce” (shangye ĵ¼), narrowly defined as trade and exchange.116 In earlier times, these 
activities had been equally included under the umbrella category shang, a formulation in which 
merchant activities subsumed commercial production as a subsidiary branch of  economic life, à la 
Braudel’s early modern merchants. This type of  early modern commercial production, however, was 
already incompatible with the classical ben/mo distinction, in which ben had meant production aimed 
116 Chan, 34. I have already mentioned this quote in the introductory chapter, but this is an 
appropriate moment to revisit it.
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at direct consumption. Successive Chinese empires had for centuries championed the role of  
commerce over subsistence agriculture, inverting the original relationship between ben and mo. Now, 
on the cusp of  the twentieth century, Chen Chi seemed to be suggesting that commerce itself  
needed to be subdivided into specialized realms of  commercial circulation and commercial 
production (including agriculture), with the latter receiving greater attention. In this way, his ideas 
were similar to the political innovations of  officials and planters in India, who decades earlier had 
recognized that “labor” needed to be treated as a special category in itself, cast apart from overly 
general, market-centered political economic theories.
Several decades would pass before Chen Chi’s innovative ideas were taken up by Qing and 
Republican reformers. British tea merchant J.M. Ringer seemed to be correct in his early assessment 
that until peasants and merchants fully understood the gravity of  the threat posed by Indian tea, 
change would be too difficult to galvanize. “The Natives cannot, of  course, be induced to at once 
make radical changes in their method of  cultivation,” Ringer said at the time. “[Such] can only be 
brought about by making the growers understand the competition they have to face, and what it is 
incumbent on them to do in order, in any measure, to compete with Indian and Ceylon growers.”117 
Ineffective discussions to adopt Chen Chi’s proposals marked the last years of  the nineteenth 
century and the last decades of  the Qing. Huizhou administrators, for example, weighed the costs of  
hiring Indian workers to come to China and teach them how to use rolling machines (the parallels 
with the British scheme to bring Chinese teamakers to Assam in 1838 are impossible to miss).118  
Only in 1905, when a handful of  officials and merchants finally realized proposals “to secretly go to 
India,” did tea reform efforts gain new life and momentum. And only decades later, with the 
support of  the Nationalist republican government did individuals set about to reorganize tea 
production in the inland districts of  Anhui and Fujian.
117 Quoted in IMC, Tea, 75.
118 Cf. Chen Yuting.
CHAPTER SIX
279
Twentieth-century reforms were a story of  individuals attempting to narrow the distance 
between theory and practice, between the industrialized agriculture abstractly outlined by Chen Chi 
and the harsh realities of  impoverished peasant farms in Anhui, Fujian,  and the rest of  the tea belt. 
The treaty-port tea merchants, who had originally enjoyed the full support of  the Qing bureaucracy 
at the outset of  the crisis, were safe for now. But as Republican thinkers earnestly attempted to 
realize the ideals of  industrial capital, the merchant increasingly found himself  the odd man out.
CHAPTER SIX
PART III. THE AFTERMATH OF COMPETITION: TEA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
The four chapters comprising Part II have emphasized the unexpected degree to which the Chinese 
and Indian tea industries experienced parallel social and intellectual changes in the nineteenth 
century. In both regions, the competitive climate of  the world market compelled planters to 
economize the human labor processes behind tea production, as planters across China and India 
independently pursued methods of  labor-intensive industrialization. Further, the spectacular 
opportunities offered by the world tea trade also brought about regional crises at different moments 
for the two regions, and these crises in turn forced government officials and tea planters to rethink 
established paradigms of  Smithian, market-centered political economic theory.
Of  course, such parallels should not lead readers to assume that the two competitors looked 
identical at the turn of  the century. To the contrary, after a nineteenth century of  unexpected 
resemblances, the two tea countries would need to reckon with their respective fates at the turn of, 
and well into, the twentieth century. By then, the world tea market had opened up to new 
competitors, and when observers sought to survey the contours of  global competition, they did not 
look exclusively at China and India but now also included Ceylon, Japan, Java, and Taiwan.
In chapter seven, I discuss how the commercially successful Indian tea industry was forced 
to deal with the consequences of  labor indenture by responding their most ardent critics: Bengali 
reformers located in Calcutta. And in chapter eight, the commercially devastated Chinese industry 
struggled to find its own path to become a modern agro-industry. Unable to fully emulate the 
highly-capitalized tea gardens of  eastern India, Chinese reformers believed their only hope was to 
wipe out the traditional merchant class and replace them with government-supported cooperatives 
led by peasants and workers.
Chapter Seven
Free labor and idioms of  freedom: Ramkumar Vidyaratna’s Kuli Kâhinî  
(The Tale of  the Coolie) (1886)
Introduction
During the last two decades of  the nineteenth century, the Assam tea industry grew at a spectacular 
rate. Acreage under tea increased by 120 percent (from 153,657 to 337,327 acres), and overall 
production grew 4.14 times (from 34,013,583 to 141,118,644 lbs.). Along the way, Indian tea exports 
eclipsed those from China during the 1888 season, and its share of  the British market increased 
from twenty-seven to fifty-four percent.1 Colonial officials and private planters had been struggling 
to achieve this type of  “lift-off ” for decades, but commercial success arrived only with the passage 
and subsequent liberalization of  indentured contract labor recruitment laws. Act I of  1882, in 
particular, effectively deregulated prior labor legislation and has been remembered as the 
“watershed” of  the indenture system.2 The penal contract, the cornerstone of  the indenture system, 
guaranteed that the signee, the tea “coolie,” would work for three to five years on a given plantation, 
and if  s/he broke the terms of  the contract, s/he would be liable to imprisonment or forced labor. 
1 Behal and Mohapatra, 150 and Griffiths, 120-129.
2 Behal and Mohapatra, 155. In the 1860s, the Government of  India and the Bengal Council passed 
the first laws to allow planters to import migrant workers to the Assam tea gardens under penal 
labor contracts. These three-year contracts mandated a minimum wage and nine-hour working day. 
They also gave planters the power of  private arrest, that is, the ability to punish desertion, refusal to 
work, and unlawful absence through imprisonment. These protections for the planter, in turn, were 
to be counterbalanced by protection for the workers: government oversight during the process of  
recruitment and signing of  the contract, along with periodic inspections of  the gardens themselves. 
But Act I of  1882 removed many of  the restrictions on recruitment, including provisions for 
licensing and restrictions on transporting coolies to Assam prior to signing contracts (hence, the 
“coolies” could be forced to sign contracts after they had traveled from Calcutta to Assam, when it 
was “too late” to turn back).
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The phenomenal rise of  penal contract labor within the Assam workforce was coterminous with the 
growth of  the overall industry. From 1883 to 1905, over one million migrant workers were 
transported to Assam under the penal contract. These numbers equaled over forty-eight thousand 
new recruits per year, compared to about twenty-two thousand during the preceding decade.3 In 
short, the expansion of  the tea industry was made possible by the spread of  the penal labor 
contract.
In the face of  so much apparent success, however, the Government of  India severely curtailed 
the penal contract through two pieces of  legislation in 1901 and 1908. Whereas at its height in 1891 
fifty-five percent of  the total workforce were signed by penal contract, by 1910 that number had 
fallen to five percent.4 The end of  indenture in the Assam tea industry also coincided with global 
trends: indentured Indian migration to overseas colonies ended in 1915, and only a few years earlier 
extra-economic labor contract enforcements were outlawed in the US and British court systems.5
In order to understand the social and intellectual factors behind the abrupt rise and demise of  
indenture in Assam, the current chapter examines how the Assam indenture system was contested 
by late nineteenth-century Bengali writers as fundamentally “unfree” and “slavelike.” This analysis 
shall add a new dimension to a story that has hitherto relied almost exclusively upon the writings and 
voices of  British planters stationed in Calcutta, London, and Assam. Regrettably, hardly any sources 
written by workers themselves have survived from the nineteenth century. However, these essays and 
novels written by Bengali writers allow us to gain some sense of  how various sectors of  Indian 
society viewed the developments in Assam. Admittedly, these writers were elite, educated, and 
upper-caste men, often with frequent exposure to the ideas of  English liberalism and political 
3 Numbers from NAI, Department of  Revenue and Agriculture, Emigration Branch, April 1899, A 
progs., 11-13, pg. 26, and 1906 Report, 14.
4 Behal and Mohapatra, 155 and 167,
5 Robert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of  Free Labor  : the Employment Relation in English and American Law and 
Culture, 1350-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press, 1991).
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economy, and we should be careful not to equate their life experiences with that of  the “coolies” 
themselves. Nevertheless, some of  these men -- and in particular the journalist-missionary 
Ramkumar Vidyaratna, whose work is the chief  subject of  this chapter -- provided an unique and 
personal perspective on life in the Assam tea gardens. He personally traveled to Assam and lived 
among the coolies for extended periods of  time, and he documented daily life on the tea gardens 
with a level of  detail unmatched in any government report or planter handbook. 
A close analysis of  these late nineteenth-century texts helps to reveal the process by which the 
indentured labor system, so crucial to the successes of  Indian tea, was eventually repealed. Such 
writers also represented the latest installment of  an ongoing debate over the correct method to 
recruit labor: in the 1830s, government officials idealized the freely migrating commercial farmer; 
decades later, planters led the charge to create exceptional legislation for indentured recruitment; and 
now, at the end of  the century, Bengali writers chimed in by once again forcefully championing an 
image of  “free wage labor.” This time around, the argument for free labor was much more plausible 
to, and resonated deeply with, an economically transformed eastern Indian society.
The critics Dwarkanath Ganguli (1844-1898) and Ramkumar Vidyaratna (1836-1901) supplied 
the most consistent and trenchant attacks upon the indenture system. However, their writings have 
yet to be fully addressed by existing historiography, which has focused mostly on the historical 
archive of  colonial administrators and inquiry commissions. I suspect this oversight is partly due to 
the fact that these Bengali critics were were neither policymaker nor planter, and hence they 
seemingly had no direct bearing on the legislative history of  Assam. Further, such writings have 
been perceived as missionary tracts not directly engaged with debates over policymaking. Such an 
impression could be traced back to the words of  the Bengali writers themselves. For instance, the 
first of  many articles detailing Assam coolie life that appeared in the English-language periodical The 
Bengalee was also accompanied by the following preface: 
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May we not appeal with some degree of  confidence to the Missionary Societies to co-operate 
with us in the work of  mitigating the lot of  the poor coolies of  Assam? The question is not by 
any means a political question. It appeals to the deepest feelings of  the Christian and of  the 
philanthropist; and to them we appeal for help and sympathy in this work.6
  
Whatever the reason, past scholars have yet to fully grapple with the literary content and 
ideological contours of  Ganguli and Vidyaratna’s writings, and they certainly have not specified the 
political economic substance of  their campaign against indentured labor. But in order to explain the 
demise of  a seemingly successful indenture system, it is precisely these types of  critical works of  
protest that deserve greater attention.7 At the most concrete level of  policymaking, Ganguli and 
Vidyaratna’s writings were actually partially responsible for labor legislation reform. Their published 
articles and memorials to the Government of  India helped convince officials to conduct inquiries 
and appoint commissions that eventually ruled indenture was inhumane and ineffectual. More 
abstractly, the language they used to criticize the system, especially the prominence they accorded to 
the idea of  “freedom” and the comparisons they drew with African slavery, became widely adopted 
idioms among colonial officials who eventually spearheaded tea labor law reforms in 1901 and 1908. 
Pursuing these threads of  inquiry, this chapter seeks to characterize how Bengali nationalist 
writers depicted the horrors of  the penal contract system and also analyze what alternative visions 
they offered, grounded in basic principles of  political economy. My analysis will apply generally to all 
the purportedly “humanitarian” and “philanthropic” accounts of  the tea industry by Bengali 
6 Dakshinācharan Chattopādhyāy, “Chā-kar Darpan Nātak [The Tea-Planter’s Mirror],” in Bānglā 
Nātya Shankalan, vol. 1 (Kolkata: Paschimbanga Nātya Ākādemi, 2001), xiii.
7 Thus, my historiographical claim is not that my interpretation is at odds with past studies -- 
although I will point out several distinctions in the following sections. Rather, I believe that those 
past studies have underspecified the ideological content of  Ganguli and Vidyaratna, and this chapter 
shall fulfill both an expository and analytical purpose.
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nationalist writers, but I focus especially on Ramkumar Vidyaratna’s social novel Kuli Kahini (The Tale 
of  the Coolie, 1886). If  we delve further into the logic and presentation of  the stories Vidyaratna told, 
we discover a recognizable vision of  political economic thought. Namely, these writers criticized the 
penal contract as a form of  “subjection” (adhinata) and “slavery” (dasatya), contrasted against the 
ideal of  “freedom” (swadhinata). Freedom for them was defined as the free exchange of  goods, and 
in the case of  labor, the free mobility of  bodies. Because the penal contract prevented workers from 
leaving their employers in search of  other employment, it was an artificial constraint on the free 
exchange of  labor. Vidyaratna stressed both the naturalness of  freedom -- namely, that freedom 
gave humans the potential to make meaning out of  their lives -- but also that free labor was more 
economically efficient than coerced labor. This assumption of  efficiency relied upon a model of  
human nature that would respond rationally to incentives, and which would be self-regulated 
through the dynamics of  “supply and demand.” Thus, although Vidyaratna’s work appeared 
primarily concerned with spiritual and moral arguments about the cruelty of  planter violence, it also 
smuggled in a concept of  “freedom” premised upon the historically specific social structures of  
markets and industry. 
The rest of  this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I detail the background of  the critics of  
indenture, focusing especially on Ganguli and Vidyaratna and then introduce the novel Kuli Kahini 
and outline the story’s central theme, the opposition between freedom and slavery. In section three, I 
historically situate these Bengali writers’ articulation of  “free labor” by providing a brief  genealogy 
of  how the free labor concept grew out of  abolitionist movements in the early nineteenth century 
and how it was subsequently reshaped by legislators in Assam. Finally, in section four I return to Kuli 
Kahini and attempt to clearly sketch out Vidyaratna’s own vision of  free labor. I argue that 
Vidyaratna’s story should be read neither as a nostalgic romanticization of  pre-commercial village 
life nor as an endorsement of  a spiritual retreat from the material and commercial world. Although 
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presented in these forms, Vidyaratna’s work was, in the simplest terms, a criticism of  unfree labor 
grounded upon the advocacy of  free waged labor. In the following epilogue, I recount how these 
ideas about the economic superiority of  free labor were pivotal in the eventual repeal of  penal 
contracts in the Indian administration.
Late nineteenth-century Calcutta politics 
The Indian Association and the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj
Murmurs of  criticism aimed at British planters and their treatment of   “tea coolies” had begun as 
early as the 1870s. Dakshinacharan Chattopadhyay wrote his play “The Mirror of  the Tea 
Planter” (Chakar Darpan) in 1874, a story of  coolie deception, oppression, and rape.8 Chattopadhyay 
published his play himself, although some accounts suggest the play was never staged.9 Nevertheless, 
the native press took notice of  the work, writing that “[p]ossibly the oppressions actually practiced 
on the labourers are [more] severe than these depicted in the ‘Chakar Durpan.”’10 Several English 
officials read an English translation in the newspapers, and they lobbied to pass a law banning future 
“seditious” dramatic performances.11
8 The “mirror” in the title was fashioned after the famous play “The Mirror of  the Indigo 
Planter” (Nil Darpan), which subsequently inspired several other playwrights to use “mirror” in their 
titles as well. The “mirror” suggested the play was holding up a mirror to the actual conditions of  
British rule in India. Cf. Nandi Bhatia, Acts of  Authority, Acts of  Resistance : Theater and Politics in 
Colonial and Postcolonial India (Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 2004), 38.
9 Bangla Natya Sankalan, 230.
10 Quoted in Bhatia, 37.
11 “The publication of  a book called the Chakar Darpan: the Tea-planter’s Mirror has enraged the 
Anglo-Indian Community against the author. Not a little effort has been made to bring him to 
trouble and the Dramatic Performances’ Bill has perhaps originated from this source.” 29th April 
1876 “Report on Native Papers.” From Pratibha Biswas, Hujur Durpan (Calcutta: K.L.M. 
Mukhopadhyay, 1983).
In proposing the law, one official wrote: 
A few months ago our attention was directed to a Native play called the Chakar Durpan or ‘The 
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The Dramatic Performances Act of  1876 effectively ended the publication of  overtly political 
drama in Bengal for the foreseeable future.12 The high tide of  informed political agitation would 
only begin in the next decade, in response to the passage of  the 1882 Inland Migration act and the 
attendant spike in migration to Assam. The seeds for this activity, however, were planted around the 
same time that the Dramatic Performances Act was passed. In 1876, the two Calcutta organizations 
that would become most responsible for publicizing the plight of  Assam tea workers — the Indian 
Association and the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj — were in their infant stages.
The two organizations overlapped in membership, outlook, and mission. Past historians have 
argued that members of  the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, a social reform-oriented religious 
organization, had created the Indian Association as their purely political counterpart. Though 
Surendranath Banerji, the leader of  the Indian Association, did not identify as a Brahmo, he was an 
ardent supporter of  the Samaj’s activities. One estimate has placed forty-one percent of  Indian 
Association members as participants in the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj. Given the prominent, almost 
exclusive role these organizations played in politicizing the tea coolie, it would be worthwhile to 
examine the historical conditions of  their respective formations, as both organizations self-
consciously sought to establish a position more fully representative of  Indian society than their 
more entrenched predecessors had.
The original Brahmo Samaj, was perhaps the most famous and successful organization formed 
in the early years of  Calcutta political life. Its founder was Rammohan Roy, popularly known as the 
Mirror of  Tea Planting,’ which had been published in Calcutta. This work contains a scandalous 
libel on the tea planters in Assam, and if  represented on the stage would be calculated to excite 
feelings of  personal hostility against them. . . . [I]t is obvious that at a time of  political 
excitement representations of  this class might give rise to serious consequences (quoted in 
Bhatia, 38).
12 Basu et al, Bangla Natya Sankalan, 230; Biswas, Hujur Darpan, 134. A general overview of  the 
1870s period can be found in Bhatia, chapter 2.
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“Father of  Modern India” and more recently deemed “the first Indian liberal.”13 The membership 
of  the Brahmo Samaj was generally composed of  high-caste and wealthy Calcutta elites. Although 
these men expressed their devotion to the tenets of  social reform and a critique of  conservative 
Hindu practices, generational friction periodically boiled over into organizational dissent. After an 
initial split in 1866 resulted in the creation of  a newer, purportedly more progressive Samaj, this 
newer group once again split apart in 1878, resulting in the creation of  a definitively younger, more 
reform-minded organization known as the Sadharan (“universal”) Brahmo Samaj.14
 Two years earlier, the radical founders of  the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj had already formed a 
13 C. A. Bayly, quoted in Sartori 77.
14 In 1866, a younger faction split off  from the original Samaj to form the Brahmo Samaj of  India. 
This younger generation was led by Keshub Chandra Sen, who chastised the original Samaj 
members for their “hypocritical course of  paying lip services to rational religion at Brahmo 
meetings, while continuing to practice Hindu rites in the privacy of  their homes.” David Kopf, The 
Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of  the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 
132. 
Sen and his group also had tried to push older members to concern themselves more with social 
reform and, again, causes of  female emancipation: widow remarriage, Kulin polygamy, and support 
for all-women schools. Debendranath and his older peers balked at these proposals, and in the 
course of  their exchanges, Debendranath’s own conservative attitude towards his own daughter-in-
law came under scrutiny — when he heard she had been seen in town in an open carriage, he 
apparently exploded “the faces of  women must never be exposed to the glances of  the 
public”(Kopf  133). 
History, however, repeated itself  a decade later. By then, Keshub Chandra Sen, originally the 
progressive vanguard of  the older Samaj, had alienated the more radical sect of  his new 
organization. At issue was Sen’s refusal to realize older proposals for constitutional reform. Now the 
unquestioned leader of  his own organization, Sen resisted proposals to give greater power and voice 
to other members. Anandamohan Bose had returned from his stay in England in 1874 and, upon 
observing Sen’s recent conservative turn, spearheaded a campaign against Sen. He and other 
progressive members accused Sen of  betrayal and despotism, arguing that Sen’s “support of  Queen 
Victoria” paralleled his “absolutist rule” over the Samaj (Kopf  138). Again, the tipping point in this 
struggle was the alleged personal hypocrisy of  the Samaj’s leader. In this case, the constitutionalists 
accused Sen of  selling his daughter’s hand in marriage to the prince of  Cooch Behar in Bengal. The 
Cooch Behar controversy broke publicly in February 1878, and by May of  that year Ananadamohan 
Bose, now a widely successful lawyer in Calcutta, led the charge to form a new Brahmo organization. 
The Brahmo Samaj of  India was now split into the Adi (“original”) Brahmo Samaj, under Sen’s 




new political association as a vehicle for their social reform-oriented politics. The Indian 
Association, formed in July 1876, was an outgrowth of  politicized, middle class, and English-
educated graduates who had studied overseas or at elite institutions in Calcutta. At the inaugural 
meeting, Banerji proclaimed that the new group aimed to fill a vacuum in Calcutta political society, 
in which no voice represented “the middle classes and its raiyats (peasant cultivators).”15 As with the 
Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, the Indian Association self-consciously sought to depart from an older 
and, in their minds, conservative mode of  politics. At the time, the arena of  non-governmental 
politics in Calcutta was the monopoly of  the British Indian Association. The older organization was 
urban by nature, with little connection to rural life beyond Calcutta or other cities, and its focus 
remained fixed on professional advancement within the colonial state. By the last decades of  the 
century, the newer Indian Association viewed its forebears as outdated, elitist, and narrowly 
representative of  only the most conservative elements of  Indian society. Occupationally, the older 
association was overwhelmingly composed of  landlords, with a sprinkling of  merchants and 
professional pleaders. In one historian’s words, the Association was a decisively “rentier aristocrat” 
constituency, rather than a “middle class” one.16 By contrast, the newer Indian Association held the 
conviction that since the “illiterate masses could not speak for themselves and the aristocracy spoke 
15 As Anandamohan Bose and Surendranath Banerji were still talking over plans to form their own 
middle class association, Sisir Kumar Ghosh formed the Indian League in September 1875. 
Anandamohan and Surendranath had joined the League but were unhappy with losing the 
opportunity to lead the cultivate the new middle class sensibility into a formalized movement, and 
within months they resigned from the League many of  its members with them into the new Indian 
Association. Anil Seal, The Emergence of  Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 213-214. 
Cf. John McGuire, The Making of  a Colonial Mind: a Quantitative Study of  the Bhadralok in Calcutta, 
1857-1885 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1983), appendices I and J, which list the names 
of  leaders of  both groups. Many of  the same names appear on both lists).
16 McGuire, appendix H. At first, the British Indian Association did not lack for its share of  middle 
class professions, either merchants or lawyers. But from the fifties to eighties, the rentier landlord 
element gradually gained more power — from 72 to 91 percent of  the organizational positions — a 
phenomenon that must be partially explained by the emergence of  middle class organizations such 
as the Indian Association. 
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only for themselves,” then “only the middle class, strategically placed, could speak for all.”17
The link between the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj and the Indian Association was overt. “The 
faction that seemed to control the Sadharan Samaj were the very same people who served on the 
managing committee of  the Indian Association,” one historian has noted.18 Both sought to represent 
a rising middle-class demographic and sentiment within the country, especially in the urban areas. 
But what especially distinguished them from the established landed classes of  the older Brahmo 
groups and the British Indian Association was their support for the peasantry against the landlords.
 Dwarkanath Ganguli was a member of  both the Indian Association and the Sadharan Brahmo 
Samaj, and he also led the charge to pay greater attention to the cause of  the tea coolies.19 Ganguli 
also became close friends with Ramkumar Vidyaratna, who had joined the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj 
in the 1870s, though he never officially joined the Indian Association. Vidyaratna was born in 1836 
in Idilpur, Faridpur in eastern Bengal. He moved to Calcutta with his father when he was still only a 
teenager, and though details from this period are unclear, we know that Vidyaratna soon joined the 
Brahmo Samaj and eventually helped create the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj in 1878.20
Vidyaratna first visited Assam in 1878 as a missionary for the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj. He was 
enchanted by the natural beauty of  the province, and he detailed its geography and sights in a travel 
17 Leonard A. Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement, 1876-1940 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1974), 28. 
18 Kopf, 144.
19 Kopf, 123-124. Ganguli had been an active social reformer dating back to the 1870s, and the first 
political cause he championed was the Kulin Brahmin system of  female oppression. After moving to 
Calcutta, he helped found the Indian Association in 1876 and then spearheaded the creation of  the 
progressive Sadharan Brahmo Samaj in 1878.
20 Durganath Ghosh, “Paribrājakācārya Svāmī Rāmānanda [Biography of  Swami Ramkumar 
Vidyaratna] (1928),” in Āsāme Cā-Kuli Āndolana O Rāmakumāra Bidyāratna [The Tea Coolie Movement of  
Assam and Ramkumar Vidyaratna], ed. Kanailal Chattopadhyay (Kolkata: Pyāpirāsa [Papyrus], 1989), 
110–238, 133-140. Vidyaratna originally eventually found a job working as a Hindu pundit at the 
Wesleyan Mission. There, he befriended a Christian student named Anand Singh, and the two 
regularly debated about Hindu reform. From these conversations, Vidyaratna began to develop a 
heterodox perspective, and he grew critical of  the caste system. 
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book titled Udasin Satyasrabar Assam Bhraman (A true account of  travel through Assam, 1879).  That book 
curiously contained only a few pages devoted to the burgeoning Assam tea industry, with little 
critical or political edge. About halfway through the travelogue, however, Vidyaratna included an 
anecdote about his time traveling up the Brahmaputra River from Dhubri to Goalpara. He claimed 
to have seen over five hundred tea coolies on the ship, and he shared a conversation with a captive 
passenger. The passenger recounted how he had been deceived into signing a penal labor contract to 
work on the gardens and was now fated to a terrible life working on a plantation in Assam. This 
episode made such a strong impression on Vidyaratna that he reenacted it in his future literary 
depictions of  the tea gardens.21
The episode also foreshadowed Vidyaratana’s future political commitments. Soon after finishing 
his travel book, Vidyaratna spent the late 1870s and early eighties publishing a series of  articles and 
stories detailing the horrors of  the tea plantation system in several Bengali-language papers. These 
articles constituted the only first-hand journalistic accounts of  the conditions in Assam at the time, 
and Indian Association members became immediately absorbed in these accounts. They included 
several excerpts in a memorandum to the governor-general Lord Ripon, who then wrote to the 
Chief  Commissioner of  Assam to determine the veracity of  the allegations: “They (the Indian 
Association) press upon us in their memorial, this point of  ignorance of  the Coolie, and give a 
curious extract from a book published by a missionary (Ram Kumar Vidyaratna) of  the Bramho 
Samaj, to show how very ignorant are a very great number of  Coolies who engage to go to 
Assam.”22 At the time, the Government of  India was debating the passage of  a new law -- Act I of  
1882, the “watershed” of  the penal labor contract -- that would eventually liberalize restrictions on 
21 Ghosh, 158. Cf. Ramkumar Vidyaratna, “Udāsīna Satyaśrabāra Āsāma Bhramaṇa [A Truthful 
Account of  Travels through Assam] (1881),” in Āsāme Cā-Kuli Āndolana O Rāmakumāra Bidyāratna 
[The Tea Coolie Movement of  Assam and Ramkumar Vidyaratna], ed. Kanailal Chattopadhyay (Kolkata: 
Pyāpirāsa [Papyrus], 1989).
22 Ganguli (Gangopadhyay), Dwarkanath, Slavery in British Dominion, ed. K. L Chattopadhyay and 
Sris Kumar Kunda (Calcutta: Jijnasa, 1972), 69.
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recruitment of  migrant workers. The Government passed the law over the protests of  organizations 
such as the Indian Association, and the next year, 1883, individuals connected with the Brahmo 
Samaj started a new Bengali-language paper Sanjivani, which provided a new platform for publishing 
reports on Assam. Vidyaratna’s articles in Sanjivani focused especially on two court cases in which 
planters were placed on trial for killing workers on their gardens. The planters named in his articles 
were furious at the publicity, and they sought to threaten and intimidate him, or worse.23 According 
to legend, one planter stood up at an industry-wide meeting and said: “the contributor to the 
Sanjibani will be the first victim to the planters’ gun.”24
Those early 1880s Bengali-language articles eventually formed the basis for Vidyaratna’s novel 
Kuli Kahini (Tale of  the Coolie), published as one book in 1888. Vidyaratna dedicated the story to his 
close friend Dwarkanath Ganguli, who had encouraged and defended Vidyaratna in those early 
years, and Ganguli himself  traveled to Assam in 1886 to live and work incognito alongside the tea 
workers in Assam. Ganguli subsequently published a series of  articles in the Bengali-language paper 
Sanjivani and the English paper The Bengalee, the former associated with the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj 
and the latter with the Indian Association. Ganguli’s articles garnered much attention from the 
reading public in Calcutta, and they were forwarded to the Government of  India, who promised to 
eventually look into the allegations of  abuse.25  The next year, in May 1888, the Association prepared 
a long memorial on “the coolie question” and sent copies both to the government and also to the 
local press, who voiced their support. The government took notice, and it directly contacted the 
23 Chattopadhyay, viii.
24 Quoted in Ganguli, 69. After finishing his investigation into the cases, Lord Ripon issued a 
statement: “The Governor-General, after careful consideration of  the case, feels bound to 
animadvert on the incomplete an dunsatisfactory manner in which the trial was conducted by the 
Assistant Commissioner and Magistrate of  Jorhat.”1 Nevertheless, Ripon could not overturn the 
case but only issue this statement. Quoted in Chattopadhyay, ix.
25 BL. IOR/L/PJ/6/193, File 112. 17 Jan 1887. “Treatment of  tea garden labourers in Assam; 
report from Aborigines Protection Society.”
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editors of  Sanjivani in 1889, who then replied by supplying extra information about the condition of  
tea workers. In the meantime, they promised to open up a new inquiry to investigate the workings of  
Act I of  1882 within two years.26 
Indian Association members twice tried to raise the “coolie question” at the national meetings 
of  the Indian National Congress in 1887 and 1888, but they were denied attention under the 
reasoning that matters concerning Assam were considered too “provincial.” In response, the Indian 
Association organized a new conference, called the Bengal Provincial Conference, in 1888 and 1889. 
The conference was attended by branch members of  the Indian Association, and among the top 
agenda items were resolutions concerning the working of  the migration laws for Assam.27 In 1888, 
the Indian Association delivered a memorial to the Government of  Bengal and included excerpts 
from Ganguli’s travels through Assam. The memorial helped pressure the government into 
appointing a commission to look into the conditions behind “labor supply” to the gardens. The 
1896 Williams commission largely agreed with the conclusions from the Indian Association, namely, 
that Act I of  1882 should be repealed, because it has led to a litany of  abuses and injustices. The 
same year, the Bengal faction of  the Indian National Congress successfully passed a resolution at the 
all-India meeting which ran as follows: “That having regard to the facility of  intercourse between all 
parts of  India and Assam, this Congress is of  opinion that the time has now arrived when the 
Inland Emigration Act of  1882, as amended by Act VII of  1893, should be repealed.”28
Skimming through these available materials, one is struck by how much the authors were fixated 
on recounting the excruciating details of  abuse on the plantations. Their clear emphasis was planter 
26 Jogesh Chandra Bagal, History of  the Indian Association, 1876-1951 (Calcutta: Indian Association, 
2002), 88.
27 Bagal, 89. The resolution on the “coolie question” ran: “The conference is of  opinion that it has 
become essential alike in the interests of  the coolies, and for the credit of  the Government, to 
appoint an independent Commission to enquire into the condition of  the coolies in the tea-gardens 




violence, and the tracts made an appeal to basic human dignity. Such works seem to confirm the 
belief  that these works were philanthropic and humanitarian in nature, rather than engaged in 
serious political-economic analysis. That is, they were foremost concerned with the welfare of  the 
general peasant population, not the interests of  government or of  the planter classes. At times, 
however, the authors gave brief  but suggestive clues to their underlying economic views. For 
instance, in Ganguli’s first expository article in The Bengalee, he opened with a paean to the trade: 
Tea-cultivation in Assam is a grand industry and it has largely contributed to the material 
prosperity of  the province. It has converted a vast wilderness into a prosperous and smiling 
garden; it has opened out means of  communication with the far interior of  the country; it has 
increased the population and has added to the wealth of  the province by giving employment to 
nearly 3 lacs of  emigrants including their children. If  in securing all these advantages the 
emigrant labourers were subjected to such hardships as were not beyond human endurance, we 
would not probably have raised our voice. But the position of  the labourers in many tea-gardens 
is almost as bad, if  it is not worse than, the condition of  American Negro slaves before their 
emancipation.29 
Ganguli encouraged the development of  the tea industry, bemoaning only the treatment of  its 
workers. Many of  Ganguli’s readers were middle-class Calcutta residents, and they would generally 
be in favor of  developing the economic potential of  a successful tea industry. Among the members 
of  the two social reform groups, the Tagore family (members of  the British Indian Association and 
early incarnations of  the Brahmo Samaj) had actually invested in the first tea gardens, and Ananda 
Mohan Bose, founder of  the Indian Association, had “amassed a modest fortune” from his 
investments into Assam tea.30 Hence, many of  these men would have agreed that the problem was 
not the industry itself  but rather the exceptional mistreatment of  tea workers.
Economic sentiments also arose in the 1888 memorial that the Indian Association sent to the 
Government of  Bengal. In the document, Ganguli and his peers suggested that the government 
ought to consider whether they should abandon indenture laws and instead “allow the emigration of  
29 Ganguli, 1.
30 Gordon, 30. I have heard rumors that many Bengalis also invested into the Assam tea gardens, 
but I have seen very little written evidence.
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coolies into Assam to be regulated by the law of  supply and demand without the aid of  legislation.”31 
This idiom of  “supply and demand” was later picked up by other writers, including the nationalist 
writer R.C. Dutt. In the second volume (1903) of  Dutt’s two-part Economic History of  India, he noted 
the swelling momentum of  anti-penal law sentiment among the Calcutta intelligentsia, writing, 
“responsible and high administrators have desired a repeal of  the penal laws, and have 
recommended that the tea-gardens should obtain workers from the teeming labour markets of  India 
under the ordinary laws of  demand and supply.”32 He later added, along similar lines, “much oppression 
and many acts of  cruelty are reported from time to time; but the Government of  India does not 
care to brave the wrath of  capitalists by withdrawing these penal clauses, and leaving the labour 
market free as in other industries.”33
Together, these lines suggested that critics of  the indenture system were interested in economic 
growth and believed the penal contract placed unfair restraints on the labor market. These tenets 
were generally accepted ideas among middle-class and educated writers at the time, though, and 
because most writings on the tea trade were only one to two pages long, we should resist the 
temptation to read too much meaning into such short passages. Instead, the text that I believe 
provides the richest and most philosophically ambitious account of  the indentured labor system in 
Assam was Vidyaratna’s novel Kuli Kahini. If  we are to discover a political economic foundation 
beneath the critique of  planter violence, Kuli Kahini is by far our best candidate.
Kuli Kahini and the idiom of  freedom
Kuli Kahini follows the story of  a village woman Adarmani and her daughter Kritartha as they are 
recruited to work on a tea garden in the fictional Assamese town Sonitpur. At the start of  the novel, 
31 Quoted in Bagal, XXXVI. Emphases mine.
32 Romesh Chunder Dutt, The Economic History of  India, Volume Two: In the Victorian Age (1902) 




set in Bengali village, Adarmani’s family is burdened with debt and rent demands, and her opium-
addicted husband Nidhiram loans out their two sons’ labor to a neighboring family in order to 
secure some fast cash, a decision that crushes Adarmani’s spirit. Dejected, she is easily swayed to 
travel to the tea gardens when two female recruiters drop by her home and regale her with 
wondrous stories about the riches and comforts of  a life spent on an Assam plantation. The novel 
then narrates their harrowing journey from Dhubri (a port halfway between Calcutta and Assam) to 
Assam, the tortuous conditions on the garden itself, Adarmani and Kritartha’s efforts to escape, and, 
ultimately, their release from the garden with the mercy of  the kind-hearted junior tea planter.34 The 
final scene features Adarmani’s opportunity to tell her own “story” (kahini) to a courtroom, where 
her tales of  woe bring the jury and judge to tears, and she is finally able to escape from her life on 
the tea garden. 
Narrative perspective, however, does not remain glued to the two women, and different chapters 
reveal all different dimensions of  the tea coolie trade: inside the tea planter’s bungalow in Assam; at 
an all-planter meeting in Calcutta (likely a proxy for the real-life Indian Tea Association); on the 
coolie ship traveling up the Brahmaputra River to Assam; and in the courtroom. Individual chapters 
also introduce new characters in episodic form, each with the transparent function to provide a new 
angle from which to criticize the colonial administration. For instance, in one chapter, a Calcutta 
doctor despairs over being tricked into working on a plantation. The doctor’s parting words are to 
warn readers: “If  you do not speak out, if  you do not make any more pronouncements about the 
laws of  the civilized (susabhya) Christian government’s liberal (udar) rule, then you will continue to 
commit great sins (mahapap)… in order to free the nation from its misery (desher daridrata), tell your 
friends these words” (144). In another scene, a group of  absconding tea coolie women are able to 
speak with the gods of  former Assamese rulers. The voice of  these former kings implore the coolie 
women to tell their stories to others in order to achieve vengeance against the British: 
34 Known as choto saheb, or, “junior (European) master.”
CHAPTER SEVEN
297
If  you cannot take vengeance (pratihingsa), then your tears can take vengeance. Do not cry to us! 
Your tears are not insignificant, drop by drop your tears will form a pit in hell (narak-kund), and 
into this hell-pit will sink all those judges who have wronged you, and all those educated folk and 
moral preachers will be washed away ….Do you think your god-fearing Christian judges will 
salvation? No, no, not at all! Your cries (dirghanishbas, lit. “long sigh”) will be their destruction! In 
this fire, they will burn and become nothing more than ashes!!” (163).
Understandably, historians have described Kuli Kahini as merely a work of  nationalist fiction, one 
that starkly opposed Indian freedom against British rule. Bipan Chandra wrote that Vidyaratna’s aim 
was to “awaken the dormant feelings of  collective national abasement and wounded national pride, 
lighting in the process the torch of  nationalism in innumerable hearts.”35 But if  we can characterize 
Vidyaratna’s story as an oppositional and negative critique of  planter violence, then a much more 
ambivalent, though no less important, question is what alternative vision did Vidyaratna harbor for 
Assam and for the coolies themselves?
Most interpretations of  the novel have assumed that anti-indenture writers operated from within 
an opposition between the Indian village, a repository of  traditional precolonial life, versus life on a 
colonial plantation, where Adarmani is subject to the whims of  British rule. Thus, Kuli Kahini was 
not so much a simple story of  good versus evil but rather one of  a competing “bad” village versus a 
“worse” plantation. In Chandra’s words, the tea industry had thrown the workers “from the frying 
pan of  their traditional rural poverty into the fire of  misery and exploitation of  indentured labour.”36
35 Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of  Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of  Indian 
National Leadership, 1880-1905 (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1969), 360. Cf. 363: “Already 
in 1870, the vernacular press of  Bengal had started writing of  the abuses of  the system and, thus, 
arousing the latent nationalism of  the readers with hair-raising stories of  the scandalous treatment 




The hardships of  the village indeed leave a lasting first impression on the reader. In the opening 
scenes of  the first chapter, Vidyaratna portrays Adarmani’s home village, Gopalpur, as a small and 
unexceptional town, but also one “not totally without its own beauty” (10). He does not, however, 
depict it in romantic and nostalgic terms. At a river nearby, the village women gather to wash rice in 
preparation for dinner and begin to trade stories:
Without any stop in conversation, one woman spoke up, ‘in the heat of  this hellish world (pora 
samsar), I have been worked to death (khete khete sara hoilam).’ On the other side, another woman 
said, ‘there’s already so much work in this world, but taking care of  the children makes me even 
more anxious. If  I didn’t believe in god (iswar) then I wouldn’t find any comfort (nistar).’ From 
the other side of  the lake, another woman spoke up, ‘in this hellish world, so much work has 
piled up that all day long I toil at the cost of  my own life (pranpone), but I also cannot not work 
so much!’ ‘Oh sister, there’s no time for such talk. Evening is coming, and my man (minshe) and 
the children are about to come back from the fields. Let me go home and cook, or else what are 
they going to eat?’ (11) 
Based on passages such as this, historian Samita Sen has agreed that Vidyaratna presented 
Adarmani with a forced choice between a “bad” village and a “worse” plantation. Sen also skillfully 
described how the immiseration of  village life contributes to Adarmani’s desire to find a new life 
elsewhere. The female recruiters who lured Adarmani prey upon her frustration with an increasingly 
depressed village life, as they display lavish clothing and jewelry. They play a “trick” (fikir) on 
Adarmani by giving tiny advances of  one-quarter rupee to mothers and by bringing a small toy for 
the children, establishing close relationships (atmiyata kariyachila) with wives and aunties (44). For 
Sen, “the recruiters direct an ideological assault on family and marriage as a means of  persuading 
Adar to accompany them, thereby emphasizing that she is exercising a choice between family/
marriage and wage work in plantations.” However, Sen adds, Vidyaratna’s text is filled with 
ambiguity, for although the tea gardens are a clear danger to vulnerable village women, the 
arguments advanced by the recruiters “must have had some credibility, both to the author and to the 
anticipated community of  readers.”  Vidyaratna, according to Sen, emphasizes that many coolies 
were drawn to leave their homes because village life was plagued by “economic hardship, physical 
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strain, battering and above all male control and subjugation.” Thus, “on the one hand, the author 
quite evidently presumed that a kind of  a declaration of  war against the husband would, credibly, 
appeal to Adar; on the other, he regretted Adar’s susceptibility.” For Sen, the novel suggests that 
female workers, caught between the Scylla of  village life and the Charybdis of  the tea garden, would 
be better off  staying home. If  the novel portrays the village in a negative light, such imagery is 
“laden with a heavy and obvious irony,” for the reader should already be able to anticipate that life in 
the tea gardens would be “in every aspect worse.” There is “no doubt,” in Sen’s reading, that an 
abusive and exploitative life in the villages would be “indeed a better option for Adar than her 
inevitable fate in the teagardens.”37
Prathama Banerjee has held a less charitable view of  Vidyaratna’s writing, but she nevertheless 
agreed that the novel’s central lesson was to admonish coolies for abandoning their proper place in 
the village: “Bengali novels were written about the moral degradation of  those who allowed 
themselves to go to Assam, about impatient and greedy women who migrated and ended up 
compromising their chastity and character in order to survive.”38
To summarize, the interpretations offered by these three historians -- Banerjee, Chandra, and 
Sen -- all suggest that Vidyaratna provided his protagonist Adarmani with a menu featuring only two 
options: remaining in her village household or becoming ensnared in the prison of  the tea garden. 
“Family/marriage,” in Sen’s words, were the clear winner over “wage work.” However, there are 
several reasons why we should question whether Vidyaratna’s novel presents its protagonists with 
only this narrow, binaristic choice, and whether Vidyaratna aimed to criticize all forms of  “wage 
work,” as opposed to a specific criticism of  its indentured form.
First, Sen’s interpretation downplays the force of  Vidyaratna’s descriptions of  village life. If  the 
logic of  Vidyaratna’s novel left its protagonists no choice but to remain destitute in Gopalpur, then 
37 Sen 2008, 85-86.
38 Banerjee, 103, fn 121.
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his would indeed be a dark and pessimistic story. No clues in the text suggested that village life was 
sustainable or held out any hope of  improvement. In fact, the novel arguably presented clues for the 
opposite conclusion, that coolies traveled to Assam precisely because, objectively, they could no longer 
survive in the village. At the time when Vidyaratna wrote his novel, the 1880s, nationalist economists 
across India had begun to articulate the thesis that British occupation was “draining” wealth out of  
the countryside.39 The “drain thesis” also subtly invaded mundane writings about everyday life. In 
the Bengali novels of  the late nineteenth century, Tanika Sarkar has shown, “the well-worn theme of  
the drain of  wealth is recreated within indigenous society: there is a drain within a drain, so to speak, 
with the wealth, talent and leadership siphoned off  from the village - the real India of  authentic 
peasant and familial virtues.”40 Accordingly, the village and in particular the wife/mother were 
romanticized as a repository of  traditional values, and the “cash nexus” of  landlords, usurers, urban 
babus — and, in this case, tea plantation recruiters — encroached upon this immaculate space. In 
each of  the vernacular-language stories I have been able to track down,41 the recruited migrant 
workers feel compelled to leave for the Assam gardens precisely because village life had long begun 
to show cracks beneath the weight of  economic pressures. For instance, Chattopadhay’s play “The 
tea-planter’s mirror” opens with the peasant Sarada bemoaning the anxiety of  a poor harvest 
compounded with debt to the zamindar (landlord) and money collector (46). And in Kuli Kahini, 
Adarmani’s household existed precariously from season to season: 
This year was a very bad year without any rain, and almost nothing grew. Nidhiram [Adarmani’s 
39 Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 2004), 226. She summarizes the “drain thesis” on pp. 224-231.
40 Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion, and Cultural Nationalism (New Delhi: 
Permanent Black, 2001), 259.
41 The list includes, besides Kuli Kahini, the plays Chakar Darpan (“The Tea-planter’s mirror,” by 
Dakshincharan Chattopadhyay, 1874) Arkati (“Recruiter,” by Harilal Bandopadhyay, 1897), and the 




husband] spent a lot of  energy worrying about this situation. He had many dependents: three 
boys, two girls, and his wife — and beyond this, he could not miss rent, and if  Brahmins or 
Vaishnav mendicants came by, he must feed them. About a month ago, his oldest daughter 
became a widow, and in her grief  Adarmani had given up eating and drinking. For these various 
reasons, Nidhiram tonight was holding his head in his hands, deep in thought, and smoking 
tobacco”(39).
Given the futility of  village life, it would make little sense to read Vidyaratna’s novel as a 
normative statement that his protagonists should remain in the village.42
A second reason why we should be skeptical of  the forced choice between the village and waged 
work is that Adarmani’s confinement to a hopeless village situation would run counter to one of, if  
not the principal theme of  Vidyaratna’s text: the contrast between swadhinata (“freedom”) and its 
opposites adhinata (“subjection,” or “unfreedom”) and dasatya (“slavery”). In fact, I argue that rather 
than “family/marriage” versus “wage work,” the central opposition throughout the novel was 
between two forms of  “wage work”: free versus unfree labor. Rather than promoting the anti-
commercial idea that the tea coolies should have stayed in the village -- a passive response to a dire 
situation -- Vidyaratna sought to articulate a concept of  “free” and mobile labor instead. But before 
42 Compounding the family’s problems was a visit from several Vaishnav mendicants who asked to 
stay in their house. I will confine this entertaining episode to the footnotes:
The next morning, Nidhiram and Adarmani discover that the mendicants have left and also taken 
with them the family’s material possessions: the water pot, the lamp, the dishes, etc. Blinded by 
religious belief, Nidhiram refuses to blame the mendicants for stealing their things and naively hopes 
that losing all their property is a good sign (keep in mind that Vidyaratna, as a member of  the 
Brahmo Samaj, would be deeply critical of  “irrational” indigenous religion). During the same 
morning, the district rent-collector (gomosta) stops by the house to take his fees. Vidyaratna describes 
the collector as “the devil’s accountant (samaduta). He had no mercy (doya), no compassion (maya), no 
politeness, and no hint of  civility.” When the family explains they have lost everything to the 
Vaishnav mendicants, the collector replies, “Okay, I understand, you son of  a bitch. If  ten guests 
come over, you will feed them, but for the zamindar’s rent and my tip, you only have excuses. By the 
end of  today, you’ll pay ten rupees in rent and two rupees as my tip, otherwise we’ll come and take it 
by force” (41). This picture is indeed a bleak one. Adarmani’s family is always one bad harvest away 
from penury, her husband is naively hoodwinked by petty thieves, and the rent-collector not only 
spares no sympathy but also increases their debt. The final straw comes when Nidhiram tries to 
come up with the rent by selling his wife’s jewelry and then renting out his sons’ labor to a local 
farmer. No wonder that when the two female recruiters appeared at her door to entice her with 
stories of  a luxurious life on the Assam gardens, Adarmani could not resist the tales they told: “As if  
possessed by an evil spirit (bhutgrasta), Adarmani’s existence had been corrupted. Her heart had been 
dried up, but her eyes still had tears and her face was dirty. Now this great temptation pulled on her 
mind, and she could not stay grounded in common sense”(48).
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delving into the political economic foundations of  his idea of  “freedom,” let me briefly outline 
several important passages from the novel that suggest the prominence of  the opposition between 
freedom (swadhinata) and unfreedom (adhinata and dasatya).
“Freedom” (swadhinata) in Kuli Kahini
From the very first glimpse of  the tea gardens, Kuli Kahini depicts the plantation as a space of  
confinement, and characters frequently compare it to a prison (phatak). In fact, historically, colonial 
administrators had observed at the time that “amongst the coolies the whole plantation system was 
commonly regarded as a phatak.”43 Here was the reader’s first encounter with the garden:
Even as the morning sun rays pierce through the forests surrounding Sonitpur, the coolies 
waking from their sleep are not fully rested. Sontipur is a jungle-filled kingdom. On all four 
sides, it is surrounded by mountain peaks that are so tall they seem to be peeking in on the 
misery of  the coolies, as their tears of  sorrow and sadness ooze down to wet the soil. These 
tears from the tea gardens of  Sonitpur flow all the way into the Brahmaputra River. Beneath the 
mountains is a country of  forests, and in these forests there lurk tigers, rhinoceroses, bears, and 
other animals (20).
The garden is a world the workers cannot escape. Outside the garden, which was regulated 
internally by planters and overseers, escaped coolies would need to find their way through forests 
filled with wild and dangerous animals, and beyond there, insurmountable mountains awaited them. 
Not only were the coolies hemmed in by the dangerous world of  the jungle, their fate on the garden 
was worse than that of  natural prey: “The coolies wander around afraid of  the overseers (sardar) just 
as cowboys are afraid of  tigers. However, when a herd of  cattle see a tiger, they will flee out of  fear 
and danger. When tea garden coolies see a saheb, they are not allowed to flee. That is the only 
difference between lowly versus “free” animals [i.e. humans]” (27).
In this early chapter, furthermore, Vidyaratna wastes no time establishing the comparison 
between the tea coolies and historical institutions of  slavery:
43 Behal and Mohapatra, 162.
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With the sunrise, a terror appears in the hearts of  the coolies who live in the tea gardens. Their 
faces are stained with the shadow of  melancholy. They live in despair and in fear of  being hit 
and struck. In sum, the life of  a coolie — past, present, and future — is one of  being plunged 
into the dark depths of  slavery (dasatya) (23).
The term dasatya has much older roots as a term to denote submission and servitude, but it also 
became the standard Bengali44 translation to describe historical practices of  African chattel slavery. 
Vidyaratna’s characters constantly associate indentured contract labor with abolished forms of  
African slavery in the British colonies and the U.S. Vidyaratna inherited the explicit opposition 
between freedom and slavery from the language of  abolitionists, and although the terms “freedom” 
and “slavery” were consistently used to mark opposites and extremes in nineteenth-century political 
discourse, the actual content and meaning behind the words were liable to shift. 
For many critics, indentured tea labor resembled slavery because the deceptive tactics denied 
workers the opportunity for willful consent, as had slavery. “If  slavery meant involuntary labor for 
the master’s benefit,” Thomas Holt wrote of  the post-abolition political consensus throughout the 
British empire, “freedom meant voluntary contracts determined by mutual consent, which 
theoretically should guarantee the enjoyment of  the fruits of  one’s labor.”45 Another argument 
against indenture was that work conditions were subhuman, and concerned officials and journalists 
shared stories of  workers who were physically beaten, forced to work long hours, and lived in 
squalid conditions. For instance, when Vidyaratna first introduces the chief  planter in charge of  the 
44 All Indian languages? Question for future research.
45 Thomas C Holt, The Problem of  Freedom Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 26.
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tea gardens, a one-dimensional archetypal villain named Bet Sahib,46 we see Bet telling the garden’s 
doctor to no longer allow sick days. When the doctor protests that overwork will threaten the 
coolies’ health, Bet replies, “What, do you think of  the coolies as humans? (manush) Don’t you know 
that once upon a time in America, we civilized English would use slaves (das), that is, coolies like 
dogs? We do the same here” (24). 
However, more fundamental than the ills of  deception and subhuman work conditions was the 
contract itself  and especially its immobilization of  workers. Vidyaratna believed that, even if  plantation 
recruiters had pledged never to deceive migrant workers, and even if  working conditions were 
improved dramatically, coolie labor would remain a fundamentally unfree institution so long as the 
penal contract prevented workers from leaving the tea garden. For instance, Vidyaratna describes a 
scene of  chained coolies crowding into a steamer bound to Assam from Calcutta as “the life of  
slaves” (das jiban) (63). In another scene depicting a dialogue between evil British planters debating 
the merits of  indentured labor, one villainous character says: 
In America, when they had to deal with the bad behavior (birup babohar) of  negros (nigrodiger), or 
our indigo-planter brothers in Bengal (bhratagon), what did they used to do? They had the dark 
races (krishno bon). Whether in America, in Bengal, or in this country, work is always done by the 
dark races. …The coolies are sad and always trying to organize and run away. Like in America, 
we have coolie runaway laws. But the difference is between heaven and earth. In America, they 
could imprison slaves for life (jiban). With us, we can only imprison coolies for six months. And 
when they run away, you need to report it, put up a reward, pay five rupees per slave, and with 
that cost added onto each coolie, then how can business continue? (110)
These planters long for the days when they could treat workers as true slaves, which meant 
indefinite imprisonment, and thus for Vidyaratna, unfreedom and slavery meant immobility. 
Historically, the indenture labor policies of  colonial capitalists were founded on the paradoxical idea 
that coolies needed to be both uprooted from their village ties yet also settled on the plantation once 
they arrived. “The task was to mobilise an essentially immobile work force only to re-immobilise it 
46 “Bet” in Bengali means “whip,” and as Vidyaratna explains, Bet sahib was such a cruel young boy 
that his parents nicknamed him “whip.” Why an English family would give him a Bengali name is, of  
course, a reasonable yet unanswered question.
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by tying it to the enclaves of  capitalist production,” Breman and Daniel have observed. “Indenture 
came to be one of  the principal means, not only of  coolie recruitment itself, but also of  such re-
immobilisation.”47 Vidyaratna spotlighted the horrors of  (re)immobilization and its resemblance to 
historical slavery in an early scene marking the passage from Bengali village to Assamese plantation. 
As I mentioned earlier, Vidyaratna had included in his 1878 travelogue a real-life encounter with a 
“captured” passenger on a ship traveling up the Brahmaputra River. He recreated the same scene in 
a chapter describing the passage from Bengali village to Assam garden. An upper class passenger 
stumbles upon a man who has been chained up in a lower hull of  the ship, and he learns that the 
prisoner was a Brahmin from Bankura who was tricked into signing an indenture contract. As the 
nearby constable explains, according to “the royal queen’s law. If  you sign a contract and flee before 
the time expires, then you will be arrested.”
Passenger: “The magistrate determines the sentence?”
Constable: “According to law, jail and labor.”
Passenger: “Then?”
Constable: “Then we send him back to the gardens.”
Passenger: “Oh my! Who says that the Christian government has abolished slavery? This is a 
system of  slavery (dasatya)! I have been blind for so long, but now it is clear before our eyes. The 
British government is civilized and moral (dharmik) in word, but not in practice” (66-67).
The passenger then addresses the coolie directly, asking him about his life in Assam. “Assam is 
hell (narak),” he replies. “The Hindusthanis who recruited us were messengers of  hell. Just thinking 
about them makes my hair stand on end.” The prisoner, named Kailashchandra Chakrabarti, 
proceeds to narrate a brief  autobiography redolent of  American slave novels that described how 
black freedmen could be tricked into being captured as slaves in the south: Kailashchandra was 
desperate for a job to support his family after his father died at a relatively young age. He was 
offered a job in Calcutta but was told to lie about his caste and identity.48 After telling the magistrate 
47 Jan Breman and E. Valentine Daniel, “Conclusion: The Making of  a Coolie,” in Plantations, 
Proletarians, and Peasants in Colonial Asia (London: F. Cass, 1992), 271.
48 A story similar to that of  the protagonist in “Cha-Kuli Atmakahini.”
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he fully understood the terms of  his indenture contract, he found himself  sent to Assam and unable 
to escape. ““Now I have no freedom (swadhinata),” he exclaimed, “and my life has no value 
(mulya)” (68-72).
But Vidyaratna did not reserve the theme of  swadhinata and unfreedom exclusively for tea 
coolies. One of  the most philosophical chapters of  his novel revolved around a well-meaning 
bureaucrat who found himself  stuck on the Assam tea gardens. Narendranath Ghosh was the 
resident doctor in Sonitpur. Originally from south of  Calcutta, Ghosh graduated from medical 
school in the city, but because his family was poor and his father too old, he took the only job he 
could find -- as resident doctor on a tea garden -- and he signed a contract to work in Sonitpur. “In 
Assam,” the narrator explains, “there are no differences in the contractual agreements. Whether 
coolie, clerk, or doctor, all must travel to Assam by means of  agreement. Narendra, too, was brought 
to Assam via a two-year agreement” (137).
Ghosh represents the well-intentioned Bengali middle-class professional, with whom many 
readers of  the novel could identify.49 Naive at first, he soon discovers that by helping manage and 
run the tea garden, he is also culpable for the “inhumane and unimaginable” forms of  punishment 
exacted against coolies on a daily basis. Stunned by what he sees, Narendranath decides he wants to 
leave. The English planter Bet sahib has warned him, however, that Narendranath is not immune 
from discipline: “‘Look here doctor! Just because you are a doctor does not mean you can do 
whatever you want.  I am also watching you! You, too, if  you disobey any of  my orders, then you 
will also be punished’” (138). In despair, the doctor delivers a monologue on the theme of  freedom: 
I cannot escape this hell (narak) and the agony that it brings me. Once a free man, I have 
become a vile and low animal. Forest animals have freedom, they can frolic freely on their own 
accord, but I cannot. Alas, what irony! Freedom (swadhinata) is the sap (raw) of  life! Without it, a 
49 Note: here I can bring in a more explicit engagement with the middle-class character of  the 
Indian Association and Sadharan Brahmo Samaj members and how, at this time in Calcutta history, 
many writers began to complain about how the Bengali middle class was being “locked out” of  the 
colonial economy along racial lines. Cf., e.g., Amiya Kumar Bagchi.
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tree has no luster and without luster, it gradually (miliya jay), and falls into ruin. I, too, having lost 
my luster, have become spoiled (mishiya jaitechi). I have no zeal, no dreams, no love in my heart, 
no force in my mind, no satisfaction in my heart. I have my hands, I have my feet, I have the 
power to walk, I have the desire to go, so I will go — NOW I will go! (139).50
Narendra tries to escape but the guards wake up and hear his footsteps. He is caught and beaten 
and sent back to his room. At 2 AM, he lies wide awake, “without any desires (prabritta), without any 
‘effort at life’ (jibaner chesta). His mind broken down (bhangiyache), his heart dry as a desert, his life 
turned cold as a stone. In this state, he could not stay still.” Narendra awakes from bed, grabs his 
keys from the desk, walks to the dispensary and returns with a bottle. His disposition is stiff  (kath), 
and his face covered by a “shadow of  gloom.” Despair fills his “soul, mind, and vitality,” (atma, mon, 
pran) and finally he lifts up the bottle of  medicine and exclaims: 
“‘Bet! Let’s see how much you are able to confine me? My movement (atghat) has been stopped, 
my free being (sbadhin jib) has been turned into an unfree animal (adhin pashur mata). ...Today, I 
tried to run away, but you forbade me, all parts of  me are now completely subordinated to you 
(adhin haiya). I have sold my freedom (swadhinata), and I can’t take any more, so enough.’ Saying 
these words, Narendra became more crazy and excited, continuing, ‘Look, scoundrel (paji)! Do I 
have my freedom or not? Drinking this stuff, I will have bought my precious and lost freedom, I 
will put out the flames that burn my life, and I will have escaped from this hellish tea-garden and 
your shrewd conspiracy. Now, will I stay? I am going — I am going!’” 
After he consumes the medicine, Narendra “becomes free” (mukta o swadhin), and he breaks out 
of  the “prison of  his soul.” “He was free (swadhin),” Vidyaratna writes, “and in this heavenly world, 
he had bought his great freedom (mahaswadhin).” When the police arrive the next day, they find near 
him a letter he wrote before his suicide. In Narendra’s words:
 I have arrived at the final limit of  freedom. You are a believer in god, you have your health, so 
you can believe in god. This is freedom. I am not a believer. I have nothing....This morning I 
have come to say that I have suffered from fear and darkness, and so I have run away, my life has 
50 Cf. This speech to the opening paragraph of  the chapter, in which Vidyaratna writes: 
“Joy, festivity, sorrow, happiness, grief, tranquility, love, amity (ananda, utsab, bishad, shush, duhkh, 
shanti, prem, shôhardya) — the basis for all these values is freedom (swadhinata). Whoever is free, 
happiness will follow them, they will know the value of  celebration, subject themselves to love, a 
friend of  joylessness, a servant to grief. And those who are unfree (adhin) will feel no happiness, no 
sadness, no tranquility, no grief, neither sweetness nor venom — absolutely none of  these” (136).
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been released from the darkness. But my wish is that this morning I can see the sunlight of  
freedom (swadhin suryer alo paibo) (143).
These overwrought passages illustrate the striking degree to which Vidyaratna premised his 
novel on the opposition between freedom and unfreedom, an opposition that pivoted upon mobility 
(atghat). But Vidyaratna and his peers were not the first to ask the question of  freedom with regards 
to Assam indentured labor. In order to better situate and understand the appeal of  these categories 
for late nineteenth-century imperial subjects, I will briefly retrace the trajectory of  “freedom” and 
“slavery” as they unraveled across debates over migration, labor, and colonization in the nineteenth 
century.
The political economic understanding of  freedom 
Free labor, slavery, and free exchange: a brief  genealogy
Within the discourses of  Bengali writers who criticized the indenture system, authors and readers 
took for granted that penal contracts were inherently “unfree” and “slavelike,” a violation of  a 
natural and free exchange of  labor. Aside from Vidyaratna’s constant comparisons between tea 
coolies and historical slavery in the U.S. and British empire, other writers also invoked the specter of  
African slavery. The phrase “slave-law,” for instance, was used by Dutt, Ganguli, and the Indian 
Association. In fact, Ganguli titled his series of  journalistic articles “Slavery in British dominion,” 
and he opened by proclaiming: “it is pure necessity that has obliged us to make use of  this very 
expressive name, for none other would adequately convey to the minds of  our readers any idea of  
those horrible sufferings to which the emigrants in the tea-plantations of  Assam are subjected.”51 
The opposition between freedom and slavery that undergirded these critics’ works had actually 




to earlier figures such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Holt has argued, it only achieved 
hallowed status as a foundational political principle with the rise of  abolitionist movements. The 
British abolition of  slavery in 1834 marked a turning point in the political trajectory of  the category 
“freedom,” which now became a primary political principle of  empire.52 But though abolition 
sanctified the principle of  freedom, the concept itself  remained dogged by broader questions of  
formal definitions and historical practices, problems that linger to the present day. For instance, in 
the former slave-owning plantation colonies of  the West Indies, the Caribbean, and Mauritius, sugar 
planters sought various measures to replace the former supply of  slave workers, and after struggling 
to hire ex-slaves they experimented with hiring workers from overseas, including workers from 
China and India. What, precisely, labor would look like in a world in which slavery was outlawed was 
up for debate. In making their case against slavery, abolitionists had to learn how to articulate what 
“freedom” actually entailed. However, no one knew with certainty what freedom looked like. It was 
“an abstract concept, difficult to define in substance” and “liable to misuse.”53 Slavery, by contrast, 
was “clear-cut and concrete.” Abolitionists and subsequent policymakers adopted the strategy of  
defining free labor as the opposite of  slavery. But though freedom and slavery became the stable 
opposition which framed ensuing debates, the actual meaning assigned to them remained fluid and 
“plastic.”54 
Indeed, over the course of  the history of  indentured Indian workers being sent to the ex-slave 
sugar colonies -- namely, British Guiana and Mauritius -- freedom assumed different meanings and 
took on almost opposite functions within legislative debates. The system of  indentured labor in 
52 Holt, 3-4.
53 Holt, 25-26.
54 Madhavi Kale, Fragments of  Empire: Capital, Slavery, and Indian Indentured Labor Migration to the British 
Caribbean (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 87. Cf. Jairus Banaji’s critique of  the 
concept: “The issue here is not that of  the plasticity of  legal reasoning, of  where one draws the line 




Assam developed almost two decades after that of  the sugar colonies, but colonial officials in India 
seemed to move in step with broader, empire-wide shifts of  opinion regarding free labor and the 
contract. Heuristically, we can outline two moments: at first, indentured labor appeared too much 
like slavery and hence was considered “unfree.” Second, by the middle of  the nineteenth century, 
officials began to convince themselves that penal contracts could actually be made to fit with the 
ideals of  “free labor,” albeit with modification. This reasoning had allowed the Government of  
India to rationalize indenture labor laws for the Assam tea gardens between 1863 and 1882. Despite 
these different interpretations, officials relied upon the a priori assumption that labor should be 
treated as an alienable good, and that the principle of  free labor, therefore, should be imagined as an 
extension of  the political-economic law of  free trade and free exchange.
When colonial officials began to grow tea in Assam, just years after the 1833 Slavery Abolition 
Act, indentured labor reeked too much of  slavery to be considered a viable option for planters in 
India. Once again, it is instructive to revisit H.T. Prinsep’s 1840 pronouncement, which I have cited 
before, that the Assam industry should avoid indenture:
The advance due by the laborer must be paid as the condition of  his being released with liberty 
to enter into new engagements but more than this could scarcely be demanded, and the 
Government should be careful of  establishing a precedent for the transfer or laborers for a 
consideration which eventually may assume a shape not easily distinguishable from the 
transactions so much cried out against in Mauritius and in the Slave Colonies.55
Prinsep was not opposed to migration in general, for elsewhere he had complimented overseas 
55 BL, IOR/Z/E/4/15/T48. “Tea, Assam in, Cultivation of, Reports on and measures to improve.” 
“Minute by the Honble HT Prinsep Esqre, 25th Feby 1840.” Emphases added.
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labor migration as a “powerful agent of  civilization.”56 However, he expressed unease about labor 
arrangements that were coercive. The specific distinction he drew was whether laborers were 
allowed out of  their contracts simply by paying back an advance or whether anything “more” — 
presumably, imprisonment or forced labor — could be extracted. In other words, Prinsep believed 
that workers could not be bound to contracts through any form of  extra-economic coercion. He 
had undoubtedly been paying attention to the recent controversies over indentured labor in British 
Guiana and Mauritius.57 In the wake of  abolition, planters in Mauritius had quietly begun importing 
Indian indentured laborers to replace its emancipated slave workforce as early as 1834.58 In 1836, 
Scottish planters invested in West Indian sugar had attempted to emulate the “Mauritius” model by 
importing Indian laborers in their British Caribbean investments, and the Colonial Office consented 
to five-year contracts in July 1837.59 By 1838, however, anti-slavery organizations in Britain began to 
denounce overseas contract labor as disguised slavery.60 Calcutta newspapers also began to run 
similar opinions. One petition called the system “radically bad and contained in itself  the elements 
of  a new species of  slavery.”61 In 1839, overseas migration was completely halted amid these 
allegations, forming the backdrop to Prinsep’s own denunciation of  indentured labor in Assam.
By the middle of  the nineteenth century, however, British officials had come to accept and 
justify indentured labor contracts for overseas sugar colonies as an acceptable form of  free labor. 
Government of  India officials followed suit and soon began to pass legislation for penal labor 
56 Quoted in Marina Carter, Servants, Sirdars and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius 1834-1874 (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 21.




61 Quoted in Kale, 30.
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contracts in India, starting with Act XIII of  1859, followed by a series of  laws in the 1860s and 
1870s specially aimed at Assam. By this period, the Lieutenant-Governor of  Bengal approvingly cited 
the examples of  Mauritius and of  “colonial emigration.”62 Thus, although Government of  India 
officials originally shied away from indentured labor in the 1840s, a moment when the scandalous 
association with slavery reached its peak, their attitudes had changed by the 1860s, in sync with a 
new acceptance of  indentured migration as free labor. 
In order to understand how this reversal of  position was possible -- how the principle of  free 
labor could be used at first to strike down indentured labor contracts but then later serve as their 
justification -- we must seek to understand the underlying principles behind abolitionism and free 
labor. According to historians of  slavery and overseas indentured labor, the foundations behind early 
nineteenth-century abolitionism was composed of  much more than simply a visceral disapproval or 
religious denunciation of  inhumane practices. Abolitionism was fostered from the belief  that free 
labor systems were comparatively better economically. Abolitionists, Holt has shown, were committed 
to the idea that self-interested behavior should be unhampered by “artificial and arbitrary 
constraints” such as unjust taxation on goods or limitations on labor mobility. Slavery’s greatest sin 
was its inefficiencies and the way it retarded the slave’s rational pursuit of  profit. Abolitionists 
emphatically argued that slavery was incompatible with the burgeoning capitalist system. Following 
“their mentor Adam Smith,” they believed “there was no question that free laborers, having the 
greater incentive for efficient and productive work, were more profitable to employ than slaves.”63
For students of  political economy, the contrast between slavery and free labor generated at least 
two practical conclusions about the character of  freedom. First, “if  slavery meant involuntary labor 
for the master’s benefit, freedom meant voluntary contracts determined by mutual consent, which 
theoretically should guarantee the enjoyment of  the fruits of  one’s labor.” Second, if  “slavery meant 




subordination to the physical coercion and personal dominion of  an arbitrary master, then freedom 
meant submission only to the impersonal forces of  the marketplace.”64 Free labor, then, was rooted 
in newly prevalent ideas about the naturalness of  free exchange. Political economy’s “notion of  
Exchange” in the eighteenth century, Atiyah has noted, brokered a marriage between the concepts 
of  “freedom of  trade” and “freedom of  contract.” Restrictions on either freedom “simply protected 
(or exploited) some groups at the expense of  others.” In order for Adam Smith to equate free trade 
with free labor, he treated labor itself  as a commodity that obeyed the laws of  supply and demand. 
Thus, the immobilization of  labor was both “contrary to natural liberty and justice” (a quote from 
Smith) but also condemned “on grounds of  economic efficiency.”65 
If  slavery had been labor extracted through nonmarket practices, free labor would originate 
precisely in the marketplace. As such, a penal labor contract to work in overseas sugar colonies was 
nevertheless still a contract, and it was not necessarily incompatible with freedom. The controversy 
over indentured recruitment arose not from the legal form of  the contract but only when particular 
reports of  abuse, deception, and physical punishment began to surface. Such stories first appeared in 
British abolitionist literature, such as when the British Anti-Slavery Society publicized stories of  how 
Indian workers in British Guiana who had tried to escape were “recaptured.”66 Anti-migration 
sentiment then reached British India, where newspapers supplemented accounts of  life on overseas 
plantations with new tales of  deception and kidnapping in recruitment.67 These stories helped 
persuade government to outlaw overseas indentured migration in the 1830s, but even at the time, 
64 Holt, 25-26.
65 P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of  Freedom of  Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 300-301. 
Quotes from Smith come from Wealth of  Nations, Book I, Chapter X. Also: For Smith, 
apprenticeship was “a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of  the workman and of  





colonial officials were not categorically opposed to the indentured contract. They balanced the tales 
of  abuse against “workers’ right to sell their labor at the most favorable terms available,” which 
often times meant through the terms of  indenture.68
If  free labor was embodied in the form of  a contract, then imperial officials in the 1830s 
temporarily suspended indentured labor because it was a contract-based regime that had grown 
rotten, hence unfree. Insofar as the contract itself  was not in dispute, however, planters and planter-
friendly officials unsurprisingly learned to mobilize arguments about free labor as a justification to 
reopen indentured migration, only with greater regulation to guard against abuse. The British 
government reauthorized indentured Indian migration to Mauritius in 1842 and for the West Indies 
in 1845.69 Officials and planters defended these policies at several levels. First, they guarded against 
accusations of  abuse by emphasizing medical and government inspections to ensure health and 
consent. Also, unlike slavery, these five-year contracts did not keep workers “bound in perpetuity.”70 
Second, they appropriated the slippery concept of  freedom to their own side, arguing that outlawing 
overseas indenture would deny workers the choice to sell their own labor freely.71
However, if  overseas planters had successfully justified migration upon the right of  workers to 
freely pursue work opportunities, they had not defended the specific necessity for indenture. For the 
planters, indenture was an insurance against the costs of  transporting workers across the Indian and 
Atlantic Oceans. The contracts guaranteed the workers could not abscond upon arrival, and the 
planters could feel secure they would not lose their initial investments. In Assam, by contrast, 
planters had avoided indenture for decades because they hoped that local populations would 
68 Kale, 28-29.
69 Kale 36.
70 Kale, 147, 159, and 173-174.Cf. Steinfeld, 1. That the accepted definition of  free labor today is 




spontaneously, on their own account, find their way to the tea gardens without the financial 
commitment of  overseas travel. Although Assam faced the same problems of  underpopulation, it 
was, unlike overseas colonies, contiguous with the rest of  the subcontinent. In theory, barriers to 
migration were much lower. However, tea planters finally turned to indenture when they became fed 
up with absconding workers. When the Government of  Bengal passed the first laws regulating 
indentured labor to Assam in 1863, it described the policy as a guard against absconding.72 Thus, 
indentured labor, when first conceived, was not seen as an arbitrary exercise of  power but rather as a 
modern solution to a very modern economic problem of  securing waged laborers. Indentured labor 
was not sanctioned in spite of  an empire-wide consensus on the desirability of  free labor. It was 
featured as one of  the tools of  enforcement.
The justification for indenture as free labor was also made possible by one of  the underlying 
presuppositions of  abolitionism: that labor was a commodity that was subject to the same laws of  
free exchange as all other commodities. Political theorists had initially premised individual freedom 
on the universality of  free exchange. Within the limits of  political economic ideology, this 
relationship was not simply one of  analogy — that free labor is like free trade — but of  synecdoche: 
free labor was one type of  free trade. In order for labor to be emancipated, political economists 
needed to imagine that the worker was two things at once: a merchant and a commodity, a possessor 
of  labor-power and a labor-power that was possessed. Or, in philosophical terms, a subject and an 
object. Within the abolitionists’ framework, “liberty meant the right to sell one’s labor to the highest 
72 NAI, Legislative Branch Proceedings, November 1864, no. 30, pp. 679 - 704, “Bengal Bill for the 
protection of  planters and laborers in Assam.” From Hon’ble A. Eden, Secy to the GOB to EC 
Bayley, Esq, GOI, Darjeeling, 5th September 1864. 
“…[S]ome effectual steps should be taken to prevent such breaches of  contract by the laborers as 
are now represented to be of  almost daily occurrence in these districts, and that where Government 
interferes in regard to the protection of  the laborer in entering into a contract, the Planter has a right 
to look for some protection of  his interests in regard to that laborer.”
CHAPTER SEVEN
316
bidder.”73 The debates over indentured labor in Assam consistently described a peculiar image: a 
laborer who carries around and peddles his/her own labor-power as an alienable thing. 
Consider the following phrases. In 1838, a Calcutta recruiting firm justified overseas indentured 
labor by arguing “It is a question involving the rights of  British subjects ... to carry their manual labor 
to the most productive market.”74 The same rhetoric also animated discussions about Assam. In 
1880, the Chief  Commissioner of  Assam Sir Steuart Bayly emphasized that any labor legislation 
reform should continue to make sure workers “should be free to take his labour wherever he pleased.”75 
Elsewhere, he warned against any “special system of  labour, where the labourer is not free to take his 
labour where he likes.”76 Decades later, a member of  the Legislative Council of  India quipped in an 
offhand manner: “It appears to me that the only justification for these labourers being under a penal 
contract at all is that it is to their interest that they should be brought up to the labour-district, that they 
cannot bring themselves up there as they have not the means.”77
73 Kale, 35.
74 Quoted in Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of  Borders (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 72.
75 NAI, Home, Revenue and Agriculture Department, Emigration A file, December 1880, Progs. 
68-72 “Appointment of  a Commission to investigate and report upon the working and amendment 
of  Act VII (BC) of  1873. Page 3 of  proceeding 71.
76 NAI, Home, Revenue and Agriculture Department. Emigration A file. December 1880. 
Proceedings 68-72. “Appointment of  a Commission to investigate and report upon the working and 
amendment of  Act VII (BC) of  1873.” Emphasis added.
77 Alexander Miller, member of  the Legislative Council of  India, quoted in 1893 Annual Report of  
the ITA, 208. Emphasis added. This observation sheds new light on the unease with which colonial 
officials described the burgeoning markets for labor recruitment. Earlier, I noted that the authors 
expressed apprehension over how coolie laborers were, quote, “purchased,” and added, by means of  
embarrassed explanation, “for that is the phrase commonly in use.” The authors wished to place 
ideological distance between themselves and labor commodification, as if  it were some unsavory 
phenomenon in the dark corners of  Indian society.  But that would be a delusion. If  coolie workers 
were being treated as articles and goods, purchased and sold, this phenomenon did not begin with 
the unsavory rise of  professional recruitment. It already sat at the heart of  the free labor concept 
itself. Free labor is purportedly a form of  commodity exchange, wherein laborers sell their own 
activity. Here, the only difference was that the commodity in question was sold and moved around 
by someone else altogether.
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Several consequences stemmed from this peculiar imagery. First, by emphasizing labor-power 
as an object to be traded, officials placed greater emphasis upon the moment of  recruitment, for 
recruitment entailed the moment of  exchange. This initial agreement overshadowed concerns over 
the conditions of  labor after signing a contract. Officials who fixated on the freedom of  exchange, 
therefore, paid most attention to the moment of  consent. Bengali critics, by contrast, would later 
argue that the inability to leave a contract, the moment of  exit, canceled out the worker’s power of  
consent to guarantee his/her best interests.
Second, if  political theory treated labor-power as an alienable object, then planters did not 
find it very difficult to also begin objectifying the physical humans who supplied that labor. That is, 
by submitting labor-power to the whims of  the marketplace, planters also began to treat the laborers 
themselves as mere commodities. This phenomenon has been recognized by different political 
theorists over the years. Karl Polanyi famously described the commodification of  labor as a harmful 
“commodity fiction.”78 Feminist theorist Carole Pateman has agreed that conceptualizing labor as 
“ownership of  property is a political fiction” which conceals that “the worker and his labour, not his 
labour power, are the subject of  contract.”79 For both observers, the ideology of  free labor relied 
upon a logical separation of  subject and object — a worker and his/her labor — that simply did not 
correspond with physical or social reality. As such, this fiction could dangerously encourage 
employers to treat their living, thinking employees as merely inert objects, an arrangement not very 
far from chattel slavery.
Finally, third, the “commodity fiction” not only objectified but also attributed economic 
agency, and hence responsibility, to laborers. If  labor was both subject and object, then students of  
political economy also subscribed to the logically corresponding fiction that even the most destitute 
78 Polanyi, 72-73.




workers, those with nothing to their name, were property-owning economic subjects. Propertyless 
workers were equated with capital-owning merchants. “Every man thus lives by exchanging, or 
becomes, in some measure, a merchant,” as Smith had written.80 The government officials who 
argued in defense of  indentured labor laws took the analogy one step further. They claimed that 
indentured workers were themselves a subset of  capitalists. As such, these workers shouldered 
reciprocal responsibility in their dealings with the other capitalists they encountered, the tea planters:
The employer is compelled by law to guarantee to the coolie a minimum wage; and it is only 
equitable that the law should provide him with the means of  obtaining the due fulfillment of  the 
contract by the coolie, whose only capital is his labour, and who ought not to be allowed capriciously 
to withdraw himself  from the service of  the employer who has paid for his introduction.81
According to this logic, a worker who arbitrarily broke a working contract was analogous to a 
planter who “capriciously” withheld his own capital by halting payment of  wages to his workers. In 
that situation, “justice” would demand the employer pay the worker what was owed. 
Correspondingly, justice would also demand that an absconding worker pay the employer what the 
employer was owed: labor-power. If  labor-power was a commodity commensurable with any other 
through exchange, then both could be sought as damages to breaches of  contract. No distinction 
existed between capital spent on wages and capital expended as labor. Thus, if  the recruited coolies 
were merchants of  their own labor, the absconding coolies were bad merchants. If  the workers did 
not cooperate with the expectations of  a free commercial society, measures such as indenture 
became necessary. Because labor-power and money were both seen as different forms of  capital, it 
80 Smith, 33. More recently, historian Walter Johnson has argued that the nineteenth-century 
“bourgeois political economists” who worked in the tradition of  Smith erroneously viewed society -- 
both slaves and slaveowners -- as a world of  “clerks.”




made little difference whether the worker faced corporal or monetary discipline. Contemporary 
distinctions between pecuniary and non-pecuniary, economic and extra-economic punishment did 
not make much sense once labor-power was rendered a fungible form of  capital.82 Paradoxically, 
then, exchange functioned as both the foundation for political theories of  free labor and also the 
justification for indentured labor, or, what would later become known as unfree labor.
This was the logical minefield into which Bengali critics such as Ganguli and Vidyaratna entered 
in the 1880s. Their critique, a third stage in this saga of  the “free labor” concept, continued to build 
upon the principles of  political economy.
Vidyaratna’s “good planter” stands up for free labor
Vidyaratna’s novel was animated with descriptions of  free labor as an extension of  the principle of  
free markets. These passages defied expectations that Vidyaratna, a missionary by trade, promoted a 
vision of  freedom founded upon ahistorical religious, humanitarian, or philanthropic ideals. But 
although he spoke about freedom in a natural state, with his constant comparisons to the freedom 
of  wild animals and his invocations of  godly figures, he also wove in clever and perceptive passages 
that described the historically specific market processes governing the tea trade and the traffic in 
workers. He was well aware of  the logic by which workers were rendered commodities subject to 
supply and demand. For instance, he opened a chapter focused on the business of  transporting 
coolies from Calcutta to Assam with the following exposition:
The coolie depot is the same thing (eki katha) as the warehouse. Warehouse goods (mal) are 
imported and exported (amdani ruptani hoy), and go-betweens who understand the business come 
and buy and sell (kroy bikroy thaken), but the warehouse agents won’t sell at one penny below 
market prices. Right now, a lot of  goods have been imported to this coolie depot, but they have 
not yet been exported. Last night, the go-between (dalal), that is, the Calcutta branch coolie 
agent, just arrived. But they could not come to an agreement. The agent wanted to buy a pair of  
coolies for 175 rupees, but the market price was 200, and the depot manager resolved not to sell 
them for a single penny less than 200. But he also worried about this. Because these coolies were 
82 Cf. Steinfeld 1991, who recounts the history behind how free labor today pivots on the 
distinction between economic and extra-economic coercion.
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from their own land, but Calcutta was a much tougher place, and who knows if  they were going 
to come down with cholera or fever and infect others and die? This would cause a lot of  damage 
to their business (60).
Vidyaratna delivers these descriptions of  the market in a dry manner, and his logic mirrors that 
of  the depot workers he begins to quote. It would not be wrong to assume that even as Vidyaratna’s 
own voice mimics the contours of  labor commodification and the subjection of  labor to market 
forces, he is also ironically criticizing it. Indeed, “selling” (bikray), and especially the sale of  freedom 
(swadhinata), is a recurring object of  criticism throughout the novel. For instance, Narendra Ghosh, 
the middle-class doctor, delivers the following line in his final monologue against Bet Sahib: “Today, 
I tried to run away, but you forbade me, all parts of  me are now completely subordinated to you 
(sampurna adhin haiya). I have sold my freedom (sbadhinata bikray kariyachilam)” (142). Elsewhere, 
Narendra refers to himself  as the sahib’s “bought slave” (kritadas) (143). And in another scene, in 
which a group of  coolie women converse with the gods of  past Assamese kings, one woman 
recounts the moment they arrived in Assam: “Here, we heard that we had become coolies, that we 
had sold ourselves (atma-bikray kariya) and become the slaves of  tea-planters (ca-karer das)”(161). 
The most powerful passage that deals with money and its power over human life comes near the 
end of  the novel. Adarmani’s daughter Kritartha has been plucked from the coolie line to become a 
mistress for one of  the European planters. As he chases her in his bungalow, she stops him in his 
tracks and delivers the following speech:
Saheb! I would choose death over you. Rather than remain your slave (das) in this bungalow here, 
it’d be better to die! Shame! Shame! Foreigner! Foreigner! Sinner! (go-khadok, lit. “cow-eater”) Am 
I in a sinner’s home? Whatever it touches must be washed! Whatever it touches must be washed 
with water from the Ganges! Whatever room it enters must be atoned for! Am I going to 
become a foreigner? Absolutely not! Do not try to tempt me. Greed for money, for clothes, for 
jewelry, these things have destroyed us, they have ruined our family. Is this the reward for money, 
jewelry and good clothing? If  I had known earlier, that the value of  money was slavery (taka 
mulya dasatya), that the value of  jewelry was the prostitution of  honor (satitba bikroy), that the 
value of  good clothing was the death of  one’s people (jati nash), then I would never have agreed 
to this work! ... I have fallen into hell. Why? Take your coins and keep them to yourself, I don’t 
want any of  it. . . .  (169).
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Kritartha exclaims that money is a corrupting force. She opposes money and jewelry against her 
honor and chasteness -- “satitba,” a term that was regularly used by Vidyaratna and other authors to 
describe the violation of  coolie women by European planter men. Kritartha is aware that the Sahib 
is chasing her around out of  lecherous desires, and soon after she delivers her speech, he is able to 
pin her down and rape her. The gendered connotations of  Kritartha’s speech bring to mind Tanika 
Sarkar’s observation that in late nineteenth century anticolonial literature, women’s chastity began to 
stand in for the purity and wholeness of  the nationalist project itself. “The politics of  women’s 
monogamy,” Sarkar wrote, was “the condition of  the possible Hindu nation,” and women’s chastity 
had “a real and stated, not merely symbolic, political value.” Sarkar’s insight sheds greater light on 
the the opposition between freedom (swadhinata) and subjection (adhinata) that I have discussed so 
far. For her, “adhinata became a perculiarly loaded word, fraught with a double guilt: the sin of  
submitting to foreign domination, which necessarily conjured up the associated guilt of  submitting 
the woman to a state of  subjection.”83 
 Thus, it was no coincidence that Vidyaratna chose for his protagonists not men but two women. 
Although Kritartha and her mother Adarmani are not unique among the novel’s characters in 
experiencing recruitment, deception, exploitation, and physical abuse, they were especially targeted as 
objects of  sexual predation. Vidyaratna described them -- and they saw themselves -- through the 
prisms of  chastity and corruption. After Kritartha is beaten and raped, she wakes up the next day 
and pieces together what has happened. She begins to feel intense pangs of  guilt, for she no longer 
has a “pure chastity” (adarsa sati) (173). Compounded with the discovery that boyfriend has been 
killed by the planters, Kritartha descends into madness (pagal) and flees the garden (173). As for 
Adarmani, in the final scenes of  the book she is given the opportunity to tell her own story to a 
courtroom audience. She describes the humiliations of  life on the garden and says she does not want 




Let my life be destroyed, let my children die by my side, let me look at my dead children’s faces, but I 
will not lose my chastity!” (224).
Now, such passages suggest that Vidyaratna’s critique of  the tea gardens was grounded in the 
language of  religion and purity, especially of  sexual purity. They also seem to invite a postcolonial 
interpretation that Vidyaratna, consistent with the writings of  other late nineteenth century 
nationalists, had articulated a critique of  British rule as the colonization of  the outer “material 
world,” against which he sought to find recourse in an inner repository of  “spiritual,” and womanly, 
purity.84 This interpretation seems to be what Samita Sen had in mind when she characterized 
Adarmani’s story as a forced choice between “family/marriage and wage work in plantations.” In 
this formulation, “the world of  capitalist wage labour … appeared like a cauldron of  vice, crime and 
disease while by contrast the rural world of  family-based peasant production gained idyllic 
characteristics in increasingly nostalgic re-telling.”85
However, I believe that even the passages I have quoted here, which deal with “chastity” and the 
“sale” of  freedom, provide clues that Vidyaratna did not condemn the commodification of  labor 
writ large but only its egregiously abusive forms. For instance, in Kritartha’s speech against the 
lecherous sahib, she finishes with the conclusion: “Shame! Shame! I am a coolie, I am your servant, 
you are the boss, am I supposed to do this work? Let me go, I will spend my life doing coolie work, 
but I will not do any of  these terrible things, I will not sink into hell.” It is not waged work itself  
that is degrading but rather the specifically slavelike “unchaste” conditions of  the Sonitpur garden 
run by the immoral sahibs.
Furthermore, the passage in which Vidyaratna described the market dynamics of  the coolie 
depot is instructive, for although Vidyaratna negatively mocked the logic of  labor commodification, 





he nevertheless evinced a clear understanding that labor, and laborers, had been rendered 
commodities in his time, and that, further, they could be made subject to the same governing 
principles of  supply and demand and “market price” (bajar dar) as any other good (mal). If  Bengali 
critics of  the penal contract envisioned a labor force free from physical and extra-economic 
coercion, then they could not envision any regulatory mechanism other than the economic dynamics 
of  the market itself. For instance, I have already quoted passages in which the Indian Association 
and R.C. Dutt spoke about the “ordinary laws” of  “supply and demand” as the regulator of  free 
labor. Just as abolitionism earlier in the century was premised upon the advocacy of  free labor, so 
too was the political vision advanced by the Bengali critics of  the penal labor contract. 
Vidyaratna makes clear throughout the novel that freedom entails mobility and practical activity. 
As Thomas Holt suggested, in a world after the abolition of  slavery, people were expected to find 
their freedom in wage labor. Not coincidentally, one of  the most philosophically-minded expositions 
on “freedom” in Vidyaratna’s novel occurs in a marketplace, namely, the Sunday markets that set up 
shop near the Sonitpur garden: 
This morning they are able to get a peek of  the sunshine of  freedom (swadhinatashuryer). Today ... 
is the day when the slaves get a slight amount of  freedom. In this country, the tea garden coolies 
on sunday take leave as they desire and go to the local markets (hat bajar), and they do not have 
to do any hard labor today.. 
…Many may be thinking, these illiterate, lowly laborers, what do they know about the meaning 
of  freedom (ki swadhinotar artha bujhe)? Whether they understand or not, what’s the point of  
fighting over the meaning of  a word? In the frolicking depths of  water, the large marine life 
enjoy the same rights (adhikar), joy (ananda), and happiness (ullash) as the small fish do. 
These lines suggest that freedom is a natural and basic condition of  existence that even illiterate 
workers can understand intuitively, just like fish who are born with the knowledge of  how to swim 
and enjoy the water. Vidyaratna continues,
From the coolie lines, we see all types of  dress and make-up. They sing all sorts of  music, like on 
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a festival day. Where are they going? To the market. What fancy things will they buy? For two or 
four rupees, they get oil, salt, betel nut, tobacco. Readers will then wonder, why are they going so 
crazy? They go crazy not for salt, oil, betel nut, nor tobacco, nor do they go crazy for the market, 
but only for freedom — for that thing that was lost and caused them to become beggars(93).
For the coolies, freedom is a form rather than content. Their joy does not come from the taste of  salt 
or oil, for they are given food on the tea gardens too. Rather, their joy comes from the way they are 
able to acquire those goods, through market exchange. 
Finally, in another passage from the middle of  the novel, Vidyaratna extends his vision of  the 
“naturalness” of  markets to the regulation of  labor. In a chapter set an all-planter meeting in 
Calcutta, one no doubt modeled on the Indian Tea Association, the planters’ top agenda item is how 
should they push for legislative reform that would give them even more control over labor. A man in 
the audience, perhaps the only planter with a conscience in Vidyaratna’s world, raises his hand and 
outlines a vision of  a self-regulating free labor market. The “good planter” says: 
‘[T]oday, we have a common law canon (ain kanun procholita ache), and we should follow it to the 
letter. If  we treated the coolies well (sadhwabahar), then our work would proceed smoothly, and 
the coolies would live in the gardens with peace of  mind.’ 
Before his speech was finished, he was interrupted by six or seven men around him pulling on 
his coat and trousers to make him sit down. Among them, another man stood up to speak: ‘The 
previous speaker’s words have no logic whatsoever, or else business cycles (byabsha chakra) would 
never occur. He’s speaking on faith, not facts. We cannot treat coolies with good behavior, 
because they are all too lazy. If  you try to make a lazy person work, it won’t work. We should use 
the same tactics on them that we use when trying to train a horse: hitting and kicking them until 
they learn their lesson . . . .’ (109)
…. The second speaker [the good planter] sought permission to stand up and speak again. ‘But 
why do the coolies flee? If  the coolies received good treatment on the gardens, if  they had 
enough to eat, then they would never flee. Like I was saying before, if  we treat the coolies well, 
then the gardens will run smoothly. And I still insist that in order to make the gardens operate 
well, then the contract labor laws aren’t even that necessary. If  we treat them well, they will not 
flee. They will be mindful, they will do their work, the gardens will run smoothly’ (110-111).
Central to this “good planter’s” vision of  a free labor market was faith in the rule of  law to 
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regulate abuse. The speaker’s vision of  free labor presumed that the coolies were themselves 
economic agents who were willing to do work under the right conditions. He first attacked the idea 
that extra-economic coercion was the best motivator, proposing instead that if  planters treated 
coolies well (sadhwabahar), then the coolies would not run away, “work would proceed smoothly, and 
the coolies would live in the gardens with peace of  mind.” This good planter justified free labor and 
“good treatment” not upon humane or moral reasons but instead upon the cold calculation of  
economic efficiency. Further, he also had faith that the workers themselves possessed an inner 
tendency towards waged labor, that they would not abscond at the first chance. “They will be 
mindful,” he says. “They will do their work, the gardens will run smoothly.” 
The idea that economic incentives are more efficient than extra-economic ones, that workers 
have an inner propensity to engage in waged work because of  their innate pursuit of  self-interest 
(money), were the foundational assumptions behind abolitionism decades earlier. Adam Smith had 
famously expressed these ideas in the eight chapter of  Book I of  the Wealth of  Nations (“It appears, 
accordingly, from the experience of  all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen 
comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves”),86 and they permeated the literature 
against slavery amongst merchants and capitalists throughout the early nineteenth century.87 And 
now, in late nineteenth-century India, the same ideas had traveled to Bengal, where they were 
embraced by middle-class liberals who sought to pioneer social reform that was in harmony with the 
economic development of  their region.
In fact, perhaps the most interesting line from this passage is the “bad planter” who suggests 
that business cycles (byabsha chakra) were the result of  absconding and lazy workers. Earlier in the 
novel, Bet Sahib and his colleague had also mentioned how the market had “fallen into such a slump 





pointed out how the planters had justified the penal contract upon economic necessity, but he did 
not believe that absconding workers were the real cause of  business losses. 
The penal contract, nationalist critics argued, retarded the natural self-regulating mechanisms of  
the tea and labor markets. By wielding so much power over wages, planters could always respond to 
falling prices for tea by squeezing out greater labor out of  their human capital. This labor-intensive 
strategy eventually resulted in overproduction, with the coolies bearing the brunt of  an 
oversaturated market. Meantime, just as the planters exhausted the labor market pool, employing too 
many workers too quickly, they sabotaged their own account books by pushing up the price for 
recruitment, the transaction costs of  acquiring labor. Such were the conditions behind the “high cost 
of  cheap labor” that Behal and Mohapatra outlined in their history of  Assam tea, one of  the “inherent 
contradictions” in the indenture system that appear so clearly to us today with the benefit of  
hindsight. Of  course, Vidyaratna could not foresee these economic developments with any certainty, 
but the essence of  his arguments about “freedom” nevertheless contained the suggestion that the 
perversions of  the indenture system were not simply harmful to the coolies but also self-defeating 
for the planters. The tea industry would be better off  providing economic incentives to workers 
rather than coercing them to work through violent punishment and physical containment.
Epilogue: the end of  indenture
Ganguli and Vidyaratna’s criticisms of  the penal contract as an “unfree” institution were prescient, 
as several decades would pass before the Government of  India took seriously the claim that “free 
labor” should be enshrined as a political ideal. At first, the government did not hesitate to 
acknowledge abuses and problems within the system of  coolie recruitment, but officials often 
stopped short of  attacking the system of  indenture itself. Ultimately, however, it was the inefficiency 
of  unfree labor, the same claim that Vidyaratna had voiced in his novel through the voice of  the 
“good planter,” that struck planters and officials as the most objectionable aspect of  the penal 
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contract. By the end of  the indenture system in the early twentieth century, the government had 
begun to once again accept the naturalness and desirability of  a political economic theory founded 
upon free labor. In this sense, they had returned to their Smithian beginnings. 
In the 1880s, with stories of  abuse circulating through both the English and Bengali-
language papers of  Calcutta, the provincial and imperial governments had no choice but to begin 
redressing claims of  recruiter and planter violence. The Bengal Council and the Government of  
India passed a series of  laws in 1889, 1893, 1896, and 1901, each premised upon the recognition that 
the coolie recruitment system “was full of  abuses and was not even beneficial to the planter, as it 
interferred [sp] with sardari recruiting and had raised the price of  labour.”88 As Samita Sen has 
documented, the government’s decision with Act I of  1882 to encourage the replacement of  
professional, licensed recruiters with private sardari recruitment had backfired: rather than 
encouraging an informal market of  private recruiters whose interests were to protect their recruits, 
the decision had instead effectively deregulated the professional recruiter system. Professional 
recruiters turned sardars into a subsidiary branch of  the formal market, as they asked the sardars to 
sell “their coolies to arkatis [professional recruiters] at a price above what they receive from their 
own employers.”89 Soon, the sardari and the professional networks became more “entangled” into a 
“nexus” of  impersonalized, commercialized recruitment that escaped government regulation.90 Local 
officials in Assam and the recruitment districts, such as Chota Nagpur, recognized this fact early 
after the passage of  the 1882 Act, but legislative responses came slowly.
The initial reforms had sought to preserve the indenture system, and most proposals aimed only 
to limit abuses in the recruitment process itself. “It will be seen that throughout the legislation which 
has taken place,” official documents recorded, “the main idea has been that there should be a 
88 1906 Report, 146.




contract binding the emigrant to serve on a tea estate for a certain number of  years.”91 Reform 
efforts included prescribing migration routes to Assam, reducing the length of  the contract by one 
year, requiring recruiters to pay for food and accommodation, and greater power for officials to 
cancel contracts should they uncover abuses.92 
Shortly after the passage of  the latest reform in 1901, the Chief  Comissioner of  Assam, Sir 
Henry Cotton, finally took aim at the institution of  indenture itself.93 In his “Report on Labour 
Immigration into Assam for the year 1900,” Cotton focused on the scandalously low wages laborers 
received from tea planters, which had resulted in a gradually increasing mortality rate.94 His detailed 
attack on the Indian tea industry spurred the ITA to respond with its own campaign, calling several 
meetings to organize its public response, and encouraging the Anglo-Indian press in Calcutta to 
denounce Cotton. The Bengali and English-language nationalist press, which had long criticized the 
tea coolie system dating back to the writings of  Vidyaratna, came to Cotton’s defense. Finally, 
Cotton’s fate lay in the hands of  the governor-general Lord Curzon. Privately, Curzon had 
supported Cotton, expressing his own concerns about the treatment of  Assam tea workers. But 
faced with pressure from the tea lobby, Curzon left Cotton out to dry. “I do not think that outside 
the Bengali Press,” Curzon wrote, “he has anywhere found an advocate. The fact is that Mr. Cotton 
is not a man of  sound or reliable judgment or temper.” Cotton was relieved of  his job the next year, 
and in his memoirs, he recalled that Curzon had “quailed” under pressure.95
In spite of  the unsavory ending to Cotton’s political career, his criticisms would be vindicated in 
91 1906 Report, 10.
92 1906 Report, 145.
93 1906 Report, 1. “As a remedy for the existing state of  affairs Sir Henry Cotton recommended that 
the advis ability of  abolishing the penal contract should be seriously considered.”
94 Rana P. Behal, “Coolie Drivers Or Benevolent Paternalists? British Tea Planters in Assam and the 




the following years. In 1901, the same year of  Cotton’s report, the government had acknowledged 
the folly of  the so-called free and private sardari system and returned to mandating full regulations 
for all forms of  recruitment. In restoring pre-1882 conditions, though, the government discovered 
that regulated recruitment was simply unworkable. Further, in 1903, a series of  riots on different tea 
plantations spurred the government to conduct another investigation into the relations between 
planters and recruited laborers. The report found that the indenture system was the root of  
unpopularity among potential recruits and that, therefore, “collisions between employers and their 
laborers” had steadily increased the last fourteen years.96 In 1904, tea planters in regions outside 
Assam which had never experienced the same labor shortages, Cachar and Sylhet in eastern Bengal, 
requested that all special labor laws be repealed. The Assam planters naturally disagreed, arguing that 
the industry would become prohibitively expensive without the penal contract. Finally, yet another 
inquiry was commissioned to investigate the workability of  abolishing the penal contract.
The report of  the 1906 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee was the most comprehensive report 
on tea labor since the 1868 Report commissioned after the end of  tea mania. Once again, the 
occasion was a crisis of  labor, but unlike four decades earlier, the tea planters of  1906 found 
themselves defending the very institution of  indenture itself. In the most basic terms, the 1906 
Report argued that the penal labor contract was uncompetitive with other regional industries that did 
not rely upon indenture. As perhaps the greatest indication that the tea gardens were as “industrial” 
as any urban factory, the authors argued that potential laborers balked at going to Assam and instead 
flocked towards other “industrial activity” in the “docks and jute mills of  Calcutta.”97 Indeed, over 
the previous decade, coal output had tripled from 2.7 to 7.2 million tons, and jute and shipping had 
each doubled. “The abuses which arose in connection with ‘free’ emigration brought about a rapid 
change,” the authors wrote, “and this, coupled with a marked decrease in population, the opening of  
96 1906 Report, 3.
97 1906 Report, 18.
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new railways and the starting of  new industries, has told strongly against recruitment.”98 This finding 
vindicated Cotton’s claim that the penal contract had begun to deter migrants to Assam. On an open 
and free market for labor, in other words, unfree contracts simply could not compete.
By contrast, when the government first proposed and passed laws supporting the use of  penal 
labor contracts in the 1860s, officials had reasoned that there simply did not exist the ideal 
conditions for a free labor market. Indian peasants were not economically rational and would not be 
attracted to Assam through normal market incentives. Indenture was thus justified as a temporary 
measure, a stopgap policy that would be one day repealed when free labor and free migration could 
be truly realized. With the 1906 Report, officials now seemed to suggest that the time had come. 
Wage labor had spread successfully throughout eastern India, in the coal mines, jute factories, and 
dockyards of  the region, and thus paternalistic policies were no longer needed to “create” a labor 
market. The market already stood on its own. “Conditions are changing,” the authors wrote, “the 
coolie is becoming more independent, and he is not ready to submit to the restraint which such a 
contract involves.”99 If  the government were to extend the principle of  free labor to the Assam tea 
industry, then such a move could be seen not as a repudiation of  earlier penal contract laws, as the 
defensive planters perceived them to be, but rather as the full realization of  those laws’ stated goals. 
In short, if  the aim of  indenture policies was to create a labor market, then their repeal validated 
their historical success.
According to the 1906 Report, the most visible evil in the indenture system was the professional 
recruiter. Given the now lively market in free labor, these recruiters could only succeed through acts 
of  deception and threat. According to the Report: 
The arkati, as the professional recruiter was called, has been described by different witnesses as 
the scum of  the earth, a heartless scoundrel who would boast that he could by ill-treatment 
98 1906 Report, 20.
99 1906 Report, 27.
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make any one ‘willing’ in a few minutes to emigrate to Assam and who was feared as much as a 
man-eating tiger. The spiriting away of  ignorant villagers by these unprincipled recruiters and the 
idea that their victims were ‘sold’ for work on the tea-gardens has left a deep impression on the 
minds of  the people.100
At issue, however, was not simply these “bad seeds” but rather the structural problems within 
the very institution of  indenture. Because the contract prevented coolies from changing their minds 
and leaving the tea garden after signing, the arkati was able to deceive them with impunity. If  coolies 
simply signed ordinary, non-physically binding contracts, then the recruiters’ tactics would be far less 
effective.
Several planters weighed in on the question of  the contract, and they agreed that indenture was a 
central factor behind higher recruitment costs, higher mortality rates, and dwindling supplies of  
workers. Mr. Bradish, a planter in Lakhimpur, told officials, “[i]n my opinion the contract has had 
much to do with deterring people from going to Assam. The labourer does not like being bound 
down.” A Mr. Anirudhlal Mahendra added, “amongst the people also there is a vague fear that by 
entering into a contract they may be selling their liberty for ever and may not be able to return to 
their homes.” But of  all the responses they received, the authors of  the 1906 Report wished to 
highlight the opinion of  a Mr. Winsland, an inspector who worked for several tea companies and 
estates in Dibrugarh. A planter of  over twenty years, Winsland provided some of  the most incisive 
and clearest analysis of  the shortcomings of  the current system. 
First, Winsland noted that by relying upon a third-party, planters were effectively giving money 
to the recruiters which was in fact owed to the coolies: 
Here we have all three communities interested in the industry dissatisfied - the Government, the 
coolie and the planter. Who then does score over the system? Why, the people into whose 
pockets the planter’s lacs and lacs of  rupees fall every year, and who are in no way connected with 
or interested in the industry. The coolie does not benefit one brass farthing from our lavish 
expenditure, and the sooner we devise some system by which he secures the benefit of  any 
outlay we make, the sooner we shall get what we require.
100 1906 Report, 23.
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Second, Winsland echoed the ideas of  Vidyaratna, whose own arguments stemmed from the 
Smithian strand of  the abolitionist movement. Namely, Winsland argued that the disciplinary tactics 
that tea planters used to squeeze production out of  their workers, what I have analyzed as a 
repertoire of  “labor-intensive” tactics, had eroded the workforce’s energy and enthusiasm over the 
long run. “The final result, so far as this garden is concerned, is that with its increased area labour is 
insufficient, and the management has had to insist on more discipline, i.e.,  more work and less leave.” 
If  workers were treated better and given more freedom, Winsland continued, then they would 
naturally work harder and more efficiently: “I do not believe in a coolie wanting more pay, but 
perhaps less pay and more liberty, it suits his habits and constitution much better. The strict discipline 
our present shortage of  labour forces us to keep up results in the survival of  the fittest, but for a 
coolie’s health and happiness give him more liberty and leave, and he can keep well and fit on half  
his pay.”101
Though the 1906 Report did not immediately inspire any blanket legislation from the 
Government, many planters and local districts simply opted to rely upon “free labor” contracts and 
to avoid the recruitment system altogether. Finally, Act VIII of  1915 abolished the contractor and 
professional recruiter system, and in 1926, all residual legislation that allowed the usage of  older 
penal contract laws were finally repealed. After nearly seventy years of  uneven implementation, the 
indenture system was finally dead.102 
101 1906 Report, 178-180. Hereafter referred to as 1906 Proceedings.
102 For a more detailed legislative history of  the end of  the indenture, see Griffiths, 267-296.
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Chapter Eight 
Competition, compradors, and cooperatives: Wu Juenong and
 the agrarian question, 1905-1942
“In an industrial civilization the central problem is the wage-contract; in a society of  peasants, it 
is prices, credit and tenure.”
RH Tawney, Land and labour in China.
Introduction: Comprador capitalism in Chinese history
There is an elegant symmetry in the world history of  tea from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. 
Chapter three demonstrated how the establishment of  the Indian tea industry depended upon 
British activity in China in the 1830s. Similarly, the story of  Chinese tea modernization almost one 
century later cannot be understood without examining how late Qing and Republican (1911-1949) 
reformers carefully studied the practices of  Indian tea and how their experiences impacted their 
perspectives on their own agrarian society. These latter events form the main content of  this final 
chapter, the goal of  which is to narrate efforts at tea reform in China from the turn of  the twentieth 
century to the outbreak of  the Sino-Japanese war (1937).
In the political theory of  the high Qing, tea merchants had been the protagonist of  the overseas 
tea trade since its inception. These attitudes also reflected the Qing state’s broader attitudes towards 
commerce. During the first 45 years after the establishment of  the treaty port system in 1842, tea led 
all exports from Qing China, and, at the outset, China was virtually alone in exporting tea to the 
world. But after the 1880s, the Chinese trade suffered a continuous decline over the following 
decades. At the time, Qing political thinkers still conceived of  tea merchants as a value-creating, 
dynamic, and entrepreneurial business class. Although Chen Chi (1896) had advocated for the 
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industrialization of  agriculture, he remained optimistic that merchants could lead this change.1 
However, after decades of  ineffective solutions, and with the tea trade a mere shadow of  its 
formerly vibrant self, nationalist reformers in the 1930s set about restructuring the contours of  the 
trade. Central to this program was an attempt to isolate and eliminate the same merchants in order 
to establish integrated cooperative production and marketing. Whereas in earlier times the tea trade 
metonymically stood in for Qing China’s relationship with the world market, tea now became a 
referendum on the fragile nation’s ability to reconstitute itself  in the face of  the colonizing forces of  
competition around the world – Indian, Ceylonese, Indonesian, Japanese, and Taiwanese tea. And, 
over the course of  this process, the tea merchant came to symbolize the defunct, “feudal” Qing 
empire’s inability to successfully resist the expansion of  foreign capital.
This denunciation of  native “comprador” traders should sound familiar to readers familiar with 
the history of  twentieth-century Chinese politics. The conception of  a tradition-bound, small-
minded merchant was perhaps the most dominant trope animating the social and economic history 
of  China in the first half  of  the last century.2 In more recent years, however, scholars of  China have 
tried to counter older stereotypes of  the static and feudal “Asiatic mode of  production” by 
indicating how in late imperial times, Chinese merchants were more dynamic and sophisticated than 
formerly imagined. This type of  revisionist history, however, only further magnifies the need to 
account for the peculiar way in which Chinese thinkers at the turn of  the twentieth century harbored 
critical views of  merchants and their role within society. 
This chapter historically situates such anti-merchant sentiment within efforts to understand the 
collapse of  the Chinese tea trade (“teamen,” after all, were the original compradors). I shall focus on 
the efforts of  two reformers who were instrumental in introducing a new approach to tea 
production. The first was a young industrialist named Lu Ying (1878-??), who spent three years 
1 Chen Chi, 350. 
2 Cf. Yen-P’ing Hao 1970, 1-14.
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visiting the tea plantations of  South Asia during the twilight years of  the Qing empire. His overseas 
experiences from 1905 to 1908 compelled him to view his homeland with fresh eyes, namely, from 
the standpoint of  the industrial, Indian mode of  tea production. He and his peers began to measure 
the Chinese tea trade -- decentralized, segmented, informal -- against the highly regulated and 
organized forms of  production and management in India, which was replete with large plantations 
and corporate managing agencies. Lu Ying began to measure the Chinese trade against the standards 
of  the Indian industry, and this comparative perspective changed how Chinese reformers, 
economists, officials, and bureaucrats thought about tea merchants and merchant capital.
Next, I discuss the efforts of  Wu Juenong (1897-1989), who in the 1930s led efforts to organize 
tea production into rural cooperatives. A member of  the May Fourth generation of  thinkers, Wu 
Juenong’s early exposure to works by leftwing writers from around the world shaped his thought on 
two fronts: first, he was extremely sympathetic to the “agrarian question” debated by scholars 
around the world who were concerned about the fate of  the peasantry in an increasingly 
industrializing world. Thus, Wu Juenong studied agrarian economics by adopting the perspective of  
the peasantry, rather than the usual standpoint of  the government and business. Second, Wu 
Juenong and his colleagues admired the rational social science techniques of  foreign researchers, and 
they conducted their own surveys of  the tea-growing districts of  Anhui and Fujian. Utilizing the 
methods of  firsthand fieldwork (diaocha ćċ) and quantitative measurements, they provided some 
of  the earliest, most vivid descriptions of  tea peasant life.
Lu Ying and Wu Juenong both understood the Chinese tea economy by placing it within a 
dynamic global economy. They were particularly aware of  the rationalized, capital-intensive 
techniques of  their direct competitors in South Asia. Seen from this global perspective, the domestic 
tea merchants began to appear less as a force of  dynamism and more as an anachronistic holdover 
from the Qing empire. Wu Juenong pushed the critique of  merchant exploitation even further by 
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attempting to take ownership and control away from merchants and placing tea production into the 
hands of  the peasants and workers themselves. He and his friends attempted to established tea 
cooperatives across the tea districts of  China, and along the way they produced some of  the first in-
depth investigations of  everyday life from the perspective of  the Chinese tea worker. The 
concluding section analyzes the journal Chasheng Banyuekan, or, The Voice of  Tea, the publication 
which placed greatest emphasis on the livelihood of  tea producers and which also most clearly 
articulated an industrial labor -- as opposed to circulationist -- theory of  value.
Lu Ying’s travels through South Asia
India through Chinese eyes
The first proposals by Qing officials to study Indian tea arose in the last decade of  the nineteenth 
century. Zhang Zhidong had advocated using machines to process tea, which they believed were the 
key to profitable tea production in British India.3 In 1896, Liu Kunyi, then Governor-General of  the 
Liangjiang region, advanced this proposal to the local merchants of  Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and 
Hunan, but the tea merchants “fiercely protested” it.4 Chen Chi later memorialized in 1896: “each 
post should allocate funds and choose one Chinese and one foreign tea specialist and secretly send 
them to India to inspect and test out their tea production methods, buy some machines, and bring 
them back to the mountains to process tea.”5 Finally, in 1905, the new Governor-General of  
Liangjiang, an Anhui native, commissioned Zheng Shihuang to travel through southeast Asia, 
Ceylon, and India to inspect several matters of  national interest: the state of  overseas Chinese, the 
overseas consumption of  opium, the production of  salt, and, most importantly, methods of  
3 Cf. Chen Binfan, Yu Yue, and Guan Bowen, eds., Zhongguo Cha Wenhua Jingdian [The Classic of  
Chinese Tea Culture] (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1999), 601-604. Also, Liu Kunyi on 574.
4 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 258.
5 Chen Chi, 348.
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producing tea in South Asia. 
Zheng Shihuang and his assistant Lu Ying left from Shanghai on April nine. “When we left,” Lu 
recalled in his journal, “everyone at the port took off  their hats and waved handkerchiefs to send us 
off.”6 After stopping in Singapore and Saigon, the party spent most of  May and June in Ceylon. 
They had many contacts with tea managers there, as their British entourage had entreated colleagues 
to introduce them to their planter friends in Ceylon. By late June, they made their way to Calcutta, 
and after a week of  observing the local sights, they traveled to Darjeeling via a series of  cars and 
intermediary stations. Whereas Ceylon, they noted, was far too tropical to compare with the central 
tea districts of  China, they found the cool air of  Darjeeling much closer to that of  the mountains of  
China. “Once we arrived in the mountains,” Lu would recount half  a century later, “we settled into a 
guest house in the woods. Then we split up and took cars and elephants up to the gardens. The 
plantation manager exclaimed that their teas were as good as those of  Qimen, so we tasted it and 
admitted that it had a bit of  the unique aroma and flavor of  Qimen.”7 Qimen was a south Anhui tea 
district that was quickly gaining a reputation as the premier tea region of  central China, and it would 
play a large role in tea reform efforts later (In the appendix at the end of  this dissertation, I discuss 
the history of  Qimen black teas and their curious origins in world trade). After spending most of  
July traveling to other parts of  India, the party spent August slowly making its way back to China. By 
August 27, five months after first arriving in Shanghai, the party returned. There, Zheng Shihuang 
retired to his office, but Lu Ying continued traveling for years afterwards.8
6 Lu Ying, Yisinian Diaocha Yinxi Chawu Riji [Diary of  1909 Survey of  India and Ceylon Tea] (1909), vol. 
69, Tang-Song-Yuan-Qing Cangshi Shiliao Huibian 9 (Beijing: Xueyuan Chubanshe, 2009), 3.
7 Lu Chengxi [Lu Ying], “Wo Di Zishu [My Autobiography] (1951),” in Jiangsu Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, 
vol. 18 (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), 128.
8  As he documented later, it was in Japan that he met Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary group, the 
Tongmenghui (United League), to which he was immediately attracted. Lu, “Wo,” 127.
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Lu Ying returned to Darjeeling in 1906 to conduct research for two more years.9 He had become 
obsessed with industrial methods of  tea production, and he wished to locate and fully research the 
conditions of  the closest analogue India offered to a Chinese climate. The humid conditions of  
Assam and Ceylon were too dissimilar from the climate of  central China. “When I was in the tea 
mountains in Ceylon, I paid special attention to this matter of  leaf  picking. I noticed that the climate 
was tropical and therefore unlike that of  the Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei belt. I then returned to 
Darjeeling and devoted all my energy to studying there.”10 
Lu Ying’s memoirs of  his first trip are fascinating, one of  the earliest accounts of  reformers 
from China making their way through the complex, uneven terrain of  the colonial Asian world. As 
educated gentry, both Lu and Zheng knew and heard much about South Asia, but this was a rare 
opportunity to document and describe personal encounters firsthand.11 
The most historically fascinating passage came courtesy of  Lu Ying’s daytime wanderings in 
Calcutta. When they first landed on the Hooghly River that cut through the heart of  the city, Lu 
9  Lu Chengxi, 130; and Lu Ying, “Lu Ying Jiu Woguo Chaye Shuaibai Qingxing Zhi Shiyebu Cheng 
[Letter from Lu Ying to the Ministry of  Industry Regarding the Collapse of  the Chinese Tea 
Industry] (1931),” in Zhonghua Minguoshi Dang’an Ziliao, ed. Zhongguo di’er lishi dang’anguan, vol. 1, 
5 (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1994), 868.
10  Lu Ying 1994, 870.
11  For instance, here was their experience at a tea planter bungalow in Ceylon:
Earlier, the British consulate station in Ningzhou had sent a letter introducing us. In the afternoon, I 
went with two men in my party to visit Robertson’s house at the top of  a hill, surrounded on all four 
sides by flowers and trees. A child came out with an elaborate silver tray, and on it laid two greeting 
cards to introduce himself  and his wife. Then the two came out and shook hands with us like we 
were old acquaintances. We all took a tour through the reading room and then had a light-hearted 
chat. He invited his second daughter to come out and play a tune on the piano. They then led us to 
the dining room. The study room was decorated ornate, and in the guest room, they had laid out 
ancient Chinese artifacts, Japanese lacquer ware, and on the wall hung an intricately design golden 
brocade and various photographs.…
Zheng Shihuang, Yisinian Kaocha Yinxi Cha Tu Riji [Diary of  1909 Survey of  Tea Soil in India and Ceylon] 




Ying described the imperial capitol this way: “Ten thousand boats cluster in the harbor. Merchandise 
stores are bunched like small plants. Streets and alleys are straight as an arrow. Tramways and horse-
carts line the roads without end. Large mansions with gates and yards, towering and majestic white 
buildings that face one another.”12 Several days later, a shop owner they had met in the Chinatown 
brought Lu to visit a clubhouse of  local intelligentsia:
There we met some elite members (guizu żƽ) of  Indian society and got to learn about how, in 
recent times, Indian people have begun to share ideas about self-rule. In the midst of  the 
conversation, they began to refer to us collectively. They said, ‘originally, we Asians were 
connected as one (ben yiti c). Sadly, in recent centuries, the western powers have invaded 
the east, and and interaction with your esteemed nation has been cut off.’ What a shock to hear!13
Lu Ying was sympathetic to these early rumblings of  a nationalist independence movement. It 
did not escape him that just as China and India had been thrown together by the same forces of  
market competition, so too did they face similar problems of  modernization and the fight to retain, 
or recapture, self-rule in the face of  expansive European colonialism.14 Over the next few pages of  
12 Lu Ying 2009, 50
13 Lu Ying 2009, 52.
14 Many Chinese thinkers during this period, Rebecca Karl has demonstrated, constantly drew 
analogies between the recent history of  Qing China -- loss of  sovereignty, failing economy, military 
humiliations -- with other colonized peoples. Cf. Rebecca E Karl, Staging the World: Chinese 
Nationalism at the Turn of  the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).
Just years earlier, famed reformer Kang Youwei had fled to India after the conservative coup d’état 
ending the One Hundred Days Reform endangered his life. There, he penned an essay of  sympathy 
towards colonized India, warning that India represented the worst-case scenario for a crumbling 
China. And, just years later, Zhang Taiyan, an anti-Qing revolutionary studying in Tokyo, would 




his diary, Lu Ying demonstrated a general grasp of  Indian society, detailing the pitfalls of  its 
traditional caste system, its institutions of  child marriage, its addiction to opium, and its irrational 
worship of  animal deities. Ultimately, Lu Ying made clear he sympathized with the cause for 
independence: “Every year, the Indians hold a large national meeting [referring to the Indian 
National Congress] advocating for rights (minquan éƆ). Their influence is growing daily.” He 
predicted independence as an inevitability: “Today, Australia has self-rule, and Canada has 
established its own legislature. Their influence is reaching the whole world. Surely, the British will 
soon have to change the direction of  rule in India.”15
Apart from these interesting asides, Lu Ying’s mission was to better understand the process of  
teamaking in Ceylon and India. Although he peppered his diary with individual episodes of  tea 
gardens in Ceylon and Darjeeling, he saved his most systematic account for an essay in the appendix 
titled “Summary of  observations about tea.” He first began by referencing the British experiments 
in upper Assam sixty years earlier, which had relied upon Chinese cooperation: “[The British] first 
grew in Indian, then in Ceylon. They first tried to learn about tea in Japan but were rejected. They 
continued on to look at tea grown in Hunan [sic] and finally were able to obtain some. They spent a 
great fortune hiring our own countrymen to come to India and teach the methods for growing and 
processing tea. They now have about sixty years of  experience.” He then described how the British 
utilized their knowledge of  “chemistry” and “research” activities to improve the “colors, moisture, 
and aroma” of  tea. They also used machines, which helped them “pick, fire, and sift” leaves. And, 
structurally, they benefited from “companies of  massive wealth,” namely, joint-stock managing 
agencies, “reliable government support,” and “trains and large boats to transport tea.” In sum, their 
advantage was that “productions costs are low, and their prices fall gradually cheaper. They are 
15 Lu Ying 2009, 56.
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quickly squeezing out Chinese tea.”16 
Besides this last line, Lu Ying said virtually nothing about Chinese tea in his diary and kept his 
focus on the Indian plantations he saw before him. But the subtext was clear. Every time he named 
an institutional strength of  South Asian tea, he was simultaneously isolating a weakness of  Chinese 
tea. This was a comparison between competing commodities — South Asian and Chinese tea — 
that invited a more detailed historical and technical understanding of  the production process. It 
signals for us the importance of  taking seriously the process of  competition as a cognitive and 
mental process.
Competition in consciousness
Lu Ying’s travels were a pivotal moment in the history of  tea modernization, so much so that in 
retrospect, writings about tea in China can be divided into those written before and after his trips to 
India. Prior, Qing writers such as Chen Chi struggled with how to describe concepts of  
“industrialization,” juggling new ideas about capitalist production with classical phrases about 
agriculture. Starting with Lu Ying, reformers began to speak about tea cultivation through more 
technical language, repeating standardized ideas about integrated production and efficiency. 
After returning, Lu Ying recalled that the trip broadened his perspective on what was possible 
with tea production: “Only after returning from India and Ceylon, where I accumulated several years 
of  experience, did I understand that reform did not have to be limited to existing tools, such as old 
baking baskets. The new methods can be taught, such as using the rolling, sifting, and cutting 
machines.”17 Decades later, Lu Ying recounted the larger transformative effect:
In my thirty-plus years of  service, it was only during my trip to India and Ceylon from 1905 to 
1908 that I first understood that, in India and Ceylon, the planters studied every aspect of  
cultivation, from the planting of  seeds, the cultivation of  soil, the trimming of  branches, and the 
16 Lu Chengxi, 133.
17 Lu Ying, Diaocha Guonei Chawu Baogaoshu [A Report on Surveys of  Domestic Tea Matters], 1910, 34.
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application of  manure to the picking of  leaves. I knew our country’s peasants would never be 
able to dream of  matching the fastidious spirit when trimming branches and picking leaves. In 
terms of  processing tea in India and Ceylon, every factory had honed each step into an 
integrated science (yiqi he cheng nŠ3), from cooling, rolling, and fermentation to firing, 
sifting, and packing. . . . In the fields of  cultivation, processing, and marketing, we lack 
knowledge of  agronomy (nongxue), industrial science (gongxue), and business (shangxue).”18
The main lesson Lu Ying had learned was not about any particular technique but rather an entire 
attitude to education and science. Competition was not only a technical matter for him but also an 
intellectual one. 
Although competition is one of  the most pervasive features of  modern economic life, it remains 
an under-theorized concept. As a problem of  economic thought, it is overlooked precisely because it 
seems to be devoid of  thinking, a mere reflex.19 Marx had written in his notes that he would 
someday write a full “chapter on competition,” but it was never finished.20 However, he did leave 
behind some speculative observations that may help us understand how Lu Ying’s travels to India 
impacted his own thought process about Chinese tea. In competition, Marx claimed, “everything 
appears upside down.”21 By “upside down,” he meant that in commercial competition, it appeared 
that inanimate objects and lifeless numbers seemed to take on animate properties. Indian tea did 
battle with Chinese tea on the stage of  the world market, and their weapons were their prices. 
Hidden from view were the complex networks of  merchants, planters, peasants, and laborers who 
18 Lu Ying 1994, 868.
19 Consider how an encyclopedia of  economics defines competition: “When other competitors 
learn what actions lead to profits, they may emulate the original supplier. Conversely, losses tell 
suppliers what to abandon or modify.” Kasper, Wolfgang, “competition.” 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Competition.html
20 Marx 1973, 436 and 762. Economist Fred Moseley has posted an online article discussing the role 
of  “competition” in Marx’s work entitled, “Capital in General and Competition in Volume 3 of  
Capital: the Quantitative Dimension.”
21 Marx 1993, 311. Cf. Marx 1981, 338.
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were responsible for bringing the commodity to the market in the first place.22 Market competition 
reduced those historically dense human relationships into quantifiable and calculable figures: how 
did wages compare between the Chinese and Indian industries? What about costs of  transport or 
turnover time?
By reducing the tea production and marketing process into quantifiable common denominators 
that could be systematically analyzed, Lu Ying was able to make direct comparisons between the tea 
districts of  China and India, which had been organized under very historically different 
circumstances. For instance, he framed the production processes through quantitative measures that 
expressed the superiority of  Indian tea production in an elegantly simple formula: “productions 
costs are low, and their prices fall gradually cheaper.”23 In 1909, right after he returned, Lu Ying 
described Indian tea through a three-part rubric of  production: cultivation, processing, and 
marketing. Such categories stemmed from the organization of  the Indian plantation: the tea pluckers 
in the field, the machine operators in the factories, and the merchants in the auction house. These 
three categories did not perfectly correspond to the organization of  Chinese society, however, but 
Lu Ying was nevertheless able to mentally reorganize China tea and squeeze its actors into the boxes 
of  Indian tea. In the simplest terms, if  the Indian tea plantations and the Chinese tea networks were 
playing two different games, then once Lu Ying substituted the Indian rules for the Chinese ones, it 
became overwhelmingly clear just how poorly Chinese tea production seemed prepared for the 
twentieth century.  In a memorial he sent to the Ministry of  Industry in 1931, Lu Ying presented his 
findings through the same tripartite rubric. He utilized a parallel writing style that repeatedly jumped 
22  “Marx summarized this as the “personification of  things and reification of  the relations of  
production.” Marx 1993, 969. Also, cf. Marx 1976, 166: “the relations of  labor … do not appear as 
direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as thingly relations between persons 
and social relations between things.”
Also cf. Isaak Il!ich Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of  Value (Detroit: Black & Red, 1972), 26-27: “In 
competition, then, everything appears inside out, and always seems to be in reverse.”
23  Lu Ying 2009, 133.
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between the monosyllabic wo  (“us,” China) and ren 
 (“other people,” referring to industrialists 
in Ceylon and India):
  
Whereas our country’s tea peasants, tea laborers, tea merchants all adhere to old methods, the 
others all pay close attention to improvement. As far as cultivation, then the others use new 
knowledge and science in order to raise the quality and create strong flavor. We (wo) only take 
refuge in our ignorance, and we let the mountains fill with old, dying trees. As far as processing, 
the others (ren) use machines to keep costs low. We, however, use human power, which keeps 
costs high. As far as marketing, others spend large amounts of  money on techniques to fiercely 
compete. We, however, are penniless, and we have no ability to market.24
In Lu Ying’s view, Chinese tea had collapsed because domestic merchants did not think about 
their craft in the same terms as their British rivals had. They carried out transactions under many 
headings, and these were not broken down into a ledger of  cost-effective inputs and outputs. 
Without an accurate record of  these numbers, Lu Ying complained, the Chinese mode of  tea 
production simply appeared inferior to the economic approach of  their overseas competitors. Lu 
Ying now analyzed the Chinese tea trade by documenting the various ways in which it fell short of  
the rational organization of  the Indian industry. The Chinese mode of  tea production had been 
“subsumed by analogy” to the Indian mode.25
China through Indian eyes
When Lu Ying returned to China in 1909, he must have felt overwhelmed by the task that lay before 
him. His overseas experience had convinced him that the conditions of  the Chinese tea trade were 
more deficient than previously imagined. The new modes of  tea production taking place in Ceylon 
and India were nothing short of  revolutionary, a “tea revolution” (cha geming ĠȒĀ) that he hoped 
to bring back to China. But progress was slow, for the Qing government was on the brink of  
collapse in 1910 when Lu Ying established the Tea Studies Workshop. When Qing empire collapsed 




anticlimactically, state funds disappeared, and the workshop shut down.26 However, Lu Ying was 
undeterred in his efforts. During that brief  one-year window, Lu Ying had received funding to visit 
one of  the major market areas, namely Hankou in Hubei, which served as a hub for tea before it was 
transported to Shanghai.27 Further, he could call upon old and powerful friends. In his youth, Lu 
Ying had befriended the Chinese entrepreneur Zhang Jian, who had gained fame for establishing an 
industrial-style cotton mill in Nantong, Jiangsu. During the early years of  the provisional Republican 
Government, Zhang Jian led the Ministry of  Agriculture and Commerce (nongshangbu), and in 1913, 
he sent Lu Ying to investigate tea production in the six key tea-growing provinces.28 During this 
investigation, Lu Ying made an important determination about the best locations for growing export 
teas. During his trip to India, Lu Ying mentioned how much the mountainous region of  Darjeeling 
reminded him of  Qimen county in southern Anhui. By 1915, he had no doubt that Qimen enjoyed 
the best climactic condition for growing a high-quality dark tea, and it thus represented China’s best 
shot at repositioning itself  in the world tea market. “Only the Qimen black tea, with its unique and 
fragrant aroma,” he wrote, “is worth focusing on. Qimen black tea quality truly surpasses that of  the 
best Darjeeling teas, and the teas of  Assam, Ceylon, and Java have no chance of  matching it. Thus, 
as long as we hope to revive the Chinese trade, we need to start with Qimen black.”29
In March 1915, Zhang Jian asked Lu Ying to accompany a British man named Redd to Qimen 
county. Once they arrived, Redd “went alone to the peasant houses and got a peek at how they 
rolled leaves, then he went to watch them pick leaves every day, tested out ways to pick the leaves. 
Only then did I realize his true purpose.” When Lu Ying reported back to the ministry the next 
month, he was told that Redd had applied to set up a tea garden in Qimen but officials had rejected 
26 Lu Ying 1994, 868.
27 Lu Ying 1910. 
28 Lu Chengxi, 133. 
29 Lu Ying 1994, 869.
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his plan, citing treaty provisions which barred foreigners from running businesses in the interior. 
Still, Lu Ying was heartened to learn that foreign businessmen agreed on the high quality of  Qimen 
tea. He collaborated with ministry officials to attempt focusing reform efforts on Qimen county, and 
he headed a new experimental tea center in Qimen in 1915. Zhang Jian had since left the Ministry of  
Industry and asked Lu Ying to return with him to Nantong, but when Lu Ying insisted on sticking it 
out in Qimen, Zhang sent his former student support for his new tea center.30
It is difficult to judge how successful Lu Ying’s efforts were during this time. He later recalled it 
as a highly productive period of  experimentation and cooperation between the Anhui and Jiangxi 
provinces, and such experiments formally continued up until 1928.31 Decades later, reformers 
remembered these first efforts as a “flower that bloomed for only a brief  moment” (tanhua yixian ɾ
A).32 The 1915 experimental station was effectively stopped after one year, and the world trade 
in tea was also seriously affected by the Russian revolution and the First World War, not to mention 
domestic strife between the warlords and the various Republican parties in China.33 
If  Lu Ying’s efforts in the 1910s did not produce immediate results in the form of  modern 
plantations, he at least successfully popularized the idea that China tea production required new 
education and a commitment to science. He understood that reformers would need to make a 
concerted effort to reach the peasants and merchants who lived in the isolated tea countries. “In the 
tea districts,” he wrote, “there was no education about the science of  tea. I called for more agrarian, 
industrial, and commercial education, the reform of  old methods, and the scientification of  three 
30 Lu Chengxi, 136.
31 Lu Chengxi, 136-138
32 Wu Juenong [1983] 1987, 437.
33 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 259. WJN, 437.
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items: cultivation, processing, and marketing.”34
The practical education that Lu Ying sought could not to be met by scholarly translations of  
European science textbooks alone. He also wanted practical study of  the industrial tea production he 
witnessed in South Asia. Short of  sending students to India, the next best solution was to send them 
to Japan.35  Lu Ying became less personally involved in tea reform efforts by the end of  the 1920s, 
but his education programs directly ensured that others would pick up where he left off. In 
particular, one of  the young students who benefited from those overseas scholarship opportunities, 
Wu Juenong, would eventually become the most important agrarian reformer of  tea production in 
twentieth-century China.
The Nanjing Decade (1927-1937): An anti-merchant critique gains steam
Wu Juenong asks the agrarian question of  China
Perhaps the easiest way for the reader to understand Wu Juenong is to first inquire into the origins 
of  his peculiar name (ȝUǁ). Originally given a different birth name, he was born in 1897 to a 
middle-class farmer family in Shangyu, Zhejiang province, part of  the highly commercialized Yangzi 
Delta. His immediate surroundings made a profound impression on him: “In my hometown, there 
were many peasants in the mountains who grew tea, drinking tea was entirely common, but because 
the peasants’ lives were so difficult, and because they knew nothing about scientific cultivation, tea 
farming was backwards, small scale and only a side occupation.”36 By the time he graduated from the 
Zhejiang Number One Agrarian Sciences College (zhejiangsheng jia zhongnongye zhuanke xuexiao) and 
34  Lu Ying 1994, 870.
35  Lu Ying 1994, 874. “This education cannot be found in European and American schools, and in 
Japan, it is only in the infant stages. Without systematically studying and accumulating the various 
strengths of  tea in India, Ceylon, Java, and Japan, and utilizing it to integrate together the business 
of  the six provinces and three treaty ports, and training a large number of  skilled personnel, there’s 
no way to save the precariously-positioned tea industry.”
36 Wu Juenong [1983] 1987, 434.
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made his way to Shizuoka, Japan to study tea cultivation, he had begun calling himself  a new name: 
“Juenong.” How did he choose this new name? The nong ǁ was straightforward enough: it signified 
the agrarian, and it was also shorthand for the nongmin, or the peasantry (lit. “the agrarian people”). 
Near the end of  his life, a ninety-two year old Wu explained: “My name is Juenong. Why did I 
choose this name? My entire life, the issue which concerned me the most was the living conditions 
of  the peasantry and their ability to produce.”37
What about the jue U? The Chinese character carries the connotation of  realization, 
consciousness (juewu), or awakening (juexing). In his first work on the peasantry, Wu wrote: “The 
great masses of  the peasantry cannot afford not to achieve authentic consciousness (juewu)!”38 Thus, 
although trained as a scientist and economist, disciplines often caricatured for sharing a robotic view 
of  nature and of  human activity, Wu announced his deeply romantic sense of  political responsibility. 
Further, around the same time that he chose his new name, those childhood encounters with 
agrarian poverty crystallized into serious intellectual and political pursuits for him: “I was born in a 
tea village, and thus I developed an interest in tea science in high school. I hoped to one day devote 
my energy to reviving the tea trade.”39
Wu is today remembered as the “modern-day saint of  tea,” and in his lifetime he helped pioneer 
the modernization of  the national tea trade. In Republican China (1912-1949), he worked in the 
Shanghai Commodities Inspection Bureau, led the Qimen experimental tea station, and managed the 
nationally-owned China Tea Company. Later, he served as vice minister of  the Ministry of  
Agriculture in the PRC government. These nominal titles, however, barely scratch the surface. As 
37 Cited in Wang Xufeng, Cha zhe sheng: Wu Juenong zhuan [The tea saint: Wu Juenong] (Hangzhou: 
Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2003), 15.        
38 Wu Juenong, “Zhongguo de nongmin wenti” [The agrarian problem of  China], in Dongfang Zazhi 
19.16 (1922), 17.
39 Wu Juenong [1983] 1987, 434.
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one digs deeper into the varied efforts to research and revive agrarian production during the last 
century, one notices Wu’s name everywhere, from Beijing to Shanghai, Anhui to Yunnan.40 
After graduating from college in 1918, Wu accepted an opportunity to study at the Kanaya 
experimental tea station in Shizuoka province (shizuoka kanaya nihon chagyô shikenjô). Thus, Wu, having 
never lived in a major city in China, set off  for three years to study and live alone in a foreign 
country. He had begun learning Japanese on the eve of  his departure, and he continued his studies 
during free time in Shizuoka. There, he would master not only Japanese but also dabble in English, 
Russian and other European languages. These were formative times for Wu’s education and 
economic philosophy. “Besides participating in cultivation and refinement experiments,” Wu 
recalled, “I also traveled as an observer to every tea factory and conducted more experiments with 
them to understand all aspects of  production.” During leisure hours, “I collected from [my 
coworkers] materials on tea in Japan and other countries, and they taught me every stage of  
processes for growing, refining and transporting tea.”41 
Upon returning to China in 1922, Wu made a strong impression on the intellectual and 
publishing world of  China by penning over thirty printed articles in a two-year span. In the articles, 
he displayed his newfound erudition by quoting from Euro-American authors like Kenyon 
Butterfield, John Dewey, Frederick Engels, Oliver Goldsmith, Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Leo 
Tolstoy. During the same period, he courted friendships with a variety of  China’s most famous 
writers from this period, including the Comintern member Chen Hansheng, the agrarian economist 
40 In part, his ubiquity and prominence can be explained as a function of  scarcity. In order to gain 
the necessary qualifications and expertise to reform the tea trade, someone from this period would 
have needed to benefit from the education and support that came with a scholarship to study 
overseas. Wu was only the second Chinese student ever sent to study Japanese tea production, one 
of  only eight total. None of  the other men ever rose to the same positions of  power, or expressed 
the same commitment, as Wu would. Wu Juenong [1943] 1987, 259.
41 Wu Juenong [1983] 1987, 434
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Figure 14. Tea experiment station, Makinohara, Shizuoka. 
Wu Juenong studied abroad at a research center similar to this one: the tea experimental station of  
the Agriculture and Forestry Department, Shizuoka.42
Zou Bingwen, the writer and editor Zhou Jianren, and his famous brother Lu Xun. Firmly immersed 
in the intellectually creative and politically progressive world of  May Fourth Shanghai, Wu’s writings
from this period spanned different genres that appear unrelated at first but which, I shall argue, 
revealed a dimension of  his thought highly sympathetic to the experiences of  those he believed were 
oppressed by traditional Chinese social structures.
First, from January 1922 to July 1924, Wu published twenty-six pieces criticizing the feudal 
family structure of  China and also translating the ideas of  European feminist thinkers, primarily the 
Swedish writer Ellen Key. If  Wu would eventually help create a national discourse on the “agrarian 
question,” then through these first pieces he contributed to the ongoing and lively debate over the 
“woman question.”43 The majority appeared in the Ladies’ Journal (funü zazhi ǓGƚƸ), a major 
42 Ukers, 325.
43 Wu Juenong, for reasons never explained, did not publish these under his own name. Instead, he 
used the initials Y.D., which mystified readers and actually led to a spirited debate over the true 
identity of  this writer. In her comprehensive study of  Chinese feminism, Tani Barlow followed 
convention and identified Y.D. as Li Rongdi. Only recently has the Japanese historian Maeyama 
Kanako verified that “Y.D.” was in fact Wu Juenong. The Y.D. derived from the Japanese 
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publication of  feminist writings in 1920s Shanghai.44 Wu’s relationship with the journal began when 
he sent in a few Japanese translations from overseas, and when he returned he befriended the 
journal’s editors through a mutual childhood friend.45 In his writings, Wu approached topics such as 
the Chinese views on chastity, free marriage, and divorce from a standpoint of  liberation. He aimed 
his criticism at the dehumanizing patriarchal structures of  Chinese society, which prevented women 
from existing as autonomous subjects of  self-determination. On chastity, he wrote that “in Chinese 
society … women have never held the status of  humans. They have been the mere accessories to the 
family system, the sexual playthings (xing de wannongpin ƶ) of  an autocracy of  men. The 
institution of  so-called chastity a pure case of  men shackling women, and from the standpoint of  
human dignity, it cannot be redeemed.”46 On the question of  free divorce, he concluded it was far 
preferable to the ultimate evil, the degradation of  women as commodities: “Marriage produces the 
most degraded sexual practices, the most despicable buying and selling of  intercourse, the most 
damaging violence to the spirit, the most non-human cruelties disclosed in contemporary life — 
nothing compares!”47
For Wu Juenong, the woman question represented a critique of  objectification and alienation. 
pronunciation of  Rongtang, as eidou, which in Taisho-era Japan would still have been rendered as 
Yeidô. Maeyama Kanako, “On the identity of  ‘Y.D.’: On Wu Juenong’s introductions and critiques 
of  works of  questions related to Japanese women,” in Chûgoku joseishi kenkyû 17.2 (2008), 68.
44 Ladies’ Journal was the authoritative feminist publication during the era. From 1929 to 1934, key 
journal articles from the May Fourth era were republished in a volume titled Collected Discussions of  the 
Chinese Women Question. In the six volumes, 159 total articles were published, of  which 66, or 41.5%, 
were from Ladies’ Journal. The second place, Women’s Review [Funü Pinglun], claimed only 12, or 
7.5% of  the pieces. Tani E. Barlow, The Question of  Women in Chinese Feminism (Durham: Duke 
University Press Books, 2004), 75-76.
45 Wu Juenong [1985] 1987, 527.
46 Wu Juenong, “Jindai de zhencao guan” [Modern views on chastity], in Funü zazhi, 8:12 (1922), 6.
47 Wu Juenong, “Ailunkai de ziyou lihun lun” [Ellen Key’s theories of  free divorce], in Funü zazhi, 
(special issue on divorce, 1922), 52.                                  
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His approach recalls Vera Schwarcz’s thesis that, for the predominantly male social movements of  
Republican China, the woman question was primarily a negative critique.48 That is, male writers did 
not recognize the figure of  the woman as an autonomous social agent. Rather than a positive 
identification with women, these critics offered a negative critique of  the objective structures of  
unfreedom in society, such as the patriarchal family. But even granting this cynical interpretation, it 
must be acknowledged that for Wu Juenong, feminist politics encouraged awareness and discussion 
about other forms of  social exploitation, such as that of  workers, the youth, and the peasantry.49 
Although originally simply a negative critique of  traditional society, May Fourth feminism also 
aspired towards an expansive and universal political vision of  rights. In short, the “woman question” 
stood in for the broader question of  alienation and exploitation writ large, and for Wu Juenong, this 
bled into his interests in helping save the peasantry.
Wu Juenong’s most wide-ranging and abstract writings on the Chinese economy appeared in 
1922, titled simply “The agrarian question of  China (1922),” and it was the eponymous article of  a 
special issue of  Eastern Miscellany (dongfang zazhi VƚƸ), one of  the most influential journals of  
the literary world of  Shanghai. In terms of  works which anticipated the explosion of  agrarian 
economics and peasant studies in the thirties, Wu’s essay predated Mao Zedong’s famous report on 
the Hunan peasantry by four years. Mao himself  was aware of  the piece, and he used Wu’s essay as 
teaching material during lectures he delivered at a 1926 conference on, again, the agrarian question.50
Wu Juenong organized the essay through titles such as “the bitterness of  the peasant’s lifestyle,” 
“the panic of  food scarcity,” “the poverty trap,” “the rate of  disastrous famine,” and “the oppression 
48 Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of  the May Fourth Movement of  
1919 (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1990), 114-116.
49 Cf. Tani Barlow, The Question of  Women in Chinese Feminism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 
67, 75.
50 Wang 2003, 33-34. 
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of  local capitalists.”51 He first took aim at targets like imperialism, capitalism and industry by 
borrowing a mix of  economic theories absorbed from socialist friends in Shanghai and Japan. His 
analysis could be said to consist of  two different perspectives that co-existed in tension: on the 
hand, he was critical of  “monopoly” and “rentier” capitalists -- merchants, banks, and financiers -- 
who swindled those in society without power and resources -- workers in the city, peasants in the 
country. On the other, he saw great potential in the “capitalist” style of  business management and 
production, a revolutionarily efficient form of  production that could bring unprecedented wealth to 
the most marginalized groups in China. As I shall show, Wu reconciled these two perspectives by 
championing the efforts of  producers while also demonizing the activity of  those who merely 
handled and hoarded money. 
First, his analysis of  monopoly and rentier capitalism expanded on themes from his feminist 
writings by suggesting that peasants were subject to unjust and unequal power relationships. “The 
goods produced by peasants all pass through the hands of  middlemen merchants who have a 
stranglehold on the trade,” he wrote. “Tea, silk and cotton, wind up being sold at a low price, and 
this is the area where the peasants receive the greatest damage.”52 Elsewhere, he elaborated upon the 
“squeeze” (zhaqu ɤ) of  merchant capital: “controlling the produce of  the peasants, controlling 
the supply of  daily goods to sell to the peasants, and controlling the avenues of  financial relief.”53 
Eventually, he revealed that the most concrete instances he had in mind were regarding tea: 
“[Marketing] is the most bitter matter concerning the relationship between peasants and 
merchants. . . . This is the worst phenomenon we see in society today, and the most extreme instance 
51 Wu Juenong [1922] 1987, 454, 457.
52 Wu Juenong, “Riben,” 14-15.
53 Wu Juenong, “Zhongguo nongye de xiandaihua” [“The modernization of  China’s agriculture”], 
in Shenbao Yuekan 2, no. 7 (1933), 75.
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is in the tea trade.”54
Second, he argued that capitalist expansion elsewhere in the world had yielded industrial 
improvements that rendered handicraft peasant production obsolete and unprofitable. “Much of  the 
world has undergone a capitalist-style transformation (ziben zhuyihua de qingxiang ęc[śÔǴ
³),” he wrote, elaborating that “those large land-holding agricultural countries have developed at an 
unprecedented speed.”55 Again, this definition of  capitalist production as labor-saving development 
was articulated through the prism of  tea. Without industry, the tea peasants would find themselves 
stuck in a trap of  static productivity: “The tea peasants of  China treat it as a side-job. They’ve never 
practiced large-scale operations, they are casual about production, and they’ve never tried to 
rationalize it.”56 Although Wu detested the former type of  degraded and parasitic capitalism, he 
found much in the developed industrial capitalism worth emulating. If  his mission was to raise the 
consciousness and welfare of  the peasant, then a system which provided more income through less 
work was naturally desirable.
Wu had articulated two different faces to capitalism. The two were of  course related: the 
peasantry were blocked from adopting labor-saving scientific techniques because they were being 
kept down, squeezed by parasitic middlemen. His solution, the agrarian cooperative, sought to turn 
that configuration squarely on its head. By providing low-interest loans and coordinating marketing 
and production, the cooperatives would remove the excess layers of  merchants and thereby release 
the peasants from their fetters, helping them compete with the developed industries of  India, Japan 
and Ceylon. The cooperatives represented an opportunity for the Chinese peasantry to make the 
passage from a backwards mode of  capitalist accumulation to one which was more developed and 
54 Wu Juenong [1922] 1987, 38.
55 Wu Juenong and Li Zongfan “Shijie nongye konghuang yu guoji maoyi” [“World agrarian crisis 
and international trade”], in Guoji maoyi daobao, 4, no. 5 (1932), 13.
56 Wu Juenong [1931] 1987, 74.
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more competitive with industrial methods overseas. 
In due time, Wu Juenong found the opportunity to test the hypotheses from his early “agrarian 
question” essay. In 1928, the Guomindang government created several commodity inspections 
bureaux at major treaty ports, and Wu Juenong was hired to lead the Shanghai bureau in 1931. His 
appointment kicked off  a six-year period of  rapid development for the tea industry, one that lasted 
until the outbreak of  the Sino-Japanese war began to hinder national economic programs.57 But Wu 
Juenong was not content with merely inspecting tea as it was sent overseas. He clamored to actively 
improve the production process itself: “implementing tea export inspection procedures only counted 
as passively decreasing poor quality teas. In order to more thoroughly and comprehensively improve 
the quality of  tea, one needed to practice scientific methods for cultivation, picking, processing, and 
storage.”58 In 1932, the head of  the Reconstruction Bureau of  the Qimen Provincial Government, 
Cheng Zhenjun, came to Shanghai and approached the Inspection Bureau about reviving Lu Ying’s 
abandoned tea experiments in Qimen. After consultation, the heads of  the bureau, Zou Bingwen 
and Cai Wuji, sent Wu Juenong to Qimen to see what he could manage.59 
Wu Juenong’s activities running the Qimen tea improvement center (qimen chaye gailiangchang ʈ
ĠǆöƏ) involved two important endeavors. First, he commissioned in-depth field surveys of  
the actual conditions for rural tea peasants in Anhui, Fujian, and other tea-growing districts. 
Through the methods of  first-person reporting and quantitative measurement, these economist-
reformers were able to fully grasp the dynamics of  the tea trade as it extended from the coastal 
treaty ports all the way down to the peasant household. Second, in 1934 Wu Juenong and his 
colleagues experimented with a cooperative production system in the tea districts of  Qimen, Anhui. 
57 Wu Juenong [1943] 1987, 257-259
58 Wu Juenong [1983] 1987, 437.
59 Wu Juenong [1983] 1987, 437.
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He imagined the cooperative as a form of  integrated production with low capital requirements 
which could set Chinese tea back onto the right path of  international competitiveness. Based on his 
single experience in Qimen, Wu Juenong later campaigned to expand the rural cooperative to all tea-
growing regions. Both the results of  the surveys as well as the cooperative experiments convinced 
him and his colleagues that the tea merchants were a superfluous and harmful element in the trade 
that deserved to be eliminated. The next two sections will further describe these two endeavors -- 
rural surveys and cooperative efforts -- in more detail.
“The magic of  advances”: the first agrarian surveys
In the early twenties, Wu Juenong frequently complained that, although urban socialists and 
intellectuals claimed to understand the peasantry, almost no reliable information about them existed. 
“Our country, sadly, does not have accurate statistics, and we cannot make accurate comparisons 
[with other countries],” he wrote.60 On tea in particular he added: “In order to plan the revival of  
national tea production or to chart our progress, one must have accurate statistics and on-the-
ground surveys. But for our country’s tea trade, other than export numbers from the maritime 
customs, there’s no other materials to be found!”61 
The badly-desired surveys began to emerge in the thirties and forties. They were an initiative of  the 
nationalist government and of  the Shanghai Commodity Inspections Bureau, where Wu Juenong 
worked.62 These surveys helped impose a scientific and systematic order onto the mass of  
60 Wu Juenong, “Riben nongmin yundong de qushi,” 54. 
61 Wu Juenong [1922] 1987, 41.
62 In 1932 the Executive Yuan decreed that agricultural agencies should focus on the country’s five 
main crops: rice, wheat, cotton, tea and silk. The work for tea, funded by separate provincial 
agricultural banks, was assigned to Nanjing University’s agricultural economics department. The 
survey teams studied the tea season cycles of  two southern Anhui towns, Qimen and Tunxi, during 
the 1934 and 1935 seasons, providing the most complete quantitative data from the period. Both 
teams were led by Sun Wenyu, a former student of  Buck’s, and the survey work inherited many of  
the methodological assumptions of  the latter. Besides the Nanjing surveys, Wu Juenong helped 
coordinate fieldwork through his job as at the Shanghai commodity inspections bureau, where he 
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impressionistic anecdotes from previous dynasties. To the surveyors, the tea picking and refinement 
processes in the countryside bore striking resemblances wherever they went. They drew charts to 
illustrate the abstract movement of  money and tea along the trade routes. Putting aside local 
variations in names, these charts appeared remarkably similar when laid on top of  one another: 
began work in 1931. At the bureau, Wu worked under two men with similar backgrounds studying 
overseas. The first director, Zou Bingwen, had studied agronomics with John L. Buck at Cornell. He 
was succeeded by Cai Wuji, son of  famed educator Cai Yuanpei, who would serve as president of  
two of  China’s most renowned institutions, the Academia Sinica and Peking University. The younger 
Cai had studied for a decade in France before returning in the twenties and joining the bureau. Wu 
felt strongly that “in order to revive our country’s trade, naturally it was simply not enough to 
confine ourselves to the passive methods [xiaoji de fangshi úĹVĆ] of  export quality 
control” (Wu [1983] 1987, 436). He collaborated with Cai and Zou to undertake “on-site 
surveys” (shidi diaocha p-ćċ) in the tea countries. Through piecemeal efforts, Wu Juenong and 
his colleagues published a substantial amount of  research in various Republican journals. In this 
period, “scientific research on the tea trade still remained in its infant stages (youzhi ǬɊ)” (Wu 
Juenong [1934] 1987, 161).
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Figure 15. These images were taken from surveys conducted in Tunxi, Huizhou (top) and the Wuyi 
districts in Fujian (below).
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By the thirties, conditions had deteriorated considerably since their golden age.63 Still, the basic 
structure remained identical to the world described in mid to late-Qing documents. There were, 
roughly, six moment within the trade cycle. Starting from the tea shrubs in the country and moving 
toward the trading ports:
1. The tea peasant (chanong Ġǁ). Also called the “tea family” or the “mountain peasant.”
2. Seasonal tea labor (chagong Ġ¢). Both men and women, they worked for peasants and the
tea houses. 
3. The tea peddlers (chake, chafan, chahang Ġù, Ġɜ, Ġ\). Itinerant middlemen who traveled 
between village farms and market towns, delivering the raw leaves from the peasant to the tea 
house.
4. The tea house or tea shop (chazhuang, chahao, zhuanghao, chachang, ĠȆ, ĠÎ, ȆÎ, etc.). 
These men were inland merchants who, first, bought unprocessed tea from peasants, and then, 
second, operated factories (chachang ĠȖ) in the market towns and sold the finished products to 
Shanghai warehouses. Hence, although they served as merchants, they are more appropriately 
designated a versatile “house.”
5. The tea warehouse merchant (chazhan Ġɰ). The warehouse managers in Shanghai began 
as buyers for British businessmen in the earlier era of  Canton trade. Hence, they closely 
approximated that infamous figure of  Chinese history, the comprador. As time passed, and 
although it kept the original appellation “warehouse” (zhan), the chazhan also adopted the 
functions of  finance, providing loans to the inland tea house and also keeping close ties with the 
foreign traders and banks. 
6. The foreign trading company (yanghang Ƣ\). American, British, French and Indian 
companies.
The most comprehensive surveys came from independently-published articles in trade journals 
as well as longer surveys conducted by the Nanjing University research team. Both were connected 
to the reform efforts led by Wu Juenong. The best surveys dealt with the neighboring Huizhou 
districts of  Qimen, a black tea district in southwest Anhui, and Tunxi, a green tea district in south 
Anhui. For now, we begin with the numbers from the Nanjing surveys.
Because of  their stronger economic potential, the Qimen black tea districts received the most 
extensive attention from both the government and the surveyors. According to the surveys, 36 of  
63 Cf. Tomoko Shiroyama, China During the Great Depression: Market, State, and the World Economy, 
1929-1937 (Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 91-93.  
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the 75 peasant families interviewed in Qimen were listed as “owners,” and another 21 were “part-
owners.” Surveyors recorded that the savings and economic positions of  families in Qimen was 
uneven, with examples of  both well-to-do peasants and those heavily in debt. Of  the twenty-four 
houses that responded, nine had a savings of  about 128 yuan, and twenty-one houses had an average 
debt of  121 yuan. But these numbers were only a fraction of  tea country, and the surveyors noted 
that “it is unavoidable that many people did not want to tell the truth, especially those families who 
had some savings. Further, of  those families in debt, many were not perpetually stuck in debt but 
simply relied upon casual borrowing and lending.”64 
For those peasants on the verge of  debt, the lack of  ready cash proved a barrier to production, 
which required significant amounts of  working capital, such as manure, seasonal workers, the 
upkeep of  equipment, etc. Because the families needed to, first, cultivate and pick the leaves, then, 
second, put the leaves through an initial round of  drying and wilting prior to selling them -- 
converting the fresh leaves into unprocessed leaves (maocha) -- surveyors recorded two tiers of  
production costs. On average, these two cost, respectively, 61.26 and 19.89 yuan per family. During 
the seasons surveyed, the 124 families were able to sell the maocha for 107.4 yuan, which left them a 
net income of  26.27 per household during the years surveyed.65 This also also meant the costs of  
production annually were larger than the net income by fourfold, and the families were one or two 
bad harvests away from falling irreparably into debt.
For comparison’s sake, the numbers in Tunxi were as follows: the twenty-four families surveyed 
received an income of  141.34 yuan per family. Cultivation costs were 71.1 and processing cost 53.05 
yuan, for a net income of  about 17.20 yuan per family.66 In the larger picture, the figures in both 
districts represented low stakes. “It is clear,” wrote one surveyor, Fu Hongzhen, “the investments are 
64 1. Sun Wenyu 1936a, 22.
65 Sun Wenyu 1936a, 27, 35.
66 Sun Wenyu 1936b, 7-14.
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small, profits are also small, and generally, in all the counties, the profits are all thin.”67 Of  course, to 
the peasant household which relied upon this cash to sustain them through the winter, a difference 
of  a few dozen yuan mattered a great deal.
Starting in April, the families expended their own labor and money to grow tea each year in 
anticipation of  decent market prices. Fu Hongzhen noted, “in the cultivation and management of  
Huizhou tea fields, everyone excitedly gossips about the tea market, whether prices are rising or 
falling. Without an indication of  high prices, they would naturally not grow excess tea.”68 Ostensibly, 
the peasants’ job was to obtain enough working capital to cultivate the tea shrubs planted on their 
own land and then sell them to the tea houses during tea season, starting in June. When the season 
began, the Qimen marketplace was populated by peasant families on the one hand and tea houses on 
the other:
The tea peasant will carry the leaves, probably soaked in water to add weight, to the marketplace. 
There it will inquire on the door of  a tea house or one of  the house’s sub-branches and 
negotiate over prices. If  they agree on a price, the two sides will weigh the leaves. Otherwise the 
peasant will head out to another house and try to sell leaves to them. If  they still cannot agree 
on a price, sometimes they will travel as far as ten li away before finally selling off  of  their 
harvest.69
At the start of  the season, Qimen peasants enjoyed a fiercely competitive buyer’s market, but as 
time passed, prices were liable to collapse, and merchants resorted to nasty bargaining techniques: 
67 Fu Hongzhen, “Wan-Zhe Xin’an Jiangliuyu Zhi Chaye [The Tea Trade of  the Anhui-Zhejiang 
Corridor of  the Xin’an River],” Guoji Maoyi Daobao 6, no. 7 (1934), 123. 
68 Fu Hongzhen, 122.
69 Sun Wenyu 1936a, 55.
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In general, there are so many tea houses, and the competition is extremely fierce ... But most of  
the small branches do not obey the rules laid out by the merchant guilds, so they slash prices and 
manipulate scales as they please. Prices are not uniform. One look at disparities is enough to 
shock any observer.70
What choice did the peasants have? The scant data on household incomes indicated that most 
households were desperate for cash. As we saw in the last chapter, the Qing official Chen Chi 
speculated that the peasants and tea houses encountered each other as equal, formidable rivals in the 
marketplace: “When merchants enter the mountains to buy tea, they team up and push down prices, 
this is unavoidable. Over the course of  time, the mountain families caught onto the merchants’ 
tricks, and they gradually learned to raise their own prices by wantonly hoarding their tea.”71 These 
observations from the late nineteenth century, however, described market conditions that had 
changed by the 1930s. With a dwindling share in the world market, the tea houses learned to be 
more cautious with how much tea to buy and how much to pay. Faced with diminished demand, 
peasants had little leverage. One survey recorded, “tea houses take advantage of  the fact that the 
peasants cannot procrastinate selling raw tea. If  they hesitate just a little, then the leaves will 
overferment and become trash. Thus, the houses exploit the peasants harshly, there’s nothing they 
won’t try.”72 Even if  peasants threatened to raise prices, the merchants could push them right back 
down. Consider the following anecdote:
Mountain prices last year [1930] reached a record high. The warehouse merchants heard about 
this this, and they concluded that the overseas markets were not strong enough, and if  mountain 
70 Sun Wenyu 1936a, 55.
71 Chen Chi, 347. 
72 Jiang Xuekai, “Qimen Hongcha [Qimen Black Tea],” Nongcun Hezuo 2, no. 3 (1937), 99.
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prices were too high, then they could be in trouble. They quickly sent telegrams to partners, and 
the inland merchants in Qimen duly shrank their operations, which caused prices to fall again.73
Further, at the same time that the Nanjing team documented village life in the thirties, Wu 
Juenong and his colleagues -- men such as Fu Hongzhen, Fan Hejun, and Jiang Xuekai -- expanded 
upon the scope of  the Nanjing surveys by analyzing the entire circuit of  capital and tea between 
Shanghai and the inland tea districts. Through this work, the surveyors could determine that the 
relationship between the tea houses and the peasants merely reproduced the relationship between 
the inland houses and the Shanghai warehouses. The practices that the houses used to profit off  the 
peasants were an extension of  similar tactics practiced on them. “The exploitative relationships was 
a cycle of  debts that could not be disentangled,” noted Jiang Xuekai. “The foreign companies 
exploit the warehouses, who exploit the tea houses, who exploit the peasants, who exploit the 
workers.”74 
The advance loan from tea warehouses in Shanghai to the inland tea houses demonstrated that 
the tea trade simultaneously functioned as a financial industry. By providing advance payments to the 
tea houses, who could not conduct business without new loans each season, the warehouses could 
skim from the houses’ profits. “When sales are good and the houses do not lose money, then the 
warehouses can merely sit there and collect a monthly interest of  one fen and five li, plus they have the 
special ability to control debtors.” The surveyor, Fu Hongzhen, also warned, “when the market fails, 
then, with the houses, the warehouses must also shut down. When the houses win, the warehouses 
73 Shanghai Savings Bank survey department, ed., Cha? [Tea?] (Shanghai: Shanghai Chuxu Yinghang 
Xintuobu, 1931), 60-61.
74 Jiang Xuekai, 98.
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win. When the houses lose, the warehouses suffer.”75 But Fu’s description here, which would apply 
to basic partnerships, was not accurate. 
Herein lay the significance of  the fact that the tea warehouses wore two hats in their dealings 
with the inland houses. Many surveyors commented on this unusual relationship. “On the one hand, 
the tea warehouses are purchasing agents. On the other hand, they also act as an instrument of  
financial adjustments.”76 The dual role of  the warehouses gave them a protected position, in which 
they only felt the risk of  a bad market when the tea houses were a total failure. In a normal year, the 
warehouses in Shanghai would first distribute advance loans to the houses. Then after the first 
harvests, the warehouses would switch roles and act as agents selling leaves to foreign companies on 
behalf  of  the inland houses. But before distributing the profits back to the tea houses, the 
warehouses would again switch hats from agents to financiers and deduct the principal and interest 
of  the advances from the profits themselves. The first sale of  the season would go towards paying 
off  one-half  of  the advances, the second sale would pay off  the rest, and only with the third sale 
would the houses start earning any net revenue. In effect, this meant the tea warehouses enjoyed 
“first dibs” to the houses’ profits, and this almost always protected them from losses. “The nature of  
this type of  loan,” wrote Fan Hejun, “is just like a bank mortgage.” Therefore, “the loans given out 
for advances are not dangerous at all to the warehouses.”77 
The arrangement between warehouses and tea houses could be considered a “post-harvest 
payment scheme” in the sense of  economist Gerald Jaynes’ description of  the postbellum 
(1862-1882) American south. Jaynes showed that, with the dearth of  circulating credit after the U.S. 
Civil War, planters and freedmen workers negotiated a type of  staggered, or “post-harvest,” payment 
scheme. Planters only paid the workers a subsistence level of  wages up front, and the rest would 
75 Fu Hongzhen, 117.  
76 Shanghai Savings Bank, 60.
77 Fan Hejun, 115.
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only be distributed after the crop was sold. In a profitable year, the workers would be fully 
compensated. But, short of  that, any gross revenue would first be claimed by the planters, which left 
the workers exposed to the risk of  earning no real income. The planters effectively spent on capital 
inputs and only paid for a portion of  labor inputs. Jaynes adeptly saw through the confusion of  these 
informal business arrangements and grasped the real economic relationship: “by far the most 
important and ironic aspect of  post-harvest payments was the fact that they made the laborer a 
creditor of  the planter!”78 Unfortunately for the laborer, however, they had no means to enforce the 
outstanding debts owed to them by the planters. 
A similar “post-harvest” payment scheme developed between the tea houses and the tea 
warehouses. The tea houses, enabled by the advances of  the warehouses, would first ship tea to 
Shanghai to be sold. When they received the tea in Shanghai, the warehouses gave the houses 
vouchers to be redeemed at the end of  the season. All gross revenue was first appropriated by the 
warehouses, covering the principal and interest on the advance loans, which had functioned as the 
working capital for the tea houses. As with the freedmen in the American south, the tea houses were 
exposed to the risk of  a bad season, in which case their vouchers would be devalued. The tea 
warehouses shared almost none of  the risk, and the tea houses, dependent on the warehouses, had 
no recourse.
Further, even in a year when tea prices remained strong, the warehouses used their strong 
position to skim profits through the exchange of  credit. I noted above that the warehouses could 
claim a high monthly interest on loans. Remarking on the “complete dependence” of  the houses, Fu 
Hongzhen added that the “warehouses use the magic of  advance loans (xiandian shengchanzijin de moli    
þȷ"čęÂǋX) for production to ‘fish’ for profits (yuli ȿ÷).” These small profits included 
inspection fees, travel expenses, insurance, and charges for using the physical warehouses in 
78 Gerald David Jaynes, Branches Without Roots: Genesis of  the Black Working Class in the American South, 
1862-1882 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 33-53.
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Shanghai. As Fu noted, the warehouses pretended they were merely providing services to the 
merchants when in fact they were effectively buying the houses’ tea at an undervalued price. They 
“understood clearly but played dumb” about the real source of  their profits.79 
By moving backwards from the tea peasant to the tea house and its relationship to the coastal tea 
warehouse, surveyors came to realize that the story of  the peasant only made sense within the web 
of  circulating advances that transferred risk from the warehouses to the houses, who then 
transferred it to the peasants. The distribution of  power was so imbalanced that Wu Juenong 
believed that wildly inconsistent prices were not only the result of  imperfect markets but also of  
intentional manipulation by the financiers of  the trade:
Merchants in Shanghai had a ‘clever’ trick up their sleeve: every year when the season opened, no 
matter how high or low the international prices for tea, the foreign merchants would convey to 
the peasants that prices would be high but later drop off. . . . Production would jump, but once 
the foreign merchants purchased a certain amount of  tea, prices would quickly fall, and peasants 
had no available lifelines. Of  course, the foreign merchants, the warehouses, and the tea district 
merchants could not lose money. ‘The sheep’s wool is skimmed off  of  the sheep’s body’: these 
huge losses from falling prices were always transferred onto the body of  the direct producers.80 
We must be clear that these explanations of  risk and profit allocation did not demonstrate why 
the peasantry of  tea country, the proverbial sheep of  the tea trade, would necessarily fall deeper into 
debt over time. But they did help illuminate why, in a time of  depression, the warehouses carried the 
lightest burden of  risk, followed, in order, by the tea houses and then the peasants. Risk and losses 
were continually deferred and transferred from the wealthiest to poorest. The thirties were a period 
of  tumultuous foreign markets around the world, and so the decline of  the tea peasantry occurred 
so predictably that it appeared almost preordained. Even if  a family of  peasants enjoyed an excess 
of  savings, it faced steep odds in a bad year. 
79 Fu Hongzhen, 146.
80 Wu Juenong [1983] 1987, 439.
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Further, by the mid-thirties, reports emerged that advance loans, which normally only flowed 
from coastal warehouse merchants to inland buyers and tea factories, now also extended from the 
inland factories to the peasant farms. In the Nanjing University team’s extensive survey of  Qimen 
farms, researchers made no mention of  rural advances, but conditions had apparently deteriorated 
far more quickly for the Tunxi peasants. There, Nanjing surveyors noted, the peasants had come to 
depend upon tea in order to survive year to year. “Whether their tea income each year was large or 
small had a massive impact upon the economic situation of  the tea household.”81 Even in the 
normal years, they struggled to stretch one season’s worth of  cash into an entire year. The surveyors 
recorded, “every winter, there are peasants who face dire economic straits, families with inadequate 
food supplies.” For these families, there was no option other than to take out a loan, usually 
mortgaging their future tea crops. “They frequently need to borrow food from the peddler in order 
to survive. The locals call this type of  loan ‘lending coarse silver’ [fang cuyin uȁƔ], and it must be 
repaid by next year’s tea season.”82 The coarse silver was to be returned with interest, which was 
calculated through two layers: 
The interest on the grain is two percent, and usually it must be resolved by the fifth month of  
the lunar calendar the next year [late June to July]. But besides the initial interest, for every dan of  
grain borrowed the family must provide another five jiao of  Mexican silver [dayang]. But if  grain 
prices have fallen by the time of  repayment, then repayment is calculated on the prices when the 
loans were originally given: monthly interest at two percent plus five jiao for every dan of  grain. 
81 Sun Wenyu 1936b, 5.
82 The locals had a designation for those merchants who simply wrapped up shop from season to 
season: “snail merchants” (luosi chahao). This was because of  their “temporary and unfixed nature, 
just like snails who roam far and wide.” For instance, “during the 1937 season, of  the eighty-nine tea 
houses, thirty-six were ‘snail’ houses.” The same title applied to the peddlers who ran between the 




Sometimes the tea houses would bypass the small peddler and give advances directly to the 
family.83 Considering the exposition of  the tea house’s finances above, we can assume that the origin 
of  these advances extended back to the warehouses. On the surface, the principal on the “coarse 
silver,” as well as the interest, were to be repaid through cash and not the product itself. But 
effectively the tea peasants had granted the peddlers and the tea houses a lien on their tea, for if  they 
did not grow tea and exchange it for cash at the market, they would have no means to repay the 
original lenders. Tea accounted for 59.3% of  the families’ incomes, and considering the “dire 
economic” conditions of  the peasants, they had no means to repay the loan otherwise. 
The Tunxi surveyors did not bother to give numbers on land ownership. Instead, they stated 
matter of  factly that “the local tea land is almost entirely owned by the tea families, only very few 
pay rent.” Because tea was the product of  that land, it appeared to the Nanjing surveyors as the 
rightful property of  the households who had invested their labor and capital into growing and 
refining the raw leaves. However, if  the peasants had mortgaged out their tea to the lenders in 
advance, then their options were already constrained. Although the tea leaves themselves were 
undoubtedly the product of  the soil on the families’ land, much of  the working capital for seasonal 
labor, manure, tools, fuel, etc. were not paid out of  the families’ savings but by the peddlers and tea 
houses who had given out advances. Thus, the value of  the leaves, as products of  working capital 
loaned by merchants, was not actually the property of  the farmers but only temporarily loaned to them. 
When the families repaid the principal on the loans, through cash received from the leaves, they did 
not earn any gross revenue. They were simply paying off  what they had already spent on the 
production of  the leaves. 
Jairus Banaji has shown how this type of  rural advance system could be considered a disguised 
form of  waged labor. In the absence of  a proper waged-labor system in the countryside, advances 
83 Sun Wenyu 1936b, 32.
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given by usurious lenders functioned similarly to the purchase of  labor-power practiced in urban 
industrial economies. Instead of  a wage, the farmer received an advance. And instead of  returning 
profit to the capitalist in the form of  a readymade commodity, the farmer would provide interest. 
Whether agrarian interest or industrial profit, both represented revenue to the investor-capitalist: 
“[A] household in this position would find itself  subsisting ‘at the mercy of ’ its creditor, who would 
in this way come to establish control over its reproduction process from one cycle to the next. Elements of  
the production-process would be ‘advanced’ to the peasant either in money-form or directly in 
material form, and the peasant would then surrender the whole of  his crop by way of  ‘interest’-
payments.”84 
Of  course, historical nuances must be preserved. Although this abstract dynamic had begun to 
appear in the Tunxi districts, and although the peasants recognized that without growing tea it was 
near impossible to repay debts, they did not entirely depend upon advances yet in 1935. After they 
had paid off  the interest on the “coarse silver” loan, they still retained some tea which could be sold 
for income.85 Thus, the economic position of  Tunxi peasants could be located somewhere between a 
total dependence on merchant capital to survive and farmers who could survive from their savings 
alone. 
But it is a mystery why the same Nanjing surveyors who recorded the above phenomena in the 
Tunxi districts failed to see them in Qimen too. It is possible that the surveyors simply did not 
encounter any advances system during their time there, from 1933 to 1936. But only one year later, 
Wu Juenong, who had worked in Qimen since 1931, wrote unequivocally about the prevalence of  
advances in the black tea districts:
Everyone knows the saying ‘grains at the start of  the year can’t reach year’s end’ [nianqian 
jiebushang nianhou liang 6k±6;ȵ]. It’s especially true in Qimen. Crunching the 
84 Jairus Banaji, 303. Emphasis in original.
85 Sun Wenyu 1936b, 32.
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numbers, we see that the peasants all rely upon a few tea shrubs just to support themselves for 
three months. But the money they get from tea in the spring will already be eaten by year’s end. 
The only solution is to sell next year’s raw tea in advance. . . . Even though this means they can’t 
avoid the high-interest swindling of  tea houses and tea peddlers, at least they won’t starve to 
death.86 
Further, often times the tea houses distributed advances loans in the form of  “rice vouchers,” to 
be redeemed at local rice shops. Wu pointed out that “in this way, the tea peasant not only is 
exploited by the tea house, they are also exploited by the high prices of  the rice shop.”87 Another 
report on Qimen from this period corroborated the existence of  rice loans: “this year the mountain 
prices for raw leaves were unprecedentedly low, and for many peasants the prices weren’t even 
enough to repay the rice they had bought on credit!”88 If  advances had not surfaced in Qimen at the 
start of  the decade, they had unmistakably taken shape by its end.
The Qimen cooperatives experiment
These survey results confirmed to Wu Juenong and his fellow reformers that absent major reform, 
the tea-growing peasant household stood little chance for survival. They had diagnosed several evils 
within the extant system of  advance loans and circulating credit: the usurious rates of  interest 
charged by coastal warehouse merchants, the transfer of  risk from merchants to peasant households, 
and the lack of  transparency for seasonal market conditions. To address these concerns, and to 
encourage a gradual process of  industrializing production and integrating it with marketing and 
transport, Wu Juenong proposed experimenting with consolidating scattered peasant production 
under a scheme of  “cooperativization” (hezuohua ¬iÔ). The mild success of  cooperative 
experiments in 1934 would only exacerbate reformers’ frustrations with merchant capital, and the 
Republican government finally agreed that eliminating the anachronistic comprador merchants 
86 Wu Juenong [1937] 1987, 201.




should become a national policy priority.
Although reformers did not formally begin cooperative experiments until the thirties, the 
ideological roots for cooperativization could be traced back to Chen Chi and Lu Ying’s observations 
at the turn of  the century that Chinese production needed greater coordination. If  Wu Juenong and 
his staff  wished to emulate South Asia-style cultivation, they would need to consolidate hundreds of  
small plots of  land, which were used differently by individual families across hundreds of  miles of  
land scattered near the Anhui-Jiangxi border. And marketing reform would eventually require 
building railroads and paving paths, acquiring faster boats, regularizing the transport across hundreds 
of  miles between Qimen and Shanghai, a trip that normally took several weeks. It made sense, then, 
that the reformers first focused modestly on tea processing.
The Qimen Tea Improvement Center was established in November 1932, in anticipation of  the 
1933 tea season. This was the most recent incarnation of  the experiments Lu Ying had originally 
started in 1915. The 1933 experiments produced a modest amount of  tea – 59 total boxes – but the 
experience left Wu Juenong ecstatically optimistic. 
When looking through the bits and scraps of  records that survive from the first experiments, it 
becomes clear that the reformers were originally less concerned with the long-term goals of  
rationalizing production and more focused on inculcating a spirit of  cooperative self-rule (zizhi 
ƈ) among the peasantry. A report from the first year stated, “the goal was to create a foundation to 
stimulate a mass movement for cooperatives”89 In the leftist idealism of  Wu Juenong and his 
colleagues, profit was only a means to an end, useful only if  it helped the peasantry: “the passive 
function [of  the cooperative] was to avoid the various types of  middleman exploitation. The active 
function is to accumulate strength and improve cultivation and manufacture….As the tea industry 
becomes a profitable enterprise through cooperation, it gradually improves the economic and 
89 Anhui shengli chaye gailiangchang, Pingli chaye yunxiao xinyong hezuo baogao [Report on the Pingli tea 
credit and transport cooperative] (Qimen: Dawen Yinshuasuo, 1934), 1.
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cultural lifestyle of  the tea peasants.”90 Elsewhere, they made their priorities clear:
Improving the quality of  tea is the major mission that we are undertaking. However, we are also 
addressing other important matters, such as: improving peasant production, developing the tea 
peasant economy (fazhan chanong jingji 0ňĠǁZƻ), facilitating and connecting (liansuo êȚ) 
the mutual aid spirit (huzhu jingshen ƛļÃÊ) of  the peasants, and to work and plan for the 
“way of  their existence” (shengcun zhi dao "ĸN?).91
During the first year, experiments were conducted haphazardly. Only one surviving document 
details that year of  China’s first tea cooperative, and it is worth quoting at length:  
When this center was established last year, there were calls for putting all our energies into 
cooperation. The tea peasants, although sympathetic, did not dare experiment. After several 
months of  hemming and hawing, ultimately, no one came forward and took responsibility for a 
formal organization. When tea season began, we realized that now was the time to implement 
our principles, and we needed to act now. We resolved to implement the following methods:
1) To the outside world, we would take on the name ‘cooperative,’ but internally we would rely 
upon the same people to run everything.
2) We had enough capital to buy raw leaves (maocha) from the village peasants, and when they 
came to sell us their leaves, we uniformly considered them all cooperative members.
3) When buying raw leaves, we registered the transaction, gave a receipt, and recorded the 
amount and price. We declared that we only had power to claim the surplus profits from leaves, 
and we did not charge any fees to the peasants.
This type of  ‘non-profit cooperative experiment’ naturally was a very dangerous approach. 
Afterwards, however, in a year that would otherwise be considered lean, we discovered that this 
method was surprisingly effective.92
90 Anhui, 1.




Figure 16. Photographs from the Pingli, Qimen tea cooperative. Left: tea fields. Right: the engine 
room.93
The cooperative lacked enough funds to both pay the peasants for raw leaves while also keeping 
up basic costs. When buying leaves from the peasants, the workers volunteered to forgo their salaries 
for four months and only collect money after the season. Luckily, the experiment was a success:
We called a meeting of  cooperative members at the start of  July and we split up the profit, 
which was 10% of  our original outlay. … After distributing profit, we continued to hold a large 
meeting and report on the present conditions of  the cooperative. At the same time, we declared 
that the cooperative society should be given over to cooperative members [i.e., the peasants] to 
run on their own. The current center occupies an extreme position to guide and help the 
movement. When the center has enough members sign their name, recommend and prepare 
other members, then it will officially be formed. Within Qimen, there arose an enthusiastic surge 
of  response. Right now, the future for Qimen is bright, and people have optimistic wishes. It 
must be said that this was entirely due to the ‘experimental cooperation,’ this cannot be 
disputed.94
93 Ni Qun, ed., Qimen Wenshi Ziliao: Chaye Zhuanji, Qimen Wenshi Ziliao 5 (Huangshan Shi: 




Figure 17. A 1941 staff  photograph from the Pingli, Qimen tea cooperative.95
Although the cooperative directors could not match the amount of  capital deployed by the large 
managing agencies in South Asia, the staff  was optimistic they could at least economize production. 
Economy would provide the foundation for future expansion of  cooperative efforts. For instance, 
staff  managers calculated the amount of  labor expended on producing a mere 59 boxes that season. 
At the beginning of  the experiments, the leaders assigned eight people to pack boxes of  leaves, but 
according to their calculations, one person alone could pack ten boxes, and thus employing eight, 
rather than just two people, “was a 25% waste.”96
With these measures, Wu Juenong and his staff  had shielded the peasants from the harsh 
realities of  high-interest usury and the shortage of  capital in China. In addition to the money that 
came out of  staff  salaries, Wu personally supplied the rest of  the operating capital through loans he 
95 Ni Qun.
96 Anhui,  3.
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arranged independently.97 Sooner or later, however, if  these officials believed that their cooperative 
model should be exported to other regions of  China, they would need to find a more permanent 
solution to funding and marketing. It was at this point that the problem of  the usurious merchants, 
who had always been one concern among many, became the central problem facing tea reform.
Although the organizers of  the Qimen cooperative could temporarily ignore the problem of  
merchant capital during the first experiments, they now believed that the final barrier to massive, 
nation-wide tea reform was that network of  traditional merchants who monopolized finance and 
transport. The original report of  the first experiments, written in 1934, contained a section dedicated 
to the issue of  the merchants. The cooperative’s organizers held out hope that the peasantry would 
overcome the strictures of  merchant capital through their collective energies. Nevertheless, they 
realized that a shortage of  capital represented a serious difficulty:
Given these conditions, if  we wish to fully break apart this web (zhenwang) of  exploitation, we 




) spirit of  
the cooperative methods, to exhort and lead the peasants to unite and struggle together (gongtong 
jingzheng ŀgȨű). The goal is not merely to avoid those most obvious forms of  exploitation. 
The greater hope is that the peasants could gain even more benefits from their concrete mutual 
planning (shidi gongmou p-ŀɅ). But Qimen peasants have always held onto the idea that they 
should first plan for themselves. They greatly lack ‘associationality’ (jiehexing ¨¬) and ‘unity 
power’ (tuanjieli ō¨X). But what they truly lack, more than these, is capital.98
Over the course of  the next few years, anti-merchant sentiment reached new heights among the 
circles of  tea reformers, economists, and government bureaucrats now newly interested in 
expanding the cooperative form. The cooperative was suddenly becoming popular throughout all 
China, not only for tea but for all forms of  agricultural production.99 The National Economic 
97 Anhui, 1.
98 Zhang Wei, “Guanyu Pingli Hezuoshe,” 23. 
99 Cf. Yixin Chen, “The Guomindang’s Approach to Rural Socioeconomic Problems: China’s Rural 
Cooperative Movement, 1918-1949” (Washington University, 1995), 1995.
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Council took over tea production from the provincial governments. They added sixteen more 
cooperatives in 1935, for a total of  nineteen. After tea season ended in 1935, the NEC created more 
bureaucracies and local agency branches. In 1936, the NEC added 23 cooperatives, along with 13 old 
ones remained, for a total of  36. 
As government interest in tea cooperatives swelled, so too did anti-merchant sentiment. The 
success of  the cooperatives crystallized the problem of  merchant capital. As Wu Juenong wrote 
years later, during the Sino-Japanese War:
One must look at the improvement of  production and also the improvement of  economic 
conditions as going hand in hand (wu zhi shuangyi ȅN²ţ, lit. “Two wings of  the bird”). You 
cannot emphasize one at the expense of  the other. During our time running the experimental 
tea center in Pingli, Qimen, ninety percent of  the tea merchants lost money that year, but only 
we were able to claim a 15 percent rate of  profit. The next year, the organization of  the 
cooperative was able to develop a great deal. However, because we had not finished planning an 
organizational structure for marketing to Shanghai, the middlemen merchants were able to 
simply extend, and intensify, their customary skimming methods (yurou «ĕ) from the inland 
merchants to us. They presented many obstacles to cooperative production. Most cooperatives 
lost money, and potentially investing banks were scared off. Thus, the cooperative movement for 
tea found itself  stuck in an interrupted state.100
He had come to a conclusion similar to that of  R.H. Tawney, an economist and historian who 
penned a study of  agrarian Chinese society (1932) around the same period. Tawney concluded that 
in a rural nation such as China, improvements in production depended as much as on matters of  
finance as they did on technology: “it is through the improvement of  the commercial and financial 
organisation of  agriculture, as much as by the use of  better methods of  production,” he had stated, 
“that the progress of  the last half-century in Europe has taken place.”101 For those interested in 
renovating the tea trade, finance would become the target of  reforms during the second half  of  the 
decade. 




Tea reform during the wartime years
Attempts to set up a “tea control” economy
In the years following the initial successes at the Qimen cooperative, Wu Juenong and his friends 
took measures to spread the cooperative model to other provinces, especially in Fujian, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang. Meantime, Wu Juenong sought measures from the KMT government 
to pass policies that would reform the structure of  tea finance. The Ministry of  Finance obliged 
with several laws to “control” (tongzhi ľÄ)102 the hitherto lawless patterns of  tea warehouses 
circulating high-interest advance loans to the inland tea factories and small peasant producers. The 
current section provides an expository overview of  those efforts.103 
In 1936, the National Economic Council (NEC) established a special committee to manage tea, 
the Anhui-Jiangxi Committee for Marketing and Transport (wangan hongcha yunxiao weiyuanhui). The 
Committee’s aims were to directly provide peasants and tea factories with low-interest loans that the 
government secured from banks in Shanghai. The coastal warehouse merchants and foreign trading 
companies, however, immediately recognized that such a committee would render them obsolete, 
and they protested it fiercely. Foreign traders, who enjoyed the special “first right of  refusal” 
privileges with their partners the warehouses, appealed to foreign diplomats, especially the British 
embassy, and they wrote countless letters of  protest to the government. The warehouse merchants 
submitted petitions and appeals and also published large advertisements opposing the plan in the 
Shanghai papers Shenbao and Shanghai News. They understood that if  the Committee succeeded in 
circumventing their high-interest loans, then “the century-plus long fortunes (mingyun ĀË) would 
102 The phrase tongzhi jingji has been alternately translated as a “controlled economy” and a 
“planned economy.” In English, authors rarely break apart the set phrase and use the verb tongzhi in 
isolation or as a transitive verb -- “to control X” -- but Wu Juenong and other Chinese authors 
regularly did so. Rather than search for a suitable alternative such as “create a controlled economy” I 
have decided simply to translate tongzhi as it appears in the Chinese sentences, as a transitive verb.
103 This section is very cursory, and there is much more interesting stuff  to discuss from this 
period. Here, I only provide the most basic details for expository purposes. I am still considering 




from here begin to collapse (tatai Ƀď), and they knew they needed to use all their strength in order 
to oppose it.”104 Ultimately, the warehouse merchants were able to stave off  their execution with one 
last desperate measure: they withdrew all of  their credit from the countryside, refusing to honor any 
of  the promissory notes held by peasants and factories that season. If  the original policies advanced 
by the NEC was a “fatal weapon” against the warehouse merchants, then the merchants’ refusal to 
honor credit to the peasantry was a suicidal gamble, a “strategy of  counterattack” that ultimately 
paid off.105 The NEC agreed to sit down with the merchant guilds of  Shanghai, and they allowed the 
current system continue as before. 
At this point, the Ministry of  Industry (shiye bu p¼´) took over all reform policies related to 
tea, and it sought to implement several reforms: first, an auction system for selling tea in Shanghai, 
to circumvent the custom of  fixing prices among warehouse merchants; second, the creation of  a 
national Chinese tea company that would eventually directly sell tea overseas and also circumvent the 
foreign traders (yanghang) stationed in Shanghai; third, the creation of  more research institutes all 
across the tea-growing provinces; and finally, the extension of  earlier efforts to inspect and teach 
classes for improving production in these regions.106 In June 1938, wartime events brought about 
another round of  government reform. During that year’s tea season, Shanghai had been shut down 
by the Japanese occupation. The Ministry of  Finance responded by publishing a draft titled 
“Recommendations for Managing National Tea Exports,” in which officials redirected the sale of  
tea from Shanghai in the east back down to Hong Kong in the south — where the international tea 
trade had been inaugurated some two centuries earlier. 
To the surprise of  all reformers involved in this massive redirection of  the national trade, the 
104 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 302.
105 Wu Juenong [1936] 1987, 180.
106 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 302-303.
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Hong Kong market flourished. Teas from Anhui and Zhejiang sold especially well, with green tea 
prices rising to thirty-five percent above their averages. The USSR was an especially large buyer of  
black teas, prices for which climbed by up to 58 percent. The reasoning given by Wu Juenong was 
that because most of  the entrenched network of  tea warehouse merchants and foreign companies 
remained in Shanghai, Hong Kong was a terra incognita for the trade, and markets worked much more 
efficiently.107 By rerouting shipments to Hong Kong, “they freed themselves from the disturbances 
of  the Shanghai foreign companies and tea warehouses, those old and traditional staples of  
power.”108 In 1939, too, the tea trade flourished, as central agencies provided the loans for tea 
production, research, and the establishment of  new cooperative agencies. These policies also 
extended to the production of  other commodities, such as tung oil, silk, and hog bristles. Wu 
Juenong recalled, “it would be no exaggeration to state that this year was a golden age of  tea!”109 
From 1937 to 1941, under the guidance of  the Trade Committee, the China Tea Company was 
able to sell dozens of  millions of  kilograms of  tea, with a value of  over one hundred million yuan. 
These numbers did not reach the astronomical levels of  previous decades, but “without the control 
(tongzhi) policies, things would have been worse, so this qualified as a success.”110 Further, the 
“various wicked practices (lougui ɩƇ) from before the war were wiped out by” the Trade 
Committee’s willingness to distribute loans directly to the peasantry and producers.111 Over 49.3 
million yuan worth of  loans had been distributed during the tea seasons of  1938 to 1940. The 
numbers of  tea cooperatives began to increase substantially during this period.
107 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 305.
108 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 307.
109 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 305.
110 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 306.
111 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 306.
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Unfortunately, Wu Juenong noted, although the Committee had successfully replaced much of  
the old financial system with more modern and efficient government agencies, the production 
process remained fundamentally unchanged. He believed the tea production centers “never created 
an effective foundation for an industrial-style form of  management for production” (zai shengchan 
qiyexing jingying "čƼ¼Zũ).112 This failure left the tea trade prone to receding back to bad 
habits once the administrative structure of  the Tea Committee and National Tea Company were 
altered in 1940. Wu Juenong blamed the Ministry of  Finance, which had chosen to delegate 
“administrative” roles to the Tea Committee and “commercial” work to the National Tea Company. 
Ministry members had sent their “close friends” to run the Company, a decision that unsurprisingly 
yielded “scandals of  corruption and embezzlement that stained the national reputation.”113 Wu 
Juenong characterized the ultimate failures of  the Tea Company in the 1940s as the result of  
incompetence and corruption by the Ministry of  Finance. These agencies would remain in place, 
however, after the war, and Wu Juenong and his friends, still harboring memories of  the golden 
years of  1938 and 1939, believed they could rejuvenate the tea industry once again. Their wartime 
optimism was best captured in a unique and singular publication in the history of  tea up to this 
point. The journal Chasheng Banyuekan sought to analyze the tea industry from the perspective of  its 
workers.
The Voice of  Tea: The “Labor Question” finally comes to China
During the brief  half-decade period when national and provincial governments appeared committed 
to reforming the tea industry, a “golden age” in Wu Juenong’s terms, there was an efflorescence of  
political and literary activity promoting the spread of  peasant and worker-led cooperatives. This 
movement for cooperativization was not only confined to tea but also extended throughout much 
112 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 307.
113 Wu Juenong [1942] 1987, 307.
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of  the countryside.114 Many considered the cooperative a “panacea for China’s ills,” as the number of  
cooperatives in China had grown from nineteen in 1923 to over twenty-six thousand in 1935.115 
Much of  the recent development was linked to investment by Chinese banks, starting in 1934, and 
the tea industry was no exception. Nevertheless, despite skepticism about the interests of  the 
government and financial community, Wu Juenong and other leaders in the tea industry believed that 
“cooperativization” (hezuohua) was the best available path for the peasantry to strengthen their social 
position. 
The political and economic philosophy between the cooperative movement was most clearly and 
robustly articulated by a journal dedicated to spotlighting the problems facing the peasantry and 
laboring forces of  southern Anhui. It was titled Chasheng Banyuekan (ĠÍØɍ), or, The Voice of  
Tea bi-monthly magazine. Published from 1939 to 1940, the high point of  the tea reform years, the 
journal was edited in Tunxi, the commercial and tea capital of  Anhui, and it ran for two years based 
on the support of  the Ministry of  Finance’s Committee on Trade, the Anhui provincial 
government’s Tea Management Bureau, and the Qimen cooperative. 
In the initial issue, the journal declared its aim was to provide a “forum for our comrades in the 
world of  tea to discuss problems facing tea production and tea marketing.” The scope included 
analysis of  the agrarian economy, practical measures to revive production, and efforts to spark 
interest and excitement among readers. In an interview featured on the cover page with Zou 
Bingwen, a national agronomist who had also collaborated with American scholars from Cornell, 
Zou placed his current interests into historical context. Whereas “in the past, the method we took 
was to support the merchants (fuzhu shangren), which meant, simply, to make it so that the stagnant 
(zhixiao) goods were able to be successfully exported,” the last several decades of  stagnant sales and 
114 Cf. Yixin Chen 1995. Also, Zanasi 2006, 53-78.




now wartime occupation meant the government needed to concentrate more upon stimulating 
production:
The former scope of  our regulatory efforts (tiaozheng ćĒ) is not enough to deal with the 
current transport situation. Moving forward, we need plans … to provide special financial 
(jinrong ÂǾ) assistance in order to stimulate increased production … and to strengthen the 
foundation of  the wartime economy. In this type of  work, the most effective item is tea.116
Indeed, throughout the journal’s short two-year lifespan, various authors repeated the theme that 
tea served an important national and military purpose. By selling tea to the USSR, England, and the 
U.S., China could continually fund efforts to stave off  the Japanese army. Tea production was 
regularly regarded as houfang shengchan (;V"č), or, a type of  production that was also a 
“rearguard” or “back line of  defense.” Another article framed efforts to improve production as 
central to the battle for the world tea market. “If  we are able to fix and improve [the weak points], 
then it will not be difficult at all for us to eventually rein in (jialing ǫȇ) other countries.”117 Thus, 
the exigencies of  war and international commerce brought unprecedented government attention to 
the increased production of  tea. By extension, reformers who had already dedicated years to 
improving the work conditions of  peasants and manual laborers in the tea districts now enjoyed 
greater support.
In the pages of  Chasheng, Wu Juenong and his colleagues strongly pushed arguments in favor of  
establishing cooperatives. The two crucial dimensions of  their advocacy consisted of, first, an 
explication and attack upon the existing system of  merchant middlemen — an old theme that had 
116 Chasheng Banyuekan [The Voice of  Tea Bi-Monthly Magazine] (Tunxi, Anhui: Chasheng Banyuekan 
She, 1939-1940), 1.
117 Chasheng, issue 1, 5.
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been established in the literature — and second, correspondingly, a close portrayal of  the quotidian 
lives of  peasants and workers themselves, a topic that previously had never been explored with the 
same range and depth. What tied these two themes together was the clear articulation that only the 
producing sectors of  the tea trade, the peasants and manual workers, were actually generating anything 
of  commercial value. By extension, the others were simply profiting through unjust tactics. This 
formulation was a total inversion of  the “circulation theory of  value” that was widely accepted 
during the Qing empire. 
The message was broadcast clearly, for instance, in an article from the first issue titled simply 
“What does a real peasant cooperative actually mean?” (zenyang caishi yige zhenzheng de chanong hezuoshe 
KW5Ġǁ¬iŚ?).  The article opened by directing its emphasis upon the role 
of  the peasantry themselves. “Its members are all entirely tea peasants,” the author wrote, “and its 
primary mission — aside from producing and selling tea, improving quality, and providing loans for 
tea production — is to significantly improve the lives of  the peasants, to ensure their profit, and to 
rid their lives of  all vicious forces (eshili ŨóX).” However, because the government had only 
abstract and vague notions of  how to improve the industry, it did not know at which groups to aim 
their attention (duixiang /ń), while meantime the actual agents of  production, the peasants, lacked 
“proper direction” and could not fulfill their desires. By empowering peasants to reach out to the 
government, the cooperative was the most convenient “two birds with one stone” solution.118
The chief  problem facing peasants was the dearth of  capital available to them. “Without 
question, it would be impossible to manage any business without capital (zijin ęÂ),” but if  the 
peasants sought loans from the tea warehouse merchants, then “not only would they themselves be 
unable to earn any profit, they would also eventually cry bankruptcy (gao pochan ĉŷč) underneath 
118 Chasheng, issue 1, 8-9.
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the layers of  exploitation!” The government offered low-interest loans, but these loans could also be 
used in harmful ways. While many cooperatives had good intentions, the author believed, others 
were actually controlled by merchants and lenders who had taken advantage of  low-interest loans in 
order to avoid taxes and also to profit by redistributing the loans at higher rates. The author 
compared the situation to a “storefront of  perverted men who ‘sell dog meat but advertise it as lamb 
meat.’” By contrast, a true cooperative was for and by the peasants themselves, individuals and 
families that would naturally view the success of  their collective body as an extension of  their 
personal economic interests.
Underlying these criticisms of  the tea merchants, the writers for Chasheng clearly held an 
assumption that the tea business was really founded upon the activities of  peasants and workers. 
Theirs was a labor theory of  value which assumed that the work of  merchants was superfluous and 
unimportant. For instance, an article from the third issue claimed: 
Tea peasants and tea workers are the foundation of  the tea industry. This foundation has long 
been eroded (boshi ɔɯ) by those [merchant] devils (mogui ǋƝ), and it has produced instability 
(dongyao Hŵ). It must be asked where such an unstable foundation can bear the construction of  
a building on top of  it? The ancients would say that when something is rotten from the inside, it 
will also quickly be rotten with bugs (wu bi zi fu er hou chong fu zhi ¯íǷO;ȈǷN). 
Although the recent competition from foreign tea is fearsome, it cannot actually extinguish tea 
production in China. However, the exploitation of  the devils can certainly cause the Chinese tea 
industry to collapse. For this reason, the warehouse merchants and the foreign are the common 
enemy (gongdi {Ǥ) of  the tea industry. Whether you are merely out for personal profit or act 
out of  the interests of  the entire tea industry, it is clear that your number one task is to stamp 
out (pumie ǳȎ) those devils!”119
Of  course, many of  these anti-merchant assumptions had already taken root in the late Qing, 
and they further gathered momentum in the 1920s and early thirties. Now, the editors of  Chasheng 
took these claims one step further. Beyond solely criticizing the merchants, they now sought to fully 
explore the daily life and working conditions of  those men and women whom they designated as the 
119 Chasheng issue 3, 9-10.
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true “foundation” of  tea. In the sixth issue of  the journal’s run, the editors made a concerted effort 
to dedicate whole articles to the conditions of  the peasants and workers themselves. One 
anonymous article, which the editors claimed was written by a worker,120 was titled “Please save the 
tea worker!” (jiu jiu chagong ƑƑĠ¢). The author not only detailed the harsh conditions under 
which tea roasters worked — “the phrase ‘hell on earth’ does not do it justice,” s/he wrote121 — but 
also connected these conditions with overall economic production. “I worry that if  the tea workers 
one day suddenly switch industries,” the author wrote, “then they will hurt our country’s rear guard 
production (houfang shengchan) and thus hurt our economic battle strategy.” 
In the sixth issue of  the journal, the editors buried a small blurb for what would amount to a 
major research undertaking. “Attention,” the headline announced, “Everyone, please survey the tea 
workers!” The rationale mirrored that of  the earlier article. Namely, understanding the conditions of  
the tea workers was a necessary step to understanding why the tea economy had suffered for so long 
and how to fix it: “The connection between the tea workers and the production process is very tight: 
if  the tea workers’ lives are not stabilized, then it will have a very strong negative effect on the 
process of  improving our tea leaves.”122 Thus, the Anhui-Jiangxi branch of  the Trade Committee 
appealed to readers to help conduct surveys of  tea workers located around town. They provided a 
blank survey form:
120 There is good reason to believe this was, at the very least, ghost written. As an industry-wide 
survey was to demonstrate in coming issues, many of  the tea workers were actually illiterate, and this 
article in particular was written in a highly abstruse style with obscure classical characters that would 
be unfamiliar to even most educated readers.
121 Chasheng, issue 2, 10.
122 Chasheng issue 6, 70.
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Figure 18. Labor survey form from Chasheng Banyuekan.
And three months later, they introduced the results. First, they reemphasized their earlier remark, 
that the peasants and workers were the truly productive element of  the tea trade:
Since the outbreak of  the war of  resistance, tea exports account for dozens of  millions of  
dollars, and their contribution to the war effort is not meager. Although this contribution 
depends upon the management of  the government and the efforts of  the tea merchants, if  we 
truly trace its origins to the roots (zhuiben qiuyuan ųcÀž), then clearly it is the tea peasants 
and the tea laborers who are the true creators (chuangzao zhe Ļĝ×) of  this several dozen 
millions of  dollars of  military force.123
123 Chasheng issue 12, 127.
CHAPTER EIGHT
387
The editors explained that although the peasants had already begun to receive attention from 
past surveys, the workers, by contrast, were still a mystery to researchers. “We still do not have a very 
concrete sketch of  life for the tea workers, and we have even less systematic survey data,” they 
wrote. What they discovered through a survey of  forty-four factories and seventy-nine workers was 
that their conditions were even more dire than expected. “We cannot delay in improving the lives of  
tea labor,” they concluded. Among the factors they surveyed included marriage, age, wages, 
education level, and whether or not they were in debt.
Many of  the findings were similar to that of  the more expansive and systematic surveys of  the 
peasantry, documented earlier in the decade and which inspired reformers to devote so much energy 
to the cooperatives. Two particular groups received special attention, for the editors believed they 
suffered under extraordinary circumstances: women workers and for the casual labor force.
First, their findings on female labor. The editors began this analysis by taking apart one 
particularly misleading statistic: that thirty-eight percent of  the respondents claimed they were not 
“responsible for supporting their family” (fudan jiating ƘƲ,Ǒ). Though this number suggested 
that workers were financially independent, the editors clarified that it was not really “an auspicious 
phenomenon for the village economy.” The majority of  these purportedly independent workers 
were women, which reflected two negative trends. First, the availability of  women seeking work as 
wage labor indicated that the villages they came from suffered from a “surplus in the labor 
force” (shengyu laodongli ǞǧƿHX). That is, because the best waged jobs were already filled by 
men, these surplus women joined the “empty and floating” (kongfu ¾Ǧ) population seeking work 
elsewhere. Further, these women were in fact depended upon to provide supplementary income to 
their families, but because the conventional definition of  “supporting the family” (fudan jiating) 
implied “visible monetary income,” then economists did not count these women -- who under 
normal circumstances provided “only” the invisible labor of  household work -- as their family’s 
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primary income providers.  “Thus, this figure of  thirty-eight percent,” the editors cautioned “does 
not indicate a phenomenon of  rich peasant families but rather the exact opposite: that there is a 
surplus of  available labor in the peasant village.”
Second, if  female labor was being brought into the waged work force, then editors worried this 
meant they would be forced to ignore their crucial, albeit unrecognized labor in the household. 
“When the woman is at home, her work may be simple and non-economic, but it is necessary,” they 
wrote. “Now with the tea factories open, she takes advantage of  the opportunity to earn some 
monetary wages for her family to spend, but this means she must ignore some of  her responsibilities 
at home.” The clearest example to the writers was the phenomenon of  women who brought their 
children to the tea factories with them.  The factories did not provide any childcare services, so the 
mothers had no choice but look after their children and process tea simultaneously. “Her love 
towards her children,” the editors noted bitingly, “is being exploited and gifted to the tea factory 
managers.”124
This very phenomenon had already been recounted in an earlier article published in Chasheng, 
titled simply “Female tea labor” (nü chagong GĠ¢). In the story, the author described observing the 
activities of  female sorters in the tea factory, a job that was normally reserved for women because it 
required less physical strength. The author noted that as she entered the workshop, she noticed a 
young girl of  seven or eight years sitting in the corner:
Her naughty and mischievous smile grabbed my attention, so I approached her. As I looked at 
the pile of  yellowish tea leaves, and with branches, some coarse and some fine, and seeds, some 
big and some small, all being orderly picked out by her two small hands in a quick and nimble 
manner, I started to wonder if  this type of  work could be done by the hands of  such an 
innocent and pure (wuxia >ɪ) little child? 
124 Chasheng, issue 12, 143.
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The author asked the woman nearby, in her late twenties, whether she was the mother. She 
replied she was, and the author detected in her “a bit of  pride, for her kid had attracted the attention 
of  a lady (nü xiansheng Gþ") wearing relatively nice clothing.” The author, it can be surmised, was 
from the professional middle class, and throughout the article, she provided clues about her unease 
in the workshop combined with her genuine curiosity about a world of  female waged labor that had 
never before been thoroughly studied. In the midst of  asking the tea sorter a series of  questions, she 
sought to “seize the opportunity” to “learn more about her daily life and work routine.” And after 
she finished asking questions, other women invited her to sit down, but because she “feared that if  I 
dawdled I would impede their work progress,” she eventually scampered out to the outdoor tea 
ovens.
There, she encountered women performing the work of  roasting tea leaves, which was normally 
reserved for men but now extended to women during the lean war years. Again, she emphasized her 
own discomfort and lack of  preparation to endure the physical toil of  the work: “I stood next to 
these scalding hot stoves for only ten minutes, and my whole body and face were dripping sweat like 
a gondola that had been flipped over. The sweat soaked through my undergarments and began to 
seep through my shirt. My handkerchief  was drenched as if  it had just been sitting in water.” By 
contrast, the two seasoned “middle-aged female workers” seemed undaunted. They worked without 
any breaks, as “their messy bun of  hair sits in a big clump atop their heads. Though their feet are 
bound, they [their feet] can do very much: to my surprise, the women work all day standing on their 
feet!”
Further, women were also uniquely, doubly-burdened with the tasks of  maintaining the 
household while also working in the tea factory. “Female tea laborers, especially, work ten hours per 
day then return home and still need to cook food and wash clothing, look after small children, and 
sew and mend clothing,” she wrote. “Their bodies get no rest, and this greatly impacts their bodily 
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health.” Furthermore, the children suffered from regularly inhaling the “powder and dust” swirling 
throughout the factories. She worried this environment stifled these children’s development: “their 
lively bodies and youthful minds slowly worn down until they are as weary as adults, only smaller.”125 
The other social phenomenon receiving special attention from the Chasheng editors was the labor 
force of  casual and impermanent wage workers. As documented in chapter four, the most physically 
taxing jobs, especially leaf  roasting, were filled by the most destitute migrant populations, whose 
availability for work depended upon shifting market conditions. Whereas most of  the laborers 
officially thought of  themselves as farmers, others identified as “scattered” labor (sangong Ɨ¢). 
These men and women were “the most important group, which occupies nearly half  [45%] the 
general sample.” The editors defined them as men and women who were unemployed most of  the 
year but who sought out wage work during the tea seasons. “Once the factories close shop,” they 
wrote, “then they immediately revert to being unemployed. Frequently, they fall into a state of  
starvation, unable to feed themselves even a few grains of  rice. This is a very piteous (qican ʊȑ) 
image of  the tea worker.” Further, they noted that many of  the regularly employed workers had 
themselves fallen into waged work because they struggled to survive off  of  their normal income. 
They highlighted the figure of  the small village peddler (xiaofan #ɜ), who constituted twelve 
percent of  the respondents. Due to the war also also the economic depression, peddlers “faced the 
real possibility of  falling into the casual workers’ state of  unemployment.” Altogether, these various 
types of  casual workers represented over half  (57%) of  the tea workers.126
Indeed, survey numbers indicated that workers stood at the threshold of  insecurity. The editors 
noted that a full seventy-five percent of  recorded wages fell short of  what was required to support a 
family, and thirty-six percent fell short of  supporting even one person at a normal standard. The 
125 Chasheng, issue 6, 64-68.
126 Chasheng, issue 12, 147.
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majority (54%) were in debt, but of  those workers who reported some savings, twelve of  nineteen 
could claim savings of  only ten yuan or less. And of  those twelve, the editors warned “we cannot 
assume they all have ten yuan of  savings. Among them, many only have one to three yuan, and this 
type of  savings is very temporary.” Many of  these individuals overlapped with those who reported 
“no household responsibility.” Hence they were women who temporarily earned savings to bring 
back home. “But once the season ends, what they have earned quickly disappears.” Nonetheless, 
such women still enjoyed a qualitatively better position than those forty-three who reported being in 
debt even during the height of  the tea season. Those respondents had almost no chance at 
accumulating savings. These observations recalled another, memorable image from Tawney’s study 
of  1930s China: “the position of  the rural population is that of  a man standing permanently up to 
the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him.”127
Certainly, these grim portraits of  tea labor life were exacerbated by the extreme and dire 
conditions of  1930s depression, compounded by the disruption of  Japanese military occupation. 
Nevertheless, many of  these phenomena, such as surplus female labor and casual labor, were 
regularly commented upon in earlier, albeit less systematic surveys of  the tea production process. 
What compelled the editors of  Chasheng to so thoroughly delve into the lives of  these marginal 
groups was their faith in a new and emergent theory of  reviving the tea industry by paying extra 
attention to the conditions of  production. In order to understand how to improve production, the tea 
reformers reasoned, then they needed to understand the lives of  the producers. 
The peasants and workers, rather than merchants and government administrators, were now 
being recognized as the true source of  economic and political value derived from this valuable 
commercial industry. As such, they should be empowered to organize together and make collective 
decisions over their own work conditions. The editors of  Chasheng bemoaned that, as tea labor was 




workers who were uneducated — fifty percent reported they were illiterate.128 This low level of  
education was an obstacle, then, not only for the workers’ self-empowerment but also, by extension, 
the improvement of  their productive capacity:
Because the tea workers’ level of  education is so low, the exploitation they receive is so much 
harsher. They are so far from awakening and consciousness (juexing UĿ), that is, the tea 
workers are the most backwards propertyless class (wuchan jieji >čȥÒ), and they suffer the 
deepest pains. They are able to put up with twelve-hour work days with wages of  less than one 
jiao five fen to show for it….
Chinese tea production is a backward industry, and machines are not even used (the few 
machines right now are in the government-run factories). It is entirely a handicraft industry 
(shougongye @¢¼), and the relationship between workers and factory managers is stuck in a 
condition of  feudalism (fengjian qingkuang ǜī8ƫ). Therefore in order to improve the lives of  
tea workers, the government must firmly establish a policy. Because tea production can still grow 
into a concentrated industry (jizhong zhi qiye ŘÄƼ¼), close inspection would be very easy.
Unfortunately, these plans were interrupted first by the Japanese military and then by the ensuing 
civil war. However, reformers remained optimistic they had at least found the right prescription for 
success. Further, despite the short-term failure of  the cooperatives experiments, they at least 
embodied the broader historical significance that economic thinkers in China now paid greater 
attention than ever before to tea peasants and tea factory workers. A political economic worldview 
premised on improving production, one compatible with the tenets of  industrial capitalism, was now 
firmly in place, even if  it lacked the corresponding infrastructure or support. By extension, 
researchers had become disgusted with the merchant classes and now aimed their energies at 
understanding the concerns of  peasants and workers. Thanks to this emergent political economic 
theory, something akin to the “labor question,” which had dogged the Indian industry for nearly a 
century, was now being seriously addressed in the tea districts of  coastal China for the first time.  
128 Chasheng, issue 12, 147.
393
Chapter Nine
Conclusion: Capitalist development and anachronism
By the early decades of  the twentieth century, the Chinese comprador and Indian coolie had become 
salient keywords for talking about the two major tea-producing regions of  the world. Both 
“comprador” and “coolie” were concepts that pointed towards the traditional, precapitalist character 
of  Chinese and Indian societies. Although reformer critics of  the Chinese comprador portrayed him 
as a byproduct of  foreign trade -- which had only really expanded since the mid-nineteenth century 
-- they aimed their specific criticism at his tradition-bound, rentier behavior. Like the gentry of  yore, 
the compradors lived off  the fat of  their monopolistic (longduan) position in society and the 
marketplace. Rather than apply their accumulated wealth into economic development, they 
unproductively hoarded wealth. They were thus “traditional” merchants rather than “modern” 
businessmen, rentiers rather than capitalists. Chinese society, Wu Juenong reasoned, needed to 
replace them with economically productive, worker-led cooperatives.
Similarly, although the idea of  the Indian coolie did not emerge as a political concern until 
late nineteenth-century British colonial rule, the chief  complaint about the Indian peasantry was that 
they were sedentary and materially unmotivated to follow better work opportunities. Both colonial 
officials and Bengali nationalist reformers agreed that the tea coolie was an autochthonous 
simpleton who did not adhere to the natural laws of  the wage market. To colonial officials, coolies 
needed to be bound to a contract as an enforcement to their promises to migrate. And to their 
Bengali nationalist defenders, they had been deceived into migrating against their true intentions.
The argument of  this dissertation -- that the “comprador” and “coolie” concepts emerged 
out of  this history of  competition between Chinese and Indian tea producers -- should not be 
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interpreted to suggest that Chinese commercial networks and Indian labor markets did not exist 
prior to the nineteenth century. Clearly, vibrant economic activity in both regions pre-dated the 
competition for the world tea markets. The real difference between the world of  the 1840s and the 
following century, then, was the emergence of  a new set of  political concerns about raising 
industrial productivity, as opposed to merely expanding markets. In the terms set forth by Braudel, 
Chinese, British, and Indian thinkers had expanded their “field of  vision” from the “sphere of  
circulation” to the “abode of  production.” This shift of  focus magnified the non-productive 
character of  the Chinese itinerant tea merchant as well as the immobile nature of  the Indian tea 
coolie. Parochialism and tradition, in other words, were increasingly invoked to describe Asian 
economic actors. This pessimistic outlook replaced the optimism of  earlier, liberal strands of  
political theory shared across China and the British India at the outset of  the nineteenth century. 
However, if  the story of  competition between Chinese and Indian tea indeed resulted in this 
expansion of  political economy’s “field of  vision,” then such a conceptual shift entailed more than 
an ungrounded intellectual history of  free-floating ideas. That is, newly popular imagery about the 
inferiority of  the Asian economy did not take root due simply to the overpowering force of  
European ethnocentrisms traveling from west to east. And, even if  that story were true, it only begs 
the question of  why Asian economic actors appeared irrational and insufficiently modern in the first 
place. The explanation I have presented here suggests that representations of  the Chinese 
comprador and Indian coolie were historically grounded in, and indeed were indissociable from, 
social and economic upheavals over a relatively short period of  time. These changes entailed cycles 
of  fierce competition, the intensification of  labor, periodic market crises, and new articulations of  
economic theory in response to collapsed markets in both tea countries.
First, I demonstrated that the pre-twentieth century Chinese tea economy was far more 
dynamic than previously imagined (chapter four). As export tea production ballooned, starting in the 
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late eighteenth century, merchants and labor overseers demanded more efficient production, and 
they reorganized the labor process in order to maximize productivity and measure it against a notion 
of  homogeneous, abstract time. Although the phenomenon of  labor intensification has long been 
recognized by past scholars of  late imperial China, historians have generally characterized it as a 
reactive and passive effect of  natural and demographic pressures, and they presupposed the isolated 
peasant household as their unit of  analysis. However, if  labor intensification, as my materials 
suggest, was a strategy of  capital accumulation orchestrated by economically rational merchants, 
then it appears as a much more recognizable form of  early modern capitalism analogous to 
processes discovered in England and Japan. Furthermore, comparisons between Chinese and Indian 
labor-intensive tea production make clear just how much was shared in common between these two 
regions (chapter five). From the standpoint of  social dynamics, the tea regions of  mid to late 
nineteenth-century China and India did not “diverge,” as the standard historiography on economic 
growth has assumed. Rather, both experienced faster rhythms of  economic life, and both witnessed 
the subordination of  labor to concerns about time. In particular, labor overseers in China and 
planters in India introduced payment schemes that reduced agricultural work to waged work, in 
which labor was rewarded not by a fixed price for their goods but rather for the time spent working 
(and working efficiently).
Second, this gradual transformation of  social-economic forms was belatedly brought into 
the arena of  politics when an 1860s “tea mania” and a fin-de-siècle domestic crisis in China forced 
British officials and Qing officials, respectively, to come to terms with the demands of  a fiercely 
competitive world tea market. Although falling prices had long forced those directly involved in the 
trade to seek more cost-effective solutions for tea cultivation, the colonial Government of  India and 
the Qing government seemed to seriously look at the abode of  production only when planters and 
merchants complained about commercial stagnation. The colonial Government of  India addressed 
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the high cost of  coolie labor by passing a series of  labor indenture laws, policies which betrayed an 
earlier commitment to free labor and which, eventually, earned the ire of  nationalist reformers 
(chapter seven). Qing and Republican reformers -- most notably, Chen Chi and Wu Juenong -- 
responded to the protracted depression affecting export teas by drawing up plans to rationally 
reorganize and “cooperativize” cultivation and manufacture (chapters six and eight).
From the standpoint of  capital-intensive, integrated, and industrial-style agriculture, the 
Chinese system of  network-linked commercial agents suddenly appeared dilapidated and 
anachronistic. And from the standpoint of  a liberal political economic theory that presupposed free 
labor, the Indian peasant worker suddenly seemed too sedentary and unresponsive to the market. 
The government’s recourse to indenture, likewise, appeared barbaric and feudal. In both China and 
India, then, officials, writers, and reformers embedded in rapidly changing global economic 
conditions imagined the merchants, peasants, and workers of  Asia as holdovers from -- or trapped 
within -- the confines of  a precapitalist age. Paradoxically, these global processes of  tea crisis and 
reform were eventful, interconnected, and swift, yet they produced images of  Asian economic actors 
as symbols of  parochial culture, inertia, and tradition. This paradoxical process may help explain, it 
is hoped, the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the vibrant world of  commercial 
expansion across early modern Asia and spanning western Europe with, on the other hand, our 
long-held assumptions about the backwardness of  Chinese and Indian societies, the nadir for both 
of  which must have been the decades spanning the last half  of  the nineteenth and first half  of  the 
twentieth centuries. Although the logic of  anachronism describes a society which stands outside of  
time, the “comprador” and “coolie” concepts, anachronisms in an age of  burgeoning agro-industrial 
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APPENDIX
The legend of  Qimen red tea (Qimen hongcha )
This appendix seeks to record, for posterity’s sake, some interesting research findings that may help 
to clarify some confusions in the niche fields of  the history of  tea and of  Chinese local history. 
As I discussed in chapter eight, “Qimen black tea” produced in the southwest corner of  Anhui 
was considered, by far, the highest quality export tea grown in twentieth-century China. Reformers 
such as Lu Ying and Wu Juenong considered it their best shot at reviving the export tea industry. In 
order to learn the appropriate techniques for rationalizing and industrializing the production of  
Qimen black tea, Lu Ying and Wu Juenong looked overseas to learn about the cutting-edge methods 
practiced in South Asian tea production, in colonial India and Ceylon (Wu Juenong traveled to 
Ceylon, India, Java, and Shizuoka in 1935-1936, one year after the first successful season at the 
Pingli, Qimen tea cooperative). 
Unbeknownst to most tea historians today, however, Chinese black tea was from the beginning a 
byproduct of  foreign tastes, not an indigenous invention. The English phrase “black tea” has been 
in continual usage from the eighteenth century to the present, but it has not always referred to the 
same drink. In Chinese, the black teas sold to overseas markets could really be categorized into two 
varieties of  fermented (oxidized, actually) leaves: fully-fermented “red tea” (hongcha ìĠ) and 
semifermented oolong tea (wulong cha ȅşĠ, which means “dark dragon tea”). The umbrella term 
“black tea” in English misled many Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese historians, who re-translated 
the English “black tea” back into “red tea” in order to refer to all varieties of  dark teas sold from 
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China, regardless of  period.1 Because British, Chinese, and Japanese writers across the eighteenth to 
twentieth centuries were not consistent in describing the names of  different teas, it would be 
hopeless to simply try to sort out what was meant by “black tea” unless one could access 
information about the production processes. In an incisive piece of  history of  science research, H.T. 
Huang clarified the historical distinctions between the two by focusing on descriptions of  
cultivating, drying, wilting, rolling, and inducing oxidation in the leaves. He discovered that the 
“black teas” of  the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries -- for which British consumers 
developed an insatiable taste -- were, in fact, the semifermented oolong variety. Thus, although 
individuals in southern China produced and consumed oolong teas for years before the entry of  
European traders, red tea did not appear until the late nineteenth century, at the behest of  foreign 
tastes. In other words, the Chinese had sent out semifermented teas to the world, and in response, 
the world asked for teas that were even darker.
First, Huang proved that the “black teas” of  the eighteenth century were semifermented. As 
described in chapters two and four, the British fixated on a black tea variety known as “Bohea,” the 
local pronunciation of  the famed northwest Fujian mountains Wuyi. Many latter-day historians 
therefore presumed that Chinese “red teas” originated in Fujian. But “although Fujian is generally 
acknowledged as the original home of  red tea, the term hongcha is not seen in the local gazetteers of  
Fujian.”2 Huang then read the descriptions of  the “black tea” process provided by the only two 
British men who had access to the inland tea markets, Samuel Ball and Robert Fortune. From their 
accounts, he concluded “beyond a shadow of  doubt that the pre-1850 black tea of  maritime 
commerce had to be … a partly fermented (i.e. oolong) tea, and not a fully fermented (i.e. red) tea.”3
1 H.T. Huang, 542
2 H.T. Huang, 543. Huang used an unorthodox romanization system for Chinese words, which have 
been converted into standard pinyin.
3 H.T. Huang, 547.
APPENDIX
414
Hongcha, or “red tea,” was not regularly mentioned in Chinese until 1866, after the treaty port 
system had facilitated a huge surge in overseas commercial exchange.4 Records for “red tea” first 
appeared in the central provinces of  Hubei and Hunan in mid century. Here was the 1866 gazetteer 
for a county in Hubei: “in about 1850, Cantonese merchants came here to buy tea. They require that 
we pick young buds, wilt them in the sun and them roll them, without resorting to stir-frying [in a 
pan]. In rainy weather the leaves may be dried over charcoal … The tea is exported overseas and is 
called hongcha.”5 Sorting through similar passages, Huang came to the following conclusions:
It is also evident that tea brokers were the driving force behind [red tea’s] development and 
commercialisation.… Firstly, red tea took off  as a major product sometime between 1850 and 
1860, almost simultaneously in several provinces. This means that experimentation of  red tea 
must have started earlier, perhaps as early as 1830. Secondly, tea brokers from Guangdong were 
instrumental in persuading the producers to shift their processing methods towards the 
production of  red teas. Their action was, no doubt, a response to the demands of  the foreign tea 
buyers, which, in turn, represented the preference of  the tea-consuming public in England and 
other European countries. Red tea was, therefore, a product developed specially for export.6
In a final ironic twist, Huang discovered that there was a mention of  hongcha teas before 1860 — in an 
English text! Samuel Ball, the former tea inspector for the East India Company, remarked an 
observation from his Cantonese informant in a footnote: “there is a particular kind of  common tea 
called Hong Cha, or Red Tea, which I have seen and which is said to be made by a longer continuance 
of  the process of  Oc Ching.”7
4 H.T. Huang, 542.
5 H.T. Huang, 542. Here, also, is a description of  tea in a region called Tong from 1888: “Hongcha 
processing started in the later years of  the Daoguang emperor regin (1821-1851). Tea brokers from 
Jiangxi were collecting tea in Yining county, and … taught the people how to make red tea.” Ye 
Ruiyan, cited in H.T. Huang, 543.
6 H.T. Huang, 544.
7 Ball 114, fn. Cited in H.T. Huang, 547. Oc Ching, 漚青, was probably a Cantonese term for wilting. 
N.B., also, that Ball’s official experience in Canton was from 1804 to 1826, so although his book was 
not published until 1848, his observations dated back to, at latest, 1826.
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And here is where the story of  Qimen red really begins. The history of  export teas witnessed a 
subtle geographic shift in the middle of  the nineteenth century. Earlier, the majority of  “black teas” 
for the export trade came from Fujian, shipped via the southern port Guangdong, and these were 
the oolong teas that were emulated in Assam. With the opening of  multiple treaty ports, and 
concurrent with the rise of  Shanghai as the trading capital of  east Asia, the black tea trade shifted to 
central provinces along the Yangzi River network, in the rural regions of  Anhui, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, 
Hunan, Hubei, and Zhejiang. This shift was largely stimulated by the movement of  Cantonese 
merchants, who had moved their activities from Canton to Shanghai, and who overtook the local tea 
trade to cater to foreign markets. 
The red teas of  Qimen, at the intersection of  Anhui and Jiangxi, got their start at this time, 
decades before the region became the object of  twentieth-century government efforts at 
modernization and promotion. But even Huang, who had successfully debunked the myth of  
continuity between eighteenth-century Fujian oolong and twentieth-century black teas, contradicted 
himself  by repeating the local legend that Qimen reds started in 1875, as “technique transferred 
from Fujian.”8 Closer examination of  this myth will prove that it, too, fails when placed under 
further scrutiny.
There are, in fact, two local origin stories that Qimen locals tell visitors who come to learn about 
their world-famous tea. Both involve men who allegedly served as Qing officials elsewhere in China 
in the 1870s, left their posts, and then returned to their Anhui roots to invent a highly successful 
variety of  red tea. In the case of  one man, Hu Longyan, local historians described his activities as an 
effort to patriotically “save the nation.”9 The more popular myth belongs to other man, Yu 
Ganchen. Here is one description: “Yu Ganchen, an Yi County man, left his work as an official in 
Fujian and came to rent a room on Sanli street in Qimen county. He observed that Qimen produced 
8 H.T. Huang, 544.
9 Ni Yong’an, 211.
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tea, and based on his experience observing Fujian red tea production, he advised the people of  
Qimen to switch to red tea.”10 Clearly, such legends are based on the false assumption that Fujian tea 
was always red, not oolong. It is also clear that the local historians wished to promote Yu Ganchen 
as a point of  local pride, adding details like: “he was smart and liked to learn new things,” and “he 
first studied the classics and possibly passed the civil service examination. During the time of  
Tongzhi reign, he was chosen by the court to be the county magistrate of  some county in Fujian.” 
Upon what basis do they assert this? “Mysteriously, records from that period and regarding these 
events are incredibly sparse, and there are simply no records left behind about Yu Ganchen.”11
During my time spent conducting research, I managed to find one official document that 
contained information about Yu Ganchen, and it is a telling one. In 1861, Zeng Guofan, then 
governor-general of  the Liangjiang region, which included the provinces Anhui, Jiangsu, and Jiangxi 
provinces, sent a memorial to the Zongli Yamen, the Qing office responsible for dealing with 
foreign affairs.12 He forward a complaint from the British consul R.J. Forrest, who claimed that a 
British tea house in Qimen county, the Baoshun Trading Company, had been unjustly harassed:
On the pretext of  conducting a search, [the Qimen magistrate Shi Yiyou] harassed the 
warehouse and falsely accused it of  tax evasion. They immediately locked up all the tea in the 
warehouse. They then detained and then deported their main business man, Yu Ganchen, and 
they made him pay a fine of  ten thousand liang in silver.
10 Hu Yixian, cited in Yu Yifan, 208. Yu Ganchen is incorrectly written as “She Ganchen” in 
Gardella, 1994.
11 Yu, 208-209.
12 The Institute of  Modern History, Academia Sinica. “Jinzhi yangshang sili yangzhan (“Banning 
foreign companies from secretly establishing warehouses”),” Xianfeng year 11, month 11, Zongli 
Yamen archives, file no. 01-31-004-01-006.
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Zeng Guofan asked the magistrate, Shi Yiyou, about the matter, and Shi replied in defense: 
The tea from this county has always come from merchants who buy leaves in the hills and then 
move them to Tunxi. There, the tea is boxed and taxed and shipped to Shanghai to be sold. This 
year, the path through Zhejiang was closed [due to the ongoing Taiping Rebellion], so merchants 
began to secretly ship teas from Qimen in the southwest and then through Jiujiang in Jiangxi. 
They would thereby avoid being taxed two times. . . . We indicated very clearly to merchants that 
any tea that left the borders still needed to be taxed as usual before being shipped. We also 
investigated the area known as Jie, in Cheng village of  this county. There, we found a group of  
Yi county merchants who had taken capital (ziben) from Cantonese merchants and opened the 
Baoshun tea house. Among all merchants this year, they had accumulated the most profits from 
secretly trading tea.
According to the laws of  the unequal treaty system at the time, British merchants were only 
required to pay one-half  of  the inland lijin tax on transport goods. Shi Yiyou had accused Yu 
Ganchen of  posing as a British company to avoid paying that second portion of  taxes. Forrest, for 
unclear reasons, had claimed that Baoshun was a British company, and that the seized money should 
therefore be returned. Zeng Guofan continued:
Because, there was an order for five-thousand liang of  taxes to be used to pay for food and 
salary, and specifically because the Huizhou military rations are particularly tight now [because 
of  the Taiping Rebellion], we had already declared that every merchant, no matter where, needs 
to pay a tax before operating. Foreign merchants, if  they are to set up and buy goods inland, 
need to first consult with the consulate and the local government. Earlier, before this consul 
Forrest had arrived on the scene, foreign companies were not allowed to rent land and set up 
operations. The purpose was to prevent inland unscrupulous merchant (jianshang Ɍĵ) from 
engaging in fraudulent practices. It was still not clear whether these merchants in Cheng village 
of  Qimen were affiliated with foreign merchants or not.
Later, Zeng Guofan concluded that Yu Ganchen was not what he said he was:
Now, although they have declared they are foreign merchants, I am afraid they are simply inland 
merchants who are pretending to be foreigners. This is because the tax numbers do not match 
the overall trade situation. Right now, we are waiting for the southern Anhui circuit to investigate 
the matter and for magistrate Shi to quickly send a report following up on it. If  the money came 
from Yi county merchants, and they have no relationship with a foreign company, then there’s 
no need to discuss returning the money [to the British]. But if  it turns out the silver did belong 
to a foreign merchant, then we’ll need to verify it and then return the money.
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This document suggests some unsavory conclusions about Yu Ganchen that would damage his 
reputation as a local and national hero: he was either a foreign comprador working for a British 
company who put personal profit before national strength, or, he was an unscrupulous native 
businessman, whose strategies of  tax evasion weakened the fiscal strength of  a weakened Qing 
empire (in the midst of  fighting the Taiping military, no less). Neither conclusion, however, 
supported the thesis that Yu Ganchen learned to make tea while serving as an official in Fujian. 
Putting aside local mythologies, the detail that most concerns us is that Yu Ganchen and his 
friends were allegedly connected to Cantonese merchants, who advanced them the working capital. 
Altogether, this version of  the origins of  Qimen red -- with mid-century origins and connections to 
the Shanghai trade via Cantonese merchants -- accords much better with Huang’s evidentiary 
scholarship above.
To summarize: hongcha or “red tea” was a byproduct of  foreign trade and commerce. Whereas 
green and oolong teas were enjoyed by locals for many years before the expansion of  the world tea 
market, red tea was invented as a result of  and in response to the establishment of  the treaty-port trade. 
It was not designed to be sold to locals, and in that respect, red tea was similar to the first varieties 
of  dark teas grown in Indian and Ceylon plantations. The other noteworthy detail we can take away 
from the local legends is that nothing was recorded until the early twentieth century: 1916 for Hu 
Longyan and 1933 for Yu Ganchen. Such legends probably circulated by word of  mouth for 
decades, but not until Qimen red tea gained widespread acclaim did they receive magnified attention.
